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2025 DIGILAW 1283 (KAR)

U. H. Niranjan S/o Halappa v. State

2025-11-19

VENKATESH NAIK T.

body2025
ORDER : 1. Heard Smt. Vijaya M.N., learned counsel for the petitioner, and Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State. 2. The petitioner/accused No.2 has preferred this revision petition challenging the judgment of conviction dated 29.12.2016 and order on sentence dated 08.02.2017 passed by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shivamogga, Sitting at Sagar, in Criminal Appeal No.79 of 2014, wherein the First Appellate Court convicted accused No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to pay the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court. The petitioner is accused No.2 and the respondent is the complainant-State. 4. The case against accused No.1 is split up due to his ill-health and accused No.2 faced trial for the offences punishable under Sections 326, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The trial Court acquitted accused No.2 of the aforesaid offences. Hence, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.79 of 2014, wherein the First Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court insofar as Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC, however, convicted accused No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 5. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 17.10.2005 at about 4:30 p.m., in the street adjacent to the house of the first informant at Market Road, Sagar Town, accused Nos.1 and 2 picked up quarrel with the first informant in respect of installation of sanitary pipe, abused her in filthy language, assaulted her with a plastic pipe and made criminal intimidation to eliminate her. Due to assault, the first informant sustained injury to her left leg little finger. This led to registration of an F.I.R. and investigation. 6. The Investigating Officer, after completion of investigation, filed charge-sheet against accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 326 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 7. Due to assault, the first informant sustained injury to her left leg little finger. This led to registration of an F.I.R. and investigation. 6. The Investigating Officer, after completion of investigation, filed charge-sheet against accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 326 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 7. Soon after initiation of charge-sheet, the trial Court took cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.'). 8. The prosecution, to prove its case, examined in all eight witnesses as PWs.1 to 8 and got marked five documents as per Exs.P1 to P5. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court acquitted accused No.2 of the alleged charges. Thus, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.79 of 2014 before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court insofar as Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC, however, convicted accused No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused No.2 has vehemently contended that the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court is illegal and untenable. The First Appellate Court, while passing the judgment of conviction and order on sentence, has not considered the reasons assigned by the trial Court. The First Appellate Court convicted the petitioner on uncorroborated testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. PW6-Dr. Nagaraj, who issued Ex.P5-Wound Certificate, has stated that the person falling on rough place may also sustain the same type of injury. Further, the Doctor has neither stated about the age of the injury, nor stated about how the injury has taken place. No material object is seized or produced before the trial Court. In criminal case, the recovery of material object is very important. The contention of the complainant is that the petitioner pushed the plastic pipe and hence, she sustained injury to her left leg little finger. In fact, since many years, there is dispute regarding the passage between the complainant and the accused house and the said litigation is pending before the Civil Court. The contention of the complainant is that the petitioner pushed the plastic pipe and hence, she sustained injury to her left leg little finger. In fact, since many years, there is dispute regarding the passage between the complainant and the accused house and the said litigation is pending before the Civil Court. Thus, to harass the accused, the petitioner has lodged a false complaint and deposed false evidence, but the First Appellate Court has not considered all these facts while convicting the accused. Thus, she prayed to allow the revision petition. 10. Learned High Court Government Pleader has vehemently contended that PW1/injured witness has categorically stated about the act of the petitioner and the role played by him. Hence, the First Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence of PWs.1 to 6 and the contents of Ex.P5-Wound Certificate and rightly convicted the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Thus, it does not require any interference by this Court. Hence, she prayed to dismiss the revision petition. 11. On the basis of the above pleadings, the following point arises for consideration of this Court: Whether the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the First Appellate Court requires interference at the hands of this Court? 