JUDGMENT : (P.M. MANOJ, J.) This writ petition is filed seeking the following reliefs: "For these and other reasons that might be allowed to be urged at the time of hearing, it is respectfully prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to call for the records of the case and issue 1) declare Sections and 7(3)(g) and 7A(3)(b) and 7(3)(f) 7A(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as unconstitutional ii) read down Sections 7(3)(f) and 7(3)(g) and 7A(3)(b) and 7A(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act as unconstitutional. ii) be further pleased to issue such other writ, order or direction as are deemed just and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case." 2. The principal contention put forth by the petitioner is regarding the constitutional validity of the amendments brought to Sections 7 and 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the ID Act’) whereby the qualification for appointment to the post of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals were amended. Pursuant to the said amendment, as per the law as it stands now, Joint Labour Commissioners and Deputy Chief Labour Commissioners are permitted to be appointed as Presiding Officers of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals. The amendment stipulates that a Degree in Law and at least seven years’ experience in the Labour Department, including three years of experience as a Conciliation Officer, would be the qualification that should be possessed by the candidates who aspire to be appointed to the said post. 3. The petitioner would contend that Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals are courts in the sense they are defined and mentioned in Article 234 read with 236(b) of the Constitution of India and appointment of Joint Labour Commissioners and Deputy Chief Labour Commissioners as Presiding Officers in the said Court/Tribunal would violate the constitutional mandates as laid down under Articles 14, 223 and 234 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner thus challenges the constitutional validity of Sections 7(3)(f), 7(3)(g), 7A(3)(b) and 7A(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the provisions which were incorporated by virtue of the aforesaid amendment. 4. The challenge primarily raised is on the ground of the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and encroachment on the powers of the judicial domain. The petitioner thus challenges the constitutional validity of Sections 7(3)(f), 7(3)(g), 7A(3)(b) and 7A(3)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the provisions which were incorporated by virtue of the aforesaid amendment. 4. The challenge primarily raised is on the ground of the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and encroachment on the powers of the judicial domain. It was further contended that principles of exclusive control over the judiciary are not limited to traditional courts alone but extend to Tribunals because Tribunals are formed as an alternative to courts and perform judicial functions. The Tribunals are constituted in substitution of the court and similar standards of appointment, qualification and conditions of service to inspire the confidence of the public at large. Such contentions are raised on the strength of a reported decision in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd represented by its Chief Manager and others [ 2020 (6) SCC 1 ]. 5. Further, it is contended that the labour court performs judicial functions. The labour court adjudicates upon the disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide. Although ordinary civil courts may not be able to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts, the labour courts decide disputes that are civil in nature. Therefore, the men who are deployed should be independent and should have sufficient judicial experience. The mention of High Court Judges and District Judges earlier in the Sections indicates that ordinary judicial officers from the civil judiciary must be selected at least so long as the separation of judiciary from the executive in public service is not finally achieved. The appointment of a person from the ranks of the civil judiciary carries with it an assurance which is unique. The functions of the labour court are of great public importance, and men of experience in the civil law are more suitable than Magistrates. Persons employed on multi-furious duties in addition to performing judicial functions may not truly answer the requirement of Section 7. Such contentions are raised on the strength of the reported decision in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association and others [ 1998 (2) SCC 688 ]. 6. Persons employed on multi-furious duties in addition to performing judicial functions may not truly answer the requirement of Section 7. Such contentions are raised on the strength of the reported decision in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association and others [ 1998 (2) SCC 688 ]. 6. Such contentions are raised on the background that a person who has been in executive service, as contemplated under Section 7(3) and 7A(3), for 20 to 30 years naturally develops a pro-executive approach and his thinking process becomes coloured thereby. Since the Industrial Tribunal is a judicial body that has to decide judicial matters, and it must function as an independent body, as that alone can inspire the confidence of the public. The appointment process should ensure that a person who comes from a legal background has an independent mind, whether he is or has been a High Court Judge or Advocate, having more than 10 years of practice. Such contentions are raised on the strength of the reported decision by the Allahabad High Court in Shambu Dayal v. Union of India and others [(2002) 20 LCD 721]. 7. On the basis of the aforementioned contention, the counsel for the petitioner substantiates that the amendments carried out to the qualification for appointment of Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals as per Section 7A of the Industrial Dispute Amendment Act, 2010 are unconstitutional. 