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2025 DIGILAW 1295 (GUJ)

Chandanji Ravaji Vihol v. Deceased Patel Hargovanbhai Chhaganlal Thro Heirs

2025-11-20

D.N.RAY, SUNITA AGARWAL

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JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. This Intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.11.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition upholding the order passed by the revenue tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal has not committed any jurisdictional error in exercise of the jurisdiction, which may call for interference by this Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. This case presents a chequered history of the purchases of the lands in question namely land bearing Survey Nos. 709, 709 / 1 and 710, in Village Pilvai, Taluka Vijapur, District Mehsana. The petitioners claimed to have purchased the lands in question vide registered sale deed dated 20.11.1973 from the original landlord after payment of requisite premium for conversion of the land in question from new tenure to old tenure. It is submitted that the respondent No.1, Mr.Hargovanbhai Chhaganlal Patel, claiming to be the tenant of the lands in question filed an application under Sections 70(b), 29, 32G and 32(1)(p) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (in short, “the Tenancy Act’ 1948”) before the Mamlatdar and ALT, Vijapur. The said application was registered as Tenancy Case No. 32 of 1976 and vide order dated 20.07.1976, giving benefit of Section 70(b), the application of respondent No.1 was allowed declaring him to be the tenant of the lands in question, simultaneously, ordering for removal of the petitioners from the lands in question under the provisions of Section 86 of the Tenancy Act’ 1948. 3. The original landlords, who had already sold the lands in question to the original petitioners herein filed an appeal against the order dated 20.07.1976, as Tenancy Appeal No.271 of 1976 before the Deputy Collector, who had confirmed the order passed by the Mamlatdar while dismissing the appeal vide order dated 30.06.1977. Simultaneously, the petitioners also filed a revision application before the Deputy Collector challenging the order dated 20.07.1976, which was also dismissed by a separate order of the same date, i.e. 20.07.1976. Two sets of revisions were then filed, one by the petitioner and another by the original landlord bearing Revision Nos.787 of 1977 and 788 of 1977; respectively before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Two sets of revisions were then filed, one by the petitioner and another by the original landlord bearing Revision Nos.787 of 1977 and 788 of 1977; respectively before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Both the Revisions were allowed vide order dated 06.07.1978 and while setting aside the orders of the Mamlatdar and Deputy Collector, the matter was remanded back to the Mamlatdar and ALT reserving liberty to the parties to lead fresh evidence, if they desire, with the direction to decide the matter afresh as indicated therein. 4. Upon remand, the Mamlatdar and ALT registered a Tenancy Case No.223 of 1978 and by order dated 25.11.1978 had declared that the original applicant, namely Hargovandas Chhaganlal Patel was entitled to purchase the lands in question under the Tenancy Act’ 1948 as on date, i.e. 01.04.1957, and Section 84 proceedings for removal of the possession of the petitioners was ordered. An appeal before the Collector, Mehsana was filed against the said order, who had rejected the same vide order dated 27.03.1979 on the ground of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners, then, filed a Revision No.390 of 1979 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal challenging the order dated 27.03.1979 passed by the Collector. While allowing the revision vide order dated 16.01.1980, the Tribunal granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the competent authority. The Ganot Appeal No. 28 of 1980 was, then, preferred by the petitioners before the Deputy Collector, Mehsana challenging the order dated 25.11.1979 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, who has allowed the appeal vide order dated 21.07.1980. 5. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the Deputy Collector, while allowing the appeal setting aside the order dated 25.11.1978 passed by the Mamlatdar holding the respondent No.1 of being entitled to the lands in question on payment of purchase price, has returned a finding in favour of the petitioners herein, which are relevant to be noted at this stage. 