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2025 DIGILAW 1302 (ALL)

Kamal Kant Dubey v. Union Of India

2025-11-11

VIKAS BUDHWAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : VIKAS BUDHWAR, J. 1. Heard Sri Agnivesh (Advocate Roll No.A/A1074/2017), Advocate holding brief of Sri Pranvesh, learned counsel for the writ petitioner as well as Sri S.K. Pal, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The case of the writ petitioner is that an advertisement came to be published by the Staff Selection Commission on 04.03.2024 for recruitment through open competitive examination for the post of Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The writ petitioner appeared in Paper-I which was held at Varanasi and the same was computer based exam and the petitioner qualified the same and become eligible for appearing in Physical Standard Test (PST)/Physical Endurance Test (PET) and the writ petitioner appeared in the said examination, clear the same and became eligible to appear in Paper-II and thereafter he appeared in Paper-II and the centre was at 13302- Dewa Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Varanasi. The writ petitioner also cleared Paper-II examination and after post declaration of result, the Deputy Director (Central Region) of the Commission issued a letter to the writ petitioner calling for Detailed Medical Examination (DME) intimating the date of Medical Examination. The writ petitioner appeared before the Medical Examination Committee wherein he was declared unfit on the ground that he is having 'Gynecomastia' The writ petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal for Review Medical Examination which was conducted by the 4th respondent, wherein again he was found unfit on account of 'Gynecomastia.' 3. Questioning the result dated 20.09.2025 issued by respondent No.4 and the result dated 16.09.2025 issued by respondent No.5 and seeking mandamus directing the respondent Nos.3 and 4 to re-conduct the Medical Examination of the petitioner and other medical centre of the group centre, the present writ petition has been preferred. 4. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has sought to argue that the conclusions so drawn in Detailed Medical Examination (D.M.E.) and Review Medical Examination (R.M.E.) is not accurate and further there happens to be a report of the writ petitioner from Sir Sundar Lal Chikitsalaya, Kashi Hindu Vishwavidalaya (page-58 of the paper book) wherein the said discrepancy/deficiency is not there followed by of Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Government Hospital (page-59 of the paper book). 5. 5. Submission is that once the writ petitioner possesses report from a government hospital and that too a reputed one from B.H.U. then the writ petitioner is right in questioning the conclusions drawn by Detailed Medical Examination (D.M.E.) and Review Medical Examination (R.M.E.). He seeks to rely upon the decision of this Court in Rupesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and others , 2020 (9) ADJ 555 . 6. Countering the said submission, Sri S.K. Pal, learned counsel for the respondent while countering the submission so made by the learned counsel for writ petitioner has sought to argue that none of the contentions so raised have any leg to establish for simple reason that the case of the writ petitioner stood tested twice one by D.M.E. and second by R.M.E. and further he cannot insist that a report of any other hospital or medical institute should be considered ignoring the conclusions drawn by D.M.E. and R.M.E. He seeks to rely upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in Special Appellate judgment in Special Appeal No.1076 of 2024 ( Shivansh Singh Vs. Union of India and 3 others ) decided on 16.12.2024 and a decision of Delhi High Court passed in W.P. (C) No.15804/2025 & CM Appl. No.64751/2025 ( Naomi Neijoujam Haokip Vs. Staff Selection Commission and Ors. ) decided on 14.10.2025. 7. I have heard the submissions so made across the bar and perusal of the record. 8. Apparently, the writ petitioner was subjected to Medical Examination at two levels i.e. D.M.E. and R.M.E. which goes to the route of the making the writ petitioner unsuitable came to be surfaced. However, the writ petitioner relies upon certain reports of Sir Sundar Lal Chikitsalaya, Kashi Hindu Vishwavidalaya and Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Government Hospital. In the opinion of the Court, any report so pressed into service by the writ petitioner as claimed herein cannot be a ground to negate the conclusions drawn in D.M.E. and R.M.E. In Shivansh Singh (supra) , the Special Appellate Bench had the occasion to consider the said aspect of the matter and has observed in paragraph Nos.11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 as under: "11. The law with regard to the scope of interference in matters relating to the assessment of fitness by the medical board constituted for the purpose of recruitment under the relevant statutory rules, in exercise of powers under writ jurisdiction, is fairly well settled. In this regard, we may place reliance upon the observations made in Md. Arshad Khan General (Male) Category, (Roll No.00186474), Registration No.10209488956 vs. State of UP and others1, wherein it was observed as follows: "6. The scope of interference in matters relating to assessment of fitness by a Medical Board constituted under the statutory rules in exercise of powers under writ jurisdiction, in our opinion, would be extremely limited. 