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2025 DIGILAW 1245 (TS)

Vadthya Ramulu v. State of Telangana, Rep. by its Chief Secreatary, Telangana Secretariat, Hyderabad

2025-10-17

K.LAKSHMAN

body2025
ORDER : K. LAKSHMAN, J. Heard Dr. Vijayalakshmi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri T. Rajinikanth Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6, Learned Govt.Pleader for Home, Sri D.Narender Naik, Standing Counsel appearing for Respondent No.8, Sri Vadeendra Joshi, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.9 to 12. 2. The petitioner is claiming that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac 10-17 guntas in Sy.Nos. 194 and 195 situated at Nagaram Village, Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. According to him, his father late Sri Jamala, belongs to Scheduled Tribe (ST) Community, purchased the above said land from the original owner Sri Nawab Mohd. Haji Khan in the year 1964. During the lifetime, his father had executed a registered gift settlement deed vide document No.23750 of 2019, dated 08.10.2019 in favour of the petitioner in respect of land admeasuring Ac.5.00 guntas out of Ac.10.17guntas. Since then, he is in physical possession and enjoyment of the said property. There is standing crop in the said property. His name was also entered in the revenue record. E-pattadar passbook and title deed was also issued in his favour. His father died on 07.10.2020. 3. While the petitioner carrying on agricultural operations, Sri K. Chavli and others interfered with his possession over the subject property. Therefore, he has filed a suit in O.S. No.724 of 2022 against the said K.Chavli and others for permanent injunction. Along with the said suit, he has also filed I.A.No.881 of 2022 seeking temporary injunction. Vide order dated 30.04.2024, learned XI Additional District Judge, at Ranga Reddy District, vide order dated 30.04.2024, dismissed the said petition. Therefore, he has preferred an appeal vide CMA No.452 of 2024. Vide order dated 28.11.2024, the same was allowed granting injunction in favour of the petitioner till disposal of the suit. 4. Later the suit was transferred to the Additional District Court, Ibrahimpatnam and re-numbered as O.S. 730 of 2024 and the same is pending. Despite the injunction order dated 28.11.2024 granted in C.M.A No.452 of 2024, the defendant in the said suit interfered with the possession of the petitioner over the suit scheduled property. Therefore, he has filed I.A. No 441 of 2025 seeking police aid against 6 th respondent. Vide order dated 01.05.2025, the trial Court granted police aid to the petitioner. The same has not been implemented by the police authorities. Therefore, he has filed I.A. No 441 of 2025 seeking police aid against 6 th respondent. Vide order dated 01.05.2025, the trial Court granted police aid to the petitioner. The same has not been implemented by the police authorities. Therefore, he has filed writ petition vide W.P.No.15537 of 2025 seeking a direction to the police to implement the said order by providing police aid. 5. It is alleged by the petitioner herein that Respondent Nos. 9 to 11, with the help of respondent No.14, got mutated their names fraudulently and also obtained pattadar passbooks. On verification, it is found that their names are not mutated in manual revenue records, but the names of respondent Nos. 9 to 11 appears on online records. The petitioner and others whose names are recorded in manual and online pahanies, have not sold the said land to anyone, much less to respondent Nos.1 to 11. 5 th respondent, without any valid title and documents, mutated the names of unofficial respondents Nos.9 to 11 under the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act,1971 (for short, ‘the ROR Act’). Respondent No.8 and 10, based upon the fraudulent mutation appears to have sold the land to respondent No.13 under sale deeds bearing document Nos. 1432 and 1435 of 2021 dated 08.07.2021. Respondent No.9 sold an extent of Ac 8-10 guntas in favour of Respondent No.12 vide sale deed bearing document No.11983 of 2020. Respondent No.11 sold the said land under sale deed bearing document No. 1436 of 2021 dated 09.07.2021 to Respondent No.13. 6. It is further alleged by the petitioner herein that Respondent No.13, with the help of Respondent No.14, sold various extents of the land to Respondent Nos.15 to 48 i.e. Senior IAS and IPS Officers and giving sub division numbers without any authority in Law. All the said transactions are fraudulent in nature and in collusion with the revenue authorities. The said illegal transactions were done behind his back, without notice to him and without affording him an opportunity. He came to know about the order dated 24.04.2025 in W.P.No.12637 of 2025 and the order dated 30.04.2025 passed by a Division Bench in W.A.Nos.506 of 2025, W.A.No.508 of 2025, W.A. 511 of 2025 and W.A. 514 of 2025. 7. Thus, according to the petitioner, the land in Sy.No.195 is patta land but not Bhoodan land as per the revenue records. 7. Thus, according to the petitioner, the land in Sy.No.195 is patta land but not Bhoodan land as per the revenue records. After order dated 24.04.2025 in W.P.No.12637 of 2025, Respondent No.8 raided the house of Respondent No.9 and seized cash, and necessary land document and the matter is under investigation. 8. It is contended by the petitioner that he has made three applications on 27.05.2025 to Respondent No.6 with a request to issue certified copies of mutation proceedings incorporating the name of Respondent No.9. The same was not considered. Therefore, he has filed three writ petitions i.e. W.P.Nos.17871 of 2025, 19065 of 2025 and 19446 of 2025. Vide orders dated 26.06.2025, 04.07.2025 and 08.07.2025, this Court disposed of the said writ petitions directing Respondent No.6 i.e. Tahasildar, to furnish certified copies to the petitioner as sought by him vide his applications dated 27.05.2025. 