JUDGMENT : (Per: Kunal Ravi Singh, J.) [1] Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ankit Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner; learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel Sri Devesh Vikram for the State-respondent and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Shivam Yadav, learned counsel for Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority. [2] The present petition has been filed against the letter dated 10.07.2025, whereby the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as GNIDA) i.e. respondent no.2 had demanded default amount of lease rent as on 10.04.2025 at Rs.2,08,40,858/-. Further prayer has been made to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue permission to mortgage forthwith. FACTS:- [3] In brief, facts leading to the present petition are that the petitioner i.e. M/s Jakson Engineers Ltd., with an objection of expanding its industrial operations, applied for allotment of an industrial plot under the Scheme floated by respondent no.2. In light of the application, the petitioner was allotted plot nos.25 & 26, Ecotech-III, Udyog Kendra, Greater Noida. Thereafter, consequent to the allotment, lease deed dated 06.01.2006 was executed between the petitioner and respondent no.2 and possession memo was also given to the petitioner on 06.01.2006. The terms and conditions of the lease deed required the petitioner to pay an annual rent of lease of Rs.13,50,360/- for the first ten years and thereafter lease rent may be enhanced after every ten years from the date of execution of the lease deed by paying an amount not exceeding 50% of the annual lease rent payable at the time of such enhancement. The annual lease rent was to be deposited by 6 th day of January every year. The lease deed also provided that in the event of default of payment of lease rent, interest @ 17% per annum compounding every half yearly would be chargeable for the delayed period. [4] Before the execution of the lease deed on 06.01.2006, the respondent no.3 in the year 2005, demanded an annual lease rent of Rs.13,50,360/- by letter dated 22.12.2005 which was deposited by the petitioner on 28.12.2005. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 further demanded Rs.2,47,37,826/- towards one time premium of the leased plot. The said amount was deposited by the petitioner in its entirety on 07.12.2006. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 further demanded Rs.2,47,37,826/- towards one time premium of the leased plot. The said amount was deposited by the petitioner in its entirety on 07.12.2006. This payment constituted 50% of the premium as the balance 50% had already been paid by the petitioner at the time of execution of the lease deed. The petitioner, thereafter towards payment of annual lease rent for the year 2007, instead of depositing the annual lease rent of Rs.13,50,360/-, deposited one time lease rent equivalent to 11 instalments i.e. an amount of Rs.1,48,53,960/- which was received by the Authority on 08.01.2007. After deposit of the one time lease rent equivalent to 11 instalments, the petitioner requested for issuance of “No Dues Certificate” by means of letter dated 28.04.2009. Thereafter, in pursuance of a letter dated 23.07.2010, the respondent no.3 by means of letter dated 27.07.2010 intimated the petitioner that no premium/lease rent is due against the petitioner. Accordingly, on 27.07.2010, No Dues Certificate was issued by the respondent no.2 in favour of the petitioner. [5] . In the year 2020, the petitioner again requested for No Dues Certificate for the leased plot from respondent no.2 vide letter dated 04.07.2020 in order to seek permission to mortgage from respondent no.2. [6] In light of the online application dated 04.07.2020 moved by the petitioner, respondent no.2 issued a letter on 31.07.2020 clearly stating that with regard to the leased plot nos.25 & 26, Ecotech-III, Udyog Kendra, Greater Noida, no premium and lease rent is pending as per the records available with the Authority. Thereafter, on 14.02.2024, permission to mortgage was issued in favour of the petitioner by respondent no.2. The petitioner again applied for permission to mortgage on 08.10.2024. However, no reply was received by the petitioner. The petitioner again on 02.01.2025, sent a letter to the Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida for granting permission to mortgage annexing all the relevant documents including payment challans. By that time, petitioner was verbally informed by respondent no.2 that there are dues amounting to Rs.2,00,52,000/-. On 10.07.2025 respondent no.2 issued the impugned letter to the petitioner stating that there was a default amount of lease rent as on 10.04.2025, amounting to Rs.2,08,40,858/-. The said letter has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant petition with a further prayer of issuance of mandamus to respondent no.2 for issuing the permission to mortgage. On 10.07.2025 respondent no.2 issued the impugned letter to the petitioner stating that there was a default amount of lease rent as on 10.04.2025, amounting to Rs.2,08,40,858/-. The said letter has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant petition with a further prayer of issuance of mandamus to respondent no.2 for issuing the permission to mortgage. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER :- [7] Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate argued that the lease deed was executed on 06.01.2006 in favour of the petitioner and prior to its execution, lease rent for the year 2005-06 was deposited on 28.12.2005 by the petitioner for an amount of Rs.13,50,360/-. Thereafter, when the lease rent became due for the next year i.e. 2006-07, the petitioner, instead of choosing to deposit the annual lease rent, chose to deposit eleven instalments as one time lease rent as per the policy prevalent with the Authority. The petitioner deposited Rs.1,48,53,960/- (Rs.13,50,360/- x 11 times) as one time lease rent on 08.01.2006. [8] Learned Senior Advocate next contended that even though, the deposit was to be made on 6 th day of January every year, but actual one time lease rent was deposited on 08.01.2007 as 6 th January of that year was Saturday and 7 th January being Sunday. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that in any case, if the lease rent had become due, then interest @ 17% compounded half year would be applicable for the default period. He further submits that in fact, the petitioner had paid an extra instalment of lease rent, as the lease rent for the year 2005-06 was deposited on 28.12.2005 i.e. prior to the execution of the lease deed in favour of the petitioner. On the said basis, it was contended that lease rent has been paid completely by the petitioner and no lease rent is now due from the petitioner. So far as demand notice is concerned, it is contended that there was neither any show-cause nor any notice was issued to the petitioner with regard to any default from the year 2007 till the issuance of the impugned letter. Therefore, the said letter is against the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on this ground alone apart from other grounds so raised. Therefore, the said letter is against the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on this ground alone apart from other grounds so raised. [9] Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that even in the demand notice, there is no calculation to show as to how the said amount was calculated and the petitioner cannot be put to such liability without being informed the basis upon which the calculation was made while as per calculation of the petitioner, the entire lease rent was already paid. Furthermore, the respondent authority having issued no objection certificate twice i.e. 27.07.2010 & 31.07.2020, which clearly stated that there are no dues with regard to the premium or lease rent, cannot be permitted go back and say that there is a default of lease rent as the same has never been raised in the intervening period before issuance of “No Dues Certificates”. The petitioner having acted upon the “No Dues Certificates” given by the respondent no.2, is now protected by the doctrine of promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of legitimate expectation and the actions of respondent no.2 are illegal and arbitrary and the impugned notice/letter deserves to be quashed. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT AUTHORITY:- [10] Per contra, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate argued that the demand notice is justified and in accordance with the terms and conditions of lease agreement. He contended that the lease rent became payable immediately after 06.01.2007 and the petitioner having deposited one time lease rent on 08.01.2007 was in default of its instalment of Rs.13,50,360/-. He further contended that the policy for payment of one time lease rent clearly stipulated that all previous annual lease rents have to be paid and it is only thereafter that one time lease rent could be deposited. Furthermore, any default from the timeline of the payment would attract liability of interest to be paid over such payments. Since the annual lease rent, which became due for the year 2006-07, was not paid before the due date and an amount to the tune of Rs.13,50,360/- was left unpaid therefore the amount along with interest calculation as stated in the impugned letter was given to the petitioner for its payment. Since the annual lease rent, which became due for the year 2006-07, was not paid before the due date and an amount to the tune of Rs.13,50,360/- was left unpaid therefore the amount along with interest calculation as stated in the impugned letter was given to the petitioner for its payment. [11] In reply to the submissions made by Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent no.2, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner contented that the respondents having themselves accepted the one time lease rent without any objections, therefore, the petitioner had complied with the terms and conditions of the lease deed and had discharged its liability. The