7. The Courts have, time and again, emphasised the need for caution when candidates seek to assail the correctness of the findings of a Medical Board constituted under a recruitment process adopted by the State authorities. 8. We may observe that although the powers of the Court under Article 226 are wide enough to issue directions in appropriate cases but such powers are required to be wielded with caution and circumspection. Matters relating to the medical evaluation of candidates in a recruitment process involve expert determination and the Court should exercise caution in supplanting the process adopted by the recruiting agency and substituting it by a Court mandated further medical evaluation. 9. Any such exercise in acceding to requests of candidates who are not found to be medically fit for reassessment on the basis of procedures other than those envisaged by the recruiting agency under the relevant rules would result in the recruitment process being derailed, which would ordinarily be not permissible." 12. A similar view had also been taken in another judgment of this Court in Vivek Kumar S/o Mool Chandra vs. State of UP & Others2, wherein it was held that matters relating to medical evaluation of candidates in a recruitment process involve expert determination and it may not be desirable to supplant the procedure prescribed therefor as laid down under the relevant recruitment rules and taking any other view may have the effect of derailing the recruitment process. 13. 13. In the present case, where recruitment process has been carried out as per the prescribed procedure whereunder the medical fitness of candidates has been tested by a duly constituted Medical Board, the report of the Medical Board is not to be normally interfered with, and that too, solely on the basis of a claim sought to be set up by the appellant-petitioner on the basis of some subsequent report procured by him from another medical practitioner. 14. It is no where the case of the petitioner that the decision taken by the Medical Board was arbitrary or not in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the recruitment in question. 15. We are of the view that a claim sought to be set up on the basis of a subsequent medical report produced by the candidate would not have the effect of overriding or setting at naught the expert opinion of the Medical Board set up as per procedure in a recruitment process." 9. In Naomi Neijoujam Haokip (supra) the issue akin to the present controversy came up for consideration wherein the following was observed in paragraph Nos.8, 9 & 10: 8. In this context, reference may be made to the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Staff Selection Commission v Aman Singh6, authored by one of us (C Hari Shankar, J), wherein a similar issue was examined and the Court observed that medical officers are the most competent to assess whether a prospective candidate meets the prescribed medical standards for the post and the scope of judicial interference in such cases being limited. The relevant extract of the observations made are reproduced hereinbelow: "10.38 In our considered opinion, the following principles would apply: (i) The principles that apply in the case of recruitment to disciplined Forces, involved with safety and security, internal and external, such as the Armed and Paramilitary Forces, or the Police, are distinct and different from those which apply to normal civilian recruitment. The standards of fitness, and the rigour of the examination to be conducted, are undoubtedly higher and stricter. (ii) There is no absolute proscription against judicial review of, or of judicial interference with, decisions of Medical Boards or Review Medical Boards. In appropriate cases, the Court can interfere. (iii) The general principle is, however, undoubtedly one of circumspection. The standards of fitness, and the rigour of the examination to be conducted, are undoubtedly higher and stricter. (ii) There is no absolute proscription against judicial review of, or of judicial interference with, decisions of Medical Boards or Review Medical Boards. In appropriate cases, the Court can interfere. (iii) The general principle is, however, undoubtedly one of circumspection. The Court is to remain mindful of the fact that it is not peopled either with persons having intricate medical knowledge, or were aware of the needs of the Force to which the concerned candidate seeks entry. There is an irrebuttable presumption that judges are not medical men or persons conversant with the intricacies of medicine, therapeutics or medical conditions. They must, therefore, defer to the decisions of the authorities in that regard, specifically of the Medical Boards which may have assessed the candidate. The function of the Court can only, therefore, be to examine whether the manner in which the candidate was assessed by the Medical Boards, and the conclusion which the Medical Boards have arrived, inspires