Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1265 (JHR)

Savita Devi, W/o. Shri Balram Baraik v. State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand

2025-05-01

RAJESH KUMAR, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2025
JUDGMENT : Prayer 1. The instant appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 19.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.2251 of 2022, whereby and whereunder, the writ petition has been dismissed on the ground that the appointment of writ petitioner was temporary in nature and she can be removed without any notice or without assigning any reason. Facts 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated which read as under:- 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that she was appointed on07.03.2011 and gave her joining as Physical Teacher in Kasturba Gandhi Girls School, Palkot. On 12.03.2011, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent no. 4 regarding terms and conditions of the appointment. It is specific case of the petitioner that she made a representation for her leave without pay from 10.1.2017 to 10.2.2017 on the ground of ill health. However, in course of time, on 21.01.2017, a student has committed suicide in the hostel, which led to enquiry and thereafter, the petitioner’s appointment was cancelled. 4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant was appointed as Physical Teacher in Kasturba Gandhi Girls School, Palkot. The appellant while working as such, was removed from service vide order dated 14.03.2017 as contained in memo no.218. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the said order, has approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2251 of 2022 challenging the aforesaid order on the ground that the same is stigmatic in nature but without providing effective opportunity of hearing and merely by issuance of show cause notice, the order of removal was passed. 5. The ground has been taken that even though, the response was filed by the writ petitioner in terms of show cause notice issued which was not taken into consideration. 6. The learned Single Judge has called upon the Respondent-JEPC. The ground was taken that the ample opportunity was given and considering the conduct of the writ petitioner to be dereliction in duty as also after taking into consideration the nature of appointment, which was on contract for a fixed term, the impugned order of removal from service was passed. 7. The learned Single Judge has called upon the Respondent-JEPC. The ground was taken that the ample opportunity was given and considering the conduct of the writ petitioner to be dereliction in duty as also after taking into consideration the nature of appointment, which was on contract for a fixed term, the impugned order of removal from service was passed. 7. The learned Single Judge has declined to interfere with the impugned order on the ground of nature of appointment of the writ petitioner was on contract. 8. The said order is under challenge by filing the instant appeal. Argument of the learned counsel for the appellant 9. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the response submitted by the appellant in terms of show cause notice issued and as such, there is no proper consideration on the ground agitated by her, which would be evident from the face of impugned order challenged before the writ court. 10. It has been submitted that since, there is no consideration of response and as such, the same is in violation of principle of natural justice and hence, the same ought to have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge but having not done so, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an error and hence, not sustainable in the eye of law. Argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent-JEPC 11. While on the other hand, Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-JEPC has submitted that the writ petition was preferred after lapse of five years from the date of passing of the impugned order. 12. It has been contended that the nature of appointment of the appellant/writ petitioner was on contract and as such, due to lapse of period, the third party right has been created, since, the Kasturba Gandi Girls School is required to have the employee in Physical Teacher. 13. It has been submitted that even otherwise also, there is no explanation of filing the writ petition after lapse of five years against the order of termination dated 14.03.2017 that to, the nature of appointment was on contract. 14. 13. It has been submitted that even otherwise also, there is no explanation of filing the writ petition after lapse of five years against the order of termination dated 14.03.2017 that to, the nature of appointment was on contract. 14. Further, the allegation as per finding recorded by the inquiry committee was that without any leave said to be sanctioned, the appellant/writ petitioner was found to be absent, which led casualty of death of student of School. The authority has considered the conduct of the appellant that serious lapses committed on her part and hence, taking into consideration the nature of appointment and as per the condition stipulated in the offer of appointment, the decision was taken to remove her from service. 15. It has also been contended that the principle of natural justice has been followed. 16. The argument therefore, has been advanced that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects of the matter, since, has declined to interfere with the impugned order, as such, the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, cannot be said to suffer from an error. Analysis 17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also the pleading made in the instant Letters Patent Appeal along with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-JEPC. 18. The ground which has been agitated that there is no consideration of defence, which was submitted by the appellant/writ petitioner before the authority in pursuant to the show cause notice issued by the authority concerned, hence, the impugned order cannot be said to be in accordance with law. 19. There is no dispute about the position of law that if any show cause has been asked and reply has been submitted, then the requirement is to consider the reply, which has been taken in defence and in absence of such consideration, the order as has been passed will be said to be not in accordance with law, rather, it will be said to be contrary to the principle of natural justice. 