JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is filed challenging the order dated 17.08.2024 in R.P. No.20 of 2023 and I.A. No.3 of 2023 in A.S. No.48 of 2020 of the Principal District Court, Kollam, which is an appeal from the judgment in O.S.No.439 of 2010 of the Additional Munsiff Court, Kollam. Appellant was the appellant in the A.S. and petitioner in the R.P. Respondent was the respondent in the A.S. and counter petitioner in the R.P. 2. O.S.No.439 of 2010 was a suit filed by the respondent seeking recovery of possession of property on the strength of title. The suit was decreed in favour of the respondent. Aggrieved by the same, A.S.No.48 of 2020 was filed by the appellant before the Principal District Court, Kollam. The appeal was dismissed for default on 23.09.2021. The appellant filed R.P.No.20 of 2023 for restoration of the appeal along with a petition, I.A.No.3 of 2023 seeking to condone the delay of 821 days in filing the R.P. The learned Principal District Judge, Kollam, dismissed the I.A. as well as the R.P. Aggrieved by the same, this FAO is filed along with C.M. Appl. No.1 of 2025, which is a petition seeking to condone the delay in filing the FAO. 3. The respondent entered in appearance and filed a counter affidavit in C.M. Appl. No. 1 of 2025 in the FAO. 4. Heard Sri. K. Shaj, Advocate for the appellant and Sri. Anand Mahadevan, Advocate for the respondent. 5. C.M. Appl. No.1 of 2025 was heard and the delay of 29 days in filing the FAO was condoned. The FAO was thereafter heard on merits. 6. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that after reckoning the period towards COVID 19 pandemic, the actual delay in filing the RP is only 658 days and not 821 days. The learned counsel further contends that the court below failed to take note of the fact that the delay had occasioned because the appellant's Advocate had informed her that the hearing dates of the case would be duly informed to her, but had failed to inform the date of hearing. The appellant had been for the last 20 years residing at ‘Johnson Cottage’, which is the subject matter of litigation, and not in the address to which the notice had been sent. The appellant had been for the last 20 years residing at ‘Johnson Cottage’, which is the subject matter of litigation, and not in the address to which the notice had been sent. Hence there were no willful laches on the part of the appellant and the delay was fit to be condoned. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down in Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd. v. Hussain , 1998 (1) KLT 1008 , wherein a Division Bench of this Court had held that when sufficient cause is shown, the reopening of the case is mandatory and when sufficient cause is not shown, it is discretionary in which case, the court should exercise its discretion depending upon the facts of each case. It is also contended that, while considering the expression sufficient cause, the legislature has intended to use it as an elastic expression, so as to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. The learned counsel thus submits that the FAO be allowed and the impugned judgment be set aside. 7. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent, vehemently opposed the contentions and submitted that the FAO is only yet another attempt on the part of the appellant to further protract the proceedings, so as to deny the respondent the fruits of the decree in O.S.No.439 of 2010. The appellant, who had neither title nor possession to the disputed residential building, had instituted M.C.No.49 of 2010 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II seeking residence orders, and an interim order was passed on the same. She had claimed that she, who was staying in Kottayam, had been deprived of her residence by the respondent. It is subsequent thereto that O.S.No.439 of 2010 was instituted by the respondent for declaration of title, recovery of possession and injunction and it took the respondent nearly 10 years to get his rights declared due to the delays created at the instance of the appellant. The learned counsel invited my attention to the impugned order wherein the District Court had duly taken note of the fact that in the suit filed by the respondent for recovery of possession based on title, the appellant had failed to produce any materials to establish the title over the scheduled property. The learned counsel invited my attention to the impugned order wherein the District Court had duly taken note of the fact that in the suit filed by the respondent for recovery of possession based on title, the appellant had failed to produce any materials to establish the title over the scheduled property. It had also been noted that no sufficient reason whatsoever had been shown to condone the delay in filing the restoration petition. 8. The moot question to be considered is whether the District Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the RP and in dismissing the I.A. seeking condoning the delay for non disclosure of sufficient reasons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. and others v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) , (2024) SCC OnLine SC 513 has after a detailed survey of relevant precedents on the point summarised the legal position regarding limitation and condonation of delay as follows: “26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. and others v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) , (2024) SCC OnLine SC 513 has after a detailed survey of relevant precedents on the point summarised the legal position regarding limitation and condonation of delay as follows: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the dealy for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” (emphasis added) 9. The purported reason stated by the appellant while seeking condonation of delay is that she was not informed of the posting date of the case by her counsel and that the suo motu notice sent to her from the registry had been returned, noting that the appellant is not residing in the relevant address. This, according to her, had led to the dismissal of the A.S. on default. The District Court, however, after a perusal of the notice sent from the Registry noted that the notice had been sent in the very same address shown in the appeal memorandum and that the address in the affidavit submitted by the appellant is the very same residential address. Hence it was concluded by the District Court that the contention now raised by the appellant that she had left the address to which notice had been sent 20 years back and that she is presently residing at ‘Johnson Cottage’ is not borne out from the records submitted by the appellant herself. As regards the purported default alleged on the part of her earlier counsel, the District Court concluded that the proceedings reveal that the appellant herself had placed a request to appoint a fresh counsel and hence the averment in the delay condonation petition that it was on account of the fault of the former counsel that she could not get the details of posting of the appeal is devoid of merit. Nothing has been placed before me to show that the conclusions arrived at by the District Court were erroneous or devoid of merits. I find that there existed valid and tenable reasons for the District Court to conclude that no substantial cause had been made out while seeking to condone the delay that had been occasioned in filing the Review Petition. The conclusion arrived at by the District Court is thus valid and legal. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy 's case (supra) the discretionary powers vested in the courts with respect to condonation of delay need not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established if there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence on part of the party seeking to condone the delay. The delay occasioned from the appellant in the case at hand can only be termed as inordinate. The delay occasioned from the appellant in the case at hand can only be termed as inordinate. The District Court was hence justified in dismissing the I.A. and the R.P. The FAO is only to be dismissed. It is accordingly ordered so. 10. FAO dismissed. No costs.