ORDER : Gadi Praveen Kumar, J. 1. Since the issues raised in both the Writ Petitions arise out of the very same impugned proceeding Rc.No.B/145/2018 dated 20.02.2018, they are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The Writ Petitions, W.P.No.7272 of 2019 and W.P.No.21577 of 2019, are filed challenging the Proceedings Rc.No.B/145/2018 dated 20.02.2018 issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer (Respondent No.3/ “RDO”), by which the RDO directed the Tahsildar, Uppal Mandal (Respondent No.4), to mutate the names of respondent Nos.5 to 7 in the ‘occupation column’ in respect of lands admeasuring Ac.1-31 gts. in Sy.No.34; Ac.1-24 gtsin Sy. No.35; Ac.1-36 gts. in Sy. No.36; Ac.2-17 gts. in Sy. No.37 and Ac.2-23 gts. in Sy.No.39, situated at Uppal Kalsa Village, Uppal Mandal, Medchal–Malkajgiri District (erstwhile Ranga Reddy District). 3. We have elaborately heard Sri V.Ravinder Rao, learned Senior Counsel for Sri S.Vamshi Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner inW.P.No.7272 of 2019, Sri Vivek Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019, Sri B.Mayur Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri AtlaAbhinandhan Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.5 to 7 in both the Writ Petitions, Sri Kohir Bhaskar Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.12 in W.P.No.21577 of 2019, Sri Md.Arshad Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.13 in W.P.No.21577 of 2019 and Sri Dara Haritha Kiran, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue in both the Writ Petitions. 4. The dispute concerns agricultural lands comprised in several survey numbers in UppalKalsa (Kalasa) Village, Uppal Mandal, Medchal– Malkajgiri District (erstwhile Ranga Reddy District). The controversy between the parties has been the subject of prolonged litigation before various fora. 5. The Petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019, Mr. Salla Chandra Reddy, claims to be the owner and possessor of Acs.15-23 Gts. in Sy.Nos.34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 794 & 795, relying upon alleged Agreements of Sale dated 10-04-1971 and 12-04-1971 together with a compromise decree dated 13-08-1990 passed in I.A.No.887 of 1990 in O.S.No.231 of 1987 by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District. By virtue of the compromise decree dated 13-08-1990, the Petitioner claims title and possession to Acs.15-23 Gts. 6. The Petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019 claim to be owners and possessors of another extent of Acs.15-23 Gts. By virtue of the compromise decree dated 13-08-1990, the Petitioner claims title and possession to Acs.15-23 Gts. 6. The Petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019 claim to be owners and possessors of another extent of Acs.15-23 Gts. in the same survey numbers, having succeeded to the lands from their ancestor, Late Sri Raja Malla Reddy, who purchased the lands by a registered sale deed. 7. Respondent Nos.5 to 7 asserts that originally Smt. Ashrafunnisa Begum was the pattadar and possessor of Acs.31.06 Gts. in the survey numbers in question. She sold the lands by a registered sale deed dated 20th Sherhwar 1354 Fasli (1944) to Sri Rokat Raman and Sri Venkat Reddy, who in turn sold the entire land by registered deed (Doc.No.195 of 1356 Fasli dated 10th 1356 Fasli (1946)) in favour of (i) Sri Raja Reddy, (ii) Sri Raj Malla Reddy (ancestor of Petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019) and (iii) Sri Matham Lingaiah (father of Respondent Nos.5 to 7), jointly. 8. Thereafter, Sri Raja Reddy sold his share (approximately Acs.10-00 Gts.) to late Sri Matham Lingaiah and Sri Raj Malla Reddy. Consequently, Matham Lingaiah became the owner and possessor of approximately Acs.15-03 Gts. 9. Matham Lingaiah died in 1970, leaving his wives, Smt. Matham Laxmamma and Smt. MathamNarsamma. Smt. Matham Laxmamma died issueless in 1994; thereafter, Smt. Matham Narsamma became the absolute owner and possessor and died in 2002, leaving Respondent Nos.5 to 7 as her legal heirs. Consequently, Respondent Nos.5 to 7 succeeded to approximately Acs.15-03 Gts. and claim to be absolute owners and possessors of that share. 10. Respondent Nos.5 to 7 filed applications for mutation of their names. Pursuant to the application, Respondent No.4 submitted a report dated 30-01-2018. Acting on that report, Respondent No.3 issued Proceedings Rc.No.B/145/2018 dated 20-02-2018 permitting mutation in favour of Respondent Nos.5 to 7. 11. Aggrieved by the said proceedings dated 20-02-2018, the present writ petitions were filed. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 contends that the impugned proceeding was issued by the RDO without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the original jurisdiction to effect mutation vests exclusively with the Tahsildar under the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (ROR Act). It is further contended that the impugned proceeding was issued without issuing any notice to the petitioner and therefore violates principles of natural justice. 13. It is submitted that the original jurisdiction to effect mutation vests exclusively with the Tahsildar under the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (ROR Act). It is further contended that the impugned proceeding was issued without issuing any notice to the petitioner and therefore violates principles of natural justice. 13. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District &Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao &Ors , (2015) 3 SCC 695 learned Senior Counsel urges that by virtue of the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 passed in I.A.No.887 of 1990 in O.S.No.231 of 1987, the petitioner has already acquired rights and interests over the subject lands. 