JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed by CBI challenging the acquittal judgment passed in C.C.No.13 of 2010 on the file of learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai. 2. Brief facts of the case: A1 to A6 and approver P.W.3 in C.C.No. 13 of 2010 on the file of the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai entered into conspiracy to cheat the unemployed youth on the false promise of arranging employment in the railway protection force (RPF) by preparing forged application for the post of Sub Inspector of Police, police constable in RPF and forged index card, RPF selection card, RPF Chennai permission pass, RPF call letter for written examination, RPF identity slip cum free travel authority, RPF selection list on different occasions and appointment orders and allotment of duty and demanded, accepted various amounts from various witnesses and made repayment of part of the amount to some of the witnesses and gave the forged appointment order to P.W.2 and P.W.4. P.W.2 and P.W.4 approached P.W.5 Inspector of Police, Railway Protection Post, Madurai on the basis of the forged appointment order and duty allotment order on 14.06.2009 and requested to allow them to join. Eventually P.W.5 came to know that the same was forged one and on suspicion, he contacted A6 and A6 asked to release him and thereafter P.W. 5 and the department came to know about the forged appointment order and received the complaint from P.W.2 and P.W.4, and after consulting the higher officers P.W.1 gave complaint to the CBI under Ex.P6. The CBI registered the case under sections 120 (b), r/w. 420 of I.P.C., 468, 471, 473 of IPC and 13 (2), 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. 2.1. Thereafter, CBI conducted investigation and filed the final report against A1 to A6 and P.W.3 turned approver. The said final report was taken on file by the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai in C.C.No. 13 of 2010 and summons was issued to the accused. After appearance of the accused, the copies under section 207 of Cr.P.C., were served upon them. Proper charges were framed and the accused were questioned and all the accused pleaded not guilty and they stood for trial. The prosecution to prove the case examined P.W.1 to P.W.41 and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P77 and marked M.O.1 to M.O.9. After appearance of the accused, the copies under section 207 of Cr.P.C., were served upon them. Proper charges were framed and the accused were questioned and all the accused pleaded not guilty and they stood for trial. The prosecution to prove the case examined P.W.1 to P.W.41 and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P77 and marked M.O.1 to M.O.9. The learned trial judge questioned the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C. by putting the incriminating material available against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the prosecution documents. All the accused denied them as false and they gave explanation that they were falsely roped in this case. A1 took a specific stand that he was one of the victims at the hands of A4 and he was arrayed as accused without any legal evidence and A3 stated that false case was foisted against him. Similarly remaining accused also took a stand that they were falsely arrayed as accused. 2.2. On the side of the defense, D.W.1, D.W.2 were examined and Ex.D1 was marked. The learned trial judge after considering both prosecution and defense evidence acquitted all the accused by impugned judgment dated 19.04.2017. Challenging the same the CBI has filed this appeal. 3. The learned public prosecutor made the following detailed submissions :- Thiru. Muthusaravanan, the learned public prosecutor for CBI would read the entire evidence of the prosecution witnesses and relevant portion of the material documents and also argued about the legal principles governing the approver evidence, conspiracy and the appreciation of the evidence in this type of the case of job racktering and also the legal infirmity and factually erroneous finding of the learned trial Court and seeks to interfere with the said trial court judgment. 3.1. Many witnesses clearly deposed about the false promise made by the respondents/ accused to get job in the railway protection force. They clearly deposed about the issuance of various forged documents relating to the appointment of Sub Inspector of Police, Police constables in RPF purported to have been issued by the railway recruitment board such as application form, index card, identity card, selection card, Chennai office permission pass, selection list, appointment order and the allotment of duty order etc., The CBI collected all the forged documents and proved through the examination of the expert and also through other mode. Number of witnesses categorically deposed about the receipt of the amount by various accused on various occasions. Some of the witnesses turned hostile, but the material portion of their evidence corroborated the prosecution case. In such a situation the learned trial judge has committed error in acquitting all the accused from all the charges without appreciating the entire evidence which leads to the only one conclusion that all the accused committed the charged offence. Therefore, he seeks to convict all the accused by setting aside the impugned acquittal judgment. 3.2. P.W.2 and P.W.3 in their evidence clearly deposed about the receipt of the amount under the guise of getting job in the RPF and also furnishing of the fake selection card, fake appointment order, fake duty allotment in the Madurai RPF office and thereafter P.W.1 gave the complaint to the CBI. Their evidence itself is sufficient to convict the accused for the charged offences. But the learned trial judge has not considered the same in proper manner and erroneously acquitted the accused. 3.3. The Learned Special Public prosecutor also reiterated the averments made in the grounds of appeal and made detailed arguments about the perversity in the reasoning of the learned trial judge in acquitting A1, A3, A4, A5 and A6. Therefore he seeks to convict the accused. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the accused No.1/ respondent No.1/ G.Senthilkumar : He is also a victim and he also had given application to get a job to A4/Thangam through A2/Iyyanar (deceased). But, he was arrayed as accused and similarly placed persons were cited as witnesses. 4.1. There are lot of infirmities and inconsistencies between the evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the receipt of money from various witnesses by making the false promise to get the job. P.W.23 has not made allegation about him and hence, the learned trial Judge has correctly acquitted the first respondent. The evidence of P.W.24 has a lot of infirmities and his evidence do not corroborate with the evidence of the remaining witnesses. Even though the prosecution has filed the hand writing expert's opinion, the same is not a ground to convict R1 for the reason that the same was not taken in accordance with law. The evidence of P.W.24 has a lot of infirmities and his evidence do not corroborate with the evidence of the remaining witnesses. Even though the prosecution has filed the hand writing expert's opinion, the same is not a ground to convict R1 for the reason that the same was not taken in accordance with law. Further, the conviction could not be passed merely on the basis of the handwriting expert's opinion and he relied on number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to substantiate the said contention. 4.2. The learned counsel read the evidence of P.W.2, P.W.28, P.W.27, D.W.2, P.W.33, P.W.16, P.W.24 and P.W.8 and submitted that the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to convict this respondent for the charged offence. There was no evidence on the side of the prosecution to prove the conspiracy and hence, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the respondents holding that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 4.3. He also produced the following precedents: (i) CBI vs. C. Shukla & others, AIR 1998 SC 1406 (ii) Arun Gulan Gawali Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cri. L.J. 4481 (iii) Basheera Begam Vs. Mohamed Ibrahim & others, (2020) 11 SCC 174 (iv) Parveen @ Sonu Vs. State of Haryana, 2021 (LL) SC 715 (v) Ram Narain vs State of U.P. (1973) 2 SCC 86 (vi) Tomaso Brun & another Vs. State of U.P. (2015) 7 SCC 178 (vii) S.P.S. Rathore Vs. CBI & another, (2017) 5 SCC 817 (viii) Chennadi Jalapathy Reddy vs. Baddam Pratap Reddy & another, (2019) 14 SCC 220 (ix) Padum Kumar Vs. State of U.P. (2020) 3 SCC 35 5. The submission of the learned counsel for the Accused No.4/ respondent No.3/R.Thangam: The learned counsel for the Third respondent/Thangam (A4 ) would submit that the approver's evidence P.W.3 is not corroborated by the remaining evidence. The evidence of P.W.3, P.W.36, P.W.38 and P.W.39 do not help the prosecution. The approver's evidence was not recorded legally. P.W.3's statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., was recorded without following the procedures and hence, his evidence is liable to be rejected. He also submitted that the certificate of memorandum as required under Section 164(4) of Cr.P.C., was not obtained and hence, benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused. The investigating agency has not conducted the investigation in a legal manner. He also submitted that the certificate of memorandum as required under Section 164(4) of Cr.P.C., was not obtained and hence, benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused. The investigating agency has not conducted the investigation in a legal manner. They have committed number of illegalities during the course of search and seizure and hence, he seeks acquittal. He also submitted that there are discrepancies between the witnesses, relating to the place of the occurrence. Some witnesses deposed that they saw the accused Nos.1 and 2 at Kattayathevanpatti and the other set of witnesses submitted that they saw the accused Nos.1 and 2 at Chennai. The FIR also was not registered as per law and there was insertion and overwriting in Ex.P2 and the same is clear from the perusal of Ex.P2. The learned counsel also submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.4, 16, 19, 26, 27 and 28 that the third respondent has received the amount is not proved in view of a number of contradictions in their evidence. The learned counsel also submitted that the above witnesses are not trustworthy and their evidence is not sufficient to convict the respondent under the charged offences. This accused's handwriting does not tally with the questioned documents sent to the expert. Hence, the opinion of handwriting expert has not supported the case of the prosecution. There are number of embellishments in the prosecution evidence. He also argued by referring the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., of various witnesses and stated that there is a material improvement and hence, their evidence are not trustworthy. He also relied on number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to substantiate his plea that interference in the appeal against acquittal is very much limited. He relied the following judgments, 2024 Cri. L.J. 2021 (SC) : 2024 Cri. L.J. 1282. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the Accused No.3/ respondent No.2/R.Kalidass: The learned counsel for the respondent No.2/accused No.3 has reiterated the above submission and further submitted that P.W.4's evidence is not trustworthy and the same cannot be relied to convict the accused. There are number of contradictions between the evidence of P.W.38, P.W. 28, P.W.22 and P.W.26. He also submitted that two complaints were given ie., one to the IG/RPF and the other to the CBI. There are number of contradictions between the evidence of P.W.38, P.W. 28, P.W.22 and P.W.26. He also submitted that two complaints were given ie., one to the IG/RPF and the other to the CBI. There was suppression of one complaint and hence, on the basis of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A IR 1981 SC 1230 , the case against the respondents is liable to be rejected and the same was properly done by the learned trial Judge. Since R2 was not in relationship with the other accused he is not liable to be convicted. P.W.2's evidence is not in line with the case of CBI Case. 6.1. The learned counsel for the remaining respondents also had reiterated the said submission and sought for the confirmation of the acquittal judgment. 7. Discussion on merits: A6/ J.M.C.Joyson was a inspector, railway protection force, Chennai division. A5/ R.Bhaskaran was also working in the railway protection force in the supernumerary post. A1, A2 are brothers. A3 is a relative of A1. A4/ Smt.R.Thangam is a close associate of A6, A5 and A2. P.W.3 approver is st the proprietor of Backkeyam Xerox, No.13/8, Krishnapillai Garden, 1 Street, Saidapet, Chennai. A2's native place is Thoothukudi and he is friend of P.W.2’s father. A2 is uncle of P.W.4. A2 contacted P.W.2’s father and informed about the appointment in the RPF, Chennai and handed over the application form of P.W.2 and asked to fill it and received the same. He also deposed about the demand of Rs.50,000/- by A2. After one month A2 took P.W.2 to the Trichy RPF office ground with yellow colour permission pass and A2 told him that the RPF officers are not available and he assured to get the job in the forthcoming selection at Chennai. Thereafter, more than 10 persons were taken to the Chennai by A2 and A3 and they arranged the stay at Eswari lodge. In the Eswari lodge the accused Nos.2 and 3 introduced Thangam /A4 as an officer who would select them. She made a call to some other person and informed that there was no selection and she would inform further selection date within one week and received the phone numbers. After 20 days she informed to P.W.2 to come and participate in the selection. P.W.2 went to Chennai and A4 issued the permission card under Ex.P4. She made a call to some other person and informed that there was no selection and she would inform further selection date within one week and received the phone numbers. After 20 days she informed to P.W.2 to come and participate in the selection. P.W.2 went to Chennai and A4 issued the permission card under Ex.P4. She also assured that on showing the card, P.W.2 would be selected and thereafter they called to meet at the central railway station car parking lot. A6 and A4 were present and they handed over the selection card Ex.P3. On enquiry A4 told that A6 was the training officer. Thereafter, A4 told to go and meet at Madurai office with his order. In the Madurai office P.W.6, the Sub Inspector of Police on seeing the card stated that the said card was forged one and immediately he contacted the Inspector of RPF, P.W.4. Came there and contacted Thangam and A6 asked to release him. But, P.W.4 refused to release him and directed his subordinate to take P.W.2 and P.W.4 before P.W.1 assistant commissioner RPF. In P.W.1’s office, P.W.2 and P.W.4 gave the complaint about the above fraud under Ex.P2 and P3 and also handed over the pass Ex.P4 and P5. Thereafter, P.W.1 informed the same to the CBI. The said evidence of P.W.2 is corroborated by the evidence of P.W.4. P.W.9 was a tenant of A4 and he deposed that A4 assured to get job but he partly retracted in evidence saying he never gave any amount to A4. P.W.10, brother of P.W.9 also deposed in a similar way. But, during the cross examination he specifically deposed that the Ex.P34, P35 were shown by the CBI officer at the time of the enquiry. He also informed that she knew about higher officials in the railway department and assured to get the job. He also deposed that he handed over the certificates to A4 to get job. Even through they were treated hostile, in the material portion of the evidence clearly disclosed that A4 made a false promise to get job in the railway department. 7.1. P.W.8 was one of the victims who deposed that A1/Senthilkumar had shown the filled application form and obtained his signature under Ex.P32 in the presence of A4. Even through they were treated hostile, in the material portion of the evidence clearly disclosed that A4 made a false promise to get job in the railway department. 7.1. P.W.8 was one of the victims who deposed that A1/Senthilkumar had shown the filled application form and obtained his signature under Ex.P32 in the presence of A4. P.W.16 also deposed that P.W.24 is his relative and A4/ Thangam approached him and assured to get job in the railway department and hence he also handed over his certificate and amount to A4 and thereafter the said A4/ Thangam returned the money and informed that he was not eligible on account of the scar on his face. He also deposed that A4/Thangam handed over the hall ticket to him and A1 also. P.W.21 deposed that A1 received the certificate and biodata from him and asked to meet him at central railway station. In the central railway station he came along with A4/Thangam and he introduced A4/Thangam saying that she alone would arrange the job for them. P.W.22 deposed that A2 is friend of his uncle, he and other persons were trying to get a job in the RPF by giving Rs.25,000/-. He also deposed that A1 met him and received the application form from them. After some time he made an enquiry and the said Ayyanar returned the money. P.W.23 also deposed similarly and corroborated similarly but he deposed that Ayyanar had not repaid the entire amount and he repaid of Rs.8,000/- only. He further deposed that when he was asked for the repayment of Rs.17,000/- he was criminally intimidated with threat to life. He also clearly deposed about A1 and A2. P.W.24 also deposed that he handed over Rs.2,00,000/- to A4/Thangam to get the job and he also deposed that A1/Senthilkumar is his brother-in-law and he introduced her and made a promise to get the job. But she was unable to arrange a job and repaid the entire amount in the year 2009. P.W.25 had introduced A4/Thangam to P.W.24/ Rajendran and handed over the amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to A4/Thangam and she repaid the said amount after three months without arranging the job. But she was unable to arrange a job and repaid the entire amount in the year 2009. P.W.25 had introduced A4/Thangam to P.W.24/ Rajendran and handed over the amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to A4/Thangam and she repaid the said amount after three months without arranging the job. P.W.26 also deposed that A2/Ayyanar gave the application form and he handed over the amount of Rs.30,000/- and he also was served with permission pass under Ex.P19 and he has also deposed about the introduction of A4/Thangam and also that A4/Thangam gave the permission pass under Ex.P.49 and repaid the amount of Rs.24,000/-. He also deposed about P.W.2/Sakkaravarthi handing over Rs.9,000/- to A6. P.W.27 also deposed that he met Ayyanar and received the amount of Rs.50,000/- from P.W.28 to arrange a job for his son through A1. He also deposed about the role of A4/Thangam and he also identified A6 and A4/Thangam before the court and receipt of the amount of Rs.25,000/-. He has also deposed that both A4,A6 asked to meet the Inspector of Police/ P.W.5 at Madurai RPF Office to receive the key of the car and join the duty. 7.2. From the above evidence of the various witnesses it is clear that A1 to A6 made the witnesses believe as if they would arrange job in the railway protection force and they received the amount and they issued the forged documents. P.W.3 approver clearly deposed about the preparation of the forged documents. He categorically deposed about Ex.P15, P16 series. He also deposed about the active participation of A4 in the preparation of the said forged documents with false particulars and number of incriminating materials prepared by her relating to the various applicants and the same was also recovered during the search made by the CBI officers. He also deposed about the various exhibits and the corresponding forgery. He made a statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate under Ex.P.25 and thereafter the tender of pardon application was also submitted and the same was ordered. Therefore, the above evidence of the witness corroborated the evidence of P.W.3' and hence the prosecution clearly proved the charged offence. But, the learned trial judge erroneously acquitted the accused without properly appreciating the above available evidence which leads to only conclusion that all the accused committed the charged offence. 7.3. Therefore, the above evidence of the witness corroborated the evidence of P.W.3' and hence the prosecution clearly proved the charged offence. But, the learned trial judge erroneously acquitted the accused without properly appreciating the above available evidence which leads to only conclusion that all the accused committed the charged offence. 7.3. The CBI collected various forged documents like permission pass, selection card, permission card etc., P.W.33 Principal scientific officer in his report under Ex.P.57 clearly deposed that A1's signature was found in the questioned documents. Similarly P.W.34 also deposed about the incriminating material available in the hard disk seized from P.W.3's shop and his report is Ex.P60. All the materials seized from the said shop were marked as Ex.P.37 series. So in all aspect the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. But the learned trial judge gave undue importance to the immaterial facts and acquitted the accused in spite of the fact that all the materials clearly proved the charged offence. 8. Discussion on Conspiracy In this type of organised crime, it is not expected to prove the case through the oral evidence pointing out each overt act. The conspiracy between the above accused is proved through collective activity and individual activity. When the prosecution evidence has clearly established the material circumstances against each accused and all the material circumstances completed the chain of circumstances, all the accused are collectively liable for conviction for all the offences. It is settled principle that it is not necessary that all the accused are to be involved in each of the circumstances. In this aspect it is relevant to note the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: 8.1. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 : “24. ... . In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. ... . In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use.” 8.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, ( 2003) 3 SCC 6341 has held as follows: The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co- conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. 8.3. In the case of Aravind Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2021 (11) SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Three Judges Bench considered the entire gamut of conspiracy and has held that “It is not necessary that all conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy. Some may joint that conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them”. 8.4. In the case of Harihar Prasad vs. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 89 it is held: Secrecy, it was said, is the badge of conspiracy. Openness destroys the evidence as to the conspiracy. All the transactions, it was stated, were opened. That this submission is not correct is evidence from the efforts which had to be made and the mass of evidence which had to be called to disprove one document only, ie., the proceedings of April 9, 1957. The accused persons tried to keep the veil of secrecy. All the transactions, it was stated, were opened. That this submission is not correct is evidence from the efforts which had to be made and the mass of evidence which had to be called to disprove one document only, ie., the proceedings of April 9, 1957. The accused persons tried to keep the veil of secrecy. This continued until the very weight of the wrongful acts the veil was split and the conspiracy was out. 8.5. The learned trial judge in paragraph 57 to 72 segregated a portion of the evidence of each witness and picked the evidence selectively from the evidence of each witness and erroneously held that there was no sufficient evidence against each accused. The Honourable Supreme Court repeatedly held that in the case of the corruption case, appreciation of evidence is to be in such a way as to achieve the object enshrined in the Act. While appreciating the evidence, it is the duty of the Court to read the entire evidence of the witnesses. Picking one sentence from the evidence and disbelieving the entire evidence is not appreciable. There should be a holistic reading and a segmented/selective reading cannot be accepted. The same has been underscored by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of appreciating the evidence in the following judgments: Mustak Alias Kanio Ahmed Shaikh vs. State of Gujarat, (2020) 7 SCC 237 Rakesh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2021) 7 SCC 188 34. With the greatest of respect, the evidence of the witnesses have to be read as a whole Words and sentences cannot be truncated and read in isolation. 14. One is required to consider the entire evidence as a whole with the other evidence on record. Mere on sentence here or there and that too to the question asked by the defence in the cross-examination cannot be considered stand alone. 8.6. The learned trial judge has failed to appreciate the entire evidence in accordance with the object of the prevention of corruption Act. In this case, the evidence of P.W.8, P.W.16, P.W.21, P.W.22, P.W.23, P.W. 24, P.W.25, P.W.28 corroborate with each other, with respect to the fact that the accused conspired together and received the amount under the guise of arranging job and also issued the forged documents with forged seal of the railway department. In this case, the evidence of P.W.8, P.W.16, P.W.21, P.W.22, P.W.23, P.W. 24, P.W.25, P.W.28 corroborate with each other, with respect to the fact that the accused conspired together and received the amount under the guise of arranging job and also issued the forged documents with forged seal of the railway department. Some of the witness specifically deposed about the repayment of a portion of the amount. Finally, all the accused went to the extent of issuing false appointment order and duty assignment to P.W.2 and P.W.4. P.W.2 and P.W.4 on the basis of the said forged order approached the RPF office, Madurai and met P.W.6. He found out that the said order was a forged one and immediately contacted A6 and A6 asked to release them. The above conduct of A6 itself is sufficient to presume the offence of forgery and their act of cheating and consequential offence committed under section 120 (b), r/w. 420 of I.P.C., 468, 471, 473 and 13 (2), 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. 9. Discussion on the offence under Section 120(b) r/w 420 of IPC: The learned trial judge framed the charges against A1 to A6 under section 120 (b) r/w. 420 of I.P.C. 9.1. As discussed above, all the victims namely P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.8, P.W.16, P.W.21, P.W.22, P.W.23, P.W.24, P.W.25, P.W.28 clearly deposed about the false promise made by the accused in different situations and A4 received the amount and she made a repayment of a portion and A6 also received the amount. They also issued the forged appointment order to P.W.2 and P.W.4. Therefore, they collectively acted and cheated the unemployed youth. In this type of the cheating and fraud case, court can not be expected to pick the evidence selectively in order to acquit the accused. The accused hatched conspiracy to cheat the unemployed youth in a clandestine manner by forging the railway recruitment form, permission pass, identification card, appointment order. All the forged documents were filed before the court. The same also were proved by the evidence of the P.W.3 and expert. The said documents were properly seized and produced before the court. There was no explanation during the course of the 313 questioning on the side of the accused. All the forged documents were filed before the court. The same also were proved by the evidence of the P.W.3 and expert. The said documents were properly seized and produced before the court. There was no explanation during the course of the 313 questioning on the side of the accused. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the witnesses who had deposed about the receipt of the amount under the guise of arranging the job in the railway department. Even hostile witness had deposed that A4/Thangam promised to arrange job. In the said circumstances as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases, even the evidence of hostile witnesses which corroborate the prosecution case is sufficient to sustain the conviction:- 9.2. In the case of C. Munniappan & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, JT 2010 (9) SC 95 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the earlier decisions on the admissibility of the portion of the evidence of the hostile witness summarized the law as follows: 83...the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.. 9.3. It is well settled principle that in the corruption cases, witnesses are examined after a long gap and therefore minor contradiction would occur and the same cannot be isolated and said isolated version can not be treated as a ground for acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Garg Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, 2020 (2) SCC 88 at Page 97 has painfully observed as follows in the case of acquittal under section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention and Corruption Act :- “Given the time gap of five to six years, minor contradictions on some details are bound to occur and are natural. The witnesses are not required to recollect and narrate the entire version with photographic memory notwithstanding the hiatus and passage of time. Picayune variations do not in any way negate and contradict the main and core incriminatory evidence of the demand of bribe, reason why the bribe was demanded and the actual taking of the bribe that was paid, which are the ingredients of the offence under sections 7 and13 of the Act, that as noticed above and hereinafter, have been proved and established beyond reasonable doubt. Documents prepared contemporaneously noticed above affirm the primary and ocular evidence”. 9.4. The said observation is applicable to the present case and the learned trial judge without appreciating the entire evidence, selectively chose some picayune evidence and relied on them to acquit the accused. According to the learned judge the said isolated version did not connect all the accused. But he failed to see that collective appreciation of the said isolated versions only leads to the conclusion that all the accused conspired together and cheated various witnesses under the guise of getting the job in the department. 9.5. As per the charge No.1 they hatched a conspiracy and collected the amount from the witnesses. The witnesses specifically deposed about the receipt of the amount by the accused. As discussed above A4/Thangam collected the amount from various persons and A1 also collected amounts. A1 to A6 collected the amount either individually or through the other accused. The manner of the receipt of the amount as per the evidence is as follows :- Deposition of the witnesses The accused who dishonestly received the amount P.W.2 Ayyanar/A2 collected Rs.50,000/- P.W.4 His father handed over the Rs.15,000/- to the Ayyanar/A2. He personally handed over the Rs. 37,000/- to A4/Thangam in cash and transferred Rs. 40,000/- in the account of her son. P.W.24 A1 introduced A4 and he handed over Rs. 2,00,000/- to A4, A4 had not arranged the job and she returned the same in the year 2009. P.W.25 P.W.24 introduced A4 and he handed over Rs. 1,50,000/- to the A4 who had not arranged the job and she returned the same. P.W.16 He handed over Rs.25,000/- to A4/Thangam. There was no repayment of entire amount. A1, A2, A3 also collected the amount from P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.26, P.W.23, P.W. 22 and one Kannan. A4 handed over amount to A6 directly in the presence of the Chakkaravarthi/ P.W.2 and also deposited Rs.67,000/- in the account of the son’s account. 9.6. From the above it is clear that the prosecution clearly proved the conspiracy among the accused to receive the amount dishonestly under the false promise to get the appointment in RPF. The role of all accused is clearly proved through the issuance of the forged documents relating to the employment of the railway recruitment process. 