Order : (DINESH MEHTA, J.) 1. The State has challenged the award dated 09.03.2004 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bikaner in Labour Case No. 34/2001 (titled as Mohd. Hussain vs. Chief Account Officer). 2. The facts appertain are that the respondent no. 1 – Mohd. Hussain was appointed as a Driver on ad-hoc basis, in the office of Chief Account Officer, Command Area Development, Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana, Bikaner on 14.03.1977. 3. Pursuant to an application for leave filed by the respondent- workman, 45 days’ leave was sanctioned by the competent authority vide order dated 03.03.1980; the respondent-workman applied for extension of leave on 15.05.1980 and left India in the month of June, 1980. His leave (without pay) was sanctioned for 60 days upto 14.07.1980. The respondent-workman again applied for extension of the leave and it was sanctioned upto 15.08.1980 by way of order dated 31.07.1980. 4. The respondent – workman yet again applied for extension of leave from time to time (upto 31.03.1982) by way of sending letters from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 5. The State did not extend his leave and since he did not return, a show cause notice was issued on 27.11.1980 followed by another notice dated 11.01.1982 calling upon the respondent- workman to appear in person and explain the reasons for his continuous absence from 16.08.1980. By way of said notice, the respondent – workman was also asked as to why his services be not terminated. 6. Even on receiving the notice aforesaid, the respondent – workman neither filed any reply nor did he join the duties. The Chief Accounts Officer, therefore, passed an order dated 24.02.1982 and terminated respondent’s services w.e.f. afternoon of 23.02.1982 while recording therein that since the respondent – workman had not joined the duties, his services cannot be said to be satisfactory. 7. It is to be noted that the respondent – workman firstly filed a review petition dated 16.03.1982, which was rejected and then, challenged the order of termination before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Service Tribunal’) by way of preferring an appeal (Appeal No. 510/1982). 8. The appeal so filed by the respondent-workman was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 30.09.1985 by observing thus:- “It is apparent that the appellant was granted leave upto 15.8.80. He reported back on 15.3.82. No leave was sanctioned for the intervene period. 8. The appeal so filed by the respondent-workman was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 30.09.1985 by observing thus:- “It is apparent that the appellant was granted leave upto 15.8.80. He reported back on 15.3.82. No leave was sanctioned for the intervene period. Merely making of the application for extent of leave does not mean that leave was granted. Leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right and such cannot be availed without prior sanction. Here in this case even notices were served on the appellant to report duty immediately as committed the appellant himself. Even then he did not join only asked for further extension. All these circumstances leave no doubt to infer for the appointing authority to the appellant’s action was haughty and insolvent or atleast unsatisfactory. Two alternatives were available with the appointing authority i.e. either to take disciplinary action or to issue order of termination simplicitor after having for the work as unsatisfactory. There is no bar for appointing authority to resort to second alternate for the appellant was employed absolutely on a temporary basis and with the condition that his services could be terminated at any time without any notice in case. As such the termination cannot be said to punitive (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 120). The impugned order is of course dated 24.02.82 but the services have been terminated with either from afternoon on 23 rd Feb., 1982 and as such cannot be said to be retrospective. Thus there is not force in the appeal and hereby dismissed.” 9. The respondent – workman went in oblivion for 15 years and thereafter, initiated conciliation proceedings and then raised an industrial dispute. Consequently, a reference came to be made by the State Government vide order dated 18.10.2000 before the Labour Court, wherein three questions were referred - whether the action of the workman in raising the industrial dispute after 16 years was valid/justified? and if yes, then employer’s action of terminating the workman from services w.e.f. 23.02.1982 was valid or not? And if not, then to what relief the workman was entitled to? 10. and if yes, then employer’s action of terminating the workman from services w.e.f. 23.02.1982 was valid or not? And if not, then to what relief the workman was entitled to? 10. The respondent – workman filed a statement of claim and tried to explain the delay (in raising the industrial dispute) by stating that he had approached the Service Tribunal as advised by his counsel and that though after dismissal of his appeal on 30.09.1985, he was advised to file a writ petition before the High Court, but as he could not arrange for the counsel’s fee, the order dated 30.09.1985 could not be challenged before the High Court. It was also stated that his counsel did not hand over/returned the file, for which, remedy could not be availed. The respondent – workman took a plea that as he had initiated the legal proceedings in the year 1982 against his termination and had been pursuing the same, it cannot be said that there was a delay in approaching the Labour Court. 