JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. The present appeal is directed against the part of the order dated 04.09.2024 passed in W.P. (S) No. 6704 of 2023 whereby the learned Single Judge has rejected the prayer of the petitioner/appellant for the payment of full salary for the period during which he remained under suspension i.e. from 03.11.2003 to 12.01.2006, on the ground of delay and laches. Further prayer has been made for quashing and setting aside the order as contained in clause (ga) of paragraph no. 04 of the notification as contained in memo no. 670 dated 23.03.2007 issued by the State Government after conclusion of departmental proceeding conducted against the appellant whereby it was ordered that the appellant would not get any payment except the subsistence allowance for the suspension period. 2. The factual ground of the case is that the appellant was appointed as Junior Engineer in the Department of Water Resources, Government of Bihar and was allotted Jharkhand Cadre after bifurcation. He retired from service on 31.01.2013 and at the time of retirement, he was serving as Engineer-in-Chief-II in the Department of Water Resources, Government of Jharkhand. The appellant was under suspension for the period from 03.11.2003 to 12.01.2006 and during the said period, he was paid the subsistence allowance. The departmental proceeding initiated against the appellant was concluded vide impugned order dated 23.03.2007 and the following punishment was awarded to him: - (i) Censor (year 2000-2001) (ii) Recovery of Rs. 1,89,580.35 (iii) For the suspension period, the appellant would not be paid any amount except the subsistence allowance, however the said period would be counted for the pension etc. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the appellant filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 6704 of 2023 raising two claims; one was for payment of difference of salary between the post of an Executive Engineer vis-a-vis the Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer and Engineer-in-Chief for the period he held these higher posts and the other was for the payment of full salary for the suspension period. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 04.09.2024 and though the first prayer with respect to difference of salary was allowed, the other prayer for payment of full salary for the suspension period was rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 4. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 04.09.2024 and though the first prayer with respect to difference of salary was allowed, the other prayer for payment of full salary for the suspension period was rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that before passing the order dated 23.07.2007, the appellant was not afforded any opportunity of hearing on the specific point of being denied full salary for the period of suspension i.e. from 03.11.2003 to 13.01.2006 and thus there was violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. It has further been submitted that the impugned order is also against the provisions contained in Rule 97 of the JHARKHAND SERVICE CODE . Moreover, the appellant had filed several representations before the competent authority of Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand for payment of difference of salary between the post of Executive Engineer vis-a- vis Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer and Engineer-in-Chief for the period he held these higher posts as well as for payment of full salary for the period of suspension. 6. It has also been argued that though the learned Single Judge allowed the claim of the appellant for payment of salary of the posts of Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer and Engineer-in- Chief, however exactly for the same set of facts and circumstances, the prayer of the appellant for payment of full salary for the suspension period has been rejected which amounts to adopting two different parameters for two prayers in the same case on the same set of facts and circumstances. 7. It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that non-payment of full salary for the period of suspension without following the principles of natural justice is a case of continuing wrong and as such the doctrine of doctrine of delay and laches, waiver and acquiescence etc. do not apply in this case. 8. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant for payment of full salary for the suspension period since the appellant failed to explain sufficient reason for raising the said claim after an unreasonable delay. 9. do not apply in this case. 8. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant for payment of full salary for the suspension period since the appellant failed to explain sufficient reason for raising the said claim after an unreasonable delay. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. In the departmental proceeding initiated against the appellant, the order was passed vide notification as contained in memo no. 670 dated 23.03.2007 whereby one of the punishments awarded against the appellant was that he would not get any amount other than subsistence allowance for the suspension period. 11. The appellant challenged the said order only in the year 2023 by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 6704 of 2023 that too without explaining sufficient reason for committing such a huge delay. Before this court also, the appellant has failed to show any cogent reason for committing the said delay in filing the writ petition. 12. The learned Single Judge had rejected the claim of the appellant for payment of full salary for the suspension period by observing as under: - “16. However, the stand of the State counsel with regard to laches will certainly apply in the 2nd issue i.e. in case of the punishment order imposed upon the petitioner in the year 2007. The petitioner really slept over the matter and knocked the door of this Court after almost 15 years; as such, this Court is of the opinion that for such act, he is not entitled for full salary for the suspension period. Further, there is no document or specific representation has been demonstrated by learned counsel for the petitioner in order to show that immediately, after such order, he has represented the department for such relief; as such, he is not entitled for full salary for the period of suspension. Accordingly, the 2nd issue goes against the petitioner.” 13. In the case of Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay and laches are such factors which are required to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay and laches are such factors which are required to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances. Filing of representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay. 14. In the case of State of M.P. & Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Others reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 15. It is thus well settled that delay and laches are the factors to decline the exercise of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights. 16. The claim of the appellant is that the denial of the full salary for the suspension period is a continuing wrong and as such the doctrine of delay and laches will not apply to his case. 17. In the case of Prahlad Raut Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences reported in (2021) 14 SCC 472 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “ 42. The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. There can be no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without cause, there would be a continuing cause of action. However, when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the delay. Once there is cessation of employer-employee relationship by an order of termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise when the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination is not a continuing cause of action.” 18. Thus, there are two types of situations; one is where claim of a person has been withheld without any specific order and the other is where final order rejecting the claim has been passed. In the first situation, there is a continuing cause of action and in such case, the writ petition may be entertained despite delay and laches whereas in the second situation, the cause of action would arise from the date of passing of the said order and such claim cannot be said to be a continuing cause of action. 19. In the present case, the final decision with respect to denial of full salary to the appellant for the suspension period was already taken vide notification dated 23.03.2007 and the writ petition was filed after 15 years of the said notification. As such, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order dated 04.09.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6704 of 2023. 20. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.