JUDGMENT : Deepak Roshan, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Intra Court Appeal is directed against the order dated 15.04.2024 passed by the learned single judge in W.P.(S) No. 3043 of 2021. The petitioner has prayed in the said writ application for quashing the order as contained in Memo No.1605 dt. 03.06.2022 issued by the 2 nd respondent, whereby punishment of recovery of Rs.5,06,500/- from the amount of gratuity of the petitioner as imposed by departmental order dated 12.06.2015 with a further observation that nothing would be payable to the petitioner except the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension from 27.02.2013 to 20.03.2013, has been upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the order dated 01.04.2021 issued by the 2nd respondent, whereby previous punishment order imposed vide Departmental Order No.1764 dt. 12.06.2015 and Order No.2208 dt. 20.07.2015 was upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for refund of Rs.5,06,500/-. 3. The brief fact of the case which is necessary for disposal of the instant appeal is that while the appellant was posted as Block Welfare Officer in Madhupur, Deoghar and was transferred on 12.02.2013 (relieved on 12.02.2013 afternoon) to the District Welfare Office Ranchi, a teacher of Upgraded Middle School Kogdo, namely, Tulsi Yadav was caught along with another person Vinod Sharma, selling the cycles on 16.02.2013 provided by the Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste Minority and Backward Class Welfare Department Government of Jharkhand for free of cost distribution among the students of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, which were kept in the storeroom situated within the premises of Madhupur Block. Thereafter, an FIR being Madhupur P.S. case No. 34 of 2013 was registered for the said incident against Tulsi Yadav and Vinod Sharma. However, after investigation, the charge-sheet was filed in the said case against the appellant and Tulsi Yadav under Sections 409 /420/467/468,/471,/120B/34 of IPC. 4. Thereafter, an FIR being Madhupur P.S. case No. 34 of 2013 was registered for the said incident against Tulsi Yadav and Vinod Sharma. However, after investigation, the charge-sheet was filed in the said case against the appellant and Tulsi Yadav under Sections 409 /420/467/468,/471,/120B/34 of IPC. 4. Simultaneously, a departmental proceeding was also initiated by issuing a memo of charge in “Parpatra-Ka” against this appellant alleging that he was the custodian of 407 cycles kept in the store room and at the time of getting relieved from the post of Block Welfare Officer, Madhupur, he did not handover the charge of cycle store room to any other competent officer, rather he handed over the key of the said store room to his associate Tulsi Yadav, who was caught selling these cycles in the local market from 16.02.2013. After the departmental proceeding, order imposing punishment of recovery of Rs. 5,06,500/- from the gratuity amount of the appellant and withholding of his promotion was passed vide memo no. 1764 dt.12.06.2015 issued by the 3 rd respondent. Another order dt.20.07.2015 was also passed by the 3 rd respondent to the effect that the suspension period of the appellant would be considered as period spent on duty for pension purpose. 5. The appellant filed a writ application being W.P.(S) No. 4762 of 2015 challenging both the penalty orders and the said writ petition was allowed by this court vide order dt. 10.11.2020 and the case was remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority with a liberty to proceed in the matter in accordance with law. 6. Thereafter, vide departmental letter dt.03.03.2021, the appellant was asked to appear for hearing and the appellant appeared before respondent no.2 and also filed written reply, however vide impugned order as contained in Memo No.1005 dt. 01.04.2021, the penalty orders which was previously issued were upheld. 7. The first limb of argument of this appellant is that the appellant has been acquitted from the criminal case and since the departmental proceeding was identical and started for the same cause of action and since in the criminal case, he was acquitted, as such he ought to have exonerated from the charges levelled in the departmental proceeding. The learned Writ Court after discussing the judgement passed in the case of M.Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited and another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 has rejected his claim. 8. The learned Writ Court after discussing the judgement passed in the case of M.Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited and another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 has rejected his claim. 8. We uphold the decision of the learned Writ Court, inasmuch as, it is now no more res-integra that the proceedings in criminal case and departmental inquiry can continue simultaneously as both operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. In the departmental proceeding, a charge relating to misconduct is inquired and the required standard of proof is different from that needed in a criminal case. The standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities in the departmental proceeding; whereas in criminal case the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts. It further transpires from the order of acquittal that the appellant was acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, as the important witnesses were not examined. Accordingly, the learned Writ Court has rightly held that the said acquittal cannot be termed as honourable acquittal. At this stage itself, we would like to indicate that neither before the learned Writ Court; nor before us, learned counsel for the appellant was able to demonstrate as to why he had given the key of the store room to Tulsi Yadav and not any other competent person nor he was able to indicate any document with regard to permission of handing over the key to the said Tulsi Yadav. 9. The next limb of argument of the appellant before us was that the disciplinary proceeding was started while the appellant was in service and during pendency of the departmental proceedings, he superannuated; as such, after his superannuation, the enquiry should have continued under Rule 43 of BIHAR PENSION RULES ,1950 for the limited purpose of taking such action as provided under the said Rule, however, no such specific or express order was passed. 10. 10. The learned Writ Court has rightly rejected this claim of the appellant, inasmuch as, in the case of Shambhu Saran v. State of Bihar reported in (1991) SCC Online, Pat 341 , it has been held that where a disciplinary proceeding has already been started during the service tenure of any government employee, then even after the superannuation of the said employee, the enquiry may be continued under Rule 43 of BIHAR PENSION RULES , 1950 for the limited purpose of taking such action as provided under the said Rule. We are fully endorsing the finding given by the learned Writ Court in rejecting such claim. 11. Before us, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that the recovery of Rs. 5,06,500/- from the gratuity amount of the petitioner is violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India. In this regard, we may refer to Rule 35 of JHARKHAND SERVICE CODE , 2001 as well as Rule 27 of Jharkhand Pension Rule 2000, which provides that the pension includes gratuity. Further, Rule 43(b) of the Rules, 2000 empowers the State Government to recover whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the government if the pensioner is found in a departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty of grave misconduct or to have caused pecuniary loss to the government by committing misconduct or negligence during his service including service rendered on re-employment after retirement. Thus, even this contention of the appellant does not impress us that the recovery of Rs.5,06,500/- from the gratuity amount is violative of any provision of law, much less of Article 21 of Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, continuity of meritorious and unbroken service is a condition precedent to entitle the employee to gratuity and if he commits misconduct which causes financial loss to the employer, the employer has every right to take action against him for the loss caused. 12. Before parting, we would also like to deal with one of the arguments of the appellant that the successor has not been examined in the departmental proceeding by the employer. 12. Before parting, we would also like to deal with one of the arguments of the appellant that the successor has not been examined in the departmental proceeding by the employer. In this regard, we are of the considered opinion that on the one hand, the appellant has failed to prove as to why he has not given the key to any competent authority and Suo-motto without any permission handed over the key to one Tulsi Yadav; on the other hand, even the appellant could have examined the successor in the departmental proceeding, as such, even this contention of the appellant has no bearing. 13 . Accordingly, we uphold the order dated 15.04.2024 passed by the learned Writ Court in W.P. (S) No. 3043 of 2021, and accordingly the instant LPA stands dismissed; however there shall be no order as to cost.