Order : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) 1. The short question involved in this batch of criminal revisions filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “CrPC”) is: “ whether the criminal Court and the appellate Court are justified in granting compensation to the extent of Rs.2,00,000/-, which is more than the cheque amount i.e. Rs.15,52,985/-, in exercise of power conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 357 of CrPC ? 2. The aforesaid question of law arises for consideration on the following factual backdrop: 2.1 It is the case of complainant- Heetanand Agrawal (hereinafter referred to as the “complainant”) that accused- Raj Agrawal (hereinafter referred to as the “accused”) issued a cheque bearing No.60744 for an amount of Rs.15,52,985/- on 05.10.2009 in token of his liability to him, which stood dishonored on 13.10.2009 on account of insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, the complainant firstly served legal notices to the accused on 21.10.2009 & 10.11.2009 and, ultimately, he filed criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the “NI Act”) on 10.12.2009, in which, the accused took a defence that the amount claimed by the complainant i.e. Rs.15,52,985/- is not correct and produced documents (Ex.D/7 to D/16) in support of his defence. However, the jurisdictional criminal Court vide its judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.09.2014 allowed the complaint of the complainant and convicted the accused for offence under Section 138 of NI Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 01 year and further granted compensation in exercise of power under Section 357(3) of CrPC to the extent of Rs.20,00,000/- in favour of the complainant and, in failure to pay the compensation, sentenced to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 03 months. 2.2 Feeling aggrieved against the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.09.2014, the accused preferred appeal under Section 386 of CrPC before the appellate Court, in which, vide impugned order dated 09.10.2015, the appellate Court while partly allowing the appeal of the accused though modified/reduced the sentence of 01 year rigorous imprisonment till the rising of the Court, but maintained the compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- payable by the accused to the complainant alongwith default stipulation. 2.3 Further feeling aggrieved by the order of the appellate Court dated 09.10.2015, the accused has preferred Criminal Revision No.1065 of 2015 before this Court stating that the grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- is in excess and on higher side, as in exercise of power conferred under Section 357(3) of CrPC, the same cannot be granted and, according to the accused, at the best, without admitting, the total liability on the accused would be only around Rs.12,00,000/- and, therefore, the compensation granted by the criminal Court to the extent of Rs.20,00,000/-, as also affirmed/maintained by the appellate Court, is to be modified/reduced accordingly. On the other hand, the complainant has also preferred Criminal Revision No.983 of 2015 against the order passed by the appellate Court dated 09.10.2015 seeking enhancement of the jail sentence to the accused. 3. Since the common questions of fact and law are involved and being arising out of a common impugned order, on the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, both the criminal revisions are clubbed together, heard together and are decided by this common order. 4. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the accused in CRR-1065-2015 would submit that both the Courts below have legally and concurrently erred in granting compensation more than the cheque amount, as it is not a case of imposition of fine sentence. He would rely upon the document (Ex.P/1) filed by the complainant before the criminal Court to contend that total amount which might be recoverable from the accused is Rs.15,52,985/- (principal remaining amount i.e. Rs.11,87,509/- (+) interest on the said amount i.e. Rs.3,65,476/-). Therefore, compensation, if any, ought to have been granted only to the extent of Rs.15,52,98/- instead of Rs.20,00,000/-. He would further rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. and another , (2007) 6 SCC 528 to bolster his submissions. Learned counsel also argued that considering the object behind the complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, the appellate Court is absolutely justified in directing the jail sentence of the accused till the rising of the Court, which the accused has already undergone and, as such, the revision preferred by the accused deserves to be allowed partly by modifying/reducing the amount of compensation to the extent of Rs.15,52,985/- (i.e. principal remaining amount- Rs.11,87,509/- + interest- Rs.3,65,476/-). 5. 5. Per-contra, Mr. Shishir Dixit, learned counsel appearing for the complainant in CRR-983-2015 would support the impugned order dated 09.10.2015 to the extent of granting compensation to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- in exercise of powers conferred under Section 357(3) of CrPC and submits that learned appellate Court is absolutely unjustified in reducing the jail sentence of the accused from 01 year RI till the rising of the Court, as it appears to be lower side. Therefore, the revision preferred by the accused is liable to be rejected, whereas the revision preferred by the complainant deserves to be allowed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In the case at hand, it would be appropriate to first take up the revision of the complainant being CRR-983-2015, wherein the only part of challenge is the jail sentence of the accused, which has been reduced by the appellate Court from 01 years RI till the rising of the Court. 8. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in R. Vijayan v. Baby and another , (2012) 1 SCC 260 may be noticed profitably, wherein their Lordships have clearly held that the intention of the law making authority while enacting Section 138 of NI Act is not only to ensure that the offender is punished, but also to ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque by way of compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of CrPC and further observed in Para-17 & 18 as under: “ 17. The apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished, but also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque by way of compensation under section 357(1)(b) of the Code. Though a complaint under section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount, (which strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once the criminal complaint is lodged under section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the usual direction in such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque, under section 357 (1)(b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the offences under section 138 of the Act. Most of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded at one stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest. Even where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has reached when most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings under section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary. 18. Having reached that stage, if some Magistrates go by the traditional view that the criminal proceedings are for imposing punishment on the accused, either imprisonment or fine or both, and there is no need to compensate the complainant, particularly if the complainant is not a `victim' in the real sense, but is a well-to-do financier or financing institution, difficulties and complications arise. In those cases where the discretion to direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil cases would have expired. As the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable instrument, but also the credibility of courts of justice.” 9. In the matter of Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. , (2010) 5 SCC 663 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while examining the object sought to be achieved by provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act and purpose underlying the punishment provided therein has held that Section 138 of the NI Act cases are meant to secure payment of money by holding as under: “ 17. Unlike that for other forms of crime, the punishment here (insofar as the complainant is concerned) is not a means of seeking retribution, but is more a means to ensure payment of money. The complainant’s interest lies primarily in recovering the money rather than seeking the drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of the cheque.” 10. Very recently, in the matter of Somnath Sarkar v. Utpal Basu Mallick and another , (2013) 16 SCC 465 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the punishment to be imposed under Section 138 of the NI Act have held in no uncertain term that under Section 138 of NI Act, only fine sentence can be imposed by the Criminal Court and observed as under:- “ 15. …...Suffice it to say that the High Court was competent on a plaint reading of Section 138 to impose a sentence of fine only upon the appellant. Inasmuch as the High Court did so, it committed no jurisdictional error. …….” 11. …...Suffice it to say that the High Court was competent on a plaint reading of Section 138 to impose a sentence of fine only upon the appellant. Inasmuch as the High Court did so, it committed no jurisdictional error. …….” 11. Thus, from the provision contained in Section 138 of the NI Act and going by the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in above-mentioned judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that the criminal Court, while convicting the accused for commission of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, is competent to impose sentence of fine only, as imposition of jail sentence is not mandatory for the reasons that it is discretion vested on the criminal Court either to impose jail sentence or sentence of fine, depending on the facts and circumstances of the given case. As such, since in the present case, in view of the fact that the both the Courts’ below have granted compensation in exercise of powers under Section 357(3) of CrPC, the quantum of which is on the higher side, as contended by the learned counsel for the accused, which I will consider in the later part of this order, but modification of the jail sentence of the accused by the appellate Court by reducing it from 01 year RI till the rising of the Court appears to be just and proper in exercise of appellate jurisdiction conferred on the appellate Court under Section 386 of CrPC. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere in the order dated 09.10.2015, passed by the appellate Court, with regard to the modification of the jail sentence of the accused by reducing it from 01 year RI till the rising of the Court. Accordingly, the revision preferred by the complainant being CRR-983-2015 is liable to be dismissed. 12. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere in the order dated 09.10.2015, passed by the appellate Court, with regard to the modification of the jail sentence of the accused by reducing it from 01 year RI till the rising of the Court. Accordingly, the revision preferred by the complainant being CRR-983-2015 is liable to be dismissed. 12. So far as revision preferred by the accused being CRR-1065-2015 is concerned, it is not in dispute that prior to filing of the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, legal notice, vide Ex.P/02 filed before the criminal Court, was issued by the complainant to the accused claiming an amount of Rs.15,52,985/- and, break up of said amount i.e. Rs.15,52,985/-, has been shown in document (Ex.P/1 filed before the criminal Court), in which, the total amount outstanding against the accused has been shown to be Rs.11,87,509/- and interest on the said amount for the period starting from 21.05.2008 to 31.08.2008 has been calculated as Rs.3,65,476/-. It is also not in dispute that for the said amount of Rs.15,52,985/- (i.e. principal remaining amount- Rs.11,87,509/- + interest- Rs.3,65,476/-) the cheque in question has been issued by the accused in favour of the complainant, which stood dishonored, leading to filing of the criminal complaint under Section 138 of CrPC, in which, the criminal Court vide judgment dated 16.09.2014 granted compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- in favour of the complainant, payable by the accused, which was further upheld by the appellate Court vide impugned order dated 09.10.2015. 13. In order to answer the plea, raised at the bar, it would be relevant to notice provision contained under Section 357(3) of CrPC, which reads as under: “ 357. Order to pay compensation.- (1) xxxx. (2) xxxx. (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. xxx xxx xxx” 14. xxx xxx xxx” 14. A careful perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 357 of CrPC would show that when a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment/order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. 