respondent no.2 was estopped from alleging any subsequent default or delay in payment on account of acceptance of one time lease rent. [12] Learned Standing Counsel for the State adopted the arguments made on behalf of respondent Authority. ISSUES :- [13] In light of the submissions advanced at bar, the following issues arise for determination of present dispute:- (i) Whether the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 demanding default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/- is legally justified in view of the fact that the respondent no.2 had accepted one time lease rent payment without demur? (ii) Whether the action of respondent no.2 is in accordance with the principles of natural justice? (iii) Whether the actions of respondent no.2, in issuing the letter dated 10.07.2025 is in violation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of legitimate expectation in light of issuance of “No Objection Certificates” dated 27.07.2010 & 31.07.2020 ? DISCUSSION :- [14] We have examined the rival contentions as well as records of the case. From the perusal of the record, it is apparent that the lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioner by respondent no.2 for Plot No.25 & 26 ad-measuring an area of 40090.82 sq. mts. Admittedly, before execution of the lease deed on 06.01.2006, the petitioner vide demand notice dated 22.12.2005, deposited an amount of Rs. 13,50,059/- and Rs.301/- (total amount of Rs.13,50,360/-) on 28.12.2005 and 06.01.2006 respectively. mts. Admittedly, before execution of the lease deed on 06.01.2006, the petitioner vide demand notice dated 22.12.2005, deposited an amount of Rs. 13,50,059/- and Rs.301/- (total amount of Rs.13,50,360/-) on 28.12.2005 and 06.01.2006 respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner in terms of the prevalent policy of respondent no.2 with regard to the payment of one time lease rent deposited an amount of Rs.1,48,53,960/- (Rs.13,50,360/- x 11 times) on 08.01.2007 which was accepted by the authority and no objection with regard to the payment of the same was ever raised by the Authority to the petitioner. Having accepted the payment of one time lease rent, the Authority then proceeded to issue “No Objection Certificates” on 27.07.2010 and 31.07.2020 to the petitioner. [15] It is an admitted fact that the respondent no.2 did not raise any objection with regard to any default of lease rent due by the petitioner before issuance of both No Objection Certificates. In fact, respondent no.2 also proceeded to issue the permission to mortgage vide letter bearing no. Industry/2024/480 on 14.02.2024 to the petitioner. Such action on behalf of respondent no.2 clearly indicates that respondent no.2 was fully satisfied with the one time lease rent deposited by the petitioner and the petitioner was not in default with regard to any payments due towards the annual lease rent. The principle of waiver would be fully applicable in the present scenario as respondent no.2 was fully aware of the terms and conditions of the lease deed as well the conditions with regard to payment of one time lease rent. [16] Furthermore condition (1) of lease deed stipulates “the lease rent would be Rs. 13,50,360/- annually for the first 10 years chargeable from the date of execution of the lease deed and would be payable within 10 days from the execution of the lease deed, without waiting for any demand notice or reminder therefore.” Thus the lease rent would be payable within ten days from the execution of lease deed i.e. 6 th day of January every year without waiting for any demand notice/reminder. The lease rent would therefore be payable by 16 th January of each year and the default period would start from 17 th January of each year. The lease rent would therefore be payable by 16 th January of each year and the default period would start from 17 th January of each year. In the light of the above, the deposit and acceptance of the one time lease rent on 08.01.2007 by respondent no.2 would be well within the time limit prescribed for payment of lease rent and as such, there is no delay in payment of lease rent which would attract the penalty clause. [17] As regarding the alleged default in payment of lease rent for two days, it would be appropriate to refer Clause No.(1) of the lease deed which states that “in case of default in payment of lease rent, interest @ 17% per annum compounded every half yearly would be chargeable for the delayed period.” The said clause in the lease agreement clearly stipulates that in case there is any default in payment toward annual lease rent, interest @ 17% compounded every half yearly would be applicable on the petitioner for the said default days. The contract having clearly stipulated such a condition, the respondent no. 2 was bound by the same as the contract was a concluded contract and there could be no deviation from the same. Once a concluded contract comes into existence, it is axiomatic that such rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the terms and conditions thereof. Therefore, respondent no.2 could have issued a demand notice for the compounded interest @ 17% for delay in payment of one time lease rent but since no such demand notice was ever raised by the Authority in the intervening period from the year 2007 till 2025. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Authority had consciously accepted that the petitioner had discharged its obligations under the contract and had deposited the entire annual lease rent via one time lease rent and no further amount was due on the part of the petitioner with regard to lease rent payable. [18] Once the petitioner utilized the prevailing policy of the Authority to deposit the one time lease rent, which is equivalent to 11 instalments of lease rent on 08.01.2007, the Authority then would be under an obligation to examine whether one time lease rent was in compliance of the prevailing policy of the respondents. [18] Once the petitioner utilized the prevailing policy of the Authority to deposit the one time lease rent, which is equivalent to 11 instalments of lease rent on 08.01.2007, the Authority then would be under an obligation to examine whether one time lease rent was in compliance of the prevailing policy of the respondents. Having failed to do so in the intervening period i.e. 2007-2025, the Authority would now be estopped from raising any demand relying upon the clause in the agreement which required that no reminder shall be submitted as it was not a case with regard to payment of lease rent but payment of one time annual lease rent which was governed by a different policy of the respondents. As such, having accepted the deposit of one time lease rent without demur, any fresh demand notice after a period of 18 years would be completely unjustified. [19] As regards to the arguments that the actions of the Authority are in violation of principles of natural justice we find that before issuance of the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025, neither any show-cause nor any default notice was served upon the petitioner during the intervening period from the year 2007-2025. Nothing has been placed before us to show that any letter or show cause notice was issued to the petitioner before passing the impugned demand letter dated 10.07.2025. [20] . Furthermore, from the pleadings it is apparent that the amount so stated in the impugned letter, has also not been quantified i.e. neither the principal amount nor the rate of interest applicable to the said amount is stated, therefore, the quantification of the said amount is also arbitrary and illegal. It is trite law that if there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. Even otherwise if an administrative order involves civil consequences then the order inflicting civil consequences must be made by observing rules of natural justice [ vide State of Orrisa vs. Binapani Dei, 1967 SCC Online SC 15; (2011) 7 SCC 483, I TC Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others] . Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the amount as calculated by the respondent no.2, cannot be recovered from the petitioner. State of U.P. and others] . Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the amount as calculated by the respondent no.2, cannot be recovered from the petitioner. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that before the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 was issued for an amount of Rs.2,08,40,858/-, the petitioner was never given any opportunity to explain as to how the conditions of the lease deed were not complied by the petitioner. [21] With regard to the arguments advanced on the violation of doctrine of promissory estoppel as well as doctrine of legitimate expectations, it would be worthwhile to note that the respondent no.2 issued “No Objection Certificates” to the petitioner on 27.07.2010 and 31.07.2020. Furthermore, on 14.02.2024, permission to mortgage was also granted to the petitioner vide letter No. Industry/2024/480, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be accorded the benefit of doctrine of legitimate expectation as the petitioner, upon issuance of “No Objection Certificates” and the permission to mortgage, was under the bonafide belief that no amount of lease rent remained due and the permission to mortgage would be processed in favour of the petitioner. The Authority having accepted the one time lease rent without any demur and thereafter issuing the “No Objection Certificates” as well as the permission to mortgage, clearly acted in an illegal and arbitrary manner in issuing the impugned demand letter. The said action of the Authority is clearly against the doctrine of legitimate expectation as the Government authorities are expected to deal with fairness and non- arbitrariness as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Principles of good administration would require that the decisions of the Authority i.e. respondent no.2 must withstand the test of consistency, transparency and predictability to avoid of being termed as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [22] In the present case, respondent