12. The "scope of revision" refers to the limited authority of a higher Court to review judgment of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court and focusing on correcting errors in jurisdiction or gross legal/factual flaws rather than re- examining the merits of the case. This power is exercised sparingly and is intended to set right a patent defect, not to function as an automatic second appeal. The specific grounds and limitations vary between civil and criminal proceedings. Revisions can address situations where the decision is grossly inaccurate, not supported by evidence, or where relevant evidence was ignored. The review is not a fresh trial. The Courts are generally barred from re-examining evidence or substituting their own judgment for the lower Court's on matters of fact unless the findings are demonstrably perverse or arbitrary. Revisions can address situations where the decision is grossly inaccurate, not supported by evidence, or where relevant evidence was ignored. The review is not a fresh trial. The Courts are generally barred from re-examining evidence or substituting their own judgment for the lower Court's on matters of fact unless the findings are demonstrably perverse or arbitrary. The Hon'ble Apex Court has discussed the applicability and scope of revision in various decisions, which are highlighted hereunder: A. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MUNNA DEVI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER, (2001) 9 SCC 631 while discussing the scope of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. at paragraph No.3 held as under: "3. xxx xxx xxx The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged." B. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. R. SOUNDIRARASU AND OTHERS, (2023) 6 SCC 768 at paragraph No.79 held as under: "79. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure." C. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY MANGESH POYAREKAR, (2008) 9 SCC 475 at paragraph No.16 held as under: "16. xxx xxx xxx Now it is well settled that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. A Revisional Court cannot convert itself into a regular court of appeal." Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings, or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 13. On perusal of the materials on record, PW1-complainant-Shivaleela has deposed that the accused is well known to her and they are neighbours. There is passage in between their houses. On the day of incident, accused Nos.1 and 2 were engaged in installation of sanitary pipe to their bathroom and PW1 was objecting the said work. Therefore, accused Nos.1 and 2 intentionally insulted PW1 to provoke her breach of peace and continued their work, however, PW1 objected them from doing their work. Thus, accused No.1 instructed accused No.2 to install pipe and accordingly, accused No.2 pushed the sanitary pipe from inside the house, at that time, PW1 sustained injury to her left leg little finger. She was shifted to the hospital for treatment, where she gave a statement/lodged a complaint as per Ex.P1 and on the same day of incident, the Investigating Officer visited the scene of offence, conducted spot mahazar-Ex.P2. In the cross-examination, she clearly admitted that there is civil dispute between her family and the accused and in civil suit, no injunction was granted in her favour. Being aggrieved by the same, the husband of PW1 preferred an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge Court and the same was dismissed. In the cross-examination, she clearly admitted that there is civil dispute between her family and the accused and in civil suit, no injunction was granted in her favour. Being aggrieved by the same, the husband of PW1 preferred an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge Court and the same was dismissed. It shows that there is civil litigation between the parties and the alleged incident took place while PW1 objected the act of accused No.1 and she sustained injury while accused No.2 pushed the sanitary pipe from inside the house. The fact remains that accused No.1 and PW1 were quarrelling in the passage in between the house of PW1 and the accused. Further, accused No.2 was inside the house and he was not aware about PW1 standing exactly opposite to the sanitary pipe. As soon as accused No.2 pushed the pipe, PW1, who was standing opposite to the wall in the passage, sustained injury. This aspect of the matter was not considered by the First Appellate Court. 14. To corroborate the oral testimony of PW1, the prosecution examined PW6-Dr. Nagaraj, who has stated that on 17.10.2005 at 6:30 p.m., PW1 was brought to the hospital with the history of assault and found "1 inch cut wound over the bone of left little finger with fresh red clot" and "contusion over left thigh". Thus, he examined PW1 and sent her to Orthopaedic Surgeon to conduct X-Ray and based on X-Ray report, he issued Ex.P5-Wound Certificate. As per the opinion of the Doctor, injury No.1 is grievous in nature and injury No.2 is simple in nature. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that if a person falls on the hard surface, there is possibility of sustaining injury as mentioned in Ex.P5. He further admits that he was unable to give opinion as to from which article PW1 sustained injuries. 15. PW2-H.R. Kolagi, Head Constable, who received the complaint and registered an F.I.R. 16. PW3-Siddalingesh, neighbour of PW1, has deposed that on 17.10.2005 at 5:00 p.m., PW1 came to his house with injury to her left leg and requested him to take her to the hospital. Later, he came to know that PW1 sustained injury to left leg little finger while the accused were installing sanitary pipe to their house. Accordingly, he took her to Spandana Hospital and later, to Government Hospital for treatment. Later, he came to know that PW1 sustained injury to left leg little finger while the accused were installing sanitary pipe to their house. Accordingly, he took her to Spandana Hospital and later, to Government Hospital for treatment. In the cross-examination, he admits that he did not inform the Doctor about the person accompanied PW1. Apart from this evidence, he has not stated that accused Nos.1 and 2 assaulted PW1 or abused her in filthy language and made criminal intimidation to eliminate her and thus, he pacified the quarrel. Thus, PW3 is not an eyewitness to the incident and he is a hearsay witness. 