JUDGMENT : CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA, J. 1. Appellants-plaintiffs - Premchand & Shantilal have preferred this Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.04.2019 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangwara, District Dungarpur in Civil Original Suit No. 09/2018, whereby the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs for Pre-emption in respect of the property in question. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this first appeal are that on 18.02.2013 appellants-plaintiffs instituted Civil Original Suit No.09/2018 against the respondents-defendants with the averments that the appellants-plaintiffs are in possession of ancestral house measuring 73.9’ x 29’ situated at Chhota Bodigama as owners. The house of respondents-defendants Nos. 1-3 is situated towards southern side of appellants-plaintiffs house. It was further submitted that father of the appellants-plaintiffs namely Velji had constructed a house for father of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 measuring 73.6’ x 13.6’ having existed a common wall in between both the houses. 3. It was further alleged that the respondents-defendants had sold their house through registered sale-deed dated 18.09.2012 to defendant No.4 – Smt. Chanda Bai for a consideration of Rs.3.00 Lakhs. As soon as, the appellants-plaintiffs came to know about the said sale deed, they requested the respondents-defendants to cancel the said sale deed but the respondents-defendants refused to do so. Thereafter, the appellants-plaintiffs, sent a legal notice to the respondents-defendants on 20.12.2012 but the defendants did not move forward, thus, the appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit for Haq shufa (pre-emption) seeking cancellation of the said sale deed executed in favour of the respondent-defendant No.4. 4. The defendant Nos. 1-3 filed their joint written statement wherein while denying the contents of the plaint, it was pleaded that the house, though ancestral, was not constructed by the father of the plaintiffs – Velji rather it was constructed by ancestor of the respondents-defendants Shri Gangaram Ji. It was further contended that since the respondents-defendants are holding separate house, they need not to obtain prior consent of plaintiffs to sell the property in question and thus, a prayer for dismissal of the suit was made. 5. It was further contended that since the respondents-defendants are holding separate house, they need not to obtain prior consent of plaintiffs to sell the property in question and thus, a prayer for dismissal of the suit was made. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed Five Issues on 13.07.2016, which are reproduced hereunder: ¼1½ D;k oknhx.k] çfroknhx.k la[;k 1&3 }kjk tks foØ; i= fnukad 18-09-12 ds }kjk çfroknh la[;k 4 dks edku foØ; fd;k x;k] gd'kQk ds vkèkkj ij Ø; djus ds vfèkdkjh gS\ &oknhx.k ¼2½ D;k oknhx.k gd'kQk ds vkèkkj ij çfroknhx.k la[;k 1&3 }kjk çfroknh la[;k 4 ds i{k esa fd;k x;k foØ; i= fnukad 18-09-12 dks jn~n djokus ds vfèkdkjh gS\  &oknhx.k ¼3½ D;k oknhx.k ds edkukr o çfroknhx.k la[;k 1&3 }kjk fofØr fd;s xbZ edku dh nhokj fljdrh ugha gksus ls oknhx.k dks gd'kQk dk vfèkdkj gkfly ugha gS\  &çfroknhx.k ¼4½ D;k oknhx.k dk okn i= viw.kZ U;k; 'kqYd ij gS\ &çfroknhx.k ¼5½ vuqrks"k 6. The appellants- plaintiffs, in support of their claim, produced in evidence PW1 - Premchand, PW2 - Shantilal, PW3 - Ramji Patidar and Exhibited documents Ex.1 to Ex.12. Whereas, respondents- defendants produced DW1 - Kamla in evidence. The learned trial court, after considering the submissions of both the parties, their pleadings and evidence available on the record, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 7. Mr. Narpat Ram, the learned counsel for appellants-plaintiffs contended that the trial Court has committed a serious illegality in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs for Pre-emption in respect of the disputed property. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs that the house in question is ancestral house of the plaintiffs and the defendants and when the trial court categorically recorded a finding that the ancestors of the appellants and respondents are same and the house in question was constructed by the ancestors and once it is established that the house in question is ancestors and no partition had taken place, then right of Haq shufa accrues in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs. 8. 8. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs that the wall between the plaintiffs and defendants houses is a joint and common wall and its existence is sufficient to entitle to the preferential right of the pre-emption under Section 6 (1)(i) or Section 6 (l)(ii) of the Rajasthan Pre- emption Act, 1966 (for short, hereinafter 'the Act'). 9. Per contra, Mr. Pawan Singh, learned counsel for the respondents – defendants supported the impugned judgment and prayed for dismissal of the instant appeal. 10. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned judgment as well as the record of the trial Court. 11. The principal issue for consideration in the present appeal is whether the appellants-plaintiffs have established a legal right of pre-emption over the suit property on the ground of common wall and contiguity, and whether the findings of the learned trial court suffer from any perversity or misappreciation of evidence. 