JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is filed challenging the order dated 17.02.2024 in E.A. No. 93 of 2023 in E.P. No. 138 of 2011 of the Subordinate Judges Court, Hosdurg. Appellant herein was the petitioner in the E.A. and judgment debtor in the E.P. Respondent herein was the respondent in the E.A. and decree holder in the E.P. 2. Appellant is aggrieved by the dismissal of an application filed by him under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) resisting delivery of possession to the auction purchaser. E.A. No. 60 of 2023 had been filed by the auction purchaser to pass an order of delivery of possession of the property purchased by him in court auction. Appellant filed E.A. No. 93 of 2023 contending that he has been residing with his wife and children in his house situated in a relevant property which was a land having an extent of 30 cents. He contended that he came to know about the delivery proceedings only when Amin came to take possession of the property. He resisted delivery contending that the said property had already been subjected to forfeiture by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Hosdurg and the learned Magistrate after attaching the said property had directed the District Collector, Kasaragod to act as Administrator of the same. Thereafter, the appellant had sought permission from the JFCM to permit him and his family to stay in the said property and the said permission was granted. Pursuant to the same, the appellant and his family have been residing there. He had thus validly obstructed the execution and had filed the EA. The execution court, however, without clearly understanding the scope of Order 21 Rule 97, dismissed the application preferred by him vide the impugned order without affording him an opportunity to adduce evidence. Hence this appeal. 3. Heard Sri. Saneesh Kumar K. Advocate, for the appellant and Smt.Narayani Harikrishnan, Advocate for the respondent. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Sub Court had failed to adjudicate the claim put forth by the appellant in the true perspective and contrary to the mandates of Order 21 Rule 101. Hence this appeal. 3. Heard Sri. Saneesh Kumar K. Advocate, for the appellant and Smt.Narayani Harikrishnan, Advocate for the respondent. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Sub Court had failed to adjudicate the claim put forth by the appellant in the true perspective and contrary to the mandates of Order 21 Rule 101. The learned counsel contended that all questions, including those relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceedings on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, are to be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit. Hence it was the duty of the Sub Court to decide on such questions. However, the application had been dismissed in a summary manner and without conducting any enquiry or granting any opportunity to the appellant to adduce or establish his case. The learned counsel relied on the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi and others, (2000) 10 SCC 405 and contended that when a person in possession of immovable property obstructs execution of a decree for possession claiming title, he may not be dispossessed till rights are adjudicated in appropriate proceedings. It is thus contended that the Sub Court had, without looking into the scope of wordings of Order 21 Rule 97, dismissed the application. The Sub Court had overlooked the fact that the appellant had been put in possession by an order of the JFCM and the said fact had not been denied by the respondent in the counter affidavit. Without affording an opportunity to the appellant to substantiate his case, the Sub Court had dismissed his application. The case put forth by the appellant in the application mandated an adjudication which was not granted, considered or discussed. According to the learned counsel, there ought to have been an inquiry or adjudication as envisaged under Order 21 Rule 101, however such an inquiry had not taken place. The case put forth by the appellant in the application mandated an adjudication which was not granted, considered or discussed. According to the learned counsel, there ought to have been an inquiry or adjudication as envisaged under Order 21 Rule 101, however such an inquiry had not taken place. Reliance is placed on the dictum laid down in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, (1997) 3 SCC 694 , Koyakutty Thangal and Another v. Kavunni Raja and Others, 2014 KHC 608 , Vasumathy Amma v. Janaki Amma , 2005 KHC 623, Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain and Another , 1995 KHC 729, Ved Kumari (Dead through Her Legal Representative) Dr. Vijay Agarwal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi through its Commissioner , (2023) 13 SCC 651 and Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi and others, (2000) 10 SCC 405 . The learned counsel thus sought to set aside the order of the Sub Court dismissing the E.A. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the execution proceedings arose in furtherance of an ARC proceeding and judgment since the appellant had mortgaged gold ornaments stolen from a jewellery and released huge amounts, which were to be recovered from him pursuant to the ARC proceedings. Crime No.402/2010 had been registered in Hosdurg Police Station and an Administrator had been appointed under Section 105F of Cr.P.C. after the property had been forfeited. As regards this appeal, the learned counsel raised the issue or maintainability at the threshold and contended that the appellant being a judgment debtor cannot prefer an application under Order 21 Rule 97 in which the order impugned had been rightly rendered by the Sub Court. The crux of the contentions put forth by the learned counsel is that the judgment debtor, who is the 1 st respondent in the E.P., cannot himself be an obstructor in the delivery proceedings. The learned counsel relied on the dictum laid down in Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust, 2022 KHC 6650 ; Ved Kumari (Dead through Her Legal Representative) Dr. Vijay Agarwal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi through its Commissioner , 2023 KHC 6802; Pothuri Thulasidas v. Potru Nageswara Rao , 2005 KHC 5109 and Sanjay Kumar Yadav v. Kaushal Kumar Mishra , 2024 KHC 3876. 