no.2 has failed the test of consistency, transparency and predictability thereby the issuance of the impugned letter is clearly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. The respondent no.2, in the present case, has also failed to demonstrate that the issuance of impugned letter was in public interest to frustrate the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The respondent no.2, in the present case, has also failed to demonstrate that the issuance of impugned letter was in public interest to frustrate the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 demanding default amount of lease rent of Rs.2,08,40,858/- is clearly against the doctrine of legitimate expectation and is violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be quashed. [ vide (2024) 3 SCC 799 , S ivanandan C.T. and others Vs. High Court of Kerala and others, (1994) AIR 988, Union of India Vs. Hindustan Development Corporation ]. [23] From the perusal of the record, it is also clear that the Authority had issued No Objection Certificates on 27.07.2010 and 31.7.2020 and thereafter, proceeded to issue permission to mortgage on 14.02.2024. The Authority having once issued “No Objection Certificates” without any notice for default in the intervening period, would not be entitled to issue demand notice amounting to Rs.2,08,40,858/-, as the actions of the Authority would also attract doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Authority having issued “No Objection Certificates” clearly acknowledged that no amount of premium or lease rent remained due to be paid by the petitioner. Therefore, any demand letter in the year 2025 would be in clear violation of the status created while issuing two “No Objection Certificates”. Such action of the Authority is against equitable jurisprudence as the Authority having once accepted the position of no dues from the petitioner, cannot be allowed to resile from the same. The action of the Authority is a clear violation of doctrine of promissory estoppel and equitable jurisprudence and as such, the impugned letter is liable to be quashed. [ vide 1979 (2) SCC 409 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. ]. [24] The lease deed was executed between the petitioner and respondent nos.2 & 3 on 06.01.2006 with all the relevant terms and conditions which had to be abided by the petitioner. [ vide 1979 (2) SCC 409 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. ]. [24] The lease deed was executed between the petitioner and respondent nos.2 & 3 on 06.01.2006 with all the relevant terms and conditions which had to be abided by the petitioner. The petitioner having stated that all the terms and conditions were complied with and also with the prevailing existing policy and one time lease rent was not in violation of the contract, it was upon the respondent Authority to show by cogent evidence that the petitioner was in default of the lease rent and was in violation of terms and conditions of the contract. From the conditions enumerated in the lease deed, it is clear that in case of any default, Authority would be liable to impose the interest of 17% compounded half yearly upon any delayed payment. The respondent no.2 having failed to initiate and invoke the penalty against the petitioner, would now be stopped from raising demand of Rs.2,08,40,858/- as during the intervening period of year 2007-2025, no such demand ever has been raised by the respondent Authority. Even otherwise there arose no default in payment as 10 days time from the execution of the lease deed was given for payment of lease rent as per condition 1 of the lease deed. Thus the action of the Authority in issuing the impugned letter is clearly against the terms and conditions of the contract and as such, the demand letter dated 10.07.2025 is liable to be quashed. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS (i), (ii) & (iii) [25] In light of the above discussions, we find that the letter dated 10.07.2025 is arbitrary and unjust and against the settled principles of law. This Court also finds that the petitioner has fully complied with the terms and conditions of the lease deed and is not in default of any lease amount. RELIEFS/DIRECTIONS: [26] Considering the settled proposition of law as noted above, we are of the opinion that no amount of lease rent is due from the petitioner and the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 issued by respondent no.2 is hereby quashed. RELIEFS/DIRECTIONS: [26] Considering the settled proposition of law as noted above, we are of the opinion that no amount of lease rent is due from the petitioner and the impugned letter dated 10.07.2025 issued by respondent no.2 is hereby quashed. A direction is further issued to the Authority i.e. respondent nos.2 and 3 to process the applications moved by the petitioner for permission to mortgage dated 08.10.2024 and 02.01.2025 and decide the same within a period of six weeks from the date of production of certificate copy of this order. [27] With the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition stands allowed.