ORDER : BHARGAV D. KARIA, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. B.J.Trivedi for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Anip Gandhi for respondent No.1. 2. By this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act, the appellant has challenged the order dated 24.07.2015 passed in Civil Application No. 50/2015 in Misc. Civil Application (Stamp) No.3439/2014 in Special Civil Application No. 3307/1991. 3. By order dated 24.07.2015, learned Single Judge has condoned the delay in filing Misc. Civil Application for review of a Judgement dated 07.10.2014 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 3307/1991. 4. Brief facts recorded by the learned Single Judge are reproduced for ready reference as under: “3.1 The aforesaid SCA was listed before this Court on 07/10/2014 and after hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondent being absent, the judgment was pronounced allowing the petition and directing the respondents to hear the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court, failing which the petitioner shall be deemed to have been reinstated on the date of the order of dismissal. The aforesaid directions were issued, as this Court had found the dismissal of the petitioner in SCA in violation of principles of natural justice.” 5. The learned Single Judge, after considering the submissions made by both the sides while condoning delay, has observed as under: “9. From the rival contentions, it appears that basically the applicants have explained the delay on two counts being (01) procedural delay and, (02) unawareness of various facts either by learned Advocate Mr.Pandit or incomplete information supplied by him to the applicants and thus unawareness of the applicants to the facts discussed above. 10. On the other hand, the opponents attribute the knowledge of various facts to the learned Advocate for the applicants Mr.Pandit, appearing then and argues that such knowledge of facts was available with the applicants. The plea of ignorance of various facts is sought to be met with by an argument that the learned Counsel Mr.Pandit applied for certified copy of the judgment immediately on 10/10/2014 and even otherwise the copy of the judgment was served upon the applicants by the opponent on 17/10/2014 and therefore they could not have waited for the service of certified copy and could have moved this Court immediately. 11. 11. Having considered the rival submissions, there is no dispute that initially the main SCA was scheduled to be heard on 15/10/2014 and subsequently by an order of this Court, it was preponed and notified on several dates prior to 15/10/2014 and ultimately on 07/10/2014 the judgment came to be delivered. It also appears that the learned Counsel for the applicants was aware of the said order and therefore immediately within a period of 03 days of the said order applied for a certified copy of the same. It also appears from the letter dated 12/11/2014 addressed by learned Advocate Mr.Pandit to the Chief Manager, Punjab and Sind Bank, Relief Road Branch, Ahmedabad that despite being aware of the judgment as aforestated and having applied for its certified copy, he pleaded ignorance about several developments as discussed in detailed in foregoing paragraphs. It was not disclosed to the applicants that he had already applied for the certified copy of the judgment dated 07/10/2014, on 10/10/2014. Thus, a show was made about his ignorance and it is on that basis that the applicants argue that their learned Counsel Mr.Pandit was ignorant of various facts. It is settled legal position that for the fault of an Advocate, the party should not suffer. Therefore, the argument of the applicants that they were not accurately informed about various facts discussed herein above, deserves to be accepted. 12. It cannot be disputed that delay of 42 days is not a huge delay and considering the fact that Corporate Bodies, more often than not, are bound by the procedures before filing necessary application as may be advised to them, in the Court of law. 13. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (supra), on facts it was found that delay between 18/07/2001 and 26/11/2001 was not explained. Therefore, on the facts of the case, the said authority cannot be applied. 14. In Lanka Venkatswarlu (D) by L.Rs.(supra), it appears that without assigning plausible reasons for condonation of delay and even after noticing the negligence in approaching the case by the Government Pleader’s Office and even after finding justification unacceptable, delay was condoned and in that context following observations were made in paragraph No.26 and 27: “26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 27. The order of the High Court, in our opinion, is based purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the bench. The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach",the bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality. Judges at all levels in this country subscribe to an oath when entering upon office of Judgeship, to do justice without fear or favour, ill will or malice. This commitment in form of a solemn oath is to ensure that Judges base their opinions on objectivity and impartiality. The first casualty of prejudice is objectivity and impartiality. It is also well known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to reason. Judges being human are not immune to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations of doing justice. The first casualty of prejudice is objectivity and impartiality. It is also well known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to reason. Judges being human are not immune to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations of doing justice. We may notice here the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, which are of some relevance in the present context. In Paragraph 11 of the judgment, it was observed as follows (Para 10 of AIR) : "If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fairplay and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct, justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." On the facts discussed hereinabove, the said authority is inapplicable. 