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2025 DIGILAW 1281 (GAU)

Kaling Tayeng v. State of A. P.

2025-08-05

PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA

body2025
JUDGMENT : PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA, J. Heard Mr. V. Jamoh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. T. Ete, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor representing the State of Arunachal Pradesh as well as Mr. A. Apang, the learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the Respondent No.2. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment dated 02.05.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Sessions Division, Tezu, Lohit District, Arunachal Pradesh in Sessions Case No.03/CLG/2013. By the impugned judgment, the trial court has convicted the appellant under Sections 304 and201 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC). 3. On 21.08.2012, an FIR was lodged before police wherein it was alleged that police recovered a dead body at a distance of about 30 meters from a police quarters. Blood stains were spread all over a room in the police quarters. A khukri was also recovered from the said police quarters belonging to constable K. Tayeng (the appellant). 4. In course of investigation, the dead body was subjected to post-mortem examination. It was the dead body of Langhom Sajung. The doctor reported that the death was due to cardio respiratory failure which led hemorrhagic shock as a consequence following severe bleeding from cut throat caused by a sharp edged weapon and homicidal in nature. 5. The charge under Section 302 and 201 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE was framed against the appellant. During the trial, 12 prosecution witnesses were examined. No defence evidence was adduced. 6. The first prosecution witness was Mrs. Sarita Tayeng. She is the wife of the appellant. At the time of occurrence, she was not present in her house rather she had gone to the house of her mother at Bazarline. The incident took place on 20th August, 2012 and she returned to her matrimonial house in the morning of 21.08.2012. She has stated in her evidence that in the evening of 20.08.2012, she and her husband came out of their house together. But alone went to her mother’s house. According to the witness, at that time, the appellant told her that he would be in the house of Chingru Mamai. According to the witness, in the morning of 21.08.2012 when she came back to her matrimonial house, she found that her husband was still in the house of Chingru Mamai. But alone went to her mother’s house. According to the witness, at that time, the appellant told her that he would be in the house of Chingru Mamai. According to the witness, in the morning of 21.08.2012 when she came back to her matrimonial house, she found that her husband was still in the house of Chingru Mamai. After spending some time there, the witness and the appellant together came back to her matrimonial house and found that the front door of their house was open and through the open door they witness lots of blood inside the room. The witness Sarita had stated that on seeing blood all over inside the room she and her husband did not enter into the house and straightaway went to the police station. Police came accordingly. Later she came to know that the dead body of Langhom Sajung was recovered from near their house. 7. The second prosecution witness is Shri Adhosa Ngwazan. On 21.08.2012 at about 9.30 A.M., he was going to his office. On the way to his office, he met some police personnel who informed him that the dead body of Langhom Sajung was found near the official quarters of the appellant. This witness went to see the dead body but could not see because the dead body was already removed from there. 8. The witness Adhosa Ngwazan further stated that he had seen a khukri in the house of the appellant. According to this witness, blood stains were spread all over the bedroom floor of the appellant. 9. There is nothing relevant in his cross-examination. 10. The third prosecution witness is Shri Chingrao Mamai. He is a colleague of the appellant in the Police Department. This witness has stated that on 20.08.2012 at about 5 P.M., while he was coming to his quarters, he met the deceased and the appellant together and the deceased told him that they were going to the police colony. According to this witness, he went to sleep at about 8.30 P.M. and at that time it was raining. At midnight, the appellant came to his house alone and this witness opened the door for him. This witness asked the appellant about the deceased Langhom Sajung. The appellant reportedly told him that the deceased had gone away. According to this witness, he went to sleep at about 8.30 P.M. and at that time it was raining. At midnight, the appellant came to his house alone and this witness opened the door for him. This witness asked the appellant about the deceased Langhom Sajung. The appellant reportedly told him that the deceased had gone away. After some time, the appellant also left the house of this witness saying that he will be going to the house of his father- in-law. Within a gap of 5 to 10 minutes the appellant came back to the house of this witness and slept with this witness the rest of the night. 11. Next morning at about 5.30 A.M., the witness Shri Chingrao Mamai woke up from bed and went towards the police colony in search of the deceased. At that time, the appellant was still sleeping on the bed. 12. After some time, this witness returned home and started preparations for going to office. In the meantime, the appellant also came out of the bed and they went out of the house. Within one and half hours the appellant came back to the house of this witness. This time, he was accompanied by another person called Kheng. After some time, the appellant and Kheng came to the house of this witness and told him that another person might have spent the night in the official quarters of the appellant and that person might have left the quarter in the morning leaving behind a lot of blood stains on the bedroom. Till that time, the deceased Langhom Sajung was missing. 