11. The statement of claim filed by the respondent was opposed by the State by contending that it was the case of voluntary abandonment of the services and, since the workman’s application for leave was rejected, he ought to have joined the duties. The State also took a plea that the workman’s termination was not a retrenchment and therefore, the requirement of observance of provisions of section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’) was not necessary. 12. The Labour Court, however, allowed the claim filed by the respondent – workman and answered the reference in his favour by way of award dated 09.03.2004. 13. While allowing the reference, the Labour Court held that the provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable qua the Act of 1947 and also concluded that the delay of 16 years cannot be said to be unjustified. 14. Having observed so, the Labour Court proceeded to hold that since there was non-compliance of mandate of section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act of 1947, respondent-workman’s termination was illegal. Arguments by learned counsel for the petitioner 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 09.03.2004, passed by the Labour Court is illegal, without application of mind and dehors jurisdiction. 16. Arguments by learned counsel for the petitioner 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 09.03.2004, passed by the Labour Court is illegal, without application of mind and dehors jurisdiction. 16. He argued that the Labour Court while passing the impugned award completely failed to consider the fact that Service Tribunal had already decided the matter vide order dated 30.09.1985 and respondent – workman having not challenged the same, it has attained the finality. Thus, the industrial dispute raised by the respondent – workman was clearly barred by doctrine of res-judicata. 17. Learned counsel further argued that the respondent – workman has raised the industrial dispute after inordinate and unexplained delay of 16 years and therefore, on account of the unexplained delay, the Labour Court should not have allowed the reference. 18. While reading the evidence on record, learned counsel highlighted that the respondent – workman was employed on ad - hoc basis and he did not join the services despite notices. He submitted that it was not incumbent upon the employer – State to observe the principles of retrenchment given under sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act of 1947, as they did not retrench the respondent – workman. Arguments by Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the Respondent-workman 19. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-workman contended that order of the Service Tribunal dated 30.09.1985 does not come in respondent-workman’s way to raise the industrial dispute before the Labour Court, as he was an ad-hoc employee working under the state and thus, not amenable to jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. He submitted that respondent- workman on account of ignorance of law, has availed wrong remedy and filed an appeal before Service Tribunal; since the Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction qua the respondent-workman, order of dismissal of appeal has no value in eye of law. 20. Learned counsel argued that since the provisions of limitation act has no application over the Act of 1947, in spite of the fact that industrial dispute was raised after 16 years of termination, the same would have no impediment over his right to pursue his cause before the Labour Court. 21. Mr. Joshi further contended that it was incumbent upon the employer-State to hold a proper inquiry against the respondent- workman before terminating his services, however neither proper inquiry was conducted nor opportunity of hearing was given. Mr. 21. Mr. Joshi further contended that it was incumbent upon the employer-State to hold a proper inquiry against the respondent- workman before terminating his services, however neither proper inquiry was conducted nor opportunity of hearing was given. Mr. Joshi submitted that the order of termination was passed without observing the requirements prior to retrenchment as enshrined under sections 25F, 25G, 25H of the Act of 1947. 22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 23. It is not in dispute that the appeal preferred against the order of termination dated 24.02.1982 was rejected by the Service Tribunal vide order dated 30.09.1985, that too on merit. The Service Tribunal in no ambiguous terms had held that the termination of the respondent-workman was justified, while observing that since the respondent-workman was an ad-hoc employee, no disciplinary proceedings was necessary, because the order of recording of services not being satisfactory, was a termination simpliciter for an ad-hoc employee. 