ORDER : Nagesh Bheemapaka, J. The petitioners, representing the Chenchu community (a Scheduled Tribe), challenges the proceedings in Lr. No. E1/3044/2003 dated 19.04.2011 issued by the 1st Respondent as illegal and contrary to the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. The petitioners, traditional forest dwellers, have occupied and cultivated 3-4 acres of forest land in Kandlakunta Village, Mahabubnagar District, for 30-40 years without objection from the Forest Department. They collectively occupy approximately 300 acres and have invested effort and resources to make the land cultivable. Supporting documents, such as Adangal/Pahanis, evidence their possession. The State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.20 on 31.03.1999 to form Village Tribal Development Associations (VTDAs) in tribal habitations. The VTDA President of Jangamreddipalli requested funds for deepening a 'Cheruvu,' leading to the release of Rs. 2.75 lakh by ITDA (PTG-Chenchu) based on a beneficiary list (Rc. No. A/942/97 dated 29.04.1999) that included the petitioners. However, disputes arose from non-tribals, leading to writ petitions. Under the Forest Rights Act, 2006, the petitioners applied for land titles on 18.02.2008. The Mandal Revenue Officer conducted an enquiry and included their names in the report. Due to delays, they filed W.P.No.8523 of 2008, whereby this Court by order dated 11.06.2008 directing the District Collector to process their applications. Nenavath Jagan and others challenged the order passed in W.P.No.8523 of 2008 by filing W.A.No. 1236 of 2008, which was disposed of on 05.08.2009 directing as follows: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and especially having regard to the fact that this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not venture to go into all such disputed claims or decide possession or entitlement thereto, it is felt desirable that the concerned authorities immediately take up the issue and hold a regular and comprehensive enquiry and determine all such questions as to the entitlement and take appropriate decision and pass orders for grant of pattas to eligible persons. In this connection, it is felt desirable that the District Collector, Mahabubnagar shall make such exercise in more expeditious manner after providing due and necessary opportunity to the parties concerned and as well giving a due publicity in and around the concerned place with sufficient time gap” 2. Pursuant to the directions of this Court in W.A.No. 1236 of 2008 dated 05.08.2009, the respondents conducted an enquiry into the petitioners' eligibility. Pursuant to the directions of this Court in W.A.No. 1236 of 2008 dated 05.08.2009, the respondents conducted an enquiry into the petitioners' eligibility. However, when they failed to comply, the petitioners filed C.C.No. 722 of 2010 for contempt. In response, the respondents filed a counter and issued proceedings dated 18.03.2011, rejecting the petitioners' claims. This Court found fault with this decision, noting that the 2 nd respondent's report was submitted on the same day (18.03.2011), indicating a lack of proper consideration and opportunity for the petitioners. The court directed the 1st Respondent to provide the petitioners an opportunity to present their case and reconsider the matter. Notices were issued for an inquiry on 16.04.2011, where the petitioners appeared and submitted supporting documents. However, the 1st Respondent issued the impugned proceedings in Lr.No. E1/3044/2003 dated 19.04.2011, leading to the closure of C.C.No. 722 of 2010 on 24.06.2011. The petitioners allege that the respondents are issuing pattas to ineligible candidates from Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes due to political pressure, which would cause irreparable loss to the petitioners. The present Writ Petition challenges the proceedings dated 19.04.2011. 3. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.1-District Collector,Mahabubnagar, inter aliadenying the petitioners' claim that the orders issued by the District Collector, Mahabubnagar, in Lr. No. E1/3044/03 dated 19.04.2011, are illegal or contrary to the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, as the orders were issued after joint enquiries by the Divisional Forest Officer, Achampet; District Tribal Welfare Officer, Mahabubnagar; and Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagarkurnool, who submitted their reports on 18.03.2011, followed by a hearing on 16.04.2011. Kandlakunta regadi habitation, located in Amrabad Reserve Forest (part of Nagarjuna Sagar Tiger Reserve Sanctuary), was leased to Harijans and landless poor for kummari cultivation under G.O.Ms. No. 2771, Agriculture, dated 23.12.1960, for an extent of Ac. 164 for 20 years. After the lease period, lessees approached the High Court in W.P. No. 584/1982, seeking pattas, and on 09.06.1987, the Court directed the petitioners to apply to the concerned authorities, who were to dispose of the applications within two months. The Collector, Mahabubnagar, submitted a report (Ref. No. B1/11297/90 dated 09.03.1991) to the Secretary, Social Welfare Department, recommending de-reservation of the forest land, but no further action was taken. The Collector, Mahabubnagar, submitted a report (Ref. No. B1/11297/90 dated 09.03.1991) to the Secretary, Social