13. By that time, a police team started a search for the deceased and the dead body was recovered from a deep gorge near the official quarters of the appellant. This witness had seen the dead body and noticed two injuries, one on the forehead and one on the throat of the deceased. The injury on the throat was a large one. This witness has stated that police had recovered one khukri and some other things packed inside a gunny bag. 14. The cross-examination of this witness has nothing relevant. 15. The fourth prosecution witness is Mrs. Massi Khen. Her house is situated in the same locality at a distance of about 200 meters from the house of the appellant. This witness has stated that police had recovered one khukri and some other things packed inside a gunny bag. 14. The cross-examination of this witness has nothing relevant. 15. The fourth prosecution witness is Mrs. Massi Khen. Her house is situated in the same locality at a distance of about 200 meters from the house of the appellant. This witness has stated that one day she and her husband Chow Binoy Khen had gone to the house of the Officer-In-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. Three/four persons were already present there. They already consumed a full bottle of liquor. At that time, the appellant was also present there. He was drinking local liquor unlike other persons who were drinking India Made Foreign Liquor. 16. After sometime, the appellant and the deceased came to her together. She provided them the dinner. The deceased did not take dinner. In the meantime, the appellant had already consumed a full bottle of local liquor. At about 9.30 P.M., the deceased and appellant left the house of this witness. In the next morning at about 7.30 A.M., the appellant and his wife came to the house of this witness and told her that there were lots of blood spread in their house. She immediately went to the house of the appellant where police personnel were already gathered. She did not enter into the house of the appellant. 17. In her cross-examination Mrs. Massi Khen has stated that when the deceased came to her house, he was drunk. When the deceased and the appellant went out of her house, both of them were behaving normal. 18. The fifth prosecution witness is Chaw Binoy Khen. His evidence is similar to his wife. He saw the dead body of the deceased having two injuries, one on the neck and the other on the forehead. According to this witness, the injury on the neck was a cut injury and injury on the forehead suggested that it was caused by pointed object. 19. There is nothing relevant in the cross-examination of this witness. 20. The sixth prosecution witness is Subhram Yadav. He is a colleague of the appellant in the same Department. He has stated in his evidence that probably on 19th or 20 August, 2012, he along with some other persons including the present appellant were present in the house of the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. 20. The sixth prosecution witness is Subhram Yadav. He is a colleague of the appellant in the same Department. He has stated in his evidence that probably on 19th or 20 August, 2012, he along with some other persons including the present appellant were present in the house of the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. At about 7.45 P.M., all the people had left that place. This witness went to the mess of SIB where he had taken chapattis and came back to his house. 21. Next morning at about 7.30 A.M., this witness Yadav saw the appellant going towards the house of the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. At that time, he was loudly telling that there was a lot of blood in his house. In the meantime, the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station arrived there and this witness also went to the house of the appellant. The witness entered into the house of the appellant and saw a lot of blood spread all over the bedroom of the appellant. According to this witness, within next 2 hours the dead body of the deceased was recovered at a distance of about 40/50 meters away from the police colony. This witness Yadav saw cut injuries on the neck of the deceased. 22. There is nothing relevant in the cross-examination of this witness. 23. The seventh prosecution witness is Shri Ramesh Chaturvedi. On 20 August, 2012, this witness along with some other persons including the appellant were playing cards in the house of the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. After sometime, the appellant left that place. But this witness along with the other persons stayed back. They had a bottle of liquor together. In the meantime, the deceased also arrived there with a chicken in his hand. They cooked the chicken and with it, they drank liquor. It may be stated that at that time the appellant also returned there. At about 7.45 P.M. everybody left the house of Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. After departure of those people, the present witness Mr. Chaturvedi and the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station had dinner and went to bed. 24. Next morning, the appellant came to the house of Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station and told the Officer-in-Charge Mr. Singh that there were lots of blood spread all