17. PW4-Pushpa, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, has stated that she recorded the statement of PW1 and received Would Certificate of PW1 vide Ex.P5, completed investigation and filed charge-sheet against the accused. In the cross- examination, she admits that she has not examined the person by name, Mallikarjuna, showed in Ex.P5. 18. PW5-Basavarajappa, an eyewitness to the incident, has stated that about four years ago from the date of recording his statement, one day at about 4:30 p.m., there was quarrel between PW1 and accused No.1 with regard to installation of the sanitary pipe in the passage. Hence, PW1 was obstructing to do their work and hence, accused No.1 instructed accused No.2 to install the sanitary pipe from inside the house, at that time, when accused No.2 pushed the pipe from inside the house, PW1 sustained injury, when she was standing in the passage. Hence, he pacified the quarrel and took PW1 to her house. After two to three days of the incident, the Police came to the spot, conducted spot mahazar as per Ex.P2. In the cross-examination, he admits that his wife and PW1 are sisters. At the time of incident, the accused constructed the entire house and only installation of sanitary pipe was left. He is unable to state that there is long standing enmity between PW1 and the accused in respect of the passage. The width of passage is 4 feet and there is drainage and both the families are using the said passage by storing stones on the drainage and they are releasing used water to the drainage. Hence, both the families are using the passage and drainage commonly. He further admits that as soon as he came to the scene of offence, quarrel had already taken place. 19. Hence, both the families are using the passage and drainage commonly. He further admits that as soon as he came to the scene of offence, quarrel had already taken place. 19. PW7-Basavaraja N.S., another eyewitness to the incident, has reiterated the evidence of PW5 in the chief- examination. He is also a witness to spot mahazar-Ex.P2. But, in the cross-examination, he has stated that he does not know the contents of Ex.P2 and there is no reference about the alleged incident. He further admits that as soon as he came to the scene of offence, quarrel had already taken place and he is unaware of the pending litigation between PW1 and the accused. 20. PW8-Sripada, another mahazar witness to Ex.P2, has deposed about the mahazar drawn in his presence. In the cross-examination, he admitted that he cannot name the Officer, who drafted the mahazar, he is unable to mention the schedule of Ex.P2 as well as the scene of occurrence. He further admits that mahazar was not drafted as per his statement and in the mahazar, his residential address is wrongly shown and as soon as he affixed his signature on mahazar, his entire address was not written in the mahazar. He further admits that he does not know about the civil litigation between PW1 and the accused. 21. On perusal of the evidence on record, accused No.2 has not disputed the occurrence of the incident. But he has specifically contended that he was working in the house of accused No.1 and accused No.1 was quarreling in the passage. Thus, as per the instructions of accused No.1 only, he pushed the pipe from inside the wall of the house towards outside the passage and PW1 was standing opposite to the side of the sanitary pipe. The witnesses have stated about the incident and in their cross-examination, they admitted that there was civil dispute between PW1, her husband and accused No.1. 22. In the instant case, the testimony of injured witness alone is available and accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in-guarantee of her presence at the time of crime and is likely to spare her actual occurrence in order to falsely implicate someone. Therefore, convincing evidence is required to discredit the evidence of an injured witness. 23. Accused No.2 appears to be falsely implicated in the case. Such a witness comes with a built-in-guarantee of her presence at the time of crime and is likely to spare her actual occurrence in order to falsely implicate someone. Therefore, convincing evidence is required to discredit the evidence of an injured witness. 23. Accused No.2 appears to be falsely implicated in the case. In fact, there is litigation pending between PW1 and the accused. Where feelings turn high on enmity, prudence may compel the Court to see corroboration. PWs.2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are the relatives of the complainant. But mere relationship does not make anyone interested and does not discredit the evidence of an eyewitness. The evidence of an interested witness can be acted upon, if it is found reliable after careful scrutiny. 24. In view of the aforesaid background and on perusal of the evidence of PW1, it appears that there was scuffle between her and accused No.1 in respect of installation of the sanitary pipe in the passage and there is litigation between both the parties. The fact that accused No.2 was not aware about the persons, who were standing in the passage as he was inside the house and as per the instructions of accused No.1 only, he pushed the pipe from inside the house. Hence, PW1 sustained injury to her left leg little finger. Though her oral testimony is supported by medical evidence-Ex.P5-Wound Certificate, the fact remains that accused No.2 had no intention to cause injury to her. The injury sustained by PW1 appears to be self-inflicted injury, as she would not have appeared in front of sanitary pipe, thus, she sustained injury. Further, the eyewitnesses have not stated before the Court that the accused assaulted PW1, thus, she sustained injury to her left leg little finger. Therefore, the oral testimony of PW1 is not corroborated by any other witnesses. 