6. I have heard both sides in detail and have considered the respective contentions put forth. Vijay Agarwal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi through its Commissioner , 2023 KHC 6802; Pothuri Thulasidas v. Potru Nageswara Rao , 2005 KHC 5109 and Sanjay Kumar Yadav v. Kaushal Kumar Mishra , 2024 KHC 3876. 6. I have heard both sides in detail and have considered the respective contentions put forth. I note that the primary question to be considered is regarding the maintainability of an application under Order 21 Rule 97 at the instance of the appellant who is a judgment debtor. If such an application cannot be maintained by the applicant, then the rest of the contentions put forth would be inconsequential. Hence I proceed to consider the question of maintainability at the threshold. 7. Order 21 relates to execution of decrees and orders and Rule 97 thereof reads as follows: “97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property: (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.” Thus Order 21 Rule 97 stipulates that in the event holder of a decree for possession of immovable property or the purchaser of such property sold in execution of decree is resisted or obstructed by “any person” in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. It is clear that an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the CPC can be filed prior to dispossession of “any person” in execution of decree for possession of immovable property. It is pertinent to note here that Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC however contemplates a situation where ‘any person’ other than judgment debtor is dispossessed by holder of a decree for possession of immovable property or the purchaser of such property sold in execution of decree, he may make an application under Order 21 Rule 99 complaining about such dispossession. Reading these provisions conjointly, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that ‘any person’ in Order 21 Rule 97 would take in the judgment debtor also. 8. To buttress his above said contention, heavy reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), which is the lex classicus regarding the interplay between Order 21 Rule 97 and Order 21 Rule 99. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had in the said case considered the question whether the appellant therein, who claimed to be a stranger, occupying decretal premises in his own right and who has offered resistance to the execution of the decree obtained by the decree holder against the judgment debtor qua such property, can request the executing to adjudicate upon his resistance and obstruction without being insisted upon that first he must hand over possession and then only move an application under Order 21 Rule 99. While answering the said question, Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that Order 21 of the CPC lays down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of the decree for possession obtained by a decree - holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. It was also held that the view that the claim of stranger obstructionist would be considered only after he has lost possession to decree holder, would result in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree holder. The following observation by the Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) is put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant as the trump card for the appellant: “5. The procedure has been provided in R.98 to 103, we are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under O.21, R.98 to 102. The procedure has been provided in R.98 to 103, we are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under O.21, R.98 to 102. A reading of O.21, R.97 CPC clearly envisages that "any person" even including the judgment - debtor irrespective of whether he claims derivative title from the judgment - debtor or set up his own right, title or interest de hors the judgment - debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the Court in addition to the power under R.35(3) has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possession of immovable property was legal or not. The decree - holder gets right under R.97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction removed and an enquiry thereon could be done. Each occasion of obstruction or resistance furnishes cause of action to the decree - holder to make an application for removal of the obstruction or resistance by such person.” 9. It is relevant to note that immediately after Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shreenath and another. v. Rajesh and others , (1998) 4 SCC 543 considered the expression "any person" in sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 and held that it is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the executing court could adjudicate the claim made in any such application under Order 21 Rule 97. Thus by the use of the words "any person" it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property, even those not bound by the decree, including tenants or other persons claiming right on their own, including a stranger.' The learned counsel for the appellant would relying on the same contend that a judgment debtor too would fall within the said definition of ‘any person’. To support his contentions he points to Koyakutty Thangal (supra) where this Court had concluded that the outright denial to have an adjudication of the claims regarding rights, title and interest forwarded by the appellants in the said case by the court below, had resulted