over his house and requested him to come to his house. Chaturvedi and the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station had dinner and went to bed. 24. Next morning, the appellant came to the house of Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station and told the Officer-in-Charge Mr. Singh that there were lots of blood spread all over his house and requested him to come to his house. Accordingly, the Officer-in-Charge went to the house of the appellant. This witness Mr. Chaturvedi also followed them. At that time, the deceased was missing since the last night. This witness saw lots of blood spread all over the house of the appellant. He also saw one khukri stained with blood and was lying on the floor of that room. When they searched the nearby locality, they discovered the dead body of the deceased at a distance of about 40/50 meters away from the quarters of the appellant. The witness Chaturvedi saw two injuries on the dead body of the deceased, one on the neck and the other on the forehead. 25. In his cross-examination, the witness Chaturvedi had stated that he never saw any blood in the verandah or the drawing room of the quarters of the appellant. 26. The eighth prosecution witness is S.S. Choudhury. He was the Sub- Divisional Officer at Changlang. He recorded the confessional statement of the appellant on 14.09.2012 upon a prayer made by the Investigating Officer. Before recording the confessional statement, the appellant was given sufficient time for refreshing himself. He was warned about the consequences of the statement which he will be giving to him. 27. In his cross-examination he has stated that the witness was produced from judicial custody. 28. The ninth prosecution witness is the doctor who examined the appellant after his arrest. 29. The tenth prosecution witness was the Officer-in-Charge of Vijoynagar Police Station. He investigated the case and spoke about the investigation. 30. The eleventh prosecution witness is Dr. P. Dutta. He spoke on behalf of Dr. N. Ngemu who had already expired. Dr. N. Ngemu had performed the post- mortem examination upon the dead body of the deceased. Dr. Dutta confined his evidence within the post-mortem report issued by Dr. N. Ngemu. 31. The twelfth prosecution witness was Dr. Kula Bahadur Newar. He is a policeman working within Vijoynagar Police Station. He along with others searched the dead body of the deceased and discovered. Dr. Dutta confined his evidence within the post-mortem report issued by Dr. N. Ngemu. 31. The twelfth prosecution witness was Dr. Kula Bahadur Newar. He is a policeman working within Vijoynagar Police Station. He along with others searched the dead body of the deceased and discovered. He saw deep cut injury on the neck of the deceased. He along with others lifted off the dead body to a nearby house. 32. There is nothing relevant in his cross-examination. 33. I have carefully gone through the prosecution evidence. There is no doubt that there are no eye witnesses to the occurrence. 34. The only important circumstance appearing against the appellant is that he was seen with the deceased on the previous night. Other circumstances are presence of blood stains in the bedroom of the appellant and a khukri found in the said bedroom. There is no dispute that the deceased sustained a deep cut injury on his throat. 35. So far as the last seen together aspect is concerned, it is necessary to take note of these two authorities. In State of U.P. v. Satish [ 2005(3) SCC 114 ], it was noted as follows: “22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.” 36. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. ( 2006(10) SCC 172 ), it was noted as follows: “ 27. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.” 36. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. ( 2006(10) SCC 172 ), it was noted as follows: “ 27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration.” 37. The theory of “Last seen together” is one where two persons are seen ‘together alive’ and after an interval, one of them is found alive and the other dead. If the span between two is too short, presumption as to the person alive being the creator of the death of the other can be drawn. Time span should be such that it rules out the risk of somebody else committing the crime. It is a piece of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of any eyewitnesses or tangible evidence, this theory is the last resort to the prosecution. The base of this theory is principles of probability. The circumstance of the theory does not by itself leads to the inference that it is the accused who has committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. 38. Now, the question arises how the circumstances are to be joined together? 39. So far as the evaluation, of the evidence in a case resting on circumstantial evidence is concerned, the principles thereof were laid down in the much celebrated pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ), which reads as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the Panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 40. The principles on which circumstantial evidence and its probative value has to be tested, stand authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka reported in (2010) 8 SCC593, wherein the Supreme Court laid down as follows:- “22. The evidence tendered in a court of law is either direct or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be direct if it consists of an eyewitness account of the facts in issue in a criminal case. On the other hand, circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer about the existence of facts in issue or factum probandum. In dealing with circumstantial evidence there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind may take place of proof. On the other hand, circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer about the existence of facts in issue or factum probandum. In dealing with circumstantial evidence there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind may take place of proof. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be allowed to take place of proof and, therefore, the court has to be watchful and ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of legal proof. However, it is not derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial. Human agency may be faulty in expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the circumstances cannot fail. Therefore, many a times it is aptly said that “men may tell lies, but circumstances do not”. 23. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be proved individually. However, in applying this principle a distinction must be made between facts called primary or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has to judge the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved, the question whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the accused person should be considered. In dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. Although there should not be any missing links in the case, yet it is not essential that each of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence adduced and some of these links may have to be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these inferences, the court must have regard to the common course of natural events and to human conduct and their relations to the facts of the particular case. The court thereafter has to consider the effect of proved facts. 24. In drawing these inferences, the court must have regard to the common course of natural events and to human conduct and their relations to the facts of the particular case. The court thereafter has to consider the effect of proved facts. 24. In deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, the court has to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the combined effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is/are not decisive. The facts established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused, where various links in chain are in themselves complete, then the false plea or false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.” 41. Those principles have been again reiterated by the Supreme Court in the pronouncement S.K. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal (2011) 11 SCC 754 , wherein it was stated thus: “32. Undoubtedly, conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence. However, the court must bear in mind while deciding the case involving the commission of serious offence based on circumstantial evidence that the prosecution case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence case. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability that the act must have been done by the accused. (Vide Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 : AIR 1984 SC 1622 ], Krishnan v. State [ (2008) 15 SCC 430 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1029] and Wakkar v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 3 SCC 306 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 846].” 42. In Jainoddin S/O Karimbabu Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (2012) 12 SCC 127 , the Supreme Court held thus: “12. This case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence. While circumstantial evidence by itself is enough to form the basis of conviction, provided there is no snap in the chain of events; the chain of events must, thus, be complete in such a way so as to point to the guilt of the accused person and none other. Law on this point is well settled. We need not have to labour much on that. In the present case, the trial court and the High Court, after carefully considering the entire case of the prosecution and the evidence on record, have found that the chain of events is well established and the circumstances are complete and therefore, the appellant is guilty of the offence alleged against them.” 43. Moreover, the confessional statement has been retracted by the appellant. Here, in this case, except the confessional statement, there is no other direct evidence. 44. There is no evidence in this case to suggest that on the night when the occurrence took place, the deceased had gone to the house of the appellant, though that evening they were seen together in some other places. There is also no evidence in this case to suggest that on the night when the occurrence took place the appellant was present in his house for the whole night. There is also no evidence in this case to suggest that on the night when the occurrence took place the appellant was present in his house for the whole night. The chain of circumstances appearing against the appellant has several missing links. The chain of circumstances is not complete. 45. According to the criminal jurisprudence, an offence against an accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This Court is of the opinion that the offence against the appellant has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. A thick cloud of doubt hovers over the veracity of the prosecution story against the present appellant. The benefit of doubt must be given to the accused appellant. 46. For the aforesaid reasons. The appeal is allowed. The appellant Kaling Tayeng is found not guilty and he is acquitted from this case on benefit of doubt. If the appellant is in custody, he shall be released forthwith. Send back the LCR.