14. Lastly, it is contended that the impugned proceeding amounts to a review of RDO’s order dated 19.01.2013 in Case No.A2/3841/2011, where the same RDO held that title disputes must be resolved by Civil Courts. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019 adopts the submissions made in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 and in addition, contends that the RDO impermissibly embarked upon deciding the correctness of the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990, which is not permissible in exercise of revenue jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Gangabai Ramrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra , 2019 SCC OnLineBom 1078 and on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. RatanLal Singh , (1974) 2 SCC 453 , and Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya , (1987) 4 SCC 525 , and a co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in K.Jaipal Reddy v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District & Ors , W.A.No.142 of 2009. 16. The petitioners therefore pray for setting aside the impugned proceedings dated 20.02.2018 by allowing the Writ Petitions. 17. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos.5 to 7 contends that both sets of petitioners lack locus standi to challenge the impugned proceedings as they have no subsisting right, title or interest in the subject lands. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable and deserve dismissal at the threshold. 18. It is further contended that the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 rests on unregistered agreements of sale of 1971 and upon the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990. An unregistered agreement of sale does not confer any title and is unenforceable in law. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable and deserve dismissal at the threshold. 18. It is further contended that the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 rests on unregistered agreements of sale of 1971 and upon the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990. An unregistered agreement of sale does not confer any title and is unenforceable in law. Reliance is placed on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana , (2012) 1 SCC 656 , M.S. Ananthamurthy &Anr. v. J. Manjula , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 448 , and Munishamappa v. M. Rama Reddy , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1701. 19. It is further contended that the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 cannot be a source of title because it was never registered nor implemented as required by the REGISTRATION ACT , 1908 and the relevant revenue rules. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Ripudaman Singh v. Tikka Maheshwar Chand , (2021) 7 SCC 446 , Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh , (1995) 5 SCC 709 , Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur , (2020) 9 SCC 706 and M.S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. v. J. Manjula , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 448. 20. It is also submitted that the compromise decree was never implemented under Rule 27 of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Rules, 1989, and therefore was not acted upon in the revenue records. 21. Learned Senior Counsel further draws attention to judgment dated 17.07.2025 in O.S.No.360 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.1420 of 2014) in which the learned Trial Court rejected the petitioners’ title claim after full trial and held that the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 does not convey title or create any interest in favour of the petitioners. It is urged that the petitioners suppressed the pendency of civil suits and approached the Court with unclean hands, disentitling them from discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision in K. Jayaram & Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority , (2022) 12 SCC 815 and Amar Singh v. Union of India , (2011) 7 SCC 69 . 22. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision in K. Jayaram & Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority , (2022) 12 SCC 815 and Amar Singh v. Union of India , (2011) 7 SCC 69 . 22. It is also contended that petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019 have no connection with the subject lands and that they were set up by the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 to create unnecessary litigation. 23. We have given our earnest consideration to the series of submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record. 24. The admitted position is that the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 relies upon (i) unregistered Agreements of Sale dated 10.04.1971 and 12.04.1971; and (ii) the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 passed in I.A.No.887 of 1990 in O.S.No.231 of 1987. 25. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the term "sale" and prescribes that a transfer of ownership in respect of immovable property of value Rs.100 or upwards can be effected only by a registered instrument. Admittedly, the Agreements of Sale of 1971 relied upon by the Petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 are unregistered. An unregistered agreement of sale is not a conveyance and does not transfer ownership or confer title. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamps (supra) held that an agreement of sale does not by itself create any interest in immovable property, such agreements do not convey title and cannot be the basis for mutation in revenue records. 