ORDER : Hirdesh, J. 1. This intra-Court Appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is directed against the order dated 20-12-2024 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 510 of 2019, whereby the writ petition filed by appellant (writ petitioner therein) has been dismissed. 2. In a narrow compass, the facts giving rise to present appeal are that in pursuant to selection process initiated by MP Jail Department for the post of Jail Warder (Prahari) in 1989 and on completion of interview, appellant being a Scheduled Caste candidate, was found place at Serial No.12 in the merit list dated 20-06-1989 and the candidates at Serial Nos.1 to 11 in the merit list were given appointment. Later on, after a period of two months, although the initial merit list dated 20-06-1989 was in existence for a period of one year, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Gwalior prepared an additional merit list on 28-08-1989 out of which, five candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste Category got appointment whose names were found place at Serial Nos.19, 25, 38, 45 and 51 in the merit list. Therefore, the appellant preferred a miscellaneous petition (MP No.2260 of 1990) challenging the illegal appointment of those five candidates. The said miscellaneous petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 21-11-1990 with liberty to the appellant to file a fresh petition in the event if occasion arises. 3. Again, appellant preferred a second miscellaneous petition (MP No.166 of 1991) challenging his non-selection, which was later on transferred to MP State Administrative Tribunal and was registered as TA No.88 of 1993. After abolition of State Administrative Tribunal, the matter was transferred to the High Court which was renumbered as Writ Petition No.2826 of 2003 and the same was dismissed on 14-07-1995 on the ground of non-maintainability of second petition for the same cause of action. 4. Being aggrieved, a Special Leave Petition No.26804 of 2005 was preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed. After dismissal of said SLP, a review petition was filed by which the order of SLP was affirmed vide order dated 03-05-2006. 5. 4. Being aggrieved, a Special Leave Petition No.26804 of 2005 was preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed. After dismissal of said SLP, a review petition was filed by which the order of SLP was affirmed vide order dated 03-05-2006. 5. After a lapse of 7 years, i.e. in the year 2013, a fresh writ petition i.e. WP No.5384 of 2013 was preferred by appellant against inaction of respondents/authorities inter alia alleging therein that in the initial merit list dated 20-06- 1989 his name was found place at Serial No.12 and on the basis of additional merit list prepared on 28-08-1989, three candidates (respondents No.6 to 8 therein) who were below the merit list, got appointment as Jail Warder (Prahari) in the year 1990 respectively and this fact came to his knowledge on 21 st of April, 2011 and on receipt of information through Right to Information Act, he filed aforesaid Writ Petition, challenging the illegal appointment. Such writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 17 th of March, 2016 on the ground of delay and laches as well as being barred by principle of res judicata. 6. Being dissatisfied, the appellant preferred a Writ Appeal No.120 of 2016 which was withdrawn vide order dated 29-06-2016 with liberty to the appellant to institute the proceedings seeking compensation in accordance with law before the appropriate Forum. 7. In pursuance of aforesaid liberty, the appellant approached MP State Scheduled Caste Commission and the Commission vide award dated 28 th of May, 2018 recommended for compensation of Rs.50 lac in favour of the appellant. Due to non-compliance of award passed by the Commission, appellant filed a Writ Petition No.4510 of 2019 seeking payment of compensation of Rs.50 lac awarded by the Commission and the same was dismissed by learned Single Judge of this Court vide impugned order dated 20-12-2024 holding that appellant instead of choosing right Forum has approached a wrong Forum and moved an application for grant of compensation before the Commission, which could not have been adjudicated by the Commission. Hence, the instant intra-Court appeal. 8. Hence, the instant intra-Court appeal. 8. It is contended on behalf of appellant that as per provisions of Section 9(1)(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Pichhada Varg Ayog Adhiniyam, 1995 (in brevity '' the Adhiniyam, 1995''), the Commission has power to decide application/ complaint of the applicant and has power to take appropriate action against infringement of Fundamental Rights of backward classes. 9. It is further contended on behalf of appellant that as per provisions of Section 9(2) of the Adhiniyam, 1995, though the Award passed by the Commission was in the form of advice/recommendation, ordinarily the said advice/recommendation is binding upon the State Government, rather the Superintendent, Central Jail, Gwalior had denied to comply with direction of the Commission in regard to payment of compensation of Rs.50 lac awarded to the appellant on the ground of mental and physical harassment. 10. Relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhulabhai and Others, reported in (1969) AIR (SC) 78 and Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited vs. Ananta Bhattacharjee & Others reported in (2005) AIR (SC)1400, it is contended on behalf of appellant that jurisdiction of learned Single Judge may be ousted by statutory Tribunal. Public law remedy for the purpose of grant of compensation can be resorted to only when the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution is violated and not otherwise. It is not every violation of the provisions of the Constitution or a statue which would enable the Court to direct grant of compensation. The power of the Court of judicial review to grant compensation in public law remedy is limited. The Commission has already exercised its power of a civil Court trying a suit, therefore, moving again to appropriate Forum would not be considered as an efficacious remedy. The learned writ Court has overlooked this aspect. Hence, prayed for setting aside the impugned order. 