15. In Balwant Singh (Dead) (supra), on facts it was found that the applicants seeking condonation of delay were not only negligent but had stated false facts and it is in that context that the relevant observations as regards sufficient cause came to be made in paragraph No.13, 14 and 16. This judgment also cannot be applied to the facts of the case. 16. This judgment also cannot be applied to the facts of the case. 16. The argument of the opponent that because the learned Advocate Mr.Pandit applied for the certified copy of the judgment dated 07/10/2014, the knowledge of it having been applied for by the said learned Advocate must be attributed to the applicants is presumptive argument, inasmuch as, the letter dated 12/11/2014 indicates that the learned Advocate having applied for the certified copy was not disclosed to the applicants and as stated above, he just pleaded ignorance of every material facts. Therefore, there is no question of dismissing this application on alleged suppression of material fact. 17. Under the circumstances, this Court finds substance in this application and the delay is condoned.” 6. Heard learned advocate Mr. B.J.Trivedi for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Anip Gandhi for the respondent-Bank. 7. After hearing both the learned advocates at length, it was suggested by the Court to put a quietus to the issue pending before this Court as, by the order dated 07.10.2014 passed in Special Civil Application No. 3307/1991, the respondent-bank was directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the appellant-original petitioner by observing as under: “5. Having considered the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner, it appears that in Manohar (Supra) the Apex Court while dealing with the case arising under the Right to Information Act where no hearing was given during an appeal, read the principle of natural justice in the provisions contemplating appeal. Even, otherwise, it is settled legal position that whenever serious civil consequence ensue out of an action depriving a person of certain valuable rights or keeping him away from the enjoyment of such rights, the principle of natural justice even if not specifically provided in the relevant law, must be read therein. This principle is well known and well accepted in a society governed by rule of law. Therefore to say that no hearing in absence of the specific provision is available to the aggrieved person is a travesty of justice which cannot be countenanced. 6. It is again rightly contended that witnesses being official witnesses, were well within the reach of the respondents. Fairness required the summoning and ensuring the attendance of such witnesses so as to given full and proper opportunity to the delinquent. 7. 6. It is again rightly contended that witnesses being official witnesses, were well within the reach of the respondents. Fairness required the summoning and ensuring the attendance of such witnesses so as to given full and proper opportunity to the delinquent. 7. Thirdly, it appears that the appellate authority was unable to dispute in the impugned order that the findings of the inquiry authority were not provided to the petitioner before dismissal. 8. In above view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained, as it was vitiated for the foregoing reasons. It is therefore required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded to the appellate authority of 1st respondent to decide the same in accordance with law after giving full opportunity to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court failing which the petitioner shall be deemed to have been reinstated on the date of the order of dismissal with all consequential benefits. Accordingly, ordered.” 8. As the Judgement and Order dated 07.10.2014 was passed ex-parte, review application was preferred by the respondent-Bank with delay which has been condoned and being aggrieved by the order of condonation, this appeal is preferred and is pending for adjudication since more than 10 years. 9. In such circumstances, it would be in the interest of the parties if the appeal is disposed of by issuing appropriate direction. 10. It is true that the order dated 07.10.2014 was an ex-parte order however, by efflux of time and considering the nature of litigation between the Bank and its employee, it would be in the interest of justice to direct the respondent-bank to provide an opportunity of hearing to the appellant-original petitioner as directed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned Judgement and Order dated 07.10.2014 as the grievance of the respondent-Bank that the bank was not heard is taken care by hearing learned advocate Mr. Gandhi for the Bank in this proceeding on merits. 11. In view of the above, no interference is made in the impugned order dated 24.07.2015 condoning delay passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Application No. 50/2015. Misc. Gandhi for the Bank in this proceeding on merits. 11. In view of the above, no interference is made in the impugned order dated 24.07.2015 condoning delay passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Application No. 50/2015. Misc. Civil Application is therefore, treated as heard and we are of the opinion that no interference is required to be made in the order dated 07.10.2014 whereby, the learned Single Judge has directed the respondent-bank to provide an opportunity of hearing to the appellant original petitioner. We are in agreement with the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by the respondent-bank and grievance of the respondent-bank of not providing opportunity of hearing by this Court is also redressed by hearing learned advocate for the respondent- bank in this proceeding. Therefore, this appeal is disposed of by directing the respondent-Bank to provide an opportunity of hearing to the appellant original petitioner and complete the proceedings on or before 31.03.2026. 12. We hope that both the parties shall abide by the above direction as the matter is very old and pending for more than two decades. Letters Patent Appeal is disposed of.