27. Therefore, reliance by the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 upon the unregistered Agreements of Sale dated 10.04.1971 and 12.04.1971 to claim title, is legally unsustainable. 28. The petitioners also rely heavily on the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990. Respondent Nos.5 to 7 contend that the decree was obtained fraudulently and without their consent, and that it was neither registered nor implemented. 29. The REGISTRATION ACT , 1908, particularly Sections 17 and 49, is relevant. Section 17 prescribes documents which shall be registered and Section 49 prescribes the effect of non-registration. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that a compromise decree is not required to be registered under Section 17 (2). The law on whether a compromise decree requires registration is well-settled by the Supreme Court. 31. Section 17 prescribes documents which shall be registered and Section 49 prescribes the effect of non-registration. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that a compromise decree is not required to be registered under Section 17 (2). The law on whether a compromise decree requires registration is well-settled by the Supreme Court. 31. In Bhoop Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held that a compromise decree which creates new rights or conveys title in praesenti must be registered under Section 17 (1)(b). The Court explained that the determinative question is whether the decree declares a pre-existing right or creates a new right, title or interest in immovable property for the first time. If it does create such a right for the first time, registration is mandatory. 32. On examining the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990, its contents do not indicate that it merely declared a pre-existing right in favour of the petitioner. To the contrary, the decree appears to have conferred rights, title and interest in praesenti upon Mr. Salla Chandra Reddy for the first time. Moreover, the petitioner does not possess any pre-existing right derived from the alleged unregistered Agreements of Sale of 1971. The compromise decree does not refer to or incorporate the said Agreements of Sale. 33. Consequently, the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 is in the nature of creating new rights and was required to be registered in terms of Section 17 (1)(b). Being unregistered, Section 49 of the REGISTRATION ACT renders the decree ineffective to affect the immovable property or to be received as evidence of a transaction affecting such property. The said decree therefore, cannot confer title or ownership upon the petitioner nor can it form the basis for mutation of revenue records. 34. The petitioners also failed to take steps to implement the compromise decree in the revenue records in terms of Rule 27 of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Rules, 1989. No effort was made by the petitioner to establish possession or ownership in accordance with law or to secure mutation in the revenue records pursuant to any lawful title deed. 35. No effort was made by the petitioner to establish possession or ownership in accordance with law or to secure mutation in the revenue records pursuant to any lawful title deed. 35. Attention was drawn to the judgment dated 17.07.2025 in O.S.No.360 of 2022 (Old O.S.No.1420 of 2014), wherein the learned Civil Court, after a full-fledged trial, with the same parties and contentions rejected the petitioners’ claims and held that the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 does not confer title and that the alleged Agreements of Sale are unenforceable. The Pahanis relied upon also did not confer Title. The learned Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners. 36. The learned Civil Court’s judgment dated 17.07.2025 considers and adjudicates the same core contentions relied upon in the present Writ Petitions. The findings in that judgment directly refute the petitioners’ claims in the present Writ Petitions. 37. In view of the above, the compromise decree dated 13.08.1990 is not a legally valid document capable of conferring title and cannot be relied upon by the petitioners to establish any right, title or interest in the subject lands. 38. On a careful consideration of the entire material on record, it becomes manifest that the core controversy between the parties is one of title and possession over the suit lands. The sequence of events: (a) the compromise (1990) recorded in O.S. No. 231 of 1987, (b) the subsequent administrative proceedings culminating in Rc. No. B/145/2018 dated 20.02.2018, and (c) the judgment of the Civil Court in O.S. No. 360 of 2022 dated 17.07.2025, which followed a full-fledged trial examining the rival contentions on title and possession, clearly demonstrates that the issue of ownership and lawful possession is essentially one of fact and title, which necessarily requires adjudication on evidence by a competent civil Court. 39. 