9.6. From the above it is clear that the prosecution clearly proved the conspiracy among the accused to receive the amount dishonestly under the false promise to get the appointment in RPF. The role of all accused is clearly proved through the issuance of the forged documents relating to the employment of the railway recruitment process. In this aspect it is relevant to recapitulate the words of the Hon'ble Justice Subba Rao (As he then was) stated in the case of State Vs. K.M. Vedantham, AIR 1952 Mad 183 : 4. Deceiving generally is to lead into error by causing to believe what is false or to disbelieve what is true. If a makes a representation to B intending to deceive B and B acts upon that representation, B may be said to be deceived by A. If A makes that representation which induces B to lend money to him who has no intention of repaying it to A, the offence of cheating is complete.... The deception is not in the express term and both fraudulent and dishonest intention at the inception is usually made out from entire circumstances of the case. Therefore, both fraudulent and dishonest intention from the inception is clearly made out from the entire circumstances of the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bashirbhai Mohamedbhai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 979 has held that making of false representation is one of the ingredients for an offence of cheating and also the Hon'ble Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shivanarayan Kabra vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 986 has held as follows: The appellant knew fully well that he had no right to do forward business and that he was not a member of any recognised association and that he could not lawfully advertise to P.W.2 for investment in forward contracts. It is not necessary that a false pretence should be made in express words by the appellant. It is not necessary that a false pretence should be made in express words by the appellant. It may be inferred from all the circumstances including the conduct of the appellant in obtaining the property and in Ex.P34 (a) the appellant stated something which was not true and concealed from P.W.2 the fact that he was not a member of any recognised association and that he was not entitled to carry on the forward contract business, it is clear that P.W.2 could not have parted with the sum of Rs.12,000/- but for the inducement contained in Ex.P34 and the representation of the appellant that he could lawfully carry on forward contract business. 9.7. In the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, ( 2003) 3 SCC 641 it is observed: Section 420 deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The offence of cheating is made of two ingredients: deception of any person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property. To put it differently, the ingredients of the offence are that the person deceived delivers to someone a valuable security or property, that the person so deceived was induced to do so, that such person acted on such inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the accused and that the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. 9.8. As per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B ., (2022) 7 SCC 124 following ingredients to attract the offence under Section 420 of IPC are to be made out: 35. To establish the offence of cheating in inducing the delivery of property, the following ingredients need to be proved: (i) The representation made by the person was false. (ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he made was false. (iii) The accused made false representation with dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to whom it was made. (ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he made was false. (iii) The accused made false representation with dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to whom it was made. (iv) The act where the accused induced the person to deliver the property or to perform or to abstain from any act which the person would have not done or had otherwise committed. 9.9. In this case, above ingredients are clearly proved ie., there is clear false pretence which could be legally inferred from the conduct of the appellant during the entire course of the events from point of giving fake application form, conducting mock selection and interview and giving forged appointment order. Therefore, this court holds that all the accused are liable to be convicted under section 120 (b) r/w. 420 of I.P.C. 9.10. The prosecution proved the charge against the A1, A4 and A5 under section 468 of I.P.C. through the evidence of the approver P.W.3 and the corroboratory evidence of the expert and production of the forged documents before the court. According to the prosecution A1, A4 and A5 with the help of the approver prepared the forged application form for the post of Sub Inspector of Police, constable in RPF, index-card Government of India – Ministry railways recruitment board (RRB) office note, RPF selection card, RFP Chennai permission pass, RRB call letter for written examination, RRB identity slip cum free travel authority and RPF selection list on different occasions at Bakkeyam Xerox owned by C.Raja (Approver). The said hard disk of Bakkeyam Xerox owned by C.Raja (Approver) was seized and proper report was obtained and expert was also examined and the hard disk seized was also marked. A1's handwriting in the forged documents also was proved. 9.11. The forged documents were prepared to cheat the above witnesses and to collect amount. P.W.1 clearly deposed about the forgery in the document. In all aspects in view of the above discussion the prosecution clearly proved the offence under section 468 of I.P.C against the A1, A4 and A5. 10. Discussion on the offence under Section 471 of IPC: P.W.2 and P.W.4 had handed over the money to A4 and according to the evidence of P.W.2, amount also was handed over to A6. But they issued the forged appointment order to the said witnesses, asking them to hand over the same to Madurai RPF office. 10. Discussion on the offence under Section 471 of IPC: P.W.2 and P.W.4 had handed over the money to A4 and according to the evidence of P.W.2, amount also was handed over to A6. But they issued the forged appointment order to the said witnesses, asking them to hand over the same to Madurai RPF office. When the documents were produced before P.W.5 and P.W.6, they found that the said appointment orders were forged. The said forged documents also were marked and the same were proved to be forged document, as discussed above, through the examination of the witnesses and scientific evidence. Therefore offence under section 471 of I.P.C. is made out against the A1, A4 and A5. 11. Discussion on the offence under Section 473 of IPC: P.W.3 clearly deposed about the preparation of the forged seal by A4 and its affixture in the above said forged document. The said evidence is also corroborated by the evidence of the remaining witness examined by the prosecution and hence A4/Thangam is liable to be convicted under section 473 of I.P.C. 12. Discussion on the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Prosecution witnesses clearly deposed about A5 (SNP/ RPF constable) receiving Rs.40,000/- from A4 in the presence of the approver Raja and A6 receiving the amount of Rs.9000/- from A4 in the presence of Chakkaravarthi and they had actively participated in the above conspiracy of preparation of forged documents and thereby they not only obtained pecuniary advantages, but also aided A2 and A4, in receiving the amount, and therefore they committed offence under section 13 (2) r/w. 13 (1) (d) of PC Act 1988 and are liable to be convicted. Therefore in all aspects the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 12.1. In view of the above discussion the specific submission made by A1 that he had handed over money to A4 and he is also a victim and therefore he has to be acquitted cannot be accepted. Witnesses clearly deposed about the fact that he handed over the forged application form and he facilitated the witnesses to believe the above promise made by A4 and other accused to get the job and he personally has knowledge about the forged application form and other documents handed over to each witnesses. Apart from that he forged the signature of officials in the various documents. Apart from that he forged the signature of officials in the various documents. The same was proved through the evidence of the expert. Therefore his case of innocence cannot be accepted. He is liable to be convicted under the charged offence as discussed above. 12.2. The counsel for the accused claimed that each witness has not spoken about the role played by each accused. In this type of cases, one cannot expect each individual witness to speak about the specific allegation against each accused. Each accused has different role in the chain of conspiracy. Therefore, their contention that absence of the implication about the role of the each accused in the witnesses statement, is not a ground to acquit them for the reason that as already stated above that the prosecution need not prove the the role of the each accused in each limb of the conspired act. 13. Discussion about the statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The learned some of the counsel submitted that P.W.3's evidence could not be accepted without any corroboration. As discussed above, his evidence is corroborated in every aspect of the prosecution case. All the forged documents were produced before the court and the hard disk also was produced with print out. The signatures of A1 is found in the forged documents recovered in the shop of P.W.3. The role of A4 and the remaining accused as shown in the charge, was also clearly proved. There was no explanation under section 313 of Cr.P.C questioning. Therefore, the contention of the counsel that the evidence of P.W.3 has no corroboration cannot be accepted. 13.1. The learned counsel also submitted that there is a procedural lapse in recording the statement of P.W.3 under section 164 of Cr.P.C. and hence the tender of pardon granted by the jurisdiction court is not a valid one. This court perused the recording of the statement of the P.W.3 under section 164 of Cr.P.C. P.W.36 the learned judicial magistrate deposed about the recording of the statement of the P.W.3 under section 164 of Cr.P.C. The learned judicial magistrate clearly deposed about the procedure followed by him as per the Cr.P.C. He recorded the statement under Ex.P25. This court perused the recording of the statement of the P.W.3 under section 164 of Cr.P.C. P.W.36 the learned judicial magistrate deposed about the recording of the statement of the P.W.3 under section 164 of Cr.P.C. The learned judicial magistrate clearly deposed about the procedure followed by him as per the Cr.P.C. He recorded the statement under Ex.P25. He admitted that he has not recorded the memorandum but he specifically deposed that he obtained signature after reading over the entire contention of the statement and P.W.36 also affirmed the same in his evidence which is as follows :- 13.2. Further in the Ex.P25 it is stated as follows :- 13.3. When a similar contention was raised before this court in Crl.A.(MD)No.99 of 2017, this court made a detailed discussion and held as follows :- 11.3. The said procedural irregularity committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in recording the 164 Cr.P.C statement of the P.W.3 has no consequence especially when P.W.3 deposed before the Court that he was allowed the tender of pardon. P.W.3 has not disputed the said recording of statement. He claimed that the statement was made with his own consent. He has not raised the said plea that without the said explanation portion, the same was not admissible. But in this case, P.W.3 approver gave 164 Cr.P.C statement after understanding the contents of the statement and also admitted that he understood the contents of the statement and on the basis of the same, his tender of pardon was accepted. 