6. A perusal of the order dated 21.07.1980 of the Deputy Collector indicates that it was noted therein that the lands bearing Survey Nos.709, 709/1,710 and 713 situated in the sim of Village Pilvai, Taluka Vijapur were given to Suthars as ‘Raiyat upyogi jakariyat land’ and in view of the implementation of the abolition of ‘jakariyat land’ under the Act, by confiscating it, entry No.2323 dated 09.06.1960 was made entering it in the name of the Government. Entry No.2936 dated 10.01.1968 was, thereafter, made wherein waste land were entered in the name of Suthar Nanalal Ranchoddas. In the said order, the lands bearing survey Nos. 709/1 and 710 were ultimately entered in the joint name of Prahladbhai Nanalal and Suthar Harjivan and entry No.3323 thereof was, accordingly, made on 02.01.1972. Up to the year 1972, there was no dispute with respect to the lands in question. However, in the year 1973, vide registered sale deed, half portion of the lands in question was given to Prahladbhai Nanalal and therefore, Suthar Prahladbhai Nanalal became owner of all survey numbers, namely Survey Nos. 709, 709/1 and 710. These three numbers were then sold to the original petitioners by Suthar Prahladbhai Nanalal vide registered document dated 20.11.1973 and there is no dispute also about the said sale deed. 7. The dispute arose only after execution of the sale deed dated 20.11.1973 in favour of the petitioners herein by the then recorded owners of the lands in question. The respondent No.1 herein, claiming to be the tenant of the lands in question, raised a tenancy claim by filing a Tenancy Case No.32 of 1975. 8. It is recorded by the Deputy Collector in the order dated 21.07.1980 that for deciding as to whether the claimant – respondent No.1 (defendant No.1 therein) is a tenant of the lands in question or not, the evidence produced in the proceedings have to be examined. It is noted that looking to the evidence produced by the respondent No.1 before the Mamlatdar, after remand, no fresh evidence had been produced. The record indicates that till the year 1951, admittedly, the respondent No.1 had made cultivation, but there is no entry of the name of him as the tenant after 1951. Looking to the ‘Pani Patrak’ of the lands after 1951 – 1952, there is no name of Hargovanbhai Chhaganbhai, which fact is admitted in the order passed by the Mamlatdar though there is mention of some amount shown to have been paid by way of tenancy, which could only show that some tenant was cultivating the lands by way of tenancy right. However, this finding recorded by the Mamlatdar in the order impugned was not supported by any evidence on record, inasmuch as, in the revenue records, the name of the tenant was not reflected. However, this finding recorded by the Mamlatdar in the order impugned was not supported by any evidence on record, inasmuch as, in the revenue records, the name of the tenant was not reflected. The Mamlatdar, on the basis of some entry of payment of the tenancy price, had reached at a conclusion that there was a tenant in the land in question. It was, thus, held that merely because there is a mention of some tenancy, inference may have been drawn, but it could not be treated as a proof of tenancy right of the respondent No.1 / defendant No.1 therein. 9. It was, thus, noted that till submission of the application by respondent No.1 on 20.11.1973, he had never asserted his right as a tenant, and, moreover, in his deposition dated 20.09.1961 in respect of trial of survey No.713, the respondent No.1 (defendant No.1 therein) had categorically deposed that except survey No.713, there was no other land of tenancy in his possession at the village in question. It was noted that if the respondent No.1 was holding the possession of the lands in question as a tenant, he would have come forward to assert his right of tenancy in Survey Nos. 709, 709/1 and 710. Had it been so, the Mamlatdar was required to make further examination and come to a conclusion on the submission of the record such as tenancy receipts. No such evidence had been produced by the respondent No.1. There is no entry of tenancy in village form No. 7 / 12. There is nothing on record which would make it proper to hold as to the right of the respondent No.1 being a tenant after 1951. On the basis of entry of 1951, once the respondent No.1 had failed to produce evidence about his tenancy, the decision of the Mamlatdar based on inference, cannot be sustained. 10. It was, thus, held that if it is believed that the possession of the respondent No.1 was unauthorizedly taken in the year 1952, there is nothing on record to indicate as to what action had been taken. 10. It was, thus, held that if it is believed that the possession of the respondent No.1 was unauthorizedly taken in the year 1952, there is nothing on record to indicate as to what action had been taken. The claim of the defendant No.1 was, thus, held untenable for want of any evidence and it was held that since old evidence were not to be taken into consideration, it was clearly appearing that the respondent No.1 (defendant No.1 therein) was not a tenant and the appeal was, thus, allowed setting aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT dated 25.11.1978. 