12. Before dealing with the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, in the light of various rulings cited at the Bar, this court thinks it fit and proper to consider the relevant provisions of law and citations referred at the Bar. 13. For ready reference, sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act, 1966 is reproduced as Under:- "6. Persons to whom right of pre-emption accrues. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the right of pre- emption in respect of any immovable property transferred shall accrue to, and vest in, the following classes of persons, namely:- (i) Co-sharer or partner in the property transferred; (ii) Owners of other immovable property with a stair-case or an entrance or other right or amenity common to such other property and the property transferred, and (iii) Owners of property servant or dominant to the property transferred." 15. The definition of co-sharer as defined in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Act of 1966 is also reproduced as under: - "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the subject or context requires otherwise. The definition of co-sharer as defined in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Act of 1966 is also reproduced as under: - "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the subject or context requires otherwise. - (i) "co-sharer" used in relation to any immovable property, means and person entitled as an owner or a proprietor to any share or part in such property, whether his name is or is not recorded a such owner or proprietor in the record of right or in any register prepared in accordance with law;" 14. In the instant case, the appellants, to invoke the right of pre- emption, have primarily relied on the alleged existence of a "common wall" between their houses and the suit property being ancestral. 15. In Sire Kanwar Maloo vs. Shri Daudas Mantri, 2008 (1) CT (Raj.) 407 : 2008 (1) RLW (Raj.) 781 , a Division Bench of this Court answered a reference in negative and held that co- owner of a party wall (common boundary wall) situated between the two adjacent immovable properties are not the co-sharers and have no right to pre-empt the transfer of other immovable property under Section 6 (1) of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act , 1966. Para 1 and 32 to 39 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- "1. We are seized of the matter as a referee court. The reference as made is in the subject matter of the decision in a first appeal. The matter of Smt. Sire Kanwar Maloo vs. Daudas Mantri came before the learned Single Judge. After examining the case, he was of the opinion that the following question is involved in the appeal: "Whether Co-owner of a wall situated between the two adjacent immovable properties, are co-sharers within the meaning of Sec. 2(1) of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act , 1966, read with other Provisions of the Act so as to give right to the co-owner of the party - wall to pre-empt the transfer of other immovable property under Sec. 6(1) of the Act." 2 to 31 ........................... 32. What is now to be seen is whether the term co-sharer or Partner as delineated in Section 6(1)(i) engulfs in it a person who has a right in a party wall i.e. when there is a common wall between the two dwellings. 33. A common wall supports the structure of the two houses. 32. What is now to be seen is whether the term co-sharer or Partner as delineated in Section 6(1)(i) engulfs in it a person who has a right in a party wall i.e. when there is a common wall between the two dwellings. 33. A common wall supports the structure of the two houses. To that extent, is the use of the wall. Both the dwellings being contiguous. It is to be seen whether the two inmates have any commonality of the use of their dwellings? Answer would be in the negative. None of the two houses have anything common except a wall, which is jointly owned and faces the respective dwellings. 34. It the two houses have no other feature which is common to them, then this is certain that their occupant do not share the property when put to use, in any facet, except of cause the support of wall. Can that contingency be given a broader definition so as to characterise each of the owner of the wall, be termed to be user of both the houses in its all parameters? The answer will again be in the negative. No one permits a neighbour to get into his house to his determination. Meaning thereby the co-sharership or partnership does not extend beyond the wall. Thus the owner of the house of both sides are part owner of the common wall. 35. Definition of co-sharer as given in Section 2(1) of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 defines an owner of the part of a premises as a co-sharer. But co-sharer of the nature we are concerned has a handicap, that is most important aspect, that he cannot use any part of the premises of another. If use is restricted to wall only then to what extent his rights are to be recognized? 