11. Learned Counsel for the State, on the contrary, opposed the contentions of appellant and submitted that no such power or authority is vested in the Commission to adjudicate compensation. The Commission's act is only as watch-dog, not to give any such direction for compensation. The Commission has exercised its powers beyond the scope conferred therein without jurisdiction. 12. 11. Learned Counsel for the State, on the contrary, opposed the contentions of appellant and submitted that no such power or authority is vested in the Commission to adjudicate compensation. The Commission's act is only as watch-dog, not to give any such direction for compensation. The Commission has exercised its powers beyond the scope conferred therein without jurisdiction. 12. It is further contended on behalf of State that earlier on three occasions, the merits of case of appellant were not considered at all and even the claim sought by appellant challenging non-selection on the post in question was denied on the ground of delay and laches as well as barred by principle of res judicata. 13. Since issue in question was a dead issue, therefore, the case of appellant was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 20-12-2024 holding that appellant instead of choosing right Forum has approached a wrong Forum and moved an application for grant of compensation before the Commission, which could not have been adjudicated by the Commission. Hence, prayed for dismissal of this appeal. Heard. 14. Regarding delay and laches, it is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr vs. K. Thangappan & Anr, (2006) 4 SCC 322 where-under it was held that the Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right and observed as under:- “ 6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ] . Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 ] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 ] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.'' 15. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T.N. (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :- ''11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard- and fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T.N. (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :- ''11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard- and fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8- 10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.'' 16. Also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India (2007) 9 SCC 274 has observed as under: 7. …......Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.'' 17. On going through the laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above-cited cases as well as on perusal of order passed by the writ Court, it appears that after a lapse of near about 7 years, i.e. in the year 2013, since a fresh writ petition was preferred by the appellant i.e. WP No.5384 of 2013 against inaction of the authorities regarding his non- selection/ appointment on the post of Jail Warder (Prahari), therefore, the same is barred by principle of res judicata. The learned writ Court has rightly dismissed the petition of the appellant on the ground of delay and laches. 18. The learned writ Court has rightly dismissed the petition of the appellant on the ground of delay and laches. 18. So far as the scope regarding function of Commission is concerned, the relevant provisions of Section 9(1) of the Adhiniyam, 1995 read as under:- (1)It shall be the function of the Commission- (a)to act as watch dog commission for the protection afforded to the members of the backward classes under the Commission and under any other law for the time being in force; (b) to watch the proper and timely implementation of programmes meant for the welfare of backward classes and to suggest improvement in such programmes of the State Government or any other body or authority responsible for implementation of such programmes; (c)tender advice regarding reservation for backwards classes in public services and for admission in educational institutions; (d)to examine requests for inclusion of any of the citizens as backward classes in the list prepared by State Government from time to time for purpose of making provisos for the reservation in appointments in the posts and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such lists and tender such advice to the State Government as it deems appropriate; (e)ascertain the category of person or groups falling under the creamy layer within the backward classes; (f)to perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the State Government. 19. As per provisions of sub-section 2 of Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 1995, the advice of the Commission shall, ordinarily binding upon the State Government; where, however, the Government does not accept the advice, it shall record its reasons therefor. 20. On perusal of aforesaid provisions of Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 1995, it is apparent that the Commission has only the power for forwarding the matter for recommendation/advice and not otherwise, like adjudication of the compensation. Therefore, the powers which are vested in the Commission had been exercised beyond the scope of powers conferred therein, thus, are without jurisdiction. 21. Having perused the impugned order, we are of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by learned writ Court are based on facts available on record, therefore, impeccable and the conclusion has been drawn after applying the correct principles of law. Consequently, this writ appeal sans merit, is hereby dismissed.