11. The revision filed by respondent No.1 registered as Revision Application No.873 of 1980 against the order dated 25.11.1978 passed by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana, wherein the aforesaid findings were record, had also been rejected vide order dated 19.10.1982. The findings of the Tribunal in the order dated 19.10.1982 at page No. ‘44’ of the Paper-book, are relevant to be noted by us. 12. It is categorically recorded by the Tribunal that except the bare oral statement of the opponent No.1 (namely one of the co-owners), there is no other evidence worth the name in the case to show that the disputed lands were being cultivated by the respondent No.1 (revisionist therein) as a tenant for number of years and that he is in possession of the disputed lands. It is noted that both the parties were allowed to lead fresh evidence in the previous order of the tribunal but, apart from the affidavit of respondent No.1, no other evidence has been brought on record after remand. It was, then, concluded that the Deputy Collector was right in holding that reliance on the affidavits was not proper and on the evidence produced by the parties, it was clear that the applicant was not the tenant of the suit land. Inspite of opportunity given to the respondent / present applicant for producing additional evidence, if any, in order to establish his tenancy, no additional evidence had been produced. The opportunity granted, as such, has not been availed. 13. Inspite of opportunity given to the respondent / present applicant for producing additional evidence, if any, in order to establish his tenancy, no additional evidence had been produced. The opportunity granted, as such, has not been availed. 13. It seems that these orders were challenged by the respondent No.1 before this Court in Special Civil Application No.735 of 1983, wherein this Court has allowed the writ petition setting aside the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal dated 19.10.1982 remitting the matter back with the observations in paragraph No. ‘5’ as under:- “5. In the result, this Special Civil Application succeeds in part. The order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad, dated 19-10-1982 made in revision application No.TEN.B.A.873/80 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the matter after considering the evidence "written statement filed by the respondent, Naranbhai Harjivanbhai Suthar", and decide the matter in accordance with law. The matter is old one, and as such, it is expected of the Tribunal to decide the same within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. It is further made clear that the Tribunal is free to consider the matter with a point of view to remand the matter to the lower authority also, if it considers necessary. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.” 14. We may note that after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, while remitting the matter with the abovenoted observations, the writ Court has also noted that the petitioners did not produce any other evidence on remand of the matter, rather has relied upon the copy of the written statement of one of the respondents, wherein some admissions have been made to the effect that the petitioner was cultivating the land and was paying the rent to the landlord through their Administrator. Noticing the same, it was observed that the ‘written statement’ being a relevant piece of evidence could not have been ignored by the Tribunal and the fact that the Tribunal had not considered the weight of the said evidence is a serious illegality in the order of the Tribunal which can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. 15. 15. The writ Court, thus, set aside the order of the Tribunal only on a premise that the evidence in the nature of ‘written statement’ filed by one of the respondents namely Naranbhai Harjivanbhai Suthar is a material evidence and non- consideration thereof vitiates the order of the Tribunal. While saying so, it was, however, kept open for the Tribunal to consider the matter independently. 16. It seems that after remand, revision was allowed vide order dated 01.03.2006, which was subject matter of challenge in the writ petition, out of which the present appeal has arisen. 17. Upon perusal of the order impugned dated 01.03.2006, it may be noted that the Tribunal, while setting aside the orders dated 21.07.1980 passed by the Deputy Collector, and restoring the original order dated 20.07.1976 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT in Tenancy Case No. 32 of 1975, has simply relied upon the ‘written statement’ filed by the Naranbhai Harjivanbhai, one of the co-owners of the lands in question in the proceedings before the Mamlatdar. While relying upon the said ‘written statement’, it was opined that the petitioners herein namely the opposite party therein had never challenged the truthfulness of the said ‘written statement’ and upon reading of the said ‘written statement’, the respondent No.1 (revisionist) was required to be declared as the tenant of the lands in question. 18. The stand of the opposite party therein that the said ‘written statement’ was filed in collusion with the claimants / applicants / respondent No.1 herein’ was rejected. The entire order of the Tribunal dated 01.03.2006 is, thus, founded on the statement of one of the co-owners / landlord of the lands in question in the ‘written statement’ filed by him in the tenancy proceedings, namely Tenancy Case No.32 of 1975. While setting aside the order dated 21.07.1980, pertinent is note that the Tribunal has completely ignored the other materials on record considered by the Deputy Collector in its order. 