9. It is further contended by the petitioner that Respondent Nos.4 to 6 and 9 to 11 made fraudulent acts, also illegal mutations and alienations. Therefore, he has submitted a representation dated 28.06.2025 to Respondent Nos.1 and 2 with a request to appoint Enquiry Commission to conduct detailed enquiry into all the aspects in respect of the said land scam. The same was not considered. The State Government has power to appoint an Enquiry Commission, if necessary to do so under Section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952. Despite receiving and acknowledging the said representation dated 28.06.2025, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 did not act upon the same by appointing Commission of Enquiry. Aggrieved by the said inaction of the respondent Nos.1 and 2, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 10. Sri T.Rajinikanth Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General, raised an objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition contending that the dispute is between the petitioner and third parties with regard to land admeasuring Ac.10.17 guntas in Sy.Nos.194 and 195 of Nagaram Village. There is no scam. Therefore, it is not a fit case to appoint Commission of Enquiries in terms of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ( for short, ‘the Act,1952’). 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Advocate General made their submissions extensively. 12. There is no scam. Therefore, it is not a fit case to appoint Commission of Enquiries in terms of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ( for short, ‘the Act,1952’). 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Advocate General made their submissions extensively. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar , [ AIR 1958 SC 538 ] , P.V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa , [ AIR 1969 SC 215 ] Lala Ram & Ors. v. Jaipur Development Authority , [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ] , Rajasthan State Industries Development & Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society , [ (2013) 5 SCC 427 ] , P. Janardhana Reddy v. State of A.P. , [(2001) 4 ALD 129 SC,] and Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu , (2023) 12 SCC 401 . 13. Thus, the aforesaid facts would reveal that the petitioner is seeking appointment of Commission of Inquiry in terms of Section 3 of the Act,1952, and by considering his request vide representation dated 28.06.2025. 14. In the light of the said submissions, it is relevant to note that Section 3 of the Act, 1952 deals with appointment of Commission, it is relevant and the same is extracted below:- 3. Appointment of Commission 1. The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly: Provided that where any such Commission has been appointed to inquire into any matter. a. by the Central Government, no State Government shall, except with the approval of the Central Government, appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the Central Government is functioning; b. by a State Government, the Central Government shall not appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning, unless the Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the inquiry should be extended to two or more States. 2. The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman thereof. 3. The appropriate Government may, at any stage of an inquiry by the Commission fill any vacancy which may have arisen in the office of a member of the Commission (whether consisting of one or more than one member. 4. The appropriate Government shall cause to be laid before each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State, the report, if any, of the Commission on the inquiry made by the Commission under sub-section (1) together with a memorandum of the action taken thereon, within a period of six months of the submission of the report by the Commission to the appropriate Government. 15. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, while striking down the conferment of punitive powers upon the Commission. Supreme Court clarified the scope of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, affirming that while the government has broad authority to investigate matters of public concern, such inquiries must remain non-judicial in nature. 16. In P.V. Jagannath Rao (supra) wherein the Apex Court clarified that an inquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Act, to address corruption and mal-administration squarely falls within the ambit of “definite matters of public importance,” and that the existence of political rivalry does not, by itself, vitiate the bona fides of such inquiry. 17. In Lala Ram (supra), it was held that legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel bind the State when its policies have created enforceable assurances, thereby preventing arbitrary deviation in exercise of executive power. 17. In Lala Ram (supra), it was held that legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel bind the State when its policies have created enforceable assurances, thereby preventing arbitrary deviation in exercise of executive power. To fortify the argument that statutory discretion must be exercised in conformity with constitutional guarantees, Court emphasized that every administrative or quasi- judicial authority is under an obligation to act fairly, reasonably, and in a non-arbitrary manner consistent with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 18. In Rajasthan State Industries Development & Investment Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that executive circulars cannot override statutory provisions and that Article 14 does not countenance negative equality. 19. Opposing the present writ petition and appointment of Commission of Inquiry in terms of Section 3 of the Act, 1952, learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance on the judgment of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in P. Janardhana Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh , [2003 SCC Online AP 87] , in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) of the Apex Court. 