24. Admittedly, the respondent-workman did not take any remedy against the order dated 30.09.1985 passed by the learned Service Tribunal and the same had attained finality. According to this Court, in the face of the order dated 30.09.1985, whereby the Service Tribunal had affirmed the order of termination dated 24.02.1982, the respondent-workman could not have raised any industrial dispute, that too after an inordinate delay of 16 years. The plea that after the decision of the Tribunal on 30.09.1985, he tried to challenge the said order by way of filing writ petition, but could not arrange for the fee of the counsel and other pleas were nothing but lame excuses. 25. As a matter of fact, the respondent-workman woke up from his slumber after 16 years and has raised the industrial dispute, which according to this Court was per-se impermissible and barred by the principle of res-judicata. The order of termination dated 24.02.1982 had been affirmed by the Service Tribunal. 26. A specific question as to whether raising dispute after 16 years was justified or not was referred, which issue has been decided by the Labour Court cursorily by observing that the provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable. Maybe, the provisions of Limitation Act are not strictly applicable; but it cannot be said as a rule that if the limitation is not prescribed for a remedy, it can be availed after any period of time. 27. Maybe, the provisions of Limitation Act are not strictly applicable; but it cannot be said as a rule that if the limitation is not prescribed for a remedy, it can be availed after any period of time. 27. A litigant cannot wait for 16 years to challenge an order, simply because no limitation has been provided for the remedy. The Labour Court to that extent has wrongly decided this issue. 28. According to this Court, the remedy, which the respondent- workman had taken after 16 years of termination, was barred by delay and laches. This position of law has been settled by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota vs. Mohan Lal , reported in (2013) 14 SCC 543 29. Moreso, the respondent-workman had challenged the order of termination dated 24.02.1982 by way of preferring an appeal and the said appeal was dismissed on 30.09.1985, while holding that termination was justified. The reference made by the State so also proceedings before the Labour Court were thus barred by the principles of res-judicata. It is noteworthy that the Labour Court though noticed such plea of the State, but failed to deal with it and proceeded to allow the claim. The Labour Court has therefore, committed a jurisdictional error. 30. So far as argument of Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-workman that the order of learned Service Tribunal should not come in way of respondent-workman, as the appeal was not maintainable before the Service Tribunal is concerned, the same is also misconceived. A person having availed the remedy and failed in such attempt, is estopped from taking a plea that he had availed a wrong remedy. This Court hastens to add that in light of the judgment in the case of Jeewan Das vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , reported in 1980 (1) RLR 718 , even if a workman is working with the State Government, the appeal is maintainable before the Service Tribunal. 31. That apart, the Labour Court’s conclusion that the State was required to observe the provisions of sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act of 1947 is erroneous. , reported in 1980 (1) RLR 718 , even if a workman is working with the State Government, the appeal is maintainable before the Service Tribunal. 31. That apart, the Labour Court’s conclusion that the State was required to observe the provisions of sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act of 1947 is erroneous. It was not at all the case of the retrenchment; it was rather a case of bringing an end to the respondent-workman’s ad-hoc engagement on finding his services to be unsatisfactory, as he had overstayed abroad and remained on leave without any sanction. 32. The order dated 24.02.1982, whereby the workman’s services were terminated cannot be said to be a retrenchment. It was an order of termination simplicitor, that too for the reasons mentioned therein, namely the respondent-workman had failed to join his services in spite of the notice given to him. 33. As an upshot of discussion foregoing, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Labour Court has seriously erred in passing the award dated 09.03.2004 and setting aside the termination order and directing the State to reinstate the respondent-workman. 34. The Labour Court’s observation that the State will be free to conduct inquiry is absolutely illegal, as admittedly the respondent- workman was an ad-hoc employee and Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 are not applicable. 35. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. 36. Impugned award dated 09.03.2004 is hereby quashed and set aside. 37. Stay application also stands disposed of, accordingly.