in substantial miscarriage of justice and that the questions relating to the right, title and interest raised by the appellants ought to have been determined through a proper adjudication as contemplated under Order 21 Rule 97 and its succeeding provisions of the self contained Code relating to such an adjudication. It was held that the court below had not complied with the procedure contemplated under Order 21 Rule 105 CPC to have a determination through an adjudication and the findings entered by the court below that no questions arose for adjudication was totally erroneous and therefore, liable to be set aside. Earlier in Vasumathy Amma (supra), this Court had held that if any resistance or obstruction is made, it is for the decree holder to take steps under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and referring to Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) had held that when an application was made under Order 21 Rule 97(2), the court should adjudicate the same. It also held that the executing court must first adjudicate upon objections on merits under Rule 97(2) read with Rules 101 and 98 instead of insisting upon first handing over possession. Referring to the dictum in Kazi Akeel Ahmed v. Ibrahim and another, (1996) 8 SCC 372 , it was held that when an application under Order 21 Rule 97(2) was made, the matter should be investigated by the executing court. In Bhanwar Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the question whether an application though purported to be filed under Order 21, Rule 35(3) could be converted into one under Order 21, Rule 97 Order 21. The said question was answered in the affirmative and had directed the executing court to conduct an enquiry for removal of the obstruction for delivery of possession of the property covered by the decree and pass appropriate orders according to law. The said question was answered in the affirmative and had directed the executing court to conduct an enquiry for removal of the obstruction for delivery of possession of the property covered by the decree and pass appropriate orders according to law. In Vedkumari (supra), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it was the duty of the executing court to issue warrant of possession for effecting physical delivery of the suit land to the decree - holder in terms of suit schedule property and if any resistance is offered by any stranger to the decree, the same be adjudicated upon in accordance with Rules 97 to 101 of Order 21 of the CPC. It was held that the executing court could not have dismissed the execution petition by treating the decree to be inexecutable merely on the basis that the decree - holder has lost possession to a third party/encroacher. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had therein reasoned that if the same is allowed to happen, every judgment - debtor who is in possession of the immoveable property till the decree is passed, shall hand over possession to a third party to defeat the decree - holder's right and entitlement to enjoy the fruits of litigation and this may continue indefinitely and no decree for immovable property can be executed. 10. The question is to what extent the above precedents support the contention of the appellant that a judgment debtor can maintain an application under Order 21 Rule 97. This question has engaged the attention of various High Courts and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Pothuri Thulasidas (supra) has summed up the issue pithily as follows: “10. In Bhanwarlal v. Satyanarain, AIR 1995 SC 358 ; Srinath v. Rajesh, 1998 (4) SCC 543 : AIR 1998 SC 1827 and Silverline Forum Private Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust , 1998 (3) SCC 723 : AIR 1998 SC 1754 , the Supreme Court held that the word "any person" occurring in Rule 97, would take in its fold the judgment-debtor also. This view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.S.S. Narayana Sharma v. Gold Stone Exports, AIR 2002 SC 251 . Therefore, the obstruction that may have been created by the judgment-debtor, can be dealt with not only under Rule 35(3), but also under Rule 97 of Order XXI. 11. This view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.S.S. Narayana Sharma v. Gold Stone Exports, AIR 2002 SC 251 . Therefore, the obstruction that may have been created by the judgment-debtor, can be dealt with not only under Rule 35(3), but also under Rule 97 of Order XXI. 11. Where a person, other than a judgment-debtor, is evident from a property in the course of execution, he can file an application under Rule 99 of Order XXI for restoration of the possession. Such application is required to be dealt with almost as an independent suit. In N.S.S. Narayana Sharma's case ( AIR 2002 SC 251 ) (supra), the Supreme Court took the view that a person, who is not a party to the decree, does not have to wait till he is dispossessed, for filing an application under Rule 99, and that it shall be competent for him to come forward with such an application, even on the apprehension of such dispossession. Such applications are required to be dealt with, under the parameters of Rule 97. In none of the judgments, referred to above, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible for a judgment-debtor to file an application under Rule 97. If permitted, such a course of action would result in annulment of the adjudication that culminated in the decree and would open new fronts for second round of litigation on the same dispute. This becomes apparent for the reason that an application filed under Rule 97 or 99 is required to be dealt with almost as an independent suit, under Rule 101 of Order XXI. It needs to be noted that the question of treating such applications on par with suits would arise, if only they involve the adjudication between the decree-holder, on the one hand, and the third parties, on the other. The reason is that the rights of the decree- holder, on the one hand, and the judgment-debtor, on the other, have already received adjudication in the hands of the Court and culminated in the decree.