Order : 1. The respondent-employee was appointed on the post of GDSBPM in the year 1985. While the respondent-employee was posted at Deladar (Jawal) Post Office, District Sirohi as GDSBPM during an inspection of the branch, cash to the tune of Rs.13,037/- was found deficit. In addition, an amount of Rs.6,086/- which were deposited by the certain persons against their telephone bills, was also not accounted. Thereafter, charges were framed against the respondent-employee vide memorandum dated 09.05.2012 and after conducting the enquiry, the enquiry report was submitted on 24.09.2012. The disciplinary authority passed an order on 24.09.2012 punishing the respondent-employee with punishment of removal from service. The respondent-employee preferred an appeal and the same was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 05.07.2013. Thereafter, the respondent - employee approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short, 'learned Tribunal') while preferring OA No.319/2014 (Mohabbat Ram Vs. Union of India & Ors.) in which the learned Tribunal after hearing both the parties at length observed that the charge-sheet, the enquiry report and the orders of the disciplinary authority were in accordance with the procedure laid down and there was no illegality in such orders which have been passed, including the appellate order. However, in the limited intervention, while setting aside the impugned orders to the extent of punishment of removal from service, the learned Tribunal interfered in the quantum of punishment taking into account the long service of employee. The learned Tribunal while considering the deficit cash to the tune of Rs.13,037/- and also looking into 29 years of unblemished service of the respondent-employee declared the punishment to be disproportionate. The learned Tribunal has also observed that on the first day itself, the respondent-employee submitted that due to his ill-health, certain amounts was deposited by him in two installments and thus, he has not caused any loss to the public exchequer. Learned Tribunal has also taken into consideration the age of the employee which is above 65 years. Against the order of learned Tribunal interfering in the quantum of punishment, the Union of India has preferred this petition. 2. Counsel for the Union of India has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. the Director General, SSB and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 2707 of 2022, decided on 20.04.2022. 2. Counsel for the Union of India has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. the Director General, SSB and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 2707 of 2022, decided on 20.04.2022. The relevant portion of para No.8 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- "8. On the judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to: i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as ‘Wednesbury principles’. In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact- finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 9.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge- sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 3. Counsel for the Union of India has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Others Vs. Subrata Nath passed in Civil Appeal Nos.7939-7940 of 2022, decided on 23.11.2022. The relevant portion of para No.28 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- "28. We are unable to commend the approach of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. There was no good reason for the High Court to have entered the domain of the factual aspects relating to the evidence recorded before the Inquiry Officer. This was clearly an attempt to reappreciate the evidence which is impermissible in exercise of powers of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that both, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, fell into an error by setting aside the order of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate Authority." 4. The counsel for the Union of India submits that once the respondent has admitted the missing amount, there was no scope of any interference in the impugned orders and any kind of relief in the quantum of punishment was uncalled for. The counsel for the appellant also submits that a wrong is a wrong and once established, ought to follow the consequences for any employee of the Union of India. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that he is not challenging the order on merits and the punishment order is acceptable to him but at the same time the interference in the quantum of punishment was called for because the employee was an old man who was above the age of 65 years and had rendered 29 years of unblemished service. The learned counsel also submits that Rs.13,037/- was deposited at a subsequent stage and the petitioner had admitted irregularity though not an illegality. 6. This Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties finds that the learned Tribunal has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the orders of punishment given by the disciplinary authority are in accordance with law. The Court also agrees with the findings of the learned Tribunal on disproportionate punishment on conjoint consideration of the following factors:- (a) The unblemished 29 years of service rendered by the respondent-employee. (b) The amount of Rs.13,037/- being an irregularity was not embezzled. (c) The stand of the employee remaining the same from the first to the last proceeding. (d) The fact of the respondent - employee's age having crossed 65 years. 7. Having regard to the aforementioned factors and the other issues as discussed, this Court is of the opinion that the interference in the quantum of the punishment was justified. The judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Subrata Nath (supra) and Anil Kumar Upadhyay (supra) only narrowed down the scope of interference in the quantum of the punishment but at the same time the disproportionality of the punishment was always left open to be interfered by the Tribunal in appropriate cases. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed while upholding the order passed by the learned Tribunal.