ORDER : Narsing Rao Nandikonda, J. Heard Mr. Karthik Ramana Puttamreddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax for the respondent. 2. Since the issue involved and the petitioner/assessee in these two Tax Revision Cases being one and the same, they being heard together and disposed of by way of this Common Order. 3. These two Tax Revision Case are filed by the petitioner under Section 22 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short, the ‘AGPST Act’) challenging the common order dated 17.05.2008, in T.A.Nos.1448 and 1449 of 2001, passed by the learned Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (for short, the ‘STAT’). 4. The facts of the case are that, the petitioner is a Government undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner is a registered dealer under the provisions of APGST Act and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 respectively. The petitioner's assessment for the years 1986-87 and 1987-1988 was completed by the Assessing Authority by its order dated 26.02.1991 and 23.08.1992 respectively levying tax on 70% of receipts as taxable instead of arriving at actual value of goods transferred in execution of works contract and the exemptions under Rule 6 (2) based on books have been overlooked. Challenging the said order, the petitioner preferred appeals before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Hyderabad and the same were dismissed by order dated 29.10.1993. However, when the petitioner challenged the orders passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner before the STAT, the STAT by its order dated 17.02.1995, in T.A.Nos.51 of 1994 and batch, had set aside the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner and remanded the matter to the Assessing Authority for a fresh consideration after providing due opportunity to the petitioner. But the Commercial Tax Officer has once again confirmed the levy vide order dated 12.03.1998. The Commercial Tax Officer has, however, given exemption in respect of cement, steel supply and cost recovery basis to the petitioner and incorporated in the works in respect of 1986-87 only. Further, the levy of tax is on 70% of receipts instead of giving deduction at actual towards labour and levying tax on balance turnover of the goods. 5. The Commercial Tax Officer has, however, given exemption in respect of cement, steel supply and cost recovery basis to the petitioner and incorporated in the works in respect of 1986-87 only. Further, the levy of tax is on 70% of receipts instead of giving deduction at actual towards labour and levying tax on balance turnover of the goods. 5. It was contended by the petitioner that he could not participate in the assessment as its staff were scattered at different places and sought time to furnish necessary details as per the direction of STAT. It is also contended that the Commercial Tax Officer passed an order on the ground that limitation was going to expire by 13.03.1998. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, who dismissed the same vide order dated 13.03.2001 rejecting the contentions of the petitioner that the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer was time barred and also in violation of the principles of natural justice. Challenging the same, the petitioner again preferred an appeal before the STAT on the ground that the revised assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer is barred by time under Section 24A of the APGST Act and also on the ground that the petitioner was not provided sufficient opportunity before passing the assessment order. But, the learned STAT, however, rejected the appeal on both the grounds by its order dated 17.05.2008 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the orders of the STAT in earlier round of appeals were served on the State Representative on 25.06.1995, the Commercial Tax Officer ought to have passed the consequential orders in terms of Section 24A of the APGST Act within three years from the date of service of order on the State Representative i.e., before 25.06.1998. It was also contended that the orders passed by the assessing authority dated 12.03.1998 are clearly time barred. It was also contended that the notice of the STAT in its earlier order squarely covers the issue of the petitioner and requested to set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner. However, the STAT rejected the contentions of the petitioner by duly accepting the contention of the State Representative. 7. It was also contended that the notice of the STAT in its earlier order squarely covers the issue of the petitioner and requested to set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner. However, the STAT rejected the contentions of the petitioner by duly accepting the contention of the State Representative. 7. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the order of STAT was served on the Assessing Authority on 13.03.1995, the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer on 12.03.1998 is within limitation and the State Representative cannot be considered as service on the Assessing Authority. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the proceedings of the Commercial Tax Officer for the year 1986-1987 and 1987-88 are under the APGST Act, wherein the Assessing Authority has determined turnover relating to works contract and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer is barred by time since the petitioner understands that it is passed behind the period of ____ under Section 24A of the Act. 8. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commercial Tax Officer has passed the orders nearly two years after the issuance of the show cause notice and no opportunity was given to the petitioner and that if one more opportunity is given instead of making the petitioner unaware by passing the order on the pretext that limitation is expiring, the petitioner bona fidely could not represent the matter as several employees had left and he did not have proper track of pending matters. 9. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commercial Tax Officer has taken the additional turnover as works contract receipts without giving exemption like consumable, second sales etc. That the Commercial Tax Officer ought to have adopted the labour component based on the books of accounts of petitioner instead of 30% as per the provisions of the APGST Act or the Rules since the petitioner incurred labour charges more than 30%. The Commercial Tax Officer has levied uniform rate at rate of 5% without identifying the goods and reference to Section 6A has no bearing since the Commercial Tax Officer assessed the receipts under works contract after deducting labour and supplies of road and buildings department. The Commercial Tax Officer has levied uniform rate at rate of 5% without identifying the goods and reference to Section 6A has no bearing since the Commercial Tax Officer assessed the receipts under works contract after deducting labour and supplies of road and buildings department. In any event, the rate of tax should be 4% and not 5% by virtue of the G.O.Ms.No.172, dated 13.19.1986. In any case, the Commercial Tax Officer is incorrect in levying the additional tax at 1% for the entire year, which only can be leviable for 01.08.1996 up to 31.7.1996 @ 5%. 