20. P. Janardhana Reddy (supra), it is popularly known as the “Yeleru Scam Case” wherein the High Court examined the scope of Sections 3 and 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, and held that the appointment of a Commission is a matter of executive discretion unless a legislative resolution mandates otherwise, and that such discretion is not amenable to mandamus. The Court further held that even the discontinuation of a Commission under Section 7 is permissible if the Government forms an opinion that the continuance of the inquiry is unnecessary, provided such action is not mala fide or arbitrary. The ruling re-affirmed judicial restraint in interfering with the subjective satisfaction of the Government under the Act and emphasized that Commissions are fact-finding bodies meant to aid administrative or legislative measures rather than adjudicatory forums. This judgment is relied upon to buttress the contention that the impugned action of the Government is within the four corners of the statute and not liable to interference by this Court. Further, in the said case, it was held that appointment of Commission of Inquiry is the sole discretion of State Government, High Court cannot direct appointment of Commission of Inquiry. 21. Further, in the said case, it was held that appointment of Commission of Inquiry is the sole discretion of State Government, High Court cannot direct appointment of Commission of Inquiry. 21. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:- 23.The matter stands concluded by the Five Judge Bench judgment of this Court and we are bound by the judgment that the appointment of a Commission is a discretionary power of the State Government which has to be exercised by them on their own or on the resolution of the State Legislature and the High Court cannot direct appointment of a Commission although the matter brought before it might be of public importance, because ultimately what the Commission does is only collection of facts for the guidance of the Government for future action. Although we are of the opinion that if there is a matter of public importance and a request is made to the Government from every quarter for appointment of a Commission and it is rejected, the reasons for which it is rejected can be subject matter of judicial scrutiny, similarly if a Commission is appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, Courts would be within their rights to examine whether reasons exist or whether an issue of public importance was there, but, in view of the law laid down by the Five Judge Bench judgment of this Court we do not want to deal further on this issue. Particularly in view of the fact that at this point of time continuance of Commission would be an exercise in futility. 24.The learned Additional Advocate General has referred to some judgments to show as to what could be the parameters of the High Court while testing the exercise of the power of discretion by the Government including Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board, and R.D. Chemical Co. v. Company Law Boar, . The parameters are already fixed by this Court that this Court cannot give directions for appointment of a Commission under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It is a discretion which has to be exercised by the Government. In our view, the same parameters would apply to exercise of power under Section 7 . 22. The parameters are already fixed by this Court that this Court cannot give directions for appointment of a Commission under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It is a discretion which has to be exercised by the Government. In our view, the same parameters would apply to exercise of power under Section 7 . 22. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the unofficial respondents has placed reliance on certain precedents which delineate the discretionary nature of the Government’s power under Section 3 of the Act, 1952 i.e. decision of Delhi High Court in Bhagwat Dayal v. Union of India , [1973 SCC Online DEL 223] the decision of Rajasthan High Court in Vijay Mehta v. State of Rajasthan , [1979 SCC Online Raj 60] , the decision of Kerala High Court in Rajendran v. Home Secretary , [1982 SCC Online Ker 91]. 23. In Bhagwat Dayal (supra), the Delhi High Court held that an individual has no enforceable right to compel the Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, the power being purely discretionary unless mandated by a legislative resolution. 24. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:- As a matter of construction of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act, the appropriate Government is under a statutory obligation to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in a case where a resolution in that behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State and the appropriate Government has no option or discretion in the matter. In the absence of such a resolution, the power to appoint a Commission is optional and discretionary even if there is any definite matter of public importance. A Commission may be appointed by the appropriate Government if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do. This opinion is, by the words of the section, subjective. In other words. even if there is any definite matter of public importance, the appropriate Government may not appoint a Commission of Inquiry if it is of opinion that it is not necessary so to do. In Existence of a right is the sine qua non for the issue of a writ of mandamus. In other words. even if there is any definite matter of public importance, the appropriate Government may not appoint a Commission of Inquiry if it is of opinion that it is not necessary so to do. In Existence of a right is the sine qua non for the issue of a writ of mandamus. In The State of