Welfare Department, recommending de-reservation of the forest land, but no further action was taken. Due to interference by Chenchus of Jangamreddipally village, petitioners filed W.P. No. 13504/2003 and W.P. No. 7945/2003, seeking protection of their possession and implementation of G.O.Ms. No. 2771. On 08.01.2004, the High Court directed that status quo be maintained for 13 original lessees (2 alive lessees and 11 representatives) out of the original 33 lessees, as the remaining 20 had left the village. Petitioners filed W.P. No. 8523/2008 to finalize their applications for patta certificates submitted in February 2008, and the Court disposed of the case on 11.06.2008, directing the respondents to consider their representation dated 18.02.2008. Aggrieved by this, N. Jagan & others filed Writ Appeal No. 1236/2008, which was disposed of on 05.08.2009 directing the authorities to conduct a comprehensive enquiry into the matter and determine the questions of entitlements and take appropriate decision and grant pattas to eligible persons. It is stated in the counter that the DFO, Achampet, was directed to enquire into the applications filed by the appellants. While the matter was under enquiry, the petitioners approached the Hon'ble High Court and filed Contempt Case No. 722/2010 in W.A. No. 1236/2008. The DFO, Achampet, along with the DTWO, Mahabubnagar, and RDO, Nagarkurnool, conducted joint enquiries, issuing notices to the applicants, and submitted their report on 18.03.2011. Based on this report, the District Collector issued orders rejecting the applications vide Proceeding No. E1/3044/03 dated 18.03.2011. Complying this Court's direction that the applicants be given an opportunity to present their case, the District Collector issued notices for a hearing on 16.04.2011. The applicants appeared and submitted representations, stating that they had already filed evidence with their applications dated 19.03.2010, which should be examined. However, upon enquiry, the documents submitted by the applicants were found to be not genuine. It is also contended that the pahani copies submitted by the petitioners were examined and found to be bogus. The Panchayat Secretary, Jangamreddipally, deposed before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Nagarkurnool, stating that he did not issue the pahanis and that the signatures on them were not his, as confirmed in Lr. No. E/486/2011 dated 08.04.2011. It is also contended that the pahani copies submitted by the petitioners were examined and found to be bogus. The Panchayat Secretary, Jangamreddipally, deposed before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Nagarkurnool, stating that he did not issue the pahanis and that the signatures on them were not his, as confirmed in Lr. No. E/486/2011 dated 08.04.2011. The Tahsildar, Amrabad, further verified in his letter (No. B/RK/2011 dated 25.03.2011) that the pahanies for the years 2002-03 to 2004-05 were fake and not submitted by the Panchayat Secretary. Additionally, the names of the petitioners (Sl. No. 1 to 98) were absent from the 2005- 06 pahanies. The petitioners' applications for title deeds under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, were rejected by the District Collector, Mahabubnagar, vide Proceedings No. E1/3044/2003 dated 19.04.2011. This decision followed a detailed joint enquiry by the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO), Achampet; District Tribal Welfare Officer (DTWO), Mahabubnagar; and RDO, Nagarkurnool, who submitted their report on 18.03.2011. The District Collector personally heard the petitioners on 16.04.2011, reviewed their evidence (submitted with applications dated 19.03.2010), and concluded that their claims were unsubstantiated. The respondents deny allegations of issuing pattas to ineligible candidates under political pressure, asserting that the RoFR Act, 2006, was strictly followed. They also refute the claim that the petitioners were denied the opportunity to cross-examine the Panchayat Secretary, as no such request was made by the petitioners. The respondents emphasize that the petitioners failed to provide genuine evidence of their possession of the land for over 75 years, as required under the Act. They pray for the dismissal of the writ petition, maintaining that due process was followed and the petitioners' claims were thoroughly and fairly adjudicated. 4. Heard Mr.A. Venkataramana, learned counsel for the petitioners; learned Additional Advocate General for respondent-State, learned Government Pleader for Revenue for 4th respondent; learned Government Pleader for Forests for respondent No.5. Perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned proceedings of the 1 st respondent are contrary to the material on record and were passed without proper consideration of the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of their claim under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, and the Rules framed thereunder. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned proceedings of the 1 st respondent are contrary to the material on record and were passed without proper consideration of the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of their claim under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, and the Rules framed thereunder. He contends that the 1 st respondent failed to provide the petitioners an opportunity to cross-examine the Panchayat Secretary, who allegedly stated before the 4th Respondent that the Pahanies submitted by the petitioners were fake and fabricated, thereby denying the petitioners a fair chance to rebut this claim. Learned counsel contends that the 1 st respondent should have allowed the petitioners to submit additional documents, such as admitted signatures of the Panchayat Secretary, to compare with the signatures on the Pahanies issued in their favor, so as to ensure a fair verification process. It is also contended that the 1 st respondent relied primarily on the Panchayat Secretary's statement that the Pahanies were fake and fabricated but failed to verify this claim against the admitted signatures of the Panchayat Secretary before concluding that the documents were invalid. It is also contended that the 1 st respondent also neglected to consider other documents submitted by the petitioners, which establish their possession and enjoyment of the land for over 75 years, as required under the Forest Rights Act, 2006, and its Rules, for claiming occupancy rights certificates. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, Chapter 3 on Recognition, Restoration and Vesting of Forest Rights and Related matters, wherein it is stated under paragraph 4 thereof, as follows: (4) A right conferred by sub-section (1) shall be heritable but not alienable or transferable and shall be registered jointly in the name of both the spouses in case of married persons and in the name of the single head in the case of a household headed by a single person and in the absence of a direct heir, the heritable right shall pass on to the next-of-kin. Learned counsel further relies on Rule 13 of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Rules, 2007 , which reads as follows: “13. Learned counsel further relies on Rule 13 of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Rules, 2007 , which reads as follows: “13. Evidence for determination of forest rights: (1) The evidence for recognition and vesting of forest rights shall, inter alia, include (a) public documents, Government records such as Gazetteers, Census, survey and settlement reports, maps, satellite imagery, working plans, management plans, micro-plans, forest enquiry reports, other forest records, record of rights by whatever name called, pattas or leases, reports of committees and commissions constituted by the Government, Government orders, notifications, circulars, resolutions; (b) Government authorized documents such as voter identify card, ration card, passport, house tax receipts, domicile certificates; (c) physical attributes such as house, huts and permanent improvements made to land including levelling, bunds, check dams and the like; (d) quasi- judicial and judicial records including court orders and judgments; (e) research studies, documentation of customs and traditions that illustrate the enjoyment of any forest rights and having the force of customary law, by reputed institutions, such as Anthropological Survey of India; (f) any record including maps, record of rights, privileges, concessions, favours, from erstwhile princely States or provinces or other such intermediaries; (g) traditional structures establishing antiquity such as wells, burial grounds, sacred places; (h) genealogy tracing ancestry to individuals mentioned in earlier land records or recognized as having been legitimate resident of the village at an earlier period of time; (i) statement of elders other than claimants, reduced in writing (2) An evidence for Community forest Rights shall, inter alia, include (a) community rights such as nistar by whatever name called; (b) traditional grazing grounds; areas for collection of roots and tubers, fodder, wild edible fruits and other minor forest produce; fishing grounds; irrigation systems; sources of water for human or livestock use, medicinal plant collection territories of herbal practitioners; (c) remnants of structures built by the local community, sacred trees, groves and ponds or riverine areas, burial or cremation grounds; (3) The Grama Sabha, the Sub-Divisional Level Committee and the District Level Committee shall consider more than one of the above- mentioned evidences in determining the forest rights. 7. 7. Learned Government Pleader, on the contrary, contends that the impugned proceedings dated 19.04.2011 were issued after a joint enquiry by the DFO, Achampet; DTWO, Mahabubnagar; and RDO, Nagarkurnool, who submitted their report on 18.03.2011, and a hearing was conducted on 16.04.2011, and the petitioners were provided due opportunity to present their case. He further contends that the pahani copies submitted by the petitioners were found to be bogus. The Panchayat Secretary, Jangamreddipally, deposed before the RDO, Nagarkurnool (Lr. No. E/486/2011 dated 08.04.2011), stating he did not issue the pahanis, and the signatures were not his. The Tahsildar, Amrabad, confirmed in his letter dated 25.03.2011 that the pahanies for 2002-03 to 2004-05 were fake, and the petitioners' names were absent from the 2005-06 pahanies. He further contends that Kandlakunta Regadi, part of Amrabad Reserve Forest, was leased for kummari cultivation under G.O.Ms. No. 2771 dated 23.12.1960. After the lease expired, the petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 584/1982. This Court directed the authorities to process their applications, but no further action was taken. Learned Government Pleader submits that the petitioners were given a fair opportunity of hearing on 16.04.2011, and their claims were rejected based on the enquiry report dated 18.03.2011, which found their documents to be fabricated and unsubstantiated. Learned Government Pleader submits that due process was followed, and the petitioners failed to provide genuine evidence of their possession for over 75 years, as required under the Forest Rights Act, 2006. 