11.4. Hence the compliance of the procedure under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., is satisfied by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in ordering the tender of pardon. P.W.3 has not stated above infirmities. Further, he deposed before the Court making the allegation against A2 after admitting his part. His statement is both inculpatory and exculpatory. Hence, the submission of the learned counsel that the absence of the said memorandum as required under Section 164 Cr.P.C is not a ground to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.3. 11.5. The petitioner in this aspect never substantiated his claim that there has been a failure of justice. In the case of procedural lapse, failure of justice is to be pleaded and established by the accused. The said omission of the learned Magistrate does not cause any failure of justice when P.W.3 has admitted his voluntary confession. 11.5. The petitioner in this aspect never substantiated his claim that there has been a failure of justice. In the case of procedural lapse, failure of justice is to be pleaded and established by the accused. The said omission of the learned Magistrate does not cause any failure of justice when P.W.3 has admitted his voluntary confession. In the said circumstances, this Court is not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel for A2 that P.W.3 approver’s evidence has to be rejected. Hence, this Court holds that the prosecution clearly proved the role of A2 in the conspiracy. A2 has not furnished any explanation during the 313 Cr.P.C proceedings. It is not the case of A2 that P.W.3 was threatened and he made the statement. Merely because of non-recording of the explanation column in 164 of Cr.P.C., the confession recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate did not vitiate the trial, more particularly, P.W.3 never disputed the said event. 11.6. From the above record of proceedings, it is clear that there is no prejudice established by the accused No.2 appellant, to disbelieve the confession given by the approver-P.W.3. Unless the appellant established failure of justice, the plea of the appellant that the absence of the memorandum in the co-accused's confession, would vitiate the trial, is liable to be rejected. In this aspect, it is relevant to note the meaning of the “failure of justice” as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattiram v. State of M.P. 2012 (4) SCC 516 . 65. We may state without any fear of contradiction that if the failure of justice is not bestowed its due signification in a case of the present nature, every procedural lapse or interdict would be given a privileged place on the pulpit. It would, with unnecessary interpretative dynamism, have the effect potentiality to cause a dent in the criminal justice delivery system and eventually, justice would become illusory like a mirage. It is to be borne in mind that the legislature deliberately obliterated certain rights conferred on the accused at the committal stage under the new Code. The intendment of the legislature in the plainest sense is that every stage is not to be treated as vital and it is to be interpreted to subserve the substantive objects of the criminal trial. Ram Singh v. Sonia, (2007) 3 SCC 1 : 32. The intendment of the legislature in the plainest sense is that every stage is not to be treated as vital and it is to be interpreted to subserve the substantive objects of the criminal trial. Ram Singh v. Sonia, (2007) 3 SCC 1 : 32. In State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that if the confession is not recorded in proper form as prescribed by Section 164 read with Section 281, it is a mere irregularity which is curable by Section 463 on taking evidence that the statement was recorded duly and has not injured the accused in defence on merits. It was observed at AIR p. 362, para 10 thus: “What Section 533 [Section 463 of the new Code] therefore, does is to permit oral evidence to be given to prove that the procedure laid down in Section 164 had in fact been followed when the court finds that the record produced before it does not show that that was so. If the oral evidence establishes that the procedure had been followed, then only can the record be admitted. Therefore, far from showing that the procedure laid down in Section 164 is not intended to be obligatory, Section 533 [Section 463 of the new Code] really emphasises that that procedure has to be followed. The section only permits oral evidence to prove that the procedure had actually been followed in certain cases where the record which ought to show that does not on the face of it do so.” 13.4. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in its judgment reported in 2008 Cri. L.J. 1276 held that the defect, if any, in the memoranda is one of the form and not of the substance. In this case, the following memorandum is contained in Ex.P.169: taken down by me and read over to the deponent and admitted by him to be correct” and record of proceeding containing the following relevant question: 13.5. Therefore, Ex.P169 satisfied all the substantive requirement of 164 Cr.P.C., in this case. Hence, this Court holds that the memorandum mentioned in the confession statement of P.W.3 satisfied the requirement. The claim that there is procedural infirmity cannot be raised in the present case. Therefore, Ex.P169 satisfied all the substantive requirement of 164 Cr.P.C., in this case. Hence, this Court holds that the memorandum mentioned in the confession statement of P.W.3 satisfied the requirement. The claim that there is procedural infirmity cannot be raised in the present case. In this case, on the basis of the said statement, P.W.3 was granted tender of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, P.W.3 deposed before the Court. In the course of the cross-examination, no question was put to P.W.3 relating to the involuntariness. The judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench relied by the learned counsel for A2 reported in 2006 Crl LJ 1085 is not applicable to the present case. In the said case, the confession statement of A4 was recorded and he retracted the same and raised a plea of absence of memorandum to show that it was not a voluntary confession. To prove that the confession is not voluntary, they relied on the absence of the signature of P.W.3 in the memorandum. In this case, the memorandum contained the signature of P.W.3. Further P.W.3 has also not denied the same. In this aspect, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2001 SCC Crl 652 categorically held that “mere failure to get the signature of the person making the confession may not be very material if the making of such statement is not disputed by the accused but in cases where the making of the statement itself is in controversy, the omission to get the signature is fatal.” Hence, in all aspects, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the judicial confession given by the P.W.3/approver is liable to be rejected, is not correct. 13.6. One of the accused preferred the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same also was dismissed. Therefore this Court is unable to accept the argument of the counsel in this aspect. 14. Discussion on the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge: Corruption spreads its tentacles in all the directions. Unemployment is a menace to the society. Unemployed youths are easy Prey to persons like the accused who deceive them. They are in a disadvantageous position and these circumstances were exploited by the accused. Therefore in these type of cases the court below should have considered the evidence in a proper manner. Unemployment is a menace to the society. Unemployed youths are easy Prey to persons like the accused who deceive them. They are in a disadvantageous position and these circumstances were exploited by the accused. Therefore in these type of cases the court below should have considered the evidence in a proper manner. But it failed to appreciate the same and gave the benefit of doubt which resulted in miscarriage of justice. The learned trial judge erroneously extended the principle of reasonable doubt on the basis of the irrelevant consideration without properly appreciating the entire evidence and the documents. Therefore this court after elaborate discussion, finds that the trial court committed error and the finding in paragraph Nos.57 to 72 are not only perverse and the approach of the trial court in not assessing the whole evidence of each witness along with the forged documents needs interference. The unmerited acquittal passed by the trial court is liable to be set aside. 14.1. From the above discussion of the evidence, corroborated by the scientific evidence and other circumstances, the prosecution has clearly proved the charged offence beyond reasonable doubt. The only possible view from the evidence is that the prosecution proved the charge. There is no other possible view available on record from the careful appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution. Therefore this court finds substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with the impugned acquittal judgment. 14.2. The learned trial Judge erroneously acquitted the accused, when the available evidence leans towards the only possible view of conviction under the above section. The learned trial Judge stated that there were lot of loopholes in the case of the prosecution. The loopholes assumed by the learned trial Judge is not at all significant and worthwhile to be considered in these type of cases, more particularly, when the examination of witnesses took place after number of years from the date of occurrence. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to plug the said immaterial loopholes to ensure the criminal justice system is vibrant as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 11 SCC 129 at page 154: 36. That apart, it is in the larger interest of the society that actual perpetrator of the crime gets convicted and is suitably punished. That apart, it is in the larger interest of the society that actual perpetrator of the crime gets convicted and is suitably punished. Those persons who have committed the crime, if allowed to go unpunished, this also leads to weakening of the criminal justice system and the society starts losing faith therein. Therefore, the first part of the celebrated dictum “ten criminals may go unpunished but one innocent should not be convicted” has not to be taken routinely. No doubt, latter part of the aforesaid phrase i.e. “innocent person should not be convicted” remains still valid. However, that does not mean that in the process “ten persons may go unpunished” and law becomes a mute spectator to this scenario, showing its helplessness. In order to ensure that criminal justice system is vibrant and effective, perpetrators of the crime should not go unpunished and all efforts are to be made to plug the loopholes which may give rise to the aforesaid situation 14.3. Further, as the finding of the learned trial judge is perverse in all aspects, this Court finds “substantial and compelling reasons” to interfere with the impugned acquittal Judgement. This Court, in view of the above discussion finds that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is perverse and there is substantial and compelling reason to interfere with the order of the learned trial Judge. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence, for which there is no legal impediment. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held in the case of the appeal against acquittal, that this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence. 14.4. Earlier the “Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court”, in the case of M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 22 has held the same in the following paragraph: 16....But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 17. 17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, “the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons” [vide Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : (1952) SCR 193 at p. 201]. Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 709 : (1953) SCR 418 ] it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are “very substantial and compelling reasons to do so”. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” or for “strong reasons”. In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial”. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression “substantial and compelling reasons” should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse. 14.5. In the case of K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : at page 359 9. 14.5. In the case of K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : at page 359 9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for “substantial and compelling reasons” only and Courts used to launch on a search to discover those “substantial and compelling reasons”. However, the “formulae” of “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” and “strong reasons” and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 : 14.6. In the case of K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 at page 314 5. The plenitude of power available to the court hearing an appeal against acquittal is the same as that available to a court hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. But however the court will not interfere solely because a different plausible view may arise on the evidence. In a case of murder, if the reasons given by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses are not sound, then there should be no hesitation on the part of the High Court in interfering with an order of acquittal. If the judgment of the trial Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong testimony, it would be proper for the High Court to interfere and reverse an order of acquittal. 14.7. In the totality of the circumstances, the learned trial Judge magnified every minute irrelevant fact and made mountain out of a molehill and acquitted the respondent which resulted in miscarriage of justice. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple , (1984) 1 SCC 446 at page 463 dealing the appeal against acquittal has held as follows: 36. .. It seems to us that the approach made by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is manifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. .. It seems to us that the approach made by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is manifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. In fact, the learned Judge appears to have been so much prejudiced against the prosecution that he magnified every minor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence. This is the very antithesis of a correct judicial approach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed, if such a harsh touchstone is prescribed to prove a case it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish any case at all. 14.8. The learned trial Judge allowed himself to be beset with fanciful doubts and rejected the creditworthy evidence of independent trap witness for slender reasons and has misguided himself by chasing the bare possibilities of doubt and exalting them into sufficiently militating factors justifying acquittal. Therefore, there is an obligation on the part of this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the Court below, in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule and the same was emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 18. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. stated thus : (SCC p. 799, para 6) “6. … The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.” In State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277 : (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy... 285-86, para 23) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy... Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 14.9. It is well settled that it is not every doubt, but only a reasonable doubt of which benefit is to be given to the accused. The function of the criminal Court is to find out the truth and it is not a correct approach to pick up the minor lapse of an investigation, irrelevant omission and minor contradiction to acquit the accused when the ring of the truth is undisturbed from the cogent and trustworthy evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4, PW16, PW22, PW23, PW24, PW25, PW26. Therefore, the learned trial Judge has not properly addressed the issue of “reasonable doubt”. The cherished principles of golden thread of proof of reasonable doubt which runs through web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubts. The same has been emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 14.9.1. In the case of Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of W.B., (2017) 16 SCC 466 at page 476 16.. A doubt of a timid mind which is afraid of logical consequences, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. The experienced, able and astute defence lawyers do raise doubts and uncertainties in respect of evidence adduced against the accused by marshalling the evidence, but what is to be borne in mind is—whether testimony of the witnesses before the court is natural, truthful in substance or not. The accused is entitled to get benefit of only reasonable doubt i.e. the doubt which a rational thinking man would reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has no moral courage and prefers to take shelter itself in a vain and idle scepticism. 14.9.2. In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 740 at page 749 it is observed 15... Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists ... 14.9.3. 14.9.2. In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 740 at page 749 it is observed 15... Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists ... 14.9.3. In the case of Bhim Singh Rup Singh Vs. State of Maharastra, ( 1974) 3 SCC 762 it is observed: “A reasonable doubt”, it has been remarked, “does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons 14.9.4. In State of U.P. Vs. Anil Singh, (1988) Supp SCC 686 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follow: Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. 14.9.5. In the case of I nder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 4 SCC 161 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. 14.6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on various occasions cautioned the Courts not to extend the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt to render unmerited acquittals by nurturing fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions causing miscarriage of justice. It is not only the duty of the Court to acquit an innocent, it is also the paramount duty of the Court to see that a guilty man does not escape and hence extending the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt in the present case, cannot be appreciated. It is not only the duty of the Court to acquit an innocent, it is also the paramount duty of the Court to see that a guilty man does not escape and hence extending the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt in the present case, cannot be appreciated. The relevant precedents in this aspect is as follows: The lord Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution, (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL) held as follows: “[A] Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. … Both are public duties….” 14.7. In the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh, 1990 (1) SCC 445 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 17.... Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law.... 14.8. In the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357 at page 365, it is observed: 20. ...we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. 14.9. The learned trial judge entertained fanciful doubts, rejected the creditworthy evidence of the witnesses for slender reasons and has misguided himself by chasing the bare possibilities of doubt and exalting them into sufficiently mitigating factors justifying acquittal. Therefore, there is an obvious duty on the part of this court to interfere with the impugned order of the court below, in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule. 14.10. The learned trial Judge, magnified the irrelevant omission, minor contradiction and discrepancy and has seen the testimony of the P.W. 5, P.W.7 and P.W.11 with jaundiced eyes. 14.10. The learned trial Judge, magnified the irrelevant omission, minor contradiction and discrepancy and has seen the testimony of the P.W. 5, P.W.7 and P.W.11 with jaundiced eyes. In the totality of the circumstances, the learned trial Judge magnified every minute irrelevant fact and made mountain out of a molehill and acquitted the respondent which resulted in miscarriage of justice. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple, (1984) 1 SCC 446 at page 463 while dealing with the appeal against acquittal has held as follows: 36. .. It seems to us that the approach made by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is manifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. In fact, the learned Judge appears to have been so much prejudiced against the prosecution that he magnified every minor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence. This is the very antithesis of a correct judicial approach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed, if such a harsh touchstone is prescribed to prove a case it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish any case at all. 14.11. The learned trial Judge allowed himself to be beset with fanciful doubts and rejected the creditworthy evidence of independent trap witness for slender reasons and has misguided himself by chasing the bare possibilities of doubt and exalting them into sufficiently militating factors justifying acquittal. Therefore, there is an obligation on the part of this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the Court below, in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule and the same was emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 18. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus : (SCC p. 799, para 6) “6. … The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus : (SCC p. 799, para 6) “6. … The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.” 