19. The fact that there was a deposition of the tenant dated 20.08.1961 in the trial of the tenancy case of survey No. 713 that he had no other land in his tenancy at the village in question, considered by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana, has been conveniently ignored. 19. The fact that there was a deposition of the tenant dated 20.08.1961 in the trial of the tenancy case of survey No. 713 that he had no other land in his tenancy at the village in question, considered by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana, has been conveniently ignored. It seems that the Tribunal was swayed away by the observations made by the writ Court in the order of remand dated 08.04.1997, noticing that the ‘written statement’ filed by one of the respondents would be a material piece of evidence and non-consideration thereof would vitiate the order of the Tribunal. The appropriate course after remand for the Tribunal was to weigh all the evidence of the parties and on consideration of the ‘written statement’ filed by one of the respondents, namely Naranbhai Harjivanbhai Suthar, the collective weight of the evidence filed by the alleged tenant, if any, was required to be assessed to arrive at the finding as to whether the respondent No.1 can be held to be the tenant of the lands in question. 20. When the weight of two pieces of crucial evidence on record, as considered by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana, in the order dated 21.07.1980 and relied by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the order impugned dated 01.03.2006, is put on a scale, we find that the balance tilts in favour of the petitioners, inasmuch as, the petitioners are purchasers of the lands in question by virtue of the sale deed dated 20.11.1973, when there was no entry of a sitting tenant in the revenue records. The petitioners are bona fide purchasers of the lands in question from the original owners, whose names were recorded in the revenue records at the time of sale. 21. The dispute raised by the respondent No.1 by filing application leading to the registration of Tenancy Case No.32 of 1975, is unsupported by any evidence led by the alleged tenant so as to establish that he was in the possession of the lands in question as on 01.04.1957, i.e. the tillers’ day and is entitled to seek benefit of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act’ 1948 as deemed tenant. 22. We may also take note of the assertions made on behalf of the respondent No.1 herein, the heir and legal representative of the original applicant Patel Hargovindbhai Chhaganlal, who claimed tenancy in the land in question. 22. We may also take note of the assertions made on behalf of the respondent No.1 herein, the heir and legal representative of the original applicant Patel Hargovindbhai Chhaganlal, who claimed tenancy in the land in question. In the affidavit filed in the present appeal under the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by us, only this much is stated that the name of the tenant was not continued after the year 1951 as the tenant was assured that he would be allowed to continue to cultivate the land and, in future, he would be given first chance to purchase the land whenever the landlord decides to sell it. The contention is that the landlords had allured the tenant by saying that if he had agreed to get the name removed as tenant from the revenue records of the subject land, he would be allowed to purchase the land bearing survey No.713 under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act’ 1948. They further assured that whenever in future they decide to sell the land, the tenant would have to pay the market price to the landlord. This was the internal arrangement which was allegedly made between the landlord and the tenant, namely respondent No.1 herein as per own contention of the respondent No.1 in the affidavit filed before us. 23. The further assertion in the affidavit that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not come to an end, is neither here nor there. The assertion is that the tenant was compelled to give the deposition in the Tenancy Case for survey No.713 to the effect that he was not a tenant of any other land of the village in question, is unbelievable and cannot be given due credence. 24. Suffice it to note that whatever may be the arrangement, internally made between the alleged tenant and the landlord, it would have no bearing on the case of the petitioners herein who have simply come out with a categorical assertions that as on the date when the land in question was purchased by him in the year 1973, there was no sitting tenant in the land in question and the sale was made by the recorded owners of the land in question. 25. 25. The further assertion in paragraph No.’23.6’ of the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.1 before us is that on the tillers’ day, i.e. on 01.04.1957, the tenant Hargovindbhai Patel was cultivating the subject land and thus, in view of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act’ 1948, he had became deemed purchaser. Suffice it to record that there is no evidence to support the said statement. The entire claim of the respondent No.1 in the affidavit filed before us is on the assurance given by the landlords, one of whom namely Naranbhai Harjibhai made admission in the ‘written statement’ filed in the Tenancy Case. Any oral understanding between the tenant and the landlord where under the name of the tenant was allegedly removed, and no proceeding had been initiated by the alleged tenant to assert his right in the Tenancy Act’ 1948, i.e. to declare him as a deemed tenant uptil the year 1975, would lead to only one conclusion that the respondent No.1 has failed to establish that he was the sitting tenant of the lands in question on the tillers’ day, i.e. on 01.04.1957 and was cultivating the lands in question in the said capacity. 