confidence, or transgresses any established norm of law, procedure or fair play. If it does not, the Court cannot itself examine the material on record to come to a conclusion as to whether the candidate does, or does not, suffer from the concerned ailment, as that would amount to sitting in appeal over the decision of the Medical Boards, which is not permissible in law. (iv) The situations in which a Court can legitimately interfere with the final outcome of the examination of the candidate by the Medical Board or the Review Medical Board are limited, but well-defined. Some of these may be enumerated as under: (a) A breach of the prescribed procedure that is required to be followed during examination constitutes a legitimate ground for interference. If the examination of the candidate has not taken place in the manner in which the applicable Guidelines or prescribed procedure requires it to be undertaken, the examination, and its results, would ipso facto stand vitiated. (b) If there is a notable discrepancy between the findings of the DME and the RME, or the Appellate Medical Board, interference may be justified. In this, the Court has to be conscious of what constitutes a "discrepancy". (b) If there is a notable discrepancy between the findings of the DME and the RME, or the Appellate Medical Board, interference may be justified. In this, the Court has to be conscious of what constitutes a "discrepancy". A situation in which, for example, the DME finds the candidate to be suffering from three medical conditions, whereas the RME, or the Appellate Medical Board, finds the candidate to be suffering only from one of the said three conditions, would not constitute a discrepancy, so long as the candidate is disqualified because of the presence of the condition concurrently found by the DME and the RME or the Appellate Medical Board. This is because, insofar as the existence of the said condition is concerned, there is concurrence and uniformity of opinion between the DME and the RME, or the Appellate Medical Board. In such a circumstance, the Court would ordinarily accept that the candidate suffered from the said condition. Thereafter, as the issue of whether the said condition is sufficient to justify exclusion of the candidate from the Force is not an aspect which would concern the Court, the candidate's petition would have to be rejected. (c) If the condition is one which requires a specialist opinion, and there is no specialist on the Boards which have examined the candidate, a case for interference is made out. In this, however, the Court must be satisfied that the condition is one which requires examination by a specialist. One may differentiate, for example, the existence of a haemorrhoid or a skin lesion which is apparent to any doctor who sees the candidate, with an internal orthopaedic deformity, which may require radiographic examination and analysis, or an ophthalmological impairment. Where the existence of a medical condition which ordinarily would require a specialist for assessment is certified only by Medical Boards which do not include any such specialist, the Court would be justified in directing a fresh examination of the candidate by a specialist, or a Board which includes a specialist. This would be all the more so if the candidate has himself contacted a specialist who has opined in his favour. This would be all the more so if the candidate has himself contacted a specialist who has opined in his favour. (d) Where the Medical Board, be it the DME or the RME or the Appellate Medical Board, itself refers the candidate to a specialist or to another hospital or doctor for opinion, even if the said opinion is not binding, the Medical Board is to provide reasons for disregarding the opinion and holding contrary to it. If, therefore, on the aspect of whether the candidate does, or does not, suffer from a particular ailment, the respondents themselves refer the candidate to another doctor or hospital, and the opinion of the said doctor or hospital is in the candidate's favour, then, if the Medical Board, without providing any reasons for not accepting the verdict of the said doctor or hospital, nonetheless disqualifies the candidate, a case for interference is made out. (e) Similarly, if the Medical Board requisitions specialist investigations such as radiographic or ultrasonological tests, the results of the said tests cannot be ignored by the Medical Board. If it does so, a case for interference is made out. (f) If there are applicable Guidelines, Rules or Regulations governing the manner in which Medical Examination of the candidate is required to be conducted, then, if the DME or the RME breaches the stipulated protocol, a clear case for interference is made out. (v) Opinions of private, or even government, hospitals, obtained by the concerned candidate, cannot constitute a legitimate basis for referring the case for re-examination. At the same time, if the condition is such as require a specialist's view, and the Medical Board and Review Medical Board do not include such specialists, then the Court may be justified in directing the candidate to be re-examined by a specialist or by a Medical Board which includes a specialist. In passing such a direction, the Court may