ORDER : 1. Though the matter is listed for 'Admission', with the consent of the learned counsel for both parties, the matter is taken up for 'Hearing'. 2. Heard Sri Rajaram Sooryambail, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Raju S., learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The petitioner-accused has preferred this criminal revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') praying to set aside the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 27.12.2021 passed by the Additional Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, at Channarayapatna, Hassan, in Criminal Case No.1574 of 2017 and judgment dated 25.10.2022 passed by the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hassan, Sitting at Channarayapatna, in Criminal Appeal No.2 of 2022, wherein both the Courts passed concurrent findings against the petitioner/accused and convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'N.I. Act', for short). 4. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court. The petitioner is the 'accused' and the respondent is the 'complainant' before the trial Court. 5. The brief facts of the case are as under: The complainant filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act contending that the accused and the complainant are known to each other. During the second week of June 2017, the accused approached the complainant to extend financial assistance of Rs.4.00 lakh as hand loan to clear the loans borrowed from others and agreed to repay the said loan within three months along with interest at the rate of 2% per month. Hence, the complainant lent loan of Rs.4.00 lakh on 22.06.2017 and in consideration of the same, the accused issued Cheque bearing No.035871 dated 22.09.2017 for a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh drawn on Federal Bank, Channarayapatna Branch. Accordingly, the complainant presented the said cheque for encashment on 26.09.2017, but the same was dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient'. Therefore, the complainant issued legal notice to the accused on 04.10.2017 calling upon him to pay the amount due under the cheque. In turn, the accused replied to the said notice, but did not pay the amount. Hence, the complainant filed the private complaint against the accused. 6. Therefore, the complainant issued legal notice to the accused on 04.10.2017 calling upon him to pay the amount due under the cheque. In turn, the accused replied to the said notice, but did not pay the amount. Hence, the complainant filed the private complaint against the accused. 6. After institution of the complaint, the trial Court recorded the sworn statement of the complainant, took cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C., secured the presence of the accused and recorded the plea of the accused, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. The complainant in order to prove his case examined himself as PW1 and got marked eleven documents as per Exs.C1 to C11. In order to rebut the claim of the complainant, the accused examined himself on oath as DW1. 8. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.4.10 lakh and in default to pay the fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.2 of 2022 before the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hassan, Sitting at Channarayapatna, and in turn, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused and thereby, confirmed the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the trial Court. 10. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court, the accused has filed this revision petition. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused has contended that the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by both the Courts is against the settled principles of law; both the Courts have failed to understand and appreciate the provisions of law as required under Section 138 of the N.I. Act; the complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the cheque in question was issued to one Sannegowda and it was a separate transaction between the accused and Sannegowda, but the complainant has misused the cheque and presented for encashment. Therefore, there was no legally enforceable debt or liability in order to attract Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Hence, he prayed to allow the revision petition. 12. Therefore, there was no legally enforceable debt or liability in order to attract Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Hence, he prayed to allow the revision petition. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent/complainant has contended that both the Courts have given concurrent findings and convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The complainant has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt and hence, both the Courts have drawn presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. He has further contended that if there were separate transactions between Sannegowda and the accused, the accused would have filed a case against Sannegowda or issued legal notice calling upon him to return the cheque or he would have lodged a complaint against him, but the accused has not taken any action against Sannegowda or against the complainant. Hence, he justified the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by both the Courts and prayed to dismiss the revision petition. 13. On the basis of the submissions made by the parties to the lis, the following points would arise for consideration of this Court: i. Whether the accused proved that the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court is perverse and calls for interference by this Court? ii. What order? My answer to the above points is as under: Point No. i: In the negative Point No. ii: As per the final order for the following reasons: 14. The "scope of revision" refers to the limited authority of a higher Court to review judgment of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, focusing on correcting errors in jurisdiction or gross legal/factual flaws rather than re-examining the merits of the case. This power is exercised sparingly and is intended to set right a patent defect, not to function as an automatic second appeal. The specific grounds and limitations vary between civil and criminal proceedings. Revisions can address situations where the decision is grossly inaccurate, not supported by evidence, or where relevant evidence was ignored. The review is not a fresh trial. Courts are generally barred from re-examining evidence or substituting their own judgment for the lower Court's on matters of fact unless the findings are demonstrably perverse or arbitrary. Revisions can address situations where the decision is grossly inaccurate, not supported by evidence, or where relevant evidence was ignored. The review is not a fresh trial. Courts are generally barred from re-examining evidence or substituting their own judgment for the lower Court's on matters of fact unless the findings are demonstrably perverse or arbitrary. The Hon'ble Apex Court has discussed the applicability and scope of revision in various decisions, which are highlighted hereunder: A. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MUNNA DEVI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER, ( 2001) 9 SCC 631 while discussing the scope of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. at paragraph No.3 has held as under: "3. xxx xxx xxx. The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged." B. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. R. SOUNDIRARASU AND OTHERS, (2023) 6 SCC 768 at paragraph No.79 has held as under: "79. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure." C. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY MANGESH POYAREKAR, (2008) 9 SCC 475 at paragraph No.16 has held as under: "16. xxx xxx xxx Now it is well settled that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. A Revisional Court cannot convert itself into a regular court of appeal." 15. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 16. In view of the above proposition of law, let me examine the case of the prosecution. 17. Point Nos. i and ii : It was the case of the complainant that, the accused borrowed a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh from him in order to discharge his financial needs and when the accused failed to perform his obligation, the complainant insisted him to return the amount and in turn, the accused issued a cheque for a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh as per Ex.C1 and on being presented, it was dishonoured. On the other hand, the accused denied the allegations made in the complaint. The complainant, in order to establish his claim, examined himself on oath as PW1 and got marked in all eleven documents as per Exs.C1 to C11. Ex.C1 is the cheque, Ex.C2 is the acknowledgment, Ex.C3 is the legal notice, Ex.C4 is the return memo, Ex.C5 is the genealogical tree and Exs.C6 to C11 are the RTC extracts. 18. On perusal of the oral testimony of PW1 and the contents of Ex.C1-cheque and Ex.C3-legal notice, it appears that the accused borrowed loan from the complainant for a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh in order to discharge his earlier loan borrowed from others. Accordingly, the accused borrowed a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh for his urgent needs and later, the accused failed to perform his obligation. The accused issued Ex.C1- cheque. Accordingly, the accused borrowed a sum of Rs.4.00 lakh for his urgent needs and later, the accused failed to perform his obligation. The accused issued Ex.C1- cheque. On presentation of the said cheque by the complainant, the same was returned with a shara 'insufficient funds' in the account of the accused. Therefore, a legal notice was issued to the accused. The accused neither replied to the legal notice, nor paid the amount due under the cheque. The accused has not disputed the issuance of cheque and his signature found in Ex.C1-cheque. Further, to substantiate such contention, the accused examined himself as DW1 and denied the transaction. 19. On perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the accused does not dispute the issuance of cheque and nature of the transaction. However, he has taken up the contention that there was transaction between Sannegowda and himself and therefore, he had issued the cheque in favour of Sannegowda. Further, the accused has failed to take action against Sannegowda for non-return of Ex.C1-cheque or he has not lodged the complaint against Sannegowda and the complainant. Therefore, it clearly establishes that the accused has admitted the transaction and issuance of cheque. Hence, the complainant has complied with the legal requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Now, the burden shifts on the accused to disprove the case of the complainant, but to rebut the burden, the accused has not placed any material to substantiate his contention. Again the fact remains that the accused has not discharged the transaction amount borrowed from the complainant and he has not placed any material to the effect that he has discharged the loan or taken action against Sannegowda. On the contrary, the complainant has proved that Ex.C1-cheque was issued by the accused towards discharge of legally enforceable debt. In this regard, the accused has not placed any contra evidence to disbelieve the case of the complainant. 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 866 , at paragraph Nos.34, 40 to 45 has held as under: "34. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that 'unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability'. It will be seen that the 'presumed fact' directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. xxx xxx xxx 40. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of ‘preponderance of probabilities’, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 ] 41. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words ‘until the contrary is proved’ occurring in Section 139 do not mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa , AIR 2019 SC 1983 and Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 ] 42. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non- existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non- existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused's case may be even fifty one to forty nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was ‘no debt/liability’. [Kumar Exports and Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 ] 43. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact. 44. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundanlal's case- (supra) when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Section 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well. 45. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Section 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well. 45. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit- evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption 'disappears' and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983 and Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 ] ." 21. In view of the facts, circumstances and the decision cited supra, in the instant case, the accused has not placed any rebuttal evidence. In the absence of rebuttal evidence, the accused has failed to prove the non-existence of liability. 22. When execution of negotiable instruments, passing of consideration and signature found on Ex.C1-cheque is admitted, the Court may draw presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of the negotiable instrument. 23. In the instant case, the transaction and the issuance of cheque is not in dispute. On the contrary, the accused has taken up the contention that he had issued Ex.C1-cheque in favour of Sannegowda, but he has not placed any documents to substantiate his contention. If the cheque is issued in relation to legally recoverable debt, it is to be construed that the same is issued towards legally enforceable debt or liability. There is presumption that if the negotiable instrument is supported by consideration, the Court shall draw presumption under the provisions of the N.I. Act. If the cheque is issued in relation to legally recoverable debt, it is to be construed that the same is issued towards legally enforceable debt or liability. There is presumption that if the negotiable instrument is supported by consideration, the Court shall draw presumption under the provisions of the N.I. Act. The arguments of Sri Rajaram Sooryambail, learned counsel for the petitioner, for these reasons cannot be accepted and therefore, this petition fails and is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the Court passes the following: ORDER: i. Criminal revision petition is dismissed. ii. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 27.12.2021 passed in Criminal Case No.1574 of 2017 by the Additional Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, at Channarayapatna, Hassan, and Criminal Appeal 2 of 2022 dated 25.10.2022 passed by the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hassan, Sitting at Channarayapatna, are confirmed. In view of the dismissal of the main revision petition, pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand dismissed.