8. Learned Government Pleader for Forests relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim , [ (2024) 6 SCC 461 ] , and draws the attention of the court to paragraph Nos.38, 40, 62, 65, 67, 69, 72, 75, 84, and 89 therein, relevant portions of which read as follows: Understanding of the forest: A constitutional perspective 38. Article 48-A of the Constitution of India imposes a clear mandate upon the State as a directive principle of State policy, while Article 51-A( g ) correspondingly casts a duty upon a citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for fellow living creatures. These two provisions qua a forest ought to be understood in light of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. We say so, as they represent the collective conscience of the Constitution. These two provisions qua a forest ought to be understood in light of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. We say so, as they represent the collective conscience of the Constitution. If the continued existence and protection of forests is in the interest of humanity, various species and nature, then there can be no other interpretation than to read the constitutional ethos into these provisions. Relevance of directive principles of State policy 40. Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. [ Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. , (1987) 2 SCC 295 ] : (SCC p. 305, para 4) “ 4 . In India, as elsewhere in the world, uncontrolled growth and the consequent environmental deterioration are fast assuming menacing proportions and all Indian cities are afflicted with this problem. The once Imperial City of Calcutta is no exception. The question raised in the present case is whether the Government of West Bengal has shown such lack of awareness of the problem of environment in making an allotment of land for the construction of a Five Star Hotel at the expense of the zoological garden that it warrants interference by this Court? Obviously, if the Government is alive to the various considerations requiring thought and deliberation and has arrived at a conscious decision after taking them into account, it may not be for this Court to interfere in the absence of mala fides. On the other hand, if relevant considerations are not borne in mind and irrelevant considerations influence the decision, the court may interfere in order to prevent a likelihood of prejudice to the public. Whenever a problem of ecology is brought before the court, the court is bound to bear in mind Article 48-A of the Constitution, the Directive Principle which enjoins that “the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country”, and Article 51-A(g) which proclaims it to be the fundamental duty of every citizen of India “to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures”. When the court is called upon to give effect to the Directive Principle and the fundamental duty, the court is not to shrug its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of policy and so it is a matter for the policy-making authority. When the court is called upon to give effect to the Directive Principle and the fundamental duty, the court is not to shrug its shoulders and say that priorities are a matter of policy and so it is a matter for the policy-making authority. The least that the court may do is to examine whether appropriate considerations are borne in mind and irrelevancies excluded. In appropriate cases, the court may go further, but how much further must depend on the circumstances of the case. The court may always give necessary directions. However the court will not attempt to nicely balance relevant considerations. When the question involves the nice balancing of relevant considerations, the court may feel justified in resigning itself to acceptance of the decision of the authority concerned . We may now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.” (emphasis supplied) Approach of the Court 62. This Court has repeatedly reiterated the approach required to be adopted by the courts where the onus is on the violator to prove that there is no environmental degradation. There is a constitutional duty enjoined upon every court to protect and preserve the environment. Courts will have to apply the principle of parens patriae in light of the constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 48-A, 51-A, 21, 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on a developer or industrialist and also on the State in a given case to prove that there is no such degradation. Approach of the Court: High degree of judicial scrutiny on any action of the Government 65. Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P. [ Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P. , (2006) 3 SCC 549 ] : (SCC p. 575, para 76) “ Public trust doctrine 76 . The Supreme Court of California, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine Country [ National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine Country , 33 Cali 419] also known as Mono Lake case [ National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine Country , 33 Cali 419] summed up the substance of the doctrine. The Court said: ‘Thus the public trust is more than an affirmation of State power to use public property for public purposes. The Court said: ‘Thus the public trust is more than an affirmation of State power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the State to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering the right only in those rare cases when the abandonment of the right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.’ This is an articulation of the doctrine from the angle of the affirmative duties of the State with regard to public trust. Formulated from a negatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] prohibit [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] the alienation of the property held as a public trust. However, when the State holds a resource that is freely available for the use of the public, it provides for a high degree of judicial scrutiny on any action of the Government, no matter how consistent with the existing legislations, that attempts to restrict such free use. To properly scrutinise such actions of the Government, the courts must make a distinction between the Government's general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, more demanding obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources [Joseph L. Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law : Effective Judicial Intervention ”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jan. 1970) pp. 471-566 ]. According to Prof. Sax, whose article on this subject is considered to be an authority, three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust doctrine [ibid]: 1. the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; 2. the property may not be sold, even for fair cash equivalent; 3. the property must be maintained for particular types of use: ( i either traditional uses, or ( ii ) some uses particular to that form of resources.” (emphasis supplied) Forests constitute a national asset 67.Amarnath Shrine, In re [Amarnath Shrine, In re, (2013) 3 SCC 247]: (SCC p. 260, para 19) “19. the property must be maintained for particular types of use: ( i either traditional uses, or ( ii ) some uses particular to that form of resources.” (emphasis supplied) Forests constitute a national asset 67.Amarnath Shrine, In re [Amarnath Shrine, In re, (2013) 3 SCC 247]: (SCC p. 260, para 19) “19. Where it is the bounden duty of the State to protect the above rights of the citizen in discharge of its constitutional obligation in the larger public interest, there the law also casts a duty upon the State to ensure due protection to the forests and environment of the country. Forests in India are an important part of the environment. They constitute a national asset. We may, at this stage, refer to the concept of inter-generational equity, which has been treated to be an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The courts have applied this doctrine of sustainable development and precautionary principle to the cases where development is necessary, but certainly not at the cost of environment. The courts are expected to drive a balance between the two. In other words, the onerous duty lies upon the State to ensure protection of environment and forests on the one hand as well as to undertake necessary development with due regard to the fundamental rights and values.”(emphasis supplied) Role of courts 69. H.P. Bus-Stand Management & Development Authority [ H.P. Bus-Stand Management & Development Authority v. Central Empowered Committee , (2021) 4 SCC 309 ] : (SCC pp. 339-41, paras 56 & 58-60) “I.2. Role of courts in ensuring environmental protection 56 . In a recent decision of this Court inBDA v. Sudhakar Hegde [ BDA v. Sudhakar Hegde , (2020) 15 SCC 63 ] , this Court, speaking through one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) held : (SCC pp. 112-13, paras 94-95) ‘ 94 . The adversarial system is, by its nature, rights based. In the quest for justice, it is not uncommon to postulate a winning side and a losing side. In matters of the environment and development however, there is no trade-off between the two. The protection of the environment is an inherent component of development and growth . … Professor Corker draws attention to the idea that the environmental protection goes beyond lawsuits. In matters of the environment and development however, there is no trade-off between the two. The protection of the environment is an inherent component of development and growth . … Professor Corker draws attention to the idea that the environmental protection goes beyond lawsuits. Where the State and statutory bodies fail in their duty to comply with the regulatory framework for the protection of the environment, the courts, acting on actions brought by public-spirited individuals are called to invalidate such actions . … 95 . The protection of the environment is premised not only on