Orissa and others v. Rajasaheb Chandanmull Indra kumar (P) Ltd. Supreme Court 2112, (2) a contention was raised on behalf of the and another: A.I.R. 1972 that an application under Article 226 does not lie unless the petitioner has a legal right and the Court does not assist the petitioner to continue to do acts forbidden by law. This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court and the matter was remanded to the High Court for re-adjudication on the question whether the respondent- company had any right in the colliery in question. Relying upon the observation of Bruce. J. in R. V. Lewisham Union: (1897) G 1 Q.B. 498 that---- "This Court has never exercised a general power to enforce the performance of their statutory duties by public bodies on the application of anybody who chooses to apply for a mandamus. It has always required that the applicant for a mandamus should have a legal and specific right to enforce the performance of those duties". The petitioner has clearly no right under the statue, namely, the said Act and, therefore, no locus standi to move this petition for a writ of mandamus. 25. Similarly, in Vijay Mehta (supra) , wherein the Rajasthan High Court reiterated that locus standi to demand a Commission is absent and that courts cannot issue a mandamus to direct its constitution, the function being an executive prerogative and relevant paragraphs of the said decision are extracted below:- 6. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Advocate that the petitioner has no locus standi to move this writ petition, prevails and I hold that the petitioner has no right under the Act, and therefore, he cannot maintain this writ petition for compelling the State Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under the Act. i 7. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Advocate that the petitioner has no locus standi to move this writ petition, prevails and I hold that the petitioner has no right under the Act, and therefore, he cannot maintain this writ petition for compelling the State Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under the Act. i 7. It may be recorded that learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Government Advocate, during the course of arguments, referred to some more decisions of the Supreme Court, other than those which I have already noticed hereinabove, but in view of the well-settled propositions relating to issue of writ of mandamus under Article 226, I have thought fit not to encumber this judgment by entering into a detailed discussion in regard to them. 26. In Rajendran (supra) wherein the Kerala High Court emphasized that the discretion conferred by Section 3 is solely that of the executive, and judicial interference is not warranted except in cases of demonstrable mala fides or violation of constitutional mandates. Collectively, these rulings are pressed into service to contend that the present proceedings cannot be sustained at the behest of a private litigant, since the statute does not create an enforceable public right to demand the constitution of an inquiry commission. 27. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:- 6………..On a careful analysis of the terms in the above sub-section, it appears to us that the question of appointment of a Commission would arise only if, in the opinion, of the Government, it is found necessary to appoint one or when the Government is compelled to do so as a result of the resolution passed in that behalf, either by the Lok Sabha or by the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned. The expression "if it is of opinion" used in the sub-section makes . it abundantly clear that, unless, compelled by the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned, the Government has the discretion to appoint or not (o appoint a Commission in terms of Section 3 of the Act, depending upon its opinion. the averments in the writ petition do not show how the provisions of the Act, in terms of Section 11 of the Act, would apply to the facts of the case. In our opinion Section 11 has no relevance to the context. 7. the averments in the writ petition do not show how the provisions of the Act, in terms of Section 11 of the Act, would apply to the facts of the case. In our opinion Section 11 has no relevance to the context. 7. It is a well established principle that the Court normally would be slow to issue writ of mandamus to compel any person or authority, charged with the duty to perform any act, to do such act unless it is satisfied on the pleading and the evidence in support thereof that the party seeking that relief had earlier made a specific request in that behalf to such person or authority, and that person or authority had declined or refused to comply with that request. The absence of pleadings, much less evidence, that there was such an earlier demand to and refusal by respondents 1 and 2 to order an inquiry into the allegations made by the appellant-petitioner is an additional reason why this Court could not have granted the relief sought by the appellant-petitioner besides the long and unjustifiable delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 28. In Sri Ramakrishna Dalmia (supra), in paragraph No.13, Apex Court held that Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, confers locus upon the appropriate Government to appoint a Commission only where a definite matter of public importance exists, and not otherwise. The Supreme Court clarified that such limitation itself constitutes a reasonable classification under Article 14 and that even the conduct of individuals, if of such magnitude as to prejudicially affect public well-being, can validly constitute a matter of public importance warranting inquiry. 