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2025 DIGILAW 1261 (AP)

Syed Shamsheer Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2025-12-29

A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA, BATTU DEVANAND

body2025
JUDGMENT : A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, J. This Writ Appeal is filed aggrieved by the order, dated 11.09.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.37068 of 2022. 2 . The appellant is the unsuccessful writ petitioner. The writ petition was filed seeking direction to issue writ in the nature of mandamus declaring the action of the respondent No.4 in issuing order in C.No.PR.23/2001, R.O.O.No.511/2006, dated 06.11.2006 imposing penalty of stoppage of three (03) increments with cumulative effect including on the pension against the writ petitioner and the action of the respondent No.3 in confirming the said order, as illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. 3 . Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 4 . The proceedings impugned were issued imposing punishment of stoppage of three increments in respect of a charge that, the petitioner was working as a Constable during the year 1996 and he was assigned duty of conducting search in R.T.C. bus at a time when prohibition was enforce in State of Andhra Pradesh. During inspection, a person was found in possession of illicit liquor and he was produced before the Sub-Inspector and a demand was made for payment of Rs.8,080/-. The petitioner followed the said person for collecting the said amount and a charge memo was laid against both the petitioner and the Sub-Inspector. 5 . The contention of the petitioner is that a charge-sheet was filed against the Sub Inspector whereas, the departmental enquiry is initiated against both after lapse of six years, and witnesses were also examined. The Enquiry Officer held that the charge was not proved against the writ petitioner. However, the respondent No.4 imposed punishment of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect. Questioning the orders of the respondent No.4, the writ petition was filed. 6 . Findings of the learned Single Judge: The proceedings and impugned orders were of the year 2006 and 2007. The petitioner waited for more than sixteen years and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for judicial review. The petitioner is guilty of laches and acquiescence. Therefore, at a belated stage, cannot be invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7 . The petitioner waited for more than sixteen years and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for judicial review. The petitioner is guilty of laches and acquiescence. Therefore, at a belated stage, cannot be invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7 . Arguments in the Appeal: (a) It is submitted that learned single Judge ought to have appreciated that the punishment is harsh and the petitioner has been pursuing with the Government for mercy etc., and the respondent No.4 imposing the punishment in spite of the findings of the Enquiry officer that the charge is not proved, is not correct. (b) Learned counsel for the respondents/Government submitted that the orders of the learned Single Judge are well reasoned, and after more than a decade of the impugned proceedings at a belated stage, invoking jurisdiction of the writ court is not correct and even the findings of the respondent No.4 and reasons assigned by him for not considering the report of the Enquiry Officer are justifying the punishment imposed. 8. Reasoning, findings and conclusion: (a) Laches: Admittedly, the writ petition was filed in the year 2022. The impugned proceedings are of the year 2006 and 2007. There is inordinate delay. Precedential guidance on laches: [i]. In Mohammed Yakub Ali Vs. State of Telangana and Ors. , 2016 3 ALD 251 : 2015 LAW Suit(Hyd) 507, vide para 13 and 14 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh referred to exercise of discretion in entertaining the Writ Petition, where the orders in O.A. of the Tribunal were belatedly questioned by way of Writ Petition. It is observed by the Division Bench that though no period of limitation is prescribed in Writ Petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, but the same shall be liable to be instituted within a reasonable time and proximate period of one year. At any rate, a period of three years is a reasonable period for anyone to ventilate one’s grievance, legal rights, which can be found the spirit behind the Limitation Act. [ii] In Y. Yadaiah vs. APSRTC, Rep. At any rate, a period of three years is a reasonable period for anyone to ventilate one’s grievance, legal rights, which can be found the spirit behind the Limitation Act. [ii] In Y. Yadaiah vs. APSRTC, Rep. by its Regional Manager , 2017 LawSuit(Hyd) 126: 2017(3) ALT 590 : 2017(3) ALD 657 , vide Para 7, its observed that although no period of limitation is prescribed, one cannot knock the doors of the Court, whenever he feels convenient for him, and where the petitioner was a deep slumber for twenty years, the Court declines to exercise the discretion. [iii] In B.R.Chandraiah Vs. the Industrial Tribunal Cum-Labour Court, Ananthapur, Ananthapur District, rep. by Its Presiding Officer and Anr. , 2017 LawSuit(Hyd)484: 2018(1) ALD 401 , it is observed at para 4 that 10 years delay was found as abnormal. [iv] In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Ors. vs. T.T. Murali Babu , 2014 4 SCC 108 vide para 16, it is observed in a case of four years of delay that the writ petition ought to have been thrown out.Paras 16 and 17 of the judgments read as follows: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” [v] In P.V. Narayana and Ors. etc., vs. APSRTC and Ors. Etc. , 2013 SCC OnLine AP 729 : 2013 Lawsuit (AP)2010 : 2013 (3) ALT 711 , while referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is observed that relevant considerations to be taken into account in determining the delay and latches, which are summarized in para 51, which reads as follows: “ 51. Etc. , 2013 SCC OnLine AP 729 : 2013 Lawsuit (AP)2010 : 2013 (3) ALT 711 , while referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is observed that relevant considerations to be taken into account in determining the delay and latches, which are summarized in para 51, which reads as follows: “ 51. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be taken into account in determining the issue of delay and laches may be summarized thus: (1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for the writ Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. (2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed restraints or fetters where the High Court may hot enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226. (3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application and every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus. (8) There is no waiver of fundamental right But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can take into account delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court (9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty of laches and where there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in service matters. (12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake up after the decision of the Court If it is found that the petitioner approached the Court with unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. Long Delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. (13) Where during the intervening period rights of third parties have crystallized, it would be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and where there is no cogent explanation for the delay. (14) Where the appellate authority acting within its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not ordinarily interfere with the order.” (b) Other merits: The dissent note on the Enquiry Officer’s report was transmitted to the charged officer / writ petitioner and his objection was considered by the Disciplinary Authority viz. Respondent No.4. The reason for not considering the Enquiry Officer’s report and the answers to the objections of the charged officer / writ petitioner are mentioned in the impugned orders. Further, Respondent No.3 has also referred to the procedure followed and was satisfied with the findings as well as the punishment imposed. Respondent No.4. The reason for not considering the Enquiry Officer’s report and the answers to the objections of the charged officer / writ petitioner are mentioned in the impugned orders. Further, Respondent No.3 has also referred to the procedure followed and was satisfied with the findings as well as the punishment imposed. Conclusion: Upon consideration of the matter and the laches on the part of the writ petitioner and other merits which are properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, we find that there are no grounds to interfere with the orders of the learned Single Judge. 9 . Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.