JUDGMENT: B.S. BHANUMATHI, J. This appeal under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, by the respondents 3 to 6 in I.P.No.17 of 2005 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Ramachandrapuram, against the judgment and decree, dated 02.11.2011, passed in A.S.No.197 of 2009 on the file of the Court of 1 st Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, allowing the appeal in part setting aside the order, dated 03.08.2009, of the Senior Civil Judge, Ramachandrapuram, in I.P.No.17 of 2005 adjudging the 1 st respondent in the insolvency petition as insolvent and granting six months time for discharge while declining the relief of annulment of transactions covered by originals of exhibit P2 and P3 passed by the trial Court. 2. During the pendency of this appeal, the 9 th respondent died and respondents 12 to 14 have been brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased 9 th respondent, vide order, dated 20.11.2024, in I.A.No.3 of 2024. 3. Heard Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri P. Rajesh Babu, learned counsel for the respondents No.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13 and 14. In spite of service of notice, there is no appearance for respondents No.10 & 11. 4. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they are arrayed in the insolvency petition before the trial Court. 5. The facts, in brief, are as follows: a. The petitioners/creditors filed the petition under Section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, to adjudge the respondent No.1 as insolvent and to annul the registered sale deeds dated 09.03.2005 executed by the respondents 1 and 2 through the respondents 3 and 4 to the respondents 5 and 6 in respect of petition ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule house and land properties. It is alleged that the respondent No.1 borrowed certain amounts from the petitioners on different dates and executed promissory notes in their favour as shown below: Sl. No. Borrowed from Amount Date 1 1st petitioner 60,000 29-09-2002 2 2nd petitioner 70,000 10-10-2003 3 3rd petitioner 72,000 11-11-2003 4 4th petitioner 70,000 25-09-2002 5 5th petitioner 90,000 09-01-2004 6 6th petitioner 1,10,000 25-02-2004 7 7th petitioner 30,000 15-12-2004 8 8th petitioner 65,000 04-02-2005 9 9th petitioner 1,00,000 10-01-2005 b. In spite of demands, the respondent No.1 did not repay the said amounts. The respondent No.1, with a fraudulent intention to defeat the rights of the petitioners, the respondent No.1 created possessory sale agreements-cum-general power of attorney in the name of the respondents No.3 and 4 who, in turn, executed sale deeds, dated 09.03.2005 in favour of the respondents 5 and 6 for the petition ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties. The sale deeds are not supported by consideration. In fact, the respondents 3 and 4 were never in possession and enjoyment of the properties but the respondents 1 and 2 are only in possession and enjoyment of the schedule properties. ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are ancestral house and land properties. The respondent No.2 is father of the respondent No.1 and the respondents No.1, 3 and 4 are the business associates and the respondents No.5 & 6 are closely related to the respondents No.1 and 2. Thus, in order to defeat the rights of the petitioners and delay the repayment, the respondent No.1 transferred the whole property owned and possessed by him to other respondents. 6. The respondents 1 and 2 remained ex parte before the trial Court. 7. The respondents 5 and 6 filed common counter and the same was adopted by the respondents 3 and 4. In the counter filed by the respondents 5 and 6, it was mainly contended as follows: The material averments were denied. The pronotes were brought into existence by the petitioners and they are collusive transactions. The respondents 5 and 6 purchased the property from the respondents 3 and 4, who are the GPA holders who got agreements of sale from the respondents 1 and 2 for a valuable consideration and obtained delivery of possession. The petitioners are not entitled to any relief against these respondents. The averments that the respondents 5 and 6 are close relations to the respondents 1 and 2 and they are in collusion and the further averment that the sale deeds in their favour are nominal documents and that the respondents 3 and 4 were never in possession and enjoyment of the said properties were denied. The petition is barred by limitation. Thus, it is prayed to dismiss the petition. 8. During the course of enquiry, PWs 1 to 9 were examined and exhibits P1 to P21 were marked on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is barred by limitation. Thus, it is prayed to dismiss the petition. 8. During the course of enquiry, PWs 1 to 9 were examined and exhibits P1 to P21 were marked on behalf of the petitioners. On behalf of the respondents, RWs 1 to 8 were examined and exhibits R1 to R16 were marked. 9. Exhibit P1 is the certified copy of the GPA-cum-agreement of sale executed by the respondents 1 and 2 in favour of respondent No.3; exhibit P2 is the certified copy of GPA-cum-agreement of sale executed by the respondent No.1 in favour of the respondent No.3; exhibits P3 & P4 are the sale deeds, dated 09.03.20025, executed by respondents 3 and 4 respectively; exhibit P5 is the notarized copy of the pronote, dated 29.09.2002, executed by respondent No.1; exhibit P6 is the notice, dated 07.04.2005 issued by the petitioners to the respondents 1 and 2; exhibits P7 & P8 are the postal acknowledgment, dated 12.04.2005 and 13.04.2005; exhibit P9 is the notice, dated 22.04.2005, issued by the petitioners; exhibits P10 to P13 are the acknowledgments, dated 27.04.2005, of the respondents 1, 2, 5 & 6 respectively; exhibits P14 to P16 are the notarized copies of the pronotes executed by the respondent No.1, dated 10.10.2003, 11.11.2003 and 09.01.2004; exhibit P17 is the notarized copy of the pronote, dated 25.02.2004; exhibits P17 to P20 are the notarized copies of the pronotes, dated 25.02.2004, 04.02.2005, 10.01.2005 and 15.12.2004 respectively; exhibit P21 is the pronote, dated 25.09.2002, executed by the respondent No.1 in favour of the petitioner No.4. Exhibit R1 is the certified copy of the registration extract; exhibit R2 is the house tax receipt; exhibits R3 & R4 are the original pattadar passbooks issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer; exhibit R5 is the reply notice; exhibits R6 to R8 are the postal acknowledgments of the petitioners 7, 8 & 9; exhibit R9 is the reply notice to the respondent No.9; and exhibits R10 to R16 are the acknowledgments. 