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Thereafter, I note that the issue has been set to rest finally by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sriram Housing Finance (supra) wherein after a scrutiny of the mandates under Order 21 alongwith Rules 97 to 102, the Apex Court unequivocally held as follows: “14. Thereafter, I note that the issue has been set to rest finally by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sriram Housing Finance (supra) wherein after a scrutiny of the mandates under Order 21 alongwith Rules 97 to 102, the Apex Court unequivocally held as follows: “14. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that Order XXI Rule 97 deals with the resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property by ‘any person’ obtaining possession of the property against the decree holder. It empowers the ‘decree holder’ to make an application complaining about such resistance or obstruction. On the other hand, Rule 99 of Order XXI deals with the right of ‘any person’ other than the judgment debtor who is dispossessed by holder of a decree for possession of such property or in case where such property is sold in furtherance of execution of a decree. The said provision vests ‘any person’ with a right to make an application complaining about such dispossession of immovable property in the manner prescribed above. Rule 98 and Rule 100 deal with the power of the Court to pass appropriate orders upon an application preferred under Rule 97 and Rule 99 respectively. In so far as Rule 101 is concerned, it confers jurisdiction on the Court as well as casts an obligation to determine the questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, if any, arising between parties on an application made by the concerned person under Rule 97 or Rule 99 in the same proceedings for adjudication and not in aseparate suit. Lastly, Rule 102 clarifies that Rule 98 and Rule 100 shall not apply in a case where resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property is offered by ‘transferee pendente-lite’ i.e., the person to whom the property is transferred by the judgment debtor after institution of the suit in which the decree sought to be executed was passed. 15. On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be observed that under Rule 97, it is only the ‘decree holder’ who is entitled to make an application in case where he is offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’.” 12. 15. On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be observed that under Rule 97, it is only the ‘decree holder’ who is entitled to make an application in case where he is offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’.” 12. If follows from the above dictum that Order 21 Rule 97 provides a mechanism for the decree holder or purchaser to seek court intervention when they encounter resistance or obstruction from any person (including the judgment debtor) in taking possession of the property. If a judgment debtor is being dispossessed, they have a different avenue for seeking relief. In the light of the dictum laid down in Sriram Housing Finance (supra) the question whether a judgment debtor can prefer an application under Order 21 Rule 97 is no longer res integra. I note that same reasoning has been followed subsequently by the Patna High Court in Sanjay Kumar Yadav (supra), wherein it was held that petitioner in the said case who claimed to have purchased total decretal land from one of decree holders being one of the judgment debtors, cannot for the said reason be considered to be a stranger/third party in possession resisting the delivery of possession and for this reason his objection could not be decided by following the procedure prescribed under Order 21 Rule 97, Order 21 Rule 98, Order 21 Rule 99, Order 21 Rule 100, Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code. In Ved Kumari (supra) the word 'any person' used in Order 21 Rule 97 has been interpreted to be either the person bound by the decree, claiming title through the judgment debtor or claiming independent right of his own including a tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. 13. In Ved Kumari (supra) the word 'any person' used in Order 21 Rule 97 has been interpreted to be either the person bound by the decree, claiming title through the judgment debtor or claiming independent right of his own including a tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. 13. The perceived lack of clarity as to whether the Sriram Housing Finance (supra) to the extent it holds that under Rule 97, it is only the ‘decree holder’ who is entitled to make an application in case where he is offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’ would exclude any person including a third party or tenant, who is in possession of immovable property is also no longer res integra since it has been later clarified in Ved Kumari (supra) that the word 'any person' used in Order 21 Rule 97 has been interpreted to be either the person bound by the decree, claiming title through the judgment debtor or claiming independent right of his own including a tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. The same cannot however in view of the precedent laid down in Sriram Housing Finance (supra) extend to a judgment debtor for whom, right/remedy, if any, lies elsewhere and not under Order 21 Rule 97. As for the reason for the same, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pothuri Thulasidas (supra) that the rights of the decree holder, on the one hand, and the judgment debtor, on the other, have already been adjudicated in the hands of the Court and had culminated in the decree. Conclusion: 14. In view of the above discussion, the dismissal of E.A. No. 93 of 2023 in E.P. No. 138 of 2011 by the Subordinate Judges Court, Hosdurg is upheld. Ex.F.A. is dismissed. No costs.