10. As the assessment was originally passed on 26.02.1991, the petitioner approached the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, who in turn dismissed the appeals and when the petitioner has preferred the appeals before the STAT, who remanded back the matter to the Assessing Authority for fresh consideration. In spite of the directions given by the STAT, neither appeared in-person before the Assessing Authority nor responded for the same and he failed to produce the documentary evidence in support of its contentions and the petitioner has failed to avail the opportunity given to it. Therefore, it was not desirable that the petitioner should not be encouraged by offering another opportunity, even on merits, the turnover pertains to the transfer of property of goods in execution of works contract. Hence, in the absence of document evidence, the contention of the petitioner was rejected by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner. 11. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that by order dated 17.02.1995; the matter was remanded back to the Assessing Authority for a fresh re-assessment to be done for the tax period 1986-87 and 1987-88. The STAT’s order was served on the state representative before the Tribunal on 25.02.1995 which amounts to service on the assessing authority itself. As per language of Section 24 -A of the APGST Act, the re-assessment order is to be passed within three years from the date of the service of the Tribunal order which is within 25.02.1998. The said revised orders are passed on 12.03.1995 which is barred by limitation. 12. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax is that the STAT dispatch records prove that the remand order was directly served on the Commercial Tax Officer via registered post on 13.03.1995, not through the state representative. The said revised orders are passed on 12.03.1995 which is barred by limitation. 12. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax is that the STAT dispatch records prove that the remand order was directly served on the Commercial Tax Officer via registered post on 13.03.1995, not through the state representative. It is further contended that regulation 21 does not apply as the Assessing Authority (CTO) was not the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred, hence the service on CTO was mandate, and the state representative’s role was not a conduit for communication in this case. It is further contended that Section 24 -A does not specify whose receipt triggers limitation. The Tribunals dispatch register confirms service on the CTO on 13.03.1995 and contended that the service on the CTO is the starting point of limitation and the order was passed on 12.03.1998 which is within time. 13. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax also was that as per the regulation 21, the STAT is not bound to communicate the order on the assessing authority. In the petitioner’s case since the assessing authority is neither “the party” nor the “state representative” nor the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred nor the deputy commissioner nor the board of revenue, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner appeal before the tribunal was against the order passed by the Appellate Deputy commissioner, therefore, the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred was the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, not the assessing authority and the above mentioned rule and regulations show as to how comprehensive and sufficient the service to state representative is. 14. It was further contended that the duty of the State Representative is to communicate with the revisionary or assessing authorities as he may deem fit. Once the order is served on the state representative, the three year limitation is to be calculated from the said date but and the date on which it may be served to the assessing revisionary authorities. 15. Once the order is served on the state representative, the three year limitation is to be calculated from the said date but and the date on which it may be served to the assessing revisionary authorities. 15. Basing on the above submissions of both the counsel and grounds, the following substantial question of law that arise for consideration in the instant Tax Revision Cases, viz., a) Whether the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer is beyond limitation as prescribed under section 24A of the APGST Act since the STAT remanding matter were served on the State Representative on 25-02-1995? And b) Since the State Representative is representing the State, the service of order on him should be considered as date of service for the purpose of Section 24A and consequently whether the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer on 13.03.1998 must be held to be barred by limitation as the due date for passing the re assessment order is 25.02.1998 which is three years from the date of service on State Representative ? 16. On perusal of the Regulation 21, it clearly shows that the order has to be served on the authority against whose order the appeal was preferred. In the present case, admittedly the appeal was preferred against the Appellate Deputy Commissioner but not the assessing authority. Appeal was preferred against the orders of Deputy commissioner and as per the tribunal dispatch records prove the remand order was directly served on the CTO vide registered post on 13.03.1995 which is proper as per the regulation 21 of the APGST ACT 17. In view of the above regulation the contention of the petitioner that the rules and regulations show as to how comprehensive and sufficient the service to state representative is. It is the duty of the state representative to communicate with the revisionary or assessing authority as the case may be. Once the order is served on the state representative, the three year limitation is to be calculated from the said date but not the date on which it may be served to the assessing authority / revisionery authority cannot be accepted. Once the order is served on the state representative, the three year limitation is to be calculated from the said date but not the date on which it may be served to the assessing authority / revisionery authority cannot be accepted. Hence, this court is of the opinion that the service which is effected only on the revisionary authority i.e. Deputy Commissioner only has to be treated as the proper service and which only triggers the limitation, Therefore, the revised assessment order passed on 12.03.1998 is well within time. 18. For the said reasons stated above, this Bench hold that the substantial questions of law framed are answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner. 19. Consequently, both the Tax Revision Petitions are liable to be and accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.