14.12. In State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277 (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy... Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 14.13. It is well settled that it is not every doubt, but only a reasonable doubt of which benefit is to be given to the accused. The function of the criminal Court is to find out the truth and it is not a correct approach to pick up the minor lapse in an investigation, irrelevant omission and minor contradiction, to acquit the accused when the ring of the truth is undisturbed from the cogent and trustworthy evidence of prosecution witnesses P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.16, P.W.22, P.W.23, P.W. 24, P.W.25, P.W.26. The forgery of the bogus appointment order, application form, hall ticket, ID card are clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the learned trial Judge has not properly addressed the issue of “reasonable doubt”. The cherished principles of golden thread of proof of reasonable doubt which runs through web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubts. The same has been emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 14.13.1. In the case of Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of W.B., (2017) 16 SCC 466 at page 476 16.. The same has been emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 14.13.1. In the case of Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of W.B., (2017) 16 SCC 466 at page 476 16.. A doubt of a timid mind which is afraid of logical consequences, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. The experienced, able and astute defence lawyers do raise doubts and uncertainties in respect of evidence adduced against the accused by marshalling the evidence, but what is to be borne in mind is—whether testimony of the witnesses before the court is natural, truthful in substance or not. The accused is entitled to get benefit of only reasonable doubt i.e. the doubt which a rational thinking man would reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has no moral courage and prefers to take shelter itself in a vain and idle scepticism. 14.13.2. In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P. , (2020) 10 SCC 740 at page 749 15... Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists... 14.16.3. In the case of Bhim Singh Rup Singh Vs. State of Maharastra, ( 1974) 3 SCC 762 “A reasonable doubt” it has been remarked, “does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons 14.13.4. In State of U.P. Vs. Anil Singh, ( 1988) Supp SCC 686 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. 14.16.5. In the case of Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 4 SCC 161 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. 14.13.6.The Hon'ble Supreme Court on various occasions cautioned the Courts not to extend the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt to render unmerited acquittals by nurturing fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions causing miscarriage of justice. It is not only the duty of the Court to acquit an innocent, but it is also the paramount duty of the Court to see that a guilty man does not escape. The relevant precedents in this aspect is as follows: 14.13.6.1.The lord Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution, (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL) held as follows: “[A] Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. … Both are public duties….” 14.14. In the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh, 1990 (1) SCC 445 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 17.... Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law.... 14.15. In the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357 at page 365 20. ...we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. 15. Conclusion: In view of the above discussion, this court inclines to allow this CBI appeal. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. 15. Conclusion: In view of the above discussion, this court inclines to allow this CBI appeal. A1 to A6 are found guilty under Section 120-B r/w 420 of IPC, A1, A4, A5 are found guilty under Section 468 of IPC; A1, A4, A5 are found guilty under Section 471 of IPC; A4 is found guilty under Section 473 of IPC; A5, A6 are found guilty under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the appeal filed by the CBI in Crl.A.(MD).No.402 of 2018 is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the impunged judgment passed by the 2 nd Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai in C.C.No.13/10 dated 19.04.2017, is liable to be set aside and the respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6 are convicted for the offences under Sections as stated below: S. No. Charged offences under Section Accused Conviction 1 120 B r/w 420 of IPC A1 and A3 to A6 All are convicted 2 468 of IPC A1, A4 and A5 All are convicted 3 471 of IPC A1, A4 and A5 All are convicted 4 473 of IPC A4 Convicted 5 Section13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 A5 and A6 Both are convicted 16. List this case for appearance of the respondents/Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 for questioning the sentence of imprisonment on 21.03.2025. 17. Appearance and questioning of the respondents As per the direction of this Court, dated 04.03.2025, all the accused appeared before this Court. When the respondents were questioned under Section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C., about the sentence of imprisonment to be passed, they have pleaded as follows: 18. Discussion on sentence: The learned counsel appearing for the respondents also on the basis of the above mitigating circumstances, seeks to impose minimum sentence. They are also relied the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 984 . The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI would submit that all the accused commited offence of forgery of fake interview card and fake appointment order. They are also relied the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 984 . The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for CBI would submit that all the accused commited offence of forgery of fake interview card and fake appointment order. They cheated number of the unemployed youth and they suffered a lot and there was no repayment. They conducted parallal administration and issued fake appointment order. Therefore, he pleaded the above aggravated circumstances and seeks to impose suitable punishment. 18.1. In view of the above submissions, this Court inclines to do a balancing act between two tools ie, sympathy and the administration of Criminal Justice system in awarding punishment. To come out of the complex problem and to meet out balance between two situations, this Court recapitulates the principles relating to the punishment laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases: 18.1.1. The principle of imposition of punishment should commensurate with crime committed has been illustrated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sevaka Perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 3 SCC 471 in the following paragraph: “13. … The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should ‘respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal’.” 18.1.2. The said principle was further elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359 and it has been held that : “7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of ‘order’ should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that:‘State of criminal law continues to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.’ Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc (emphasis supplied) 18.1.3. Again in the case of Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed about the gravity of the crime and the concept of proportionality as regards the punishment and observed as follows: “18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect— propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner. We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment.” (emphasis supplied) 18.1.4. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 observed as follows : “99. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment.” (emphasis supplied) 18.1.4. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 observed as follows : “99. … The object of awarding appropriate sentence should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be resultwise counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. 100. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which both the criminal and the victim belong.” 18.1.5. In the case of State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh , (2015) 3 SCC 441 at page 447 16. We again reiterate in this case that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. Meagre sentence imposed solely on account of lapse of time without considering the degree of the offence will be counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of the society. 18.1.6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the above principle in the case of Raj Bala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 1 SCC 463 and held as follows: 3. It needs no special emphasis to state that prior to the said decision, there are series of judgments of this Court emphasising on appropriate sentencing. Despite authorities existing and governing the field, it has come to the notice of this Court that sometimes the court of first instance as well as the appellate court which includes the High Court, either on individual notion or misplaced sympathy or personal perception seems to have been carried away by passion of mercy, being totally oblivious of lawful obligation to the collective as mandated by law and forgetting the oft quoted saying of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, “Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser too” and follow an extremely liberal sentencing policy which has neither legal permissibility nor social acceptability. 4. 4. We have commenced the judgment with the aforesaid pronouncements, and our anguished observations, for the present case, in essentiality, depicts an exercise of judicial discretion to be completely moving away from the objective parameters of law which clearly postulate that the prime objective of criminal law is the imposition of adequate, just and proportionate punishment which is commensurate with the gravity, nature of the crime and manner in which the offence is committed keeping in mind the social interest and the conscience of the society, as has been laid down in State of M.P. v. Bablu, (2014) 9 SCC 281 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 1, State of M.P. v. Surendra Singh, (2015) 1 SCC 222 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 603 and State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh, (2015) 3 SCC 441 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 325. 