29. Relevant paragraph is extracted below:- It will be apparent from its long title that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers. Section 3 empowers the appropriate Government, in certain circumstances therein mentioned, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions within such time as may be specified in the notification. Section 3 empowers the appropriate Government, in certain circumstances therein mentioned, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions within such time as may be specified in the notification. It seems clear-and it has not been controverted-that on a proper construction of this section, the functions the performance of which is contemplated must be such as are ancillary to and in aid of the inquiry itself and cannot be read as a function independent of or unconnected with such inquiry. That being the position, as we conceive it to be, the question arises as to the scope and ambit of the power which is conferred by it on the appropriate Government. The answer is furnished by the statute itself, for s. 3 indicates that the appropriate Government .can appoint a Commission of Inquiry only for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and into no other matter. In other words the subject matter of the inquiry can only be a definite matter of public importance. The appropriate Government, it follows, is not authorised by this section to appoint a Commission for the purpose of holding an inquiry into any other matter. Learned Solicitor- General, in the premises, submits that the section itself on the face of it, makes. a classification so that this statute falls within the first category mentioned above and contends that this classification of things is based on an intelligible differentia which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by it, for a definite matter of public importance may well call for an inquiry by a Commission. In the alternative the learned Solicitor-General urges that in any case the section itself quite clearly indicates that the policy of Parliament is to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry to inquire into any definite matter of public importance and that as there is no knowing when, where or how any such matter may crop up Parliament considers it necessary or expedient to leave it to the appropriate Government to take action as and when the appropriate moment will arrive. In the tempo of the prevailing conditions in modern society events occur which were never foreseen and it is impossible for Parliament or any legislature to anticipate all events or to provide for all eventualities and, therefore, it must leave the duty of taking the necessary action to the appropriate Government. This delegation of authority, however, is not unguided or uncontrolled, for the discretion given to the appropriate Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry must be guided by the policy laid down, namely, that the executive action of setting up a Commission of Inquiry must conform to the condition of the section, that is to say, that there must exist a definite matter. of public importance into which an inquiry is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, necessary or is required by a resolution in that behalf passed by the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of the State. If the preambles or the provisions of the statutes classed under the first category mentioned above could be read as making a reasonable classification satisfying the requirements of Art. 14 and if the preamble to the statute considered in the case of Kathi Raning Rawat (1) could be construed as laying down sufficiently clearly a policy or principle for the guidance of the executive, what objection can there be to construing s. 3 of the Act now under our consideration as also making a reasonable classification or at any rate as declaring with sufficient clarity the policy of Parliament and laying down a principle for the guidance of the exercise of the powers conferred the appropriate Government so as to bring this statute at least in the fourth category, if not also in the first category ? On the authorities, as they stand, it cannot be said that an arbitrary and uncontrolled power has been delegated to the appropriate Government and that, therefore, the law itself is bad. 30. Placing reliance on the principle laid down in Vijay Mehta, Bhagwat Dayal, Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Rajendran (supra), learned Additional Advocate General would contend that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the present proceedings. Both decisions categorically held that Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act confers only a discretionary power upon the Government, and no enforceable legal right accrues to an individual to demand constitution of a Commission. Both decisions categorically held that Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act confers only a discretionary power upon the Government, and no enforceable legal right accrues to an individual to demand constitution of a Commission. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of such standing, is not maintainable in law. 31. In Union of India v. P. Venkatesh , [ (2019) 15 SCC 613 ] , the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of mechanically directing authorities to “consider representations” without addressing the merits, holding that stale claims cannot be revived through such directions. 32. In Santhamma Vs. Contonment Board, Secunderabad , 2001 (4) ALD 56 (DB) (supra), the Apex Court elucidates the fundamental principle governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It authoritatively holds that a writ of mandamus, compelling a statutory authority to consider a representation, can be issued only when the petitioner demonstrates an enforceable legal right to be considered or the existence of a correlative legal duty cast upon the authority. A representation that is merely extra-legal, a plea for sympathy or a claim not founded upon any substantive provision of law does not confer such a right or impose such a duty. The Court emphatically declined to issue a direction for its consideration, underscoring that such judicial intervention would not only be ultra vires its constitutional power but would also impede administrative efficiency by obligating authorities to attend to matters beyond their statutory mandate. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:- 5. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that this writ petition is not maintainable for more than one reason. Firstly, the representation made by the petitioner on 10-11-2000 to the Executive Officer of the Cantonment Board is an extra-legal' petition in nature. The question before the Court is not whether the Cantonment Board would be prejudiced or inconvenienced if the Court is to issue a direction to consider and dispose of the representation of the petitioner, rather the question is whether this Court, in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue such a direction to a statutory authority like the respondent Board herein when the mover of the writ application does not establish a right to be considered. 6. 6. This Court speaking through one of us (S.R. Nayak, J) in Water Users' Association, Peddacheruvu, Krishna District v. Dist. Collector, Krishna District, , dealing with a prayer to issue a direction to a public authority to consider an extra-legal petition has observed: "2. The Court can take notice of the fact that large number of writ petitions are filed in this Court seeking directions to the public authorities to consider and dispose of extra-legal letters, petitions, representations within time-frame. This case is one of such cases where such a request is made for a direction to the respondents to consider an extra-legal representation. The question which falls for consideration is whether such requests can be granted by this Court by virtue of the power conferred upon it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Although Article 226 of the Constitution of India speaks about the power of this Court to issue not only prerogative writs, but also orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose, it is well settled that Writs or Orders can be issued only for the enforcement of fundamental rights or other rights. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR, 28, Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, and in Fertilizer Corporation Kamnagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1981 SC 344 , while interpreting the phrase "any other purpose", in short, means the "enforcement of any legal right" and the "performance of any legal duty". A right to be considered is also a legal right which can be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, if the Court finds that a representation or a letter or a correspondence or a petition filed before a public authority is extra- legal, no direction can be issued to such public authority to consider and dispose of such representation or petition or correspondence under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, if the Court finds that a representation or a letter or a correspondence or a petition filed before a public authority is extra- legal, no direction can be issued to such public authority to consider and dispose of such representation or petition or correspondence under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court can also take notice of the fact that in some cases where directions were issued to consider and dispose of extra-legal, representations, petitions, correspondence or letters to the public authorities within a time-frame, and when those public authorities could not carry out the directions within the stipulated time, they are hauled up in the contempt cases. In a Social Welfare State, it is trite to state that the public authorities receive thousands of representations, applications, petitions which are extra-legal in nature seeking favours, benefits and expressing grievances, and seeking intervention and support of the State and State authorities. If the Court were to issue directions in all such cases to the public authorities to consider and dispose of the petitions, applications which are extra-legal in nature, thereby I mean, not made or submitted under any provision of law obligating the authorities to consider, the authorities may not find time to discharge their essential duties and functions entrusted to them by law, and the efficacy of administration will suffer". 33. In the light of the said submissions, it is relevant to note that Section 3 of the Act, 1952 deals with appointment of Commission of Inquiry and as per the said provision, the following are the necessary requirements:- 1. A resolution by the legislature of the State. 2. Notification in the official gazette by the State. 3. There should be definite matter of public importance. 34. The sum and substance of the aforesaid judgments also says that if it is definite matter of public importance, the State Legislature shall pass a resolution and thereafter the Government shall issue notification appointing the Commission of Inquiry. In respect of Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013, the appropriate Government may appoint Commission if it is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so. 35. As discussed supra, in the present case, the petitioner is claiming that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac.10.17 guntas in Sy.No.194 and 195 of Nagaram Village. In respect of Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013, the appropriate Government may appoint Commission if it is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so. 35. As discussed supra, in the present case, the petitioner is claiming that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac.10.17 guntas in Sy.No.194 and 195 of Nagaram Village. According to him, his father Sri Jamala purchased the said land from original owner Sri Nawab Mohammad Haji Khan, in the year 1964. But the petitioner has not filed copy of the said sale deed in support of his contention. He has filed a copy of e-pattadar passbook issued on 22.01.2022. As per the said e-passbook, the petitioner is owner of Ac.9.09 guntas of Nagaram Village, Maheshwaram Mandal, Kandukur Division, Ranga Reddy District and the particulars of which are as follows:- 36. The petitioner has also filed a gift settlement deed bearing document No.21922 of 2019 executed by his father in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.2.37 gutnas in guntas in (out of Ac.4.00 guntas) the total land admeasuring Ac.5.00 situated at Nagaram Village. 