26. As there is an admission in the affidavit filed in this appeal, about the deposition made by the respondent No.1 on 20.08.1961 in the Tenancy Case of Survey No.713 that he was holding no other land except Survey No.713 in the village in question as the land of his tenancy, the respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to resile from the same on the premise that the said statement was given by him on the allurement given by the landlords that he would be given first choice to purchase the land in question. 27. This explanation given by the the respondent No.1 in the affidavit filed before us does not stand to reason, for the simple fact that, had the respondent No.1 was having any right to seek declaration under the Tenancy Act’ 1948 as a deemed purchaser or being the sitting tenant, it is not understandable as to why he would give up or forego such a valuable right, that too on the bald assurance of the landlord. 28. 28. The discussions made above clearly show that the respondent No.1 had never asserted his right being the sitting tenant of the lands in question uptil the year 1975, when he filed the Tenancy Case No.32 of 1975 after the original landholders had parted away with their rights in the lands in question by execution of the sale deed dated 20.11.1973 in favour of the petitioners herein. Any ‘written statement’ filed by one of the original owner / landlord after he himself had parted away which his right in the lands in question by execution of the sale deed dated 20.11.1973’ cannot be treated as a valuable piece of evidence, so as to consider it as an admission of the original owner about the tenancy right of the respondent No.1. 29. With the above, we find that all these issues arising in the matter have been completely ignored by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while passing the impugned order dated 01.03.2006. The categorical findings returned by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana in the order dated 21.07.1980 on analysis of the evidence on record, as noted hereinabove, could not have been upturned on the basis of a sole piece of evidence namely the ‘written statement’ of one of the landlords in the tenancy proceedings, after he sold away his right in the land in question. 30. With the above, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, we may note that all the above aspects of the matter have been overlooked by the learned Single Judge. 31. On one hand, the appellant had contemporaneous evidence in his favour whereas, the respondent failed to adduce any evidence, much less of contemporaneous nature, except the bald pleadings of the former landlord, that too after the landlord had executed a sale deed in favour of the appellants, thereby divesting the landlord of any rights in the land, to plead to the contrary. 32. In view of the above discussion, the judgment and order dated 27.11.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. The impugned order dated 01.03.2006 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.873 of 1980 is also set aside. 33. 32. In view of the above discussion, the judgment and order dated 27.11.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. The impugned order dated 01.03.2006 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.873 of 1980 is also set aside. 33. In the conspectus of facts and circumstances brought before us, having considered the matter in detail, we reach at an irresistible conclusion that the order dated 21.07.1980 passed by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana was completely justified in allowing the Ganot Appeal No.28 of 1980 preferred by the original petitioners as affirmed by the order dated 19.10.1982 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.873 of 1980, wherein a categorical finding has been returned that the respondent No.1 has failed to produce any evidence to support his case. 34. While affirming both the orders dated 21.07.1980 passed by the Deputy Collector, Mehsana and the Revisional Order dated 19.10.1982 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, while setting aside the order dated 01.03.2006, both the appeal and the writ petition stand allowed. The Tenancy Case No.32 of 1975, thus, stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 35. After this judgment was dictated, Ms.Trusha K. Patel, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 would make a request to grant a stay to the operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks. For the detailed deliberations made hereinabove, we do not find any good ground to accept the said prayer. The prayer for stay of the operation of this judgment is, therefore, rejected.