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2025 DIGILAW 1306 (TS)

Dongari Veeranna v. Nalla Narsimha Rao

2025-10-27

RENUKA YARA

body2025
JUDGMENT : RENUKA YARA, J. 1. Heard Sri B. Balaji, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri M. Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for respondents, on admission. Perused the record. 2. This Second Appeal is preferred challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.08.2020 in A.S.No.43 of 2017 on the file of the VI Additional District Judge, Mahabubabad, Warangal (‘First Appellate Court’), confirming the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2017 in O.S.No.64 of 2008 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mahabubabad (‘Trial Court’), wherein the suit filed seeking specific performance of Agreement of Sale, dated 23.08.2007 and to direct the appellant/defendant to execute a registered sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property, has been decreed. 3. Along with the Second Appeal, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act in the present appeal to condone delay of 1621 days in filing of the Second Appeal. 4. The reasons cited for condoning the delay are Covid pandemic up to February, 2020, lack of proper information from the counsel on record and financial constraints. The appellant came to know about the judgment and decree passed on 24.08.2020 in the last week of April, 2025 when the Advocate Commissioner came to demarcate the suit schedule property. Only in the last week of April, 2025, the appellant learned about the impugned judgment and therefore, the Second Appeal is filed with a delay of 1621 days. In that regard, reliance is placed on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Miscellaneous Application Nos. 21 of 2022 and 665 of 2021 in SMW (C) No. 3 of 2020 , wherein, limitation period was excluded from 15.03.2020 up to 28.02.2022 on account of Covid pandemic. Further, reliance is placed on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others , (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it is held as follows: “20. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy [2012) 12 SCC 693], the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful. 21. From the aforesaid authorities, the principles that can broadly be culled out are: …….. 21. From the aforesaid authorities, the principles that can broadly be culled out are: …….. 21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.” 5. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. Nafeesa Mirza and others , I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in CCCA No. 68 of 2022 , wherein, reference is made to judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Collector (LA) v. Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107 as below: “12. … (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.” 6. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Balerao alias Sara Radha Krishna v. Balerao alias Sara Hari Kishan , 2025 SCC OnLine TS 387 , wherein, delay of 1812 days in filing the application for restoration of the suit, was allowed by imposing costs. 7. On the basis of aforementioned judgments, the learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the delay be condoned and an opportunity be given for contesting the case on merits. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to the counter wherein reasons for delay are denied and also referred to proceedings in E.P.No.13 of 2021 which was filed on 15.09.2021. In said E.P, the appellant herein filed counter affidavit on 10.07.2022. Further, in E.P.No.13 of 2021, E.A.No.12 of 2023 was filed on 12.03.2023 and said copy was received by the appellant and counter affidavit was filed on 10.04.2023. In said E.P, the appellant herein filed counter affidavit on 10.07.2022. Further, in E.P.No.13 of 2021, E.A.No.12 of 2023 was filed on 12.03.2023 and said copy was received by the appellant and counter affidavit was filed on 10.04.2023. On 14.07.2023, E.A.No.12 of 2023 was dismissed. All along, the appellant herein had knowledge about the proceedings which were going on before the E.P Court and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, there are no grounds to condone delay much less due to suppression of facts. 9. In reply, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is huge difference between having knowledge about the E.P proceedings and having knowledge about the passing of the impugned judgment and decree in the First Appeal. It is the contention of the appellant that while he had knowledge about the E.P proceedings, he had no knowledge about the disposal of the First Appeal and was under the mistaken impression that the First Appeal is still pending. 10. To counter the contention of the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to contents of the E.P.No.13 of 2021, where, at column No.5, it is mentioned as follows: “5) Whether an appeal preferred : Yes, an appeal was preferred by the from the decree the defendant/J.Dr. vide in A.S.No.43 of 2017 before the Honourable Court of VI Addl. District Judge, Mahabubabad and the Appeal was dismissed on 24.08.2020.” 11. The above fact situation shows that the appellant who had to defend the appeal had taken 1621 days to file the Second Appeal. The first reason cited is Covid pandemic. Assuming for a moment that Covid pandemic is the genuine reason for not preferring the Second Appeal, said ground holds good up to 28.02.2022. Then, the appellant is under obligation to explain the delay from 01.03.2022 to 15.04.2025 which is a period of 3 years 2 months. To explain said delay, the appellant claims on one hand lack of information from the counsel. Said reasons is unbelievable as the E.P No.13 of 2021 was filed during Covid pandemic in the year 2021 itself and the appellant herein has participated in the E.P proceedings by filing the counter on 10.07.2022. There is further participation in E.A.No.12 of 2023 in E.P.No.13 of 2021 by filing counter on 10.04.2023. Said reasons is unbelievable as the E.P No.13 of 2021 was filed during Covid pandemic in the year 2021 itself and the appellant herein has participated in the E.P proceedings by filing the counter on 10.07.2022. There is further participation in E.A.No.12 of 2023 in E.P.No.13 of 2021 by filing counter on 10.04.2023. The appellant had knowledge about the proceedings in E.P and was continuously availing the services of his counsel to file counters on his behalf to oppose the E.P proceedings. In said fact scenario, one cannot claim lack of information from the counsel being a reason for allowing delay of 3 years 2 months. 12. The last reason cited is lack of knowledge about the disposal of the First Appeal. Said defense is also negated by virtue of contents of the E.P filed under Order XXI Rule 11(2) of CPC wherein at column No.5, there is a clear mention about the dismissal of the First Appeal on 24.08.2020. When the appellant had knowledge about the E.P and filing counter in E.P, the appellant cannot plead lack of knowledge about the disposal of the First Appeal. In this context, this Court is of the opinion that the case of the appellant is squarely covered by the legal ration laid down in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others , (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it is held as follows: “21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into onsideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 13. The approach of the appellant shows lack of diligence, neglect and the reasons cited are fanciful and unconvincing. Therefore, no lenience can be shown in condoning the delay of 1621 days in filing the Second Appeal. As such, the I.A.No.1 of 2025 lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed. 14. The approach of the appellant shows lack of diligence, neglect and the reasons cited are fanciful and unconvincing. Therefore, no lenience can be shown in condoning the delay of 1621 days in filing the Second Appeal. As such, the I.A.No.1 of 2025 lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the I.A.No.1 of 2025 filed seeking to condone delay of 1621 days is dismissed and the Second Appeal is also dismissed at the stage of admission confirming the judgment and decree dated 24.08.2020 in A.S.No.43 of 2017 on the file of the VI Additional District Judge, Mahabubabad, Warangal. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.