39. In the present case, the Competent Civil Court in O.S. No. 360 of 2022, which is filed by the plaintiff No.1, who is the petitioner in W.P.No.7272 of 2019 and other plaintiffs are the petitioners in W.P.No.21577 of 2019, filed for declaration of agreement of sale-cum-GPA dated 10.01.2014 bearing Doc.No.321/2014 as null and void and perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and their agents from interfering over subject land Ac.31.06 gts in Sy.Nos.37 to 39, 39, 43, 44, 794 and 795 of Uppal Khalsa village, had already considered the entire oral and documentary evidence and rendered findings on the effect of the compromise decree of 1990, the absence of registered sale deeds, and the validity of the alleged 1971 agreements. The Civil Court has categorically found that in the absence of registered deeds, executed in favour of the Plaintiff no. 1 therein (Writ Petitioner in 7272 of 2019) the terms of compromise filed in O.S. No. 231/1987 alone does not confer any title in favour of plaintiff no. 1 therein. Thus the alleged compromise in O.S. No.231 of 1987 which was unregistered, creates new enforceable rights under Section 17 (1)(b) of the REGISTRATION ACT , 1908. It was further held by the Civil court in the said suit that the entries in the revenue records, would not confer ownership, since entries in revenue records are intended only for fiscal purposes and cannot, by themselves, establish title. 40. The learned Court also specifically recorded the findings in respect of the earlier revenue proceedings, including those before the Tahsildar and RDO and held that serious disputed questions of title and possession could only be adjudicated by a competent civil court. Consequently, the learned Civil court found that the plaintiff no. 1 therein had failed to discharge the burden of proving ownership or possession either through any registered deed of conveyance or through any other lawful means. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed on 17.07.2025, though the civil court clarified that such dismissal did not amount to a declaration of title in favour of the defendants but merely reflected the plaintiff’s failure to prove his own claim. 41. If the petitioners are aggrieved by those conclusions, their remedy lies in availing the ordinary appellate remedy provided under law or in instituting appropriate civil proceedings, if maintainable. 41. If the petitioners are aggrieved by those conclusions, their remedy lies in availing the ordinary appellate remedy provided under law or in instituting appropriate civil proceedings, if maintainable. Only after the Civil Court conclusively determines the rival claims of title and possession would the administrative authorities be justified in recasting the revenue records accordingly. 42. This Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot enter upon disputed questions of title or possession over immovable property or re-appreciate the evidence already examined by the Civil Court. The scope of writ jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate, and it is well settled that the writ remedy cannot be invoked as a substitute for civil proceedings. 43. In respect of the plea alleging violation of principles of natural justice, it is well settled that such a plea, in the absence of any enforceable substantive right, cannot by itself invalidate the impugned proceedings dated 20.02.2018. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala vs SK Sharma , (1996) 3 SCC 364 , unless prejudice is demonstrably shown to have been caused to the petitioners by reason of such alleged violation, a mere procedural irregularity does not vitiate the proceedings. 44. Accordingly, having regard to the foregoing and in particular to the nature of the dispute, which is essentially one of title and possession, this Court declines to decide the question of ownership in these writ petitions. The petitioners are accordingly directed to exhaust their alternative and efficacious remedies before the competent Civil Court before seeking any further relief in this Court. Until such time as the civil remedies are exhausted or a competent civil court renders a decree or a finding which may have a bearing on the revenue records, this Court will not entertain any fresh challenge seeking determination of title or possession in writ proceedings. 45. This Court observes that the present writ proceedings are nothing but a classic example of avoidable litigation. The petitioners, instead of establishing their respective rights before a competent civil court by producing registered title deeds, have chosen to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on disputed questions of title, which are purely civil in nature. The petitioners, instead of establishing their respective rights before a competent civil court by producing registered title deeds, have chosen to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on disputed questions of title, which are purely civil in nature. Such conduct reflects a clear misuse of judicial process and an attempt to perpetuate uncertainty over valuable urban land through successive rounds of litigation. It also appears that the petitioners, upon the findings of the suit dealing with the entire issue in lis have colluded to create a various competing claims only to delay the litigation. 46. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims or the validity of the alleged transactions or the compromise decree, and all issues are left open to be adjudicated independently by the competent civil court in accordance with law. The concerned revenue authorities shall also abide by the outcome of such civil adjudication, if initiated, and shall act only in accordance with the final decree or judgment rendered therein. 47. For the reasons aforesaid, this court finds no merit in both the Writ petitions and accordingly hereby dismissed. It is, however, open to the petitioners to avail appropriate legal remedies as provided under the law, including by approaching the competent Civil Court for adjudication of their respective rights, if any, over the subject property. If such proceedings are instituted, the same shall be considered and decided independently and in accordance with the law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. 48. All connected applications shall stand closed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.