10. The trial Court framed the following points: 1. Whether the petitioners proved that the 1 st respondent is their debtor? 2. Whether the 1 st respondent committed act of insolvency and hence can he be adjudged as insolvent? 3. 10. The trial Court framed the following points: 1. Whether the petitioners proved that the 1 st respondent is their debtor? 2. Whether the 1 st respondent committed act of insolvency and hence can he be adjudged as insolvent? 3. Whether at this stage, this Court can go into the question of annulment of the sale deeds whereunder the property said to be transferred by the respondent No.1 joining with respondent No.2 to the respondent No.5 and respondent No.6 through the respondent No.3 and respondent No.4? 4. If so, whether the registered sale deeds, dated 09.03.2005, can be annulled? 5. Whether the petition is barred by limitation? 11. On point No.1, the trial Court held that the petitioners 1 to 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 have proved that the 1 st respondent is their debtor. On point No.2, the trial Court held that the 1 st respondent committed act of insolvency; on point Nos.3 & 4, the trial Court held that at this stage, the transactions under the registered sale deeds cannot be annulled; and finally on point No.5, the trial Court held that the petition is beyond the limitation period. Then, the trial Court dismissed the petition as barred by limitation. 12. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful petitioners preferred appeal before the Court of I Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry. 13. The appellate Court, after referring to the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act and the conditions laid down thereunder, partly allowed the appeal. The operative portion of the judgment impugned reads as follows: “In the instant case on hand, by the date of filing petition, seeking relief under Section 54 of the Act, the debtor/appellant herein, was not adjudged as insolvent. So, the first condition was not satisfied. The petitioner/ creditor did not approach the Official Receiver and prove his debt as contemplated U/Sec 54-A of Provincial Insolvency Act for the reason that, the question of proof of debt would not arise unless the debtor is adjudged as insolvent and administration of estate is entrusted to the Official Receiver. Therefore, compliance of the procedure contemplated U/Sec.54-A was not established by the petitioner/creditor. In view of the above discussion, the relief of annulment of transactions covered by Ex.P3 and P4 cannot be granted. Therefore, compliance of the procedure contemplated U/Sec.54-A was not established by the petitioner/creditor. In view of the above discussion, the relief of annulment of transactions covered by Ex.P3 and P4 cannot be granted. IN THE RESULT, the appeal is allowed in part setting aside the order of Senior Civil Judge, Ramachandrapuram in I.P 17/05 dt.3-8-2009 adjudging the 1 st respondent as insolvent granting six months time for discharge while declining the relief of annulment of transactions covered by originals of Ex.P2 and P3, passed by the trial Court. Each party do bear their own costs.” 14. Aggrieved thereby, this CMSA is preferred by the respondents 3 to 6 in A.S.No.197 of 2009. 15. In the grounds of appeal, it is urged that the lower appellate court grossly erred in reversing the well considered order of the trial court dismissing the insolvency petition holding that the same is barred by law of limitation as prescribed under Section 9(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. The lower appellate Court erred in adjudging the respondent No.1 as insolvent though the petitioners failed to establish the same by producing cogent evidence and it wrongly interpreted the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act and the Transfer of Property Act as regards the period of limitation. It is further urged that the lower appellate Court failed to consider the fact that execution of exhibits P1 and P2 amounts to transfer of property and the finding that no interest or charge over the immovable property is created under those documents is per se illegal and against the spirit of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 16. This Court, during the course of hearing of this second appeal, framed the following substantial question of law: “Whether Ex.P1 & Ex.P2 (GPAs-cum-possessory agreements of sale) are transfers under Section 2(f) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920? 17. Section 2(f) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, reads as under: (f) “transfer of property” includes a transfer of any interest in property and the creation of any charge upon property. 18. An act of insolvency is committed when the debtor makes an insolvency petition. If the same is dismissed, the creditor can make an insolvency petition on this ground within a period of three months from the date when the debtor presented his petition. 