8. Per contra, the additional 2nd respondent subsequently impleaded as per Order dated 07.10.2024, contended that Section 38 of the ID Act empowers the State Government to enact rules on the basis of this Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (1) and (2) of Section 38 of the ID Act read with Section 7A thereof and Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, the Government of Kerala, after considering the objections and suggestions received on the draft rules published, notified the special rules of the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal vide GO(P) No.108/2022/LBR dated 15.11.2022. Under Rule 3(5), Note 1 of the Special Rules, 10% of the total number of posts of Presiding Officers shall be set apart for the officers of the State Labour Department, having the requisite qualification as specified under Rule 4(b). 9. Under Rule 3(5), Note 1 of the Special Rules, 10% of the total number of posts of Presiding Officers shall be set apart for the officers of the State Labour Department, having the requisite qualification as specified under Rule 4(b). 9. It further states, as of now, State of Kerala has four Labour Courts and 7 Industrial Tribunals and appointment of Presiding Officers to these Labour Courts are made by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala as per Section 7(1) of the ID Act. The appointment process ensures that the Presiding Officer is a qualified judicial officer, typically a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or someone with similar legal qualifications as prescribed under the Act. 10. It is a fact that though the 2010 Amendment allowed the appointment of Joint Labour Commissioners as Presiding Officers, so far as the State had not appointed any, since Rule 3(5) Note 1 of the Special Rules reserves 10% of the Posts for the State Labour Department Officers. However, for a joint labour commissioner to be appointed, a minimum of 10 Tribunals must exist in the State. Then, as per the Parent ID Act, a Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner or Joint Labour Commissioner must resign from government service before being appointed as a Presiding Officer. Lastly, the State has only 5 Joint Labour Commissioners currently, which limits the feasibility of such appointments. 11. Over and above, the Parliament has enacted the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to Trade Unions, conditions of employment in Industrial establishments or undertakings, investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Code received the assent of the President on 28.09.2020. Under Section 44(1) of the Code, the appropriate government (Central or State) may, by notification, establish one or more Industrial Tribunals. These Industrial Tribunals will also have jurisdiction over the matters under Employees’ Provident Funds Act and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 12. Under the said Code, Section 44(2) mandates that each Industrial Tribunal shall have two members: One judicial member and one administrative member. Then Section 44(3) allows for a Bench consisting of either a judicial member and an administrative member or a single judicial member or a single administrative member. 13. 12. Under the said Code, Section 44(2) mandates that each Industrial Tribunal shall have two members: One judicial member and one administrative member. Then Section 44(3) allows for a Bench consisting of either a judicial member and an administrative member or a single judicial member or a single administrative member. 13. Section 44(4) provides that qualifications, appointment methods, salary and tenure of Tribunal Members (appointed by the Central Government) shall be determined by Rules framed under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017. Section 44(4) states that a person below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India (or equivalent in the State Government) shall not be eligible for appointment as an Administrative Member. 14. On going by the aforementioned legal framework, it is merely an apprehension on the part of the petitioner to challenge the amendments carried out to the qualification of the Presiding Officers under the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010. Therefore, there is no legal basis in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed. All these contentions are raised on the basis of a reported decision in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharath Bank Ltd [1950 SCC 470], in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Tribunals have trappings of a court but do not qualify as courts in the strict sense. Their primary role is to balance the interests of labour and management, rather than merely applying legal principles in a rigid manner. This distinction is crucial in labour jurisprudence, as it justifies a more flexible, equity-driven approach in industrial dispute resolutions, unlike other courts that adhere strictly to legal formalities. Similarly, in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha & Another v. Hind Cycles Ltd. ( AIR 1963 SC 874 ), it was held that “Industrial Tribunals have the trappings of a court but do not constitute a court in the strict legal sense. They function as specialized quasi-judicial bodies designed to resolve industrial disputes efficiently, with a focus on social justice rather than purely legalistic determinations. They function as specialized quasi-judicial bodies designed to resolve industrial disputes efficiently, with a focus on social justice rather than purely legalistic determinations. This principle remains significant in understanding the jurisdictional scope and procedural autonomy of Industrial Tribunals under Indian labour law.” In Chandrakumar v. Union of India [ 1997 (3) SCC 261 ] it was also held that: “While Industrial Tribunals perform adjudicatory functions and possess certain features of a court – such as taking evidence, issuing directions, and resolving disputes – they lack the independence, constitutional safeguards, and inherent judicial power that define a true court of law. Instead, they remain statutory bodies with quasi-judicial authority, functioning under executive supervision, and susceptible to legislative control. Thus, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in these cases, Industrial Tribunals have only the trappings of a court but do not function as courts in the strict constitutional sense.” 15. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 1 st respondent, inter alia pointing out that after the enactment of the Finance Act, 2017, the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, experience and other conditions of service of members) Rules, 2017 came into force, and pursuant to that a challenge was put forth regarding the Rules enacted thereunder. 