the active role of courts, but also on robust institutional frameworks within which every stakeholder complies with its duty to ensure sustainable development. A framework of environmental governance committed to the rule of law requires a regime which has effective, accountable and transparent institutions. Equally important is responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making. Environmental governance is founded on the rule of law and emerges from the values of our Constitution. Where the health of the environment is key to preserving the right to life as a constitutionally recognised value under Article 21 of the Constitution, proper structures for environmental decision-making find expression in the guarantee against arbitrary action and the affirmative duty of fair treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution. Sustainable development is premised not merely on the redressal of the failure of democratic institutions in the protection of the environment, but ensuring that such failures do not take place .’ *** 58 . The UNEP Report (supra) also goes on to note [ UNEP, “Environmental Rule of Law First Global Report” (January 2019), p. 213.] : ‘Courts and tribunals must be able to grant meaningful legal remedies in order to resolve disputes and enforce environmental laws. As shown in Figure 5.12, legal remedies are the actions, such as fines, jail time, and injunctions, that courts and tribunals are empowered to order. For environmental laws to have their desired effect and for there to be adequate incentives for compliance with environmental laws, the remedies must both redress the past environmental harm and deter future harm.’ 59 . In its Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism , the UNEP has further noted [ UNEP, Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism (3rd Edn., 2019), p. 7.] : ‘Courts matter. They are essential to the rule of law. In its Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism , the UNEP has further noted [ UNEP, Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism (3rd Edn., 2019), p. 7.] : ‘Courts matter. They are essential to the rule of law. Without courts, laws can be disregarded, executive officials left unchecked, and people left without recourse. And the environment and the human connection to it can suffer. Judges stand in the breach.’ 60 . The above discussion puts into perspective our decision in the present appeals, through which we shall confirm the directions given by NGT in its impugned judgment [ T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India , 2016 SCC OnLine NGT 1196] . The role of courts and tribunals cannot be overstated in ensuring that the “shield” of the “rule of law” can be used as a facilitative instrument in ensuring compliance with environmental regulations .” (emphasis supplied) 72. Rather strangely, the application so filed by the plaintiff was rejected by the Revenue Authority only on 10-1-1975. The revision filed by him was allowed by remitting the matter to the Joint Collector. Suffice it is to state that despite the findings rendered, neither the Forest Department nor the Forest Settlement Officer was arrayed as a party to these proceedings before the Revenue Department. It is also seen that the order of the Revenue Authority and the Revisional Authority were passed much after the declaration under Section 15 of the A.P. Forest Act, vesting the lands in the State by giving them the status of a reserved forest. 75. On appeal, the High Court, by giving adequate reasons reversed the said finding of the trial court qua the declaration, and confirmed the findings on injunction by dismissing the suit in toto. Ultimately, it was held that the suit property is forest land. The proceedings concluded under the A.P. Forest Act, though not specifically challenged, and that too without the proper and necessary parties, were found to be just and proper. Discussion 84. We have already recorded the facts in detail. It is a classic case where the officials of the State who are expected to protect and preserve the forests in discharge of their public duties clearly abdicated their role. Discussion 84. We have already recorded the facts in detail. It is a classic case where the officials of the State who are expected to protect and preserve the forests in discharge of their public duties clearly abdicated their role. We are at a loss to understand as to how the High Court could interfere by placing reliance upon evidence produced after the decree, at the instance of a party which succeeded along with the contesting defendant, particularly in the light of the finding that the land is forest land which has become part of reserved forest. 89. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment [ Mohd. Abdul Qasim v. State of Telangana , 2021 SCC OnLine TS 3687] stands set aside by restoring the judgment [ Mohd. Abdul Qasim v. State of Telangana Appeal Suit No. 145 of 1994, decided on 20-7-2018 (TS)] rendered in AS No. 145 of 1994. We consider it appropriate to impose costs of Rs 5,00,000 each on the appellants and respondents to be paid to the National Legal Services Authority (Nalsa) within a period of two months from the date of this judgment. The appellant State is free to enquire into the lapses committed by the officers in filing collusive affidavits before the competent court, and recover the same from those officers who are responsible for facilitating and filing incorrect affidavits in the ongoing proceedings. Contempt Case No. 624 of 2021 pending before the High Court is directed to be closed. IA No. 65196 of 2021 is dismissed. All other pending applications stand closed. 