25. Insofar as the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are concerned, the trial Court has rightly acquitted accused No.2 of the said offences, as the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. 26. Whereas, the First Appellate Court reversed the acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court and convicted the petitioner/accused No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 26. Whereas, the First Appellate Court reversed the acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court and convicted the petitioner/accused No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC. In an appeal before the First Appellate Court, against the judgment of acquittal of the accused for the offences under Sections 326, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the accused has primarily the double benefit. Firstly, the presumption under law is that, unless his guilt is proved, the accused has to be treated as an innocent person in the alleged crime. Secondly, the accused has already been enjoying the benefit of judgment of acquittal passed under the impugned judgment. As such, bearing the same in mind, the evidence placed by the prosecution in the matter is required to be analysed. 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in its judgment in the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , while laying down the general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court while dealing in an appeal against an order of acquittal, was pleased to observe at paragraph Nos.42(4) and 42(5) as below: “42(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 42(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” 28. In the case of Sudershan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) 15 SCC 666 , while referring to Chandrappa’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph No.31 of its judgment was pleased to hold that, it is the cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of acquittal. The Appellate Court, in such a case, would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reasons. 29. The Appellate Court, in such a case, would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reasons. 29. In the case of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 , at paragraph No.25 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below: “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C, the appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 30. The above principle laid down by it in its previous case was reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, (2022) 8 SCC 536 and also in the case of Roopwanti v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 2023 SC 1199 . 31. So far as the offence punishable under Section 326 of the IPC is concerned, PW1 has stated that accused No.2 pushed the sanitary pipe from inside the house. Thus, she sustained injury. In fact, there was no intention on the part of accused No.2 to assault or cause injury to PW1. Further, PWs.5 and 7, being eyewitnesses to the incident, have not specifically deposed about the role played by accused No.2. More importantly, sanitary pipe is not seized in this case and marked as a material object in the evidence. Therefore, there is a general allegation made against accused No.2. Thus, on perusal of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, there is no ample evidence against accused No.2 to attract Section 326 of the IPC. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court, which is contrary to the well established principles. Now, the accused has preferred this revision petition challenging the judgment of conviction passed by the First Appellate Court. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the acquittal judgment passed by the trial Court, which is contrary to the well established principles. Now, the accused has preferred this revision petition challenging the judgment of conviction passed by the First Appellate Court. The decision, as arrived by the First Appellate Court, is grossly inaccurate, not supported by the evidence. The First Appellate Court has not at all considered the relevant fact that accused No.2 was inside the house and accused No.1 and PW1 were standing in the passage, and as per the instructions of PW1, accused No.2 pushed the sanitary pipe from inside the house and in that scenario, the incident has taken place and PW1 sustained injury to her left leg little finger. Thus, the First Appellate Court has not at all considered this relevant aspect in a proper perspective manner and admissions given by the prosecution witnesses were completely ignored. Further, the benefit of doubt extended to the petitioner/accused No.2 has been negativated by the First Appellate Court, without assigning proper reasonsings. Thus, the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the First Appellate Court requires to be modified. However, it is made clear that in the incident, PW1 sustained grievous injury. Thus, the fine imposed by the First Appellate Court is maintained. 32. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER: i. Criminal Revision Petition is partly allowed. ii. The judgment of conviction dated 29.12.2016 and order on sentence dated 08.02.2017 passed by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shivamogga, Sitting at Sagar, in Criminal Appeal No.79 of 2014 is modified. iii. The petitioner/accused No.2 is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, however, the fine imposed by the First Appellate Court is maintained. iv. The petitioner is set at liberty, if he is not required in any other cases. v. The bail bond of the petitioner and that of his surety stands cancelled. In view of the disposal of the main petition, pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the trial Court, forthwith.