legitimately place reliance on the opinion of such a specialist, even if privately obtained by the candidate. In passing such a direction, the Court may legitimately place reliance on the opinion of such a specialist, even if privately obtained by the candidate. It is reiterated, however, that, if the Medical Board or the Review Medical Board consists of doctors who are sufficiently equipped and qualified to pronounce on the candidate's condition, then an outside medical opinion obtained by the candidate of his own volition, even if favourable to him and contrary to the findings of the DME or the RME, would not justify referring the candidate for a fresh medical examination. (vi) The aspect of "curability" assumes significance in many cases. Certain medical conditions may be curable. The Court has to be cautious in dealing with such cases. If the condition is itself specified, in the applicable Rules or Guidelines, as one which, by its very existence, renders the candidate unfit, the Court may discredit the aspect of curability. If there is no such stipulation, and the condition is curable with treatment, then, depending on the facts of the case, the Court may opine that the Review Medical Board ought to have given the candidate a chance to have his condition treated and cured. That cannot, however, be undertaken by the Court of its own volition, as a Court cannot hazard a medical opinion regarding curability, or the advisability of allowing the candidate a chance to cure the ailment. Such a decision can be taken only if there is authoritative medical opinion, from a source to which the respondents themselves have sought opinion or referred the candidate, that the condition is curable with treatment. In such a case, if there is no binding time frame within which the Review Medical Board is to pronounce its decision on the candidate's fitness, the Court may, in a given case, direct a fresh examination of the candidate after she, or he, has been afforded an opportunity to remedy her, or his, condition. It has to be remembered that the provision for a Review Medical Board is not envisaged as a chance for unfit candidates to make themselves fit, but only to verify the correctness of the decision of the initial Medical Board which assessed the candidate. (vii) The extent of judicial review has, at all times, to be restricted to the medical examination of the candidate concerned. (vii) The extent of judicial review has, at all times, to be restricted to the medical examination of the candidate concerned. The Court is completely proscribed even from observing, much less opining, that the medical disability from which the candidate may be suffering is not such as would interfere with the discharge, by her, or him, of her, or his, duties as a member of the concerned Force. The suitability of the candidates to function as a member of the Force, given the medical condition from which the candidate suffers, has to be entirely left to the members of the Force to assess the candidate, as they alone are aware of the nature of the work that the candidate, if appointed, would have to undertake, and the capacity of the candidates to undertake the said work. In other words, once the Court finds that the decision that the candidate concerned suffers from a particular ailment does not merit judicial interference, the matter must rest there. The Court cannot proceed one step further and examine whether the ailment is such as would render the candidate unfit for appointment as a member of the concerned Force." (emphasis supplied) 9. It is clear from a perusal of the aforesaid decision that the interference by courts in such matters is generally unwarranted because the standards of medical fitness for recruitment to disciplined forces are stringent and require expert assessment. The Courts, not being medically and technically equipped to reassess such findings, must defer to the opinion of the duly constituted medical boards and intervene only where there is a clear violation of procedure, established law, or principles of fair play. The judgment also highlights that the opinions obtained by a candidate from a private or a governmental hospital on their own accord, cannot serve as valid grounds for seeking dismissal and/or review of the observations of the DME and RME. 10. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the petitioner's candidature was rejected on medical grounds for being unfit due to defective vision of 6/9 in both eyes, which has been concurrently upheld by both the DME and RME. The eye test record produced from Charak Palika Hospital also does not justify any reconsideration. Thus, we find that none of the conditions laid down in Aman Singh (supra) for judicial interference stand satisfied in the present case. 10. The eye test record produced from Charak Palika Hospital also does not justify any reconsideration. Thus, we find that none of the conditions laid down in Aman Singh (supra) for judicial interference stand satisfied in the present case. 10. As regards judgment in Rupesh Kumar (supra) is concerned, the same does not deal with the said issue. 11. Accordingly, no good ground is made out to interfere in the present proceedings. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.