16. Later, the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 came into effect under which the Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules of 2021 were enacted. As it stands now, the appointment of the Presiding Officers in CGIT-cum-LCs is currently undertaken as per the provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 and the Rules made thereunder. In view of the new enactment that is in place and as per the provisions thereof, only High Court Judges or District Judges are eligible for appointment as Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals. Hence, according to the 1 st respondent, the prayer in the writ petition has become infructuous. 17. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the 2 nd respondent, who brought my attention to the Special Rules enacted by the 2 nd respondent as per notification dated 15.11.2022. As per the notification it is seen that the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, had prepared the Special Rules for the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals of the State. As per the notification it is seen that the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, had prepared the Special Rules for the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals of the State. Rule 4 thereof prescribes the qualifications and the second proviso to Rule (4) stipulates as follows: "Provided that no person shall be appointed to, or continue in the office of the Presiding Officer of an Industrial Tribunal if he is not an independent person as defined in clause (i) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947)) or if he has attained the age of sixty years." 18. I have heard Smt. A.K. Preetha, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. Sabeena P. Ismail, the learned Government and the learned Central Government Counsel for the 1 st respondent. 19. While considering the arguments of the Learned Government Pleader in the light of the decision pointed out in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and another, Bharat Bank Limited and Chandrakumar supra , it is discernible that, the Industrial Tribunals are to be equated with quasi-judicial bodies, and they would not have the character of a regular court. But, it has the trappings of courts. Hence, the appointments made to such Tribunals cannot be equated with or termed to be violative of the constitutional mandates, for the mere fact that the Central Government has enacted Rules which would enable appointments of Central Deputy Chief Labour Commissioners or Joint Commissioners of the State Labour Departments. 20. In the aforementioned circumstance, it appears that the apprehension voiced by the petitioner with respect to the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers has no relevance since the said division of powers aims to prevent any single branch from becoming too powerful and to promote accountability and democratic governance. Though the Indian Constitution outline the functions of each branch and establishes the system of checks and balances, it does not explicitly provide for the separation of powers. There is some overlap in functions between the branches, allowing for checks and balances to ensure no one branch dominates. Article 50 of the Constitution mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive, ensuring the judiciary’s independence. The doctrine aims to prevent tyranny, promote accountability, safeguard individual liberties and foster efficient administration. There is some overlap in functions between the branches, allowing for checks and balances to ensure no one branch dominates. Article 50 of the Constitution mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive, ensuring the judiciary’s independence. The doctrine aims to prevent tyranny, promote accountability, safeguard individual liberties and foster efficient administration. Though in Roger Mathew supra, this issue is dealt with in detail by the Apex Court, I do not find many reasons to think that the amendment carried out to Section 7 will completely break down the equilibrium. 21. Moreover, going by the pragmatic aspects, which have already been submitted by the learned Government Pleader, that at present Kerala has four labour courts and 7 industrial tribunals, the appointment of presiding officers of these labour courts are made by the Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of High Court of Kerala as per Section 7(1) of the ID Act. The appointment process ensures that the Presiding Officer, is a qualified judicial officer, typically a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or someone with a similar legal qualification as prescribed under the Act. 22. The writ petition was prepared and preferred in the year 2011; thereafter, it was finally heard in the year 2025. Even then, the petitioner could not point out a single instance wherein the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Joint Labour Commissioner of the State Labour Department has chosen to seek appointment as the Presiding Officers in any of the Industrial Tribunals. There are some practical reasons for that since Rule 3(5) Note (1) of the Special Rules, reserves 10% of the posts for State Labour Department officers. However, for a Joint Labour Commissioner to be appointed, a minimum of 10 Tribunals must exist in the State. As per the provisions of the parent Act, such officers, who are qualified to be appointed, must resign from such posts. As of now, Kerala has only 5 Labour Commissioners. Therefore, the possibility of such an appointment is remote. 23. In the aforementioned observations, it appears that the prayers sought in the writ petition appear to be merely on apprehensions. As per the provisions of the parent Act, such officers, who are qualified to be appointed, must resign from such posts. As of now, Kerala has only 5 Labour Commissioners. Therefore, the possibility of such an appointment is remote. 23. In the aforementioned observations, it appears that the prayers sought in the writ petition appear to be merely on apprehensions. On considering the submissions of the learned Government Pleader appearing for the 2 nd respondent that notwithstanding the promulgation of the Rules, the State Government has not effected any appointments invoking the provisions thereof, till date, I do not think that any interference is warranted in this case. Accordingly, the writ petition fails, and it is dismissed.