36. As part owner of the wall, two neighbour exclude each other from the use of the respective houses. Thus each one of them is excluded from the use of the dominant part of the main part of the house. If a co-sharer as depicted as a sharer of Party wall, is not in a position to use the dominant part of the house, then his rights are confined to the use of the wall of which each one is part owner. If a co-sharer as depicted as a sharer of Party wall, is not in a position to use the dominant part of the house, then his rights are confined to the use of the wall of which each one is part owner. A part owner thus given the right of pre-emption under Section 6(1) (i), will have the capacity to inhibit the free enjoyment of property of other. Such restriction sounds to be an onerous burden. 37. Premises on which the doctrine of right of pre-emption is based is that the vendee should not put the existing owner in a difficult position than the one which was before sale. The wall separates the two dwellings. The respective easements are governed by a separate statute. Those rights cannot be infringed by any sale. These easementary rights have been provided for in a separate statute. Thus, the transfer cannot put the vendee in a position wherein he can cause any interference in the domain of non-selling part-owner of the wall. 38. With the discussion hereinabove, we find that the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge in Dharam Pal's case (supra) are more rational and close to the points of view put forward by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bahu Ram (supra) and Atmpa Prakash (Supra). The relevant portion of Para 14 of the judgment is reproduced herein below for ready reference: - "14. .................To illustrate, I may point out that there are several plots over which adjoining bungalows or houses belonging to different persons are constructed and they have a common boundary wall which is party wall. If an adjoining house or bungalow is sold and the owner of the adjoining another bungalow having a common boundary wall filed a suit for pre-emption, his claim for pre-emption is simply on the basis of his being a neighbour. The mere existence of a common boundary does not make him a co-sharer in the property sold or a person with a common staircase or common entrance or any other common rights or amenity. Substantially he is only a neighbour and so far as party wall is concerned, rights and obligations of the two neighbours are so analogous to easement rights and obligations that they should be looked upon as part of the law of easements and not as participators is append-ages." 39. Substantially he is only a neighbour and so far as party wall is concerned, rights and obligations of the two neighbours are so analogous to easement rights and obligations that they should be looked upon as part of the law of easements and not as participators is append-ages." 39. If this is also viewed from the point of view of the statutory provision in the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act , 1966, then clause (iii) of Section 6 which has been struck down, engulfs the position of the owner of the house feeling aggrieved by sale, more specifically because the common wall having been partly owned by both the neighbours, can fit in the scheme of Part (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act , 1966 and thus, the same having been held un-constitutional, no right can be seen in the neighbour, a Part owner of the wall to enforce pre-emption. Thus, in the ultimate conclusion we opine on the question as framed by the learned Single Judge as to whether a co-owner of the party wall can pre-empt the transfer of other immovable property under Section 6 (1) of the Act, in negative and hold that no such right would accrue to a part owner of a wall, call it by any name co-owner or co-sharer." 16. It is well settled that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and must be clearly established through strict pleading as well as cogent evidence. The burden lies squarely on the person asserting the right to demonstrate both the legal basis for such a claim-whether statutory, customary, or contractual—and the factual preconditions required to exercise such a right. 17. In light of the answer given to the reference made by the Division Bench in case of Sire Kanwar (supra) and the findings recorded by the trial court on the Issue Nos. 1 and 2, this Court is of the opinion that the appellants-plaintiffs failed to prove their right of Pre-emption under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act , 1966. Considering the aforesaid legal position, interference by this court is not required. 18. Consequently, this appeal has no force in it and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 10.04.2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sangwara, Dungarpur is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs. 19. Considering the aforesaid legal position, interference by this court is not required. 18. Consequently, this appeal has no force in it and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 10.04.2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sangwara, Dungarpur is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs. 19. Send back the records to the learned Trial Court alongwith copy of this judgment.