37. In the said sale deed, the passbook number and title deed number of petitioner’s father is mentioned. He has not mentioned about the sale deed obtained by petitioner’s father from Sri Nawab Mohammad Haji Khan, as contended by the petitioner in paragraph No.3 of the writ affidavit. 38. The petitioner has also filed copy of the registered sale deed bearing document No.3237 of 2006 dated 13.03.2006 executed by Sri Kethavath Lashkar in favour of the petitioner in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.2.12 guntas in situated at Village. 39. He has also filed a copy of registered sale deed bearing document No.8052 of 2006 dated 31.05.2006 executed by Sri Sabavath Bajya represented by their Agreement of sale – cum- GPA holder Sri K.Nagendra Prasad and three others in favour of petitioner in respect of land admeasuring Ac.1.04 in Sy.Nos.194, and Ac.0.10 guntas in 194/14/ total land admeasuring Ac.1.14 guntas situated at ? Nagaram Village. 40. Thus, there is discrepancy with regard to the claim of the petitioner over the land admeasuring Ac.10.17 guntas in Sy.Nos. 194 and 195 of Nagaram Village. Nagaram Village. 40. Thus, there is discrepancy with regard to the claim of the petitioner over the land admeasuring Ac.10.17 guntas in Sy.Nos. 194 and 195 of Nagaram Village. He placed reliance on the aforesaid registered gift settlement deed bearing document No.23750 of 2019 dated 08.10.2019 executed by his father in respect of land admeasuring Ac.5.00 guntas i.e. land admeasuring Ac.2.37 guntas in 45T Ac.4.00 guntas) situated at Nagaram Village. As per the latest pattadar passbook and title deed issued on 22.01.2022, the petitioner is the owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac.9.09 guntas and details of the same are mentioned supra. The petitioner has also filed the aforesaid two registered sale deeds. Thus, there is discrepancy with regard to his extent and survey number etc. 41. He has not mentioned the details of balance land i.e. Ac.5.17 guntas in Sy.Nos.194 and 195 of his father. According to him, his father died on 07.10.2020. He has not disclosed the details of legal heirs of his father. 42. It is also relevant to note that petitioner has filed a suit in O.S.No. 724 of 2022 for perpetual injunction against Sri K.Chavli and others alleging that they interfered with the possession of the petitioner over the suit schedule property illegally. Along with the suit, he has also filed I.A.No.881 of 2022 seeking temporary injunction. Vide order dated 30.04.2024, learned XI Additional District Judge, at Ranga Reddy District, dismissed the said petition. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, he has preferred an appeal vide CMA No.452 of 2024. The same was allowed on 28.11.2024 granting injunction in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has filed I.A.No.441 of 2024 seeking police aid alleging that defendants violated the said order. The same was allowed on 01.05.2024. Even then, the Police did not provide police aid to him. Therefore, he has filed W.P.No.15537 of 2025 and this Court directed the police to provide police aid to the petitioner in compliance with the order dated 01.05.2025 in I.A.No.441 of 2025 in O.S.No.730 of 2024. 43. The grievance of the petitioner in the present writ petition is that Respondent Nos.9 to 11 with the help of respondent No.14, got mutation proceedings fraudulently in the revenue records and also obtained pattadar passbooks. On verification of passbooks, it is found that their names are not mutated in manual records. 43. The grievance of the petitioner in the present writ petition is that Respondent Nos.9 to 11 with the help of respondent No.14, got mutation proceedings fraudulently in the revenue records and also obtained pattadar passbooks. On verification of passbooks, it is found that their names are not mutated in manual records. Names of respondent Nos.9 to 11 appears only on online records. Respondent Nos.9 to 11 sold the said property to third parties. He has also mentioned the details of sale deeds in paragraph No.7. Thus, according to the petitioner, respondent Nos. 9 to 11, with the help of respondent No.14, sold various extents to respondent No.15, 48 and senior IAS and IPS officers of the State by giving sub division numbers without any authority of law. All the said transactions are fraudulent transactions and there is land scam. The petitioner has also placed reliance on the order dated 24.05.2025 in W.P.No.12637 of 2025 passed by this Court. Writ appeals filed against the said order vide W.A.No.506, 508, 511 and 514 of 2025 were dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 30.04.2025. Thus, according to the petitioner, there is land scam. He has submitted a representation dated 28.06.2025 to respondent Nos.1 and 2 seeking appointment of Commission of Inquiry to conduct detailed enquiry in the said aspects. 