9. Learned Government Pleader further relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kunja Nagaiah v. State of Telangana , [2019 SCC OnLine TS 2499] wherein it is stated at paragraph 72 as follows: 72. Guided by the plethora of precedent decisions, it is seen that in the cases on hand land in issue is reserved forest land. The reserve forest land vests in Forest Department and designated authority of Forest Department is custodian. The reserve forest land cannot be used/diverted for any purpose other than development of forest growth. Revenue authorities have no competence to deal with forest land and assign such land. The reserve forest land vests in Forest Department and designated authority of Forest Department is custodian. The reserve forest land cannot be used/diverted for any purpose other than development of forest growth. Revenue authorities have no competence to deal with forest land and assign such land. Section 33 of Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli does not give free licence to revenue authorities and is subject to Act, 1927, Act, 1967 and Act, 1980 and subject to overarching public interest and public trust doctrine. From long time possession vested in the Forest Department. Thus, merely on the ground that after long lapse of time power is exercised to cancel the assignment cannot enure to the benefit of petitioners as granting relief to petitioners would result in restoring another illegal decision. More so, when possession is not proved on contest with Forest Department. Permitting petitioners to cultivate land in reserved forest is against public interest. 10. The core issue in this case revolves around the petitioners' claim for recognition of their forest rights under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, and the respondents' rejection of their claims based on alleged fabrication of documents. The petitioners, belonging to the Chenchu community, assert long-standing possession and cultivation of forest land in Kandlakunta Village, relying on Adangal/Pahanis and other documents. However, it is to be noted that the Panchayat Secretary explicitly denied issuing the pahani copies, and that it is the specific deposition of the Panchayat Secretary that, during the relevant period, he did not work in that village and did not issue the alleged documents and that the signatures thereon are not his. Furthermore, the Tahsildar confirmed that the documents were fake. The argument sought to be canvassed that the respondents are acting under extraneous pressures cannot be countenanced as there is no plausible reason to believe that the Panchayat Secretary or the Tahsildar have acted inimically towards the petitioners to cause disadvantage to the petitioners. Furthermore, the Tahsildar confirmed that the documents were fake. The argument sought to be canvassed that the respondents are acting under extraneous pressures cannot be countenanced as there is no plausible reason to believe that the Panchayat Secretary or the Tahsildar have acted inimically towards the petitioners to cause disadvantage to the petitioners. Further, Panchayat Secretary being in public service, his posting to a particular place being a matter of record, and when it is his specific plea that he did not discharge duties at the said village during the relevant period, the very issuance of documents to the petitioners in the capacity of Panchayat Secretary does not arise as he would not have jurisdiction or competence to issue any such document; and that being so, the plea sought to be taken by the petitioners that his admitted signatures ought to have been sent for comparison etc., cannot be countenanced. It is to be noted that the respondents conducted a joint enquiry and rejected the petitioners' claims, and due process was followed under the Forest Rights Act, 2006.Though the petitioners rely on the Forest Rights Act, 2006, and Rule 13 of the Forest Rights Rules, 2007, which mandate the consideration of various forms of evidence, including public documents, physical attributes, and traditional structures, to establish forest rights, they failed to provide genuine evidence of their possessionas required under the Act. 11. In the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Abdul Qasim (supra) , emphasizing the constitutional duty to protect forests under Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution, the Apex Court held that forests constitute a national asset, and any action affecting them must undergo high judicial scrutiny. Further, as per Kunja Nagaiah (supra), reserved forest land cannot be diverted for non-forest purposes, and revenue authorities lack jurisdiction to assign such land. In that view of the matter, and also in view of lack of credible evidence of the possession of the petitioners and the documents being relied on by the petitioners proved to be fake, this Court does not see any illegality in the impugned Proceedings dated 19.04.2011. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.