5. We sadly and indubitably with a pang proceed to pen the narrative. Respondents 2 to 4 stood trial for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. Be it noted, initially the FIR was registered under Section 302 IPC but during investigation, the investigating agency had converted the offence to one under Section 306 IPC. The charge was framed in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC and the plea of the accused persons was one of complete denial. 16. A court, while imposing sentence, has a duty to respond to the collective cry of the society. The legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. A Judge has to keep in mind the paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the collective and balance it with the principle of proportionality but when the discretion is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to relinquishment of duty and reckless abandonment of responsibility. One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio- cultural milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits with patience to see that justice is done. One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio- cultural milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is shattered and the patience is wrecked. It is the duty of the court not to exercise the discretion in such a manner as a consequence of which the expectation inherent in patience, which is the “finest part of fortitude” is destroyed. A Judge should never feel that the individuals who constitute the society as a whole is imperceptible to the exercise of discretion. He should always bear in mind that erroneous and fallacious exercise of discretion is perceived by a visible collective. 18.1.7. In the case of Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, (2024) 7 SCC 531 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently also considered the above all judgments and held that it is the duty of the Court to impose sentence commensurate with the gravity of offence by keeping view of the interest of the societies and considering the degree of the offence which would be counter productive in long run and against the interest of justice and also noted as follows: Leave granted. Salmond defined “crime” as an act deemed by law to be harmful for society as a whole although its immediate victim may be an individual. Long-long ago, Kautilya said: “it is the power of punishment alone which when exercised impartially in proportion to guilt and irrespective of whether the person punished is the king's son or the enemy, that protects this world and the next” 18.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 984 has made detailed discussion to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to award sentence of imprisonment. 18.3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 984 has made detailed discussion to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to award sentence of imprisonment. 18.3. Before considering the mitigating circumstances pleaded by the accused, it is relevant to extract the sorrow of the victims of job racketeering as painfully observed by the Hon'ble Thiru Chief Justice S. Vaidyanathan Manipur High Court (as he then was) in the case of A. Perumal vs. State and Others, 2015 (2) MLJ (Crl) 669 “....The youth too, without knowing the hidden agenda, are falling prey to such temptations of lucrative jobs and paying huge amounts even by selling the properties held by their families or availing loans from financial institutions with high rate of interest. While in some cases, the consultancies or agencies would disappear overnight with the amount collected from the victims, in some other cases, they used to issue fake appointment letters to the victims, who would know about the fraud played on them only at the time of joining the post. If ultimately, he is cheated, his entire future will be in peril and it is not easy to restore normalcy in life by overcoming from the situation. In my firm view, these white-collar crimes, which have drastic effects, should be dealt with iron hands and severe punishment should be awarded to the culprits. 18.4. Applying the above principles, this Court declines to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the accused to grant minimum sentence. But, considering the age and illness, this Court also is unable to concur with the argument of the learned Special Public Prosecutor to award maximum punishment on considering the conduct of the accused. To resolve the same, this Court gets guidance from the following observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI , (2009) 11 SCC 737 at page 791 168. A sentence of punishment in our opinion poses a complex problem which requires a balancing act between the competing views based on the reformative, the deterrent as well as the retributive theories of punishment. Accordingly, a just and proper sentence should neither be too harsh nor too lenient. A sentence of punishment in our opinion poses a complex problem which requires a balancing act between the competing views based on the reformative, the deterrent as well as the retributive theories of punishment. Accordingly, a just and proper sentence should neither be too harsh nor too lenient. In judging the adequacy of a sentence, the nature of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, the age and character of the offender, injury to individual or the society, effect of punishment on offender, are some amongst many other factors which should be ordinarily taken into consideration by the courts. 18.5. From reading the various articles and precedents, this Court holds that white collar crimes are defined as non violent crimes committed by the person enjoying high social status, great repute and Public servants professionals with calculated and deliberate design with greedy eyes for personal benefit at the cost of public, regardless of the consequence of the economic disaster. 18.6. His Excellency former president of India Dr.Radhakrishnan, in the following words emphasized the requirement of the strenuous action against the white collar crimes: “The practitioners of evil, hoarders, the profiteers, the black marketeers, and speculators are the worst enemy of our society. They have to be dealt with sternly. However well placed important and influential they maybe, if we acquiesce in wrongdoing, people will lose faith in us. 18.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal , (1987) 2 SCC 364 also reiterated the said requirement of strenuous action in the following terms: 5. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest. 18.8. The said requirement also was reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI , (2003) 3 SCC 641 . 381. ... 18.8. The said requirement also was reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI , (2003) 3 SCC 641 . 381. ... the need to pierce the facadial smokescreen to unravel the truth to lift the veil so that the apparent, which is not real, can be avoided. The proverbial red herrings are to be ignored, to find out the guilt of the accused. 382. The cause of the community deserves better treatment at the hands of the court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The community or the State is not a persona non grata whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. 383. Unfortunately in the last few years, the country has seen an alarming rise in white-collar crimes which has affected the fibre of the country's economic structure. These cases are nothing but private gain at the cost of the public, and lead to economic disaster. 19. Sentence of Imprisonment: In this case, all the accused committed offence of forgery of fake interview card, appointment order and collected huge amount from the number of the victims. This Court finds no document to show that the said amount was repaid. Once cheator always a cheator. Therefore, they are elements to be suitably punished in order to prevent further course of cheating. The need and greed of people have driven them to the extent of exploiting any possible field. The exploitation of the money of the other person by doing the act of fraud to get gain at the loss of another usually forms part of the white collar crimes. In the case of fraud, greedy person gains at the loss of another. This case is no exception. Hence, this case does not deserve any sympathy to grant minimum sentence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2024 SCC Online SC 984 after elaborate discussion, directed to consider both mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances during the course of awarding punishment. In view of the above discussion, considering the age, various ailments and other mitigating circumstances, and aggravating circumstances of committing the offence of job racketeering this Court is inclined to award proper sentence between the minimum sentence and maximum sentence. In view of the above discussion, considering the age, various ailments and other mitigating circumstances, and aggravating circumstances of committing the offence of job racketeering this Court is inclined to award proper sentence between the minimum sentence and maximum sentence. S. No Under Section Accused No Sentence of Imprisonment Fine Amount Default Sentence 1 120-B r/w 420 of IPC A1, A3 to A6 4 years of Rigorous Imprisonment Rs. 1,00,000/- to each 6 months of Simple Imprisonment 2 468 of IPC A1, A4 and A5 4 years of Rigorous Imprisonment Rs. 2,00,000/- to each 9 months of Simple Imprisonment 3 471 of IPC A1, A4 and A5 4 years of Rigorous Imprisonment Rs. 2,00,000/- to each 9 months of Simple Imprisonment 4 473 of IPC A4 4 years of Rigorous Imprisonment Rs. 2,00,000/- 9 months of Simple Imprisonment 5 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 A5 and A6 3 years of Rigorous Imprisonment Rs.50,000/- to each 3 months of Simple Imprisonment 19.1. The fourth respondent/accused No.5/R.Baskaran in C.C.No.13 of 2010 in the file of the leanred II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai pleaded that his wife died and hence, 16 th day ceremony is proposed to held on 23.03.2025. Therefore, the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madurai, is hereby directed to grant leave for five days from 10.30 am., of 22.03.2025 to 03.00 pm., of 27.03.2025 and the fourth repondent is hereby directed to surrender before 04.00 pm, of 27.03.2025 before the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madurai, 20. After passing the sentence of imprisonment, Mr.R.Narendran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, Mr.A.Prasanna Rajadurai learned counsel appearing for the third respondent and Ms.M.Surantha learned counsel apparing for the second respondent would seeks to suspend the sentence of imprisonment and they placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Crl.A.No.53 of 2017, dated 19.12.2023. In the said case, the learned Judge of this Court, granted three years Rigorous Imprisonment and in this case this awarded sentence of four years Rigorous imprisonment and hence, the judgment is not applicable. Further, this Court is not inclined to grant suspension of sentence for the aggravated circumstances already discussed above. Accordingly, their request to suspend the sentence of imprisonment is hereby declined. The appellant is hereby directed to secure and produce before the Central Prison, Madurai to undergo the sentence of imprisonment passed in this case.