44. It is relevant to note that in paragraph No.4 of the writ affidavit, he has stated that he has purchased land in Sy.Nos.194 and 195 at Nagaram Village. Though the petitioner stated that the said transactions are false, he has not mentioned the details in paragraph No.4 of the writ affidavit. He has filed three applications all dated 27.05.2025 with 6 th respondent with a request to furnish certified copies of mutation proceedings incorporating the name of Mohammed Abdul Javeed, 9 th respondent. The same was not considered. Therefore, he has filed three writ petitions vide W.P.Nos.17871 of 2025, 19065 and 19446 of 2025. This Court disposed of the said writ petitions directing 6 th respondent to furnish certified copies as sought by the petitioner. The said orders were not complied with by the 6 th respondent. If the said orders are not complied with by 6 th respondent, the petitioner has to file contempt case. This Court disposed of the said writ petitions directing 6 th respondent to furnish certified copies as sought by the petitioner. The said orders were not complied with by the 6 th respondent. If the said orders are not complied with by 6 th respondent, the petitioner has to file contempt case. He cannot submit representation port dated 28.06.2025 to respondent Nos.1 and 2 seeking appointment of Commission of Inquiry alleging that there is a land scam. 45. According to the petitioner, the land in Sy.No.195 is patta land but not Bhoodan land as per the revenue records. 46. It is relevant to note that Sri Birla Mallesh has filed W.P.No.12637 of 2025 against the respondents to declare the inaction of respondent Nos.1 to 8 and 10 therein in considering the complaints dated 16.02.2025 and 08.03.2025 regarding a large scale fraudulent land grabbing operation in Nagaram Village under Sy.Nos.181, 194 and 195 of Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District involving Senior IAS and IPS Officers, local police, and revenue officials by forging and fabrication of revenue records, and unlawful benami transactions, including the unauthorized transfer of Bhoodan land, as illegal. 47. On 24.04.2025, this Court granted following interim order :- Prima facie, it appears from the record that the lands in Sy.Nos. 181, 182, 194, and 195 of Nagaram Village, Maheshwaram Mandal, are Bhoodan lands vested with the Bhoodan Board under Section 14 of the Bhoodan Act. As per the said provision, the Bhoodan Board may, taking into account the wishes of the donor where possible, allot such lands to landless persons willing and able to cultivate the land, or to the Government or local bodies for community purposes or housing for poor and weaker sections. The allottee of such land shall acquire only those rights, and shall be subject to the liabilities, conditions, and restrictions as prescribed. Rule 9 of the Bhoodan Rules makes it clear that such allotments are heritable but not alienable. Pending adjudication of the issues raised in the writ petition, and in view of serious allegations made against the persons in high positions, and as there is a possibility of misusing their power to suit their interests, and in order to protect the communal property, this Court, by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directs the respondent Nos.4, 8 and 9, to forthwith include the lands in Sy.Nos. 181, 182, 194, and 195 of Nagaram Village, MaheshwaramMandal, Ranga Reddy District in the list of prohibited properties. The respondents are further directed not to change, alter, or alienate the said lands in any manner until further orders. In view of the serious allegations made against the senior public officials and as public interest is involved, the petitioner shall not be permitted to withdraw the writ petition. The Registry is directed to make an endorsement on the writ petition to the effect that the same shall not be permitted to be withdrawn. 48. Sri Gattu Kiran Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for Bhoodan Yagna Board, on instructions, would submit that the land in Sy.Nos.184 and 185 of Nagaram Village, is Bhoodan land. The said fact is also stated by the District Collector in the counter filed by him in the aforesaid writ petition. Therefore, applications seeking modification of the said order were filed. 49. As discussed supra, in the present case, the petitioner is seeking appointment of commission of Inquiry in terms under Section 3 of the Act, 1952. For appointment of commission of Inquiry, the aforesaid three requirements are necessary. In the present case, there is no definite matter of public importance. The disputes are civil in nature, that too, with regard to the land in the aforesaid survey numbers. 50. As discussed supra, there is discrepancy with regard to the claim of the petitioner. First he has to establish his right over his land, thereafter, he has to approach revenue authorities for implementation of the same. Vide three letters dated 27.05.2025, he sought certified copies of mutation proceedings incorporating name of 9 th respondent and the same are not considered. Therefore, he has filed the aforesaid writ petitions and this Court directed 6 th respondent to furnish certified copies to the petitioner. If the said orders are not complied with, the petitioner has to file contempt case, alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the same. Instead of doing so, he is seeking appointment of commission of Inquiry to submit representation dated 28.06.2025. 51. Petitioner is seeking order of consideration of representation dated 28.06.2025 submitted by him, he has to make out a case to grant such an innocuous order. Without making out a case and establishing his right, petitioner cannot seek relief. Instead of doing so, he is seeking appointment of commission of Inquiry to submit representation dated 28.06.2025. 51. Petitioner is seeking order of consideration of representation dated 28.06.2025 submitted by him, he has to make out a case to grant such an innocuous order. Without making out a case and establishing his right, petitioner cannot seek relief. The said principle was also laid down by Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in G. Santhamma (supra) and the Supreme Court in P.Venkatesh (supra). 52. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, viewed from any angle, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief much less the relief sought in the present writ petition i.e. appointment of Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act, 1952. Therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.