18. An act of insolvency is committed when the debtor makes an insolvency petition. If the same is dismissed, the creditor can make an insolvency petition on this ground within a period of three months from the date when the debtor presented his petition. The adjudication petition should be made within a period of three months from the date when the property was sold and not when the sale was confirmed, vide decision Kanai Lal Nandy Vs. Tinkari De, [ AIR 1933 Cal 564 ] 19. Section 78 of the Insolvency Act deals with the limitation and it reads as follows: “78. Limitation.—(1) The provisions of sections 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), shall apply to appeals and applications under this Act, and for the purpose of the said section 12, a decision under section 4 shall be deemed to be a decree. (2) Where an order of adjudication has been annulled under this Act, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree (other than a suit or application in respect of which the leave of the Court was obtained under sub-section (2) of section 28) which might have been brought or made but for the making of an order of adjudication under this Act, the period from the date of the order of adjudication to the date of the order of annulment shall be excluded: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a suit or application in respect of a debt provable but not proved under this Act.” 20. The main contention of the appellants is that the petition was barred by limitation as rightly held by the insolvency Court as interest was created in favour of the transferees under exhibits P1 and P2 as the entire consideration was received and possession of the property was delivered to the vendees under documents registered on payment of stamp duty required for sale deed, and thus, the petition ought to have been filed within three months from the date of execution of exhibits P1 and P2 and not exhibits P3 and P4, but, the appellate Court erroneously appreciated the legal proposition and concluded the period of limitation commenced from the date of the registered sale deeds under exhibits P3 and P4. It is further contended that the Courts below erroneously appreciated the evidence and held that the respondent No.1 is insolvent without there being cogent evidence. 21. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents argued that the appellate Court had rightly appreciated the legal proposition basing on the decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and another, [(2012) 1 Supreme Court Cases 656], wherein it was categorically held that an agreement of sale/GPA/Will transfer does not convey any title nor does create any interest in the immovable property. 22. Insofar as proof of insolvency of respondent No.1/debtor is concerned, he submitted that both the Courts below concurrently held that he is insolvent and the finding does not require any interference in the second appeal. 23. During the course of arguments, both the parties emphasized more on the question of limitation rather than the question of insolvency of the respondent No.1/debtor. As rightly contended, since the finding of both the Courts below is concurrent on this point and exhaustive and no illegality is found, the same does not call for any interference. 24. Insofar as the question of limitation is concerned, the insolvency Court is of the view that the contents of exhibits P1 & P2 indicate that there was transfer of property as per Section 2(1)(f) of the Provincial Insolvency Act read with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act on receipt of entire amount of consideration coupled with delivery of possession of the property under registered documents on payment of stamp duty required for sale deeds, and therefore, the starting point for limitation is the date of execution of exhibits P1 & P2, but not exhibits P3 & P4. 25. On the other hand, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (1 supra), the appellate Court held that there was no transfer of interest under exhibits P1 and P2, and therefore, the trial Court was in error in appreciating the facts and law on this point. 26. The relevant portion of the decision in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and another (1 supra) is as follows: “23. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. 26. The relevant portion of the decision in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and another (1 supra) is as follows: “23. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank : 94 (2001) DLT 841 that the "concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction" when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintended misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law. 24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales. 25. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. 26. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. 26. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not 'transfers' or 'sales' and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision. 27. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favor of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bona fide/genuine transactions.” 27. In the light of the above decision and on consideration of the documents under exhibits P1 and P2, the limitation starts from the date of execution of Exs.P3 and P4 but not from the date of execution of Exs.P1 and P2. Our observations regarding 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bona fide/genuine transactions.” 27. In the light of the above decision and on consideration of the documents under exhibits P1 and P2, the limitation starts from the date of execution of Exs.P3 and P4 but not from the date of execution of Exs.P1 and P2. But, the trial Court on erroneous appreciation of facts and law concluded that the limitation starts from the date of execution of Exs.P1 and P2 though no interest or charge over the immovable property is created and such act would not amount to ‘transfer of property’ within the definition of Section 2(f) of the Act. Therefore, the finding of the appellate Court on this point is legal and does not require any interference. 28. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.