ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur['the High Court'], dated 23.11.2023, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.102/2019 by which the High Court has quashed FIR No.376/2018, dated 29.10.2018, registered with Police Station Ashok Nagar, District Jaipur Metropolitan (South), and proceedings emanating therefrom under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 473, 474 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 3. The appellant before this Court is the first informant (de facto complainant) who lodged the 'the High Court' First Information Report (FIR) alleging that by setting up a bogus/forged registered lease deed dated 29.04.2009, purported to have been executed by Jaipur Development Authority in favour of the second respondent, an agreement for sale was entered into by the accused with the de facto complainant whereunder a part of the subject matter of the alleged lease was proposed to be transferred in favour of the de facto complainant for a consideration of Rs.61,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty One Lakh) out of which Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh) was obtained by way of advance. The allegation is that later, upon enquiry, it was found that the lease deed dated 29.04.2009 is a bogus document. 4. Thus, in a nutshell, the case against the accused is that they used a forged and fabricated document to cheat the de facto complainant. Additionally, it was alleged that the accused had cheated several persons by entering into similar transactions. 5. The second and third respondents, who are accused in the aforesaid case, prayed for quashing of the FIR by claiming that they themselves are victims of fraud. They pleaded that employees of their Company held out to them that the lease deed was a genuine document and on basis whereof the second and third respondents entered into an agreement with the de facto complainant. To show their bona fides, the second and third respondents offered to refund the money advanced by the de facto complainant. 6. They pleaded that employees of their Company held out to them that the lease deed was a genuine document and on basis whereof the second and third respondents entered into an agreement with the de facto complainant. To show their bona fides, the second and third respondents offered to refund the money advanced by the de facto complainant. 6. The High Court quashed the FIR and the consequential proceedings, inter alia, on the grounds (a) that earlier also FIR No.604/2017 was lodged wherein, after investigation, on the basis of statement of witnesses, involvement of only two other persons was found in creating forged pattas; (b) that the accused showed their bona fides by offering to refund the advance; (c) that agreement for sale was of the year 2014 whereas FIR was lodged in 2018 by which time the civil suit had become barred by time; (d) that there was another FIR No.3 of 2023, which covered the issues, therefore, multiplicity of proceedings would be avoided if the impugned FIR is quashed; and (e) that there is no specific allegation that the accused has forged the lease deed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the use of the forged lease deed is not in dispute. Whether the second and third respondents were themselves victims of fraud, is a matter of defence which cannot be considered at the stage of considering a prayer for quashing of the First Information Report and the proceedings emanating therefrom as the said prayer has to be dealt with in terms of the allegations made therein. Likewise, existence of another FIR by another victim of crime would not be material as separate transactions would beget separate offences. Therefore, once the allegations made in the First Information Report disclosed commission of a cognizable offence and the materials collected during investigation supported those allegations, there was no good reason for the High Court to have quashed the First Information Report and the consequential proceedings. 9. Per-contra, learned counsel representing the respondent Nos.2 and 3 submitted that admittedly the second and third respondents had offered to return the money and, in between, for more than three years there was no demand for execution of the sale deed in terms of the alleged sale agreement. 9. Per-contra, learned counsel representing the respondent Nos.2 and 3 submitted that admittedly the second and third respondents had offered to return the money and, in between, for more than three years there was no demand for execution of the sale deed in terms of the alleged sale agreement. All of this would indicate that the de facto complainant was aware that there was some issue with regard to the defect in title, therefore, in such circumstances, there was no cheating. Moreover, there is no allegation that lease was forged by the accused. Hence, when offer was made to return the money, continuance of criminal proceedings was not warranted. Additionally, it was submitted that the second respondent is a lady and she may not be even aware of the lease being bogus. 10. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the materials on record. What is clear from the record is that there is no dispute as regards the lease deed of the year 2009 being a bogus document. There is also no dispute that the second and third respondents have acted on that bogus document to accept advance money from the de facto complainant by entering into an agreement to transfer the property claimed through that bogus document. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court fell in error by quashing the First Information Report by acting on the defence plea of the second and third respondents that they were themselves victims of a fraud, or that they were not aware of the fraud, or that they are willing to return the money. It is well settled that defence plea is ordinarily not considered at the stage of considering a prayer for quashing the First Information Report or the proceedings emanating there from. At this stage, the Court is required to consider the allegations at their face value. If the allegations make out a prima facie case regarding commission of a cognizable offence, the matter has to be investigated. If the investigation results in a police report indicting the accused, it is open for the accused to, inter alia, seek quashing of the charge sheet or apply for discharge on grounds permissible in law. If the allegations make out a prima facie case regarding commission of a cognizable offence, the matter has to be investigated. If the investigation results in a police report indicting the accused, it is open for the accused to, inter alia, seek quashing of the charge sheet or apply for discharge on grounds permissible in law. As we find that in this case the investigation has resulted in a charge sheet and the allegations made in the First Information Report find support from the materials collected during investigation, prima facie, disclosing commission of cognizable offences, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the High Court quashing the First Information Report and the consequential proceedings is not sustainable, particularly, in view of recital in the charge sheet that Guman Khandelwal (second respondent) got the bogus lease deed registered by appearing in the office of Deputy Registrar Jaipur VII. In so far as existence of other FIRs is concerned, they relate to different victims who have been cheated in the like manner by separate transactions. As each act of cheating would beget a separate offence, on that ground, the subject FIR would not become a second FIR of the same offence. Further, the offer to refund the money taken in advance will not in any way wash off the offence already committed. In view thereof, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is quashed. The proceedings emanating from FIR No.376/2018 shall be brought to its logical conclusion. 11. It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations. Our discussion was confined to assess whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings. 12. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.