15. In this regard the decision of Dilip S. Dahanukar (supra) may be noticed herein, wherein the question which cropped up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was interpretation of Section 357 of CrPC vis-a-vis the provisions of the NI Act, as regards power to impose sentence of fine is involved. In that case, the scope and power conferred under Section 357(1) (b) of CrPC was considered by their Lordships and it has been held that compensation is awarded towards sufferance of any loss or injury by reason of an act for which an accused person is sentenced and the amount of compensation sought to be imposed, thus, must be reasonable and not arbitrary and observed in Para-30, 31, 38 & 39 as under: “ 30. The fine can be imposed only in terms of the provisions of the Act. Fine which can be imposed under the Act, however, shall be double of the amount of the cheque which stood dishonoured. When, however, fine is not imposed, compensation can be directed to be paid for loss or injury caused to the complainant by reason of commission of the offence. Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 only provides for application of amount of fine which may be in respect of the entire amount or in respect of a part thereof. Sub-Section (3) of Section 357 seeks to achieve the same purpose. 31. We must, however, observe that there exists a distinction between fine and compensation, although, in a way it seeks to achieve the same purpose. An amount of compensation can be directed to be recovered as a 'fine' but the legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in that sense `fine' stands on a higher footing than compensation awarded by the Court. *** *** *** *** 38. An amount of compensation can be directed to be recovered as a 'fine' but the legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in that sense `fine' stands on a higher footing than compensation awarded by the Court. *** *** *** *** 38. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefor in mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The amount of compensation sought to be imposed, thus, must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, the capacity of accused to pay the same must be judged. A fortiori, an enquiry in this behalf even in a summary way may be necessary. Some reasons, which may not be very elaborate, may also have to be assigned; the purpose being that whereas the power to impose fine is limited and direction to pay compensation can be made for one or the other factors enumerated out of the same; but sub- Section (3) of Section 357 does not impose any such limitation and thus, power thereunder should be exercised only in appropriate cases. Such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised at the whims and caprice of a judge. 39. If a fine is to be imposed under the Act, the amount of which in the opinion of the Parliament would be more than sufficient to compensate the complainant; can it be said, that an unreasonable amount should be directed to be paid by the Court while exercising its power under sub-Section (3) of Section 357? The answer thereto must be rendered in the negative. Sub- Section (5) of Section 357 also provides for some guidelines. Ordinarily, it should be lesser than the amount which can be granted by a Civil Court upon appreciation of the evidence brought before it for losses which might have reasonably been suffered by the plaintiff. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in this behalf, for realization of the amount in question must also be borne in mind. A criminal case is not a substitution for a civil suit, far less execution of a decree which may be passed.” 16. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in this behalf, for realization of the amount in question must also be borne in mind. A criminal case is not a substitution for a civil suit, far less execution of a decree which may be passed.” 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the above-quoted principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dilip S. Dahanukar (supra) qua Section 357(3) of CrPC and the provisions of Section 138 of NI Act, it is quite vivid that in the present case an amount of Rs.15,52,985/- was only claimed by the complainant from the accused while serving him legal notice (Ex.P/02 filed before the criminal Court) and, according to document Ex.P/01, filed before the criminal Court, the said amount of Rs.15,52,985/-, includes interest of Rs.3,65,476/- for the period starting from 21.05.2008 to 31.08.2008 and principal outstanding amount is Rs.11,87,509/-. As such, the amount of goods supplied (i.e. diesel) is Rs.11,87,509/-, which has been claimed by the complainant alongwith interest (Rs.3,65,476/-) to the tune of Rs.15,52,985/-, therefore, it would be reasonable amount which can be said to be the amount of which the complainant has suffered loss on account of non-payment by the accused for the goods supplied by him and, consequently, the amount of Rs.15,52,985/- can be treated to be reasonable sum which the complainant is entitled to receive by way of compensation under Section 357(3) of CrPC vis-a-vis Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, the criminal Court as well as the appellate Court both were absolutely unjustified in granting compensation over and above the actual loss which the complainant has suffered, as it is not a case where the accused has been imposed fine sentence twice the cheque amount or he has been directed to pay compensation out of the fine sentence in exercise of power conferred under Section 357(1)(b) of the CrPC. 17. In that view of the matter, the revision of the accused being CRR-1065-2015 is liable to be partly allowed with the modification in the amount of compensation granted under Section 357(3) of CrPC. 17. In that view of the matter, the revision of the accused being CRR-1065-2015 is liable to be partly allowed with the modification in the amount of compensation granted under Section 357(3) of CrPC. Accordingly, grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- by the criminal Court and affirmed by the appellate Court is hereby modified, as the same is restricted to Rs.15,52,985/- only and to that extent the orders passed by both the Courts below i.e. 09.10.2015 (by the appellate Court) and 16.09.2014 (by the criminal Court) are hereby modified. 18. At this stage, Mr. Shishir Dixit, learned counsel appearing for the complainant submits that in terms of interim order passed by this Court dated 07.12.2015, the accused has already deposited the amount of Rs.15,52,985/-, which the complainant has also withdrawn pursuant to the permission granted by this Court vide order dated 12.07.2016. 19. The aforesaid statement made by learned counsel for the complainant is placed on record. 20. Accordingly, CRR-983-2015 filed by the complainant, is hereby dismissed , whereas CRR-1065-2015 filed by the accused, is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.