20. This Court is being conscious with the aforesaid position and adverting to the factual aspect of the present case that it is the specific case of the appellant that on the day, when the incident took place, she was on leave. 20. This Court is being conscious with the aforesaid position and adverting to the factual aspect of the present case that it is the specific case of the appellant that on the day, when the incident took place, she was on leave. However, the case of the appellant as per the defence reply is that the authority has recommended for leave but no leave was sanctioned by the competent authority but even then, she has proceeded on leave. 21. The question as has been raised on the issue of consideration of the defence reply is to be tested on the basis of the aforesaid admitted fact of no sanctioned leave. 22. It is not in dispute that the principle of natural justice is not to be taken into consideration in straight-jacket formula, rather, the natural justice is to be waived out if there is no chance of change in the decision in a case of admitted fact. 23. The inquiry is required in a situation where the fact is in dispute, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held at paragraph-64 which is being quoted herein below: “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” 24. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” 24. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein, their Lordships have held at paragraph-39, which is being quoted herein below:- “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason- perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”- meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker.” 25. Adverting to the ground taken by the appellant that there is no consideration and as such, the impugned order needs to be quashed and set aside but we are not in agreement with such submission, reason being that, the leave was not sanctioned but she was proceeded on leave. 26. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such undisputed ground even if, the matter will be remitted by interfering with the order dated 14.03.2017 then there is no chance of change in the factual aspect in such admitted fact. 27. The second ground which has been raised by the respondent-JEPC that even though, the nature of appointment was contractual and from the same, the appellant was removed from service on 14.03.2017 but the writ petition was filed after lapse of five years. 28. However, the learned Single Judge has not gone on this premise, but since, we are exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being furtherance of the proceeding of the writ Court, hence, has thought it proper to take this ground. 29. 28. However, the learned Single Judge has not gone on this premise, but since, we are exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being furtherance of the proceeding of the writ Court, hence, has thought it proper to take this ground. 29. The law is well settled that the limitation is not applicable, so far as the issue of maintaining the writ petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned but the principle of delay and laches is required to be taken into consideration. 30. It is also settled that every delay and laches is not to hold the writ petition as not maintainable, rather, if the delay has sufficiently been explained, then, such delay and laches will not be rider in entertaining the writ petition. 31. We, after going through the paper book as also the record of the writ petition, have found that no such explanation has been furnished as to what led the writ petitioner in approaching this court after lapse of five years from the date of order of termination. 32. The delay is having consequence in the facts of the present case, since, the nature of appointment of present appellant, was on contract. 33. It is evident from condition no.3 of appointment letter, wherein, the condition has been stipulated that immediately after end of the period of contract, the service of one or the other will be dispensed with. It has also been stipulated therein that service can be dispensed with without any notice given. 34. It is the admitted fact that the said appointment letter was dated07.03.2011 and as per the condition stipulated in condition no.5 that the service of one or the other contractual employee will culminate immediately after end of the period of contract. No further document has been appended, save and except, the offer of appointment letter dated 07.03.2011, which contains a condition that the period of contract will be for a period of one year only. The offer of appointment dated 07.03.2011, thus clarifies that the contract was on month-to-month basis. 35. The reason on that count, i.e., after expiry of the period of contract, the appellant has got no right to claim to be retained in service. 36. The offer of appointment dated 07.03.2011, thus clarifies that the contract was on month-to-month basis. 35. The reason on that count, i.e., after expiry of the period of contract, the appellant has got no right to claim to be retained in service. 36. This Court, after having discussed the aforesaid fact and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found that if the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the nature of appointment as also considering the reason referred in the impugned order, has declined to interfere with the impugned order, which according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 37. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed. 38. In consequence thereof, Interloucutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.