ORDER : Farjand Ali, J. 1. By way of filing this instant appeal, the appellants have assailed the judgment and order dated 27.05.1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner in Sessions Case No. 17/94, whereby they were convicted for offences under Sections 498-A/34 and 304/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo three years’ simple imprisonment on the first count and seven years’ imprisonment on the second count, with both sentences directed to run concurrently. 2. During the pendency of the present appeal, it has been officially verified by the learned Public Prosecutor that Appellant Nos. 1 and 3 have expired. In light of this, the appeal, to the extent it pertains to Appellant Nos. 1 and 3, stands abated and is accordingly disposed of as infructuous qua them. 3. Brifely stated facts of the case are that in Sessions Case No. 17/94, based on FIR No. 66/94 registered at Police Station Khajuwala, Bikaner, the accused Trilok Singh, his sons Darshan Singh and Balwant Singh were charged under Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B/34 IPC for subjecting Balwant Singh’s wife, Sunita (daughter of Joga Singh), to cruelty in connection with dowry. Soon after this alleged cruelty, Sunita died under suspicious circumstances on 10.05.1994 at the accused’s residence in village 26 K.Y.D. The accused claimed that Sunita died by suicide, either by consuming poison or due to pesticide inhalation. However, their versions were inconsistent and shifted over time, especially as different defense lawyers appeared. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses and produced 37 documents. Despite the hostile stance of key witnesses like Joga Singh and his wife Jaspal Kaur (Sunita’s stepfather and mother), other credible witnesses corroborated the allegations of dowry-related cruelty. The court noted the alarming rate of dowry deaths in the Bikaner district and the rarity of convictions, emphasizing the need for courts to evaluate such cases with a nuanced understanding of circumstantial and indirect evidence. Applying the presumptions under Sections 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC, the trial court concluded that the accused were guilty of causing Sunita’s dowry death within seven years of marriage following persistent cruelty. 4. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 5. It is evident from the record that prosecution witnesses PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 were declared hostile, and their testimonies do not support the prosecution’s case. 4. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 5. It is evident from the record that prosecution witnesses PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 were declared hostile, and their testimonies do not support the prosecution’s case. Specifically, PW-4’s statement is wholly exculpatory in nature and does not in any manner establish or substantiate the charge against the surviving appellant Balwant Singh. Rather, the witness has categorically denied any demand for dowry or cruelty, and has attributed the death of the deceased to a medical condition triggered by pesticide exposure, thus ruling out any culpability on the part of the accused. 6. PW-5 and PW-6 were also declared hostile and did not support the prosecution’s case. PW-5 stated that the deceased suffered a seizure due to pesticide spray and denied having ever witnessed any harassment or dowry demand by the accused. PW-6 similarly deposed that the deceased had a history of seizures, received no mistreatment from the accused, and confirmed her death was due to a seizure caused by pesticide exposure. Their statements clearly negate the prosecution’s allegations of cruelty or dowry demands. PW-7, the formal witness regarding seizure and storage of chemical evidence, merely proved procedural aspects of handling the seized spray bottle and did not contribute towards proving the charge against the accused 7. PW-8 Heera Singh, a neighbour of the complainant Jogasingh, has broadly supported the factum of a panchayat being convened at the instance of Jogasingh, in which the deceased Sunita allegedly disclosed instances of harassment and dowry demands by her in-laws. However, upon critical scrutiny, it becomes evident that the witness’s deposition lacks specificity or any direct imputation against the present surviving appellant Balwant Singh. PW-8 does not attribute any overt act or statement to Balwant Singh indicating cruelty, harassment, or demand for dowry. On the contrary, his narration of the panchayat proceedings shows that Balwant Singh, along with others, merely gave assurance of non-repetition of alleged misbehaviour and took the deceased back with them. There is no reference to Balwant Singh having made any demand or threat, nor is there any assertion of him having played a dominant or instigating role. The role of the surviving appellant, Balwant Singh, thus appears to be more in the nature of a passive participant or a mediator, rather than a perpetrator of the alleged cruelty. There is no reference to Balwant Singh having made any demand or threat, nor is there any assertion of him having played a dominant or instigating role. The role of the surviving appellant, Balwant Singh, thus appears to be more in the nature of a passive participant or a mediator, rather than a perpetrator of the alleged cruelty. The overall tenor of PW-8's testimony does not disclose any material indicating specific culpability of Balwant Singh under the alleged offences. Hence, in absence of direct incriminating evidence, the testimony of PW-8 does not advance the prosecution case qua the present appellant. 8. PW-9 Gurudev Singh, who identifies himself as the uncle of the deceased Sunita and brother of Jogasingh, has testified regarding the circumstances surrounding Sunita’s marriage to the appellant Balwant Singh and the subsequent demands for dowry. According to PW-9, after the marriage, Balwant Singh demanded a motorcycle, a gold bracelet (kada), and a ring. He also confirms that a panchayat was held approximately six months after the marriage to address disputes between Sunita and her in-laws over dowry. The panchayat members included several persons such as Gurdeep Singh, Heera Singh, and others, and it was agreed that no further harassment would take place. However, critically examining the testimony of PW-9 reveals that, despite his close familial relationship and knowledge of the alleged demands and disputes, there is no specific or direct evidence brought out against the surviving appellant Balwant Singh regarding any act of cruelty or harassment beyond the mention of dowry demands. There is no indication that Balwant Singh engaged in any overt acts of ill-treatment or violence towards the deceased in this witness’s deposition. Furthermore, PW-9 does not provide any corroborative evidence about Balwant Singh’s conduct post-panchayat or any direct involvement in the circumstances leading to Sunita’s death. His testimony, while relevant to establishing a backdrop of dowry-related issues, does not directly implicate Balwant Singh in any punishable offence. Therefore, similar to PW-8, the role of the surviving appellant Balwant Singh, as per PW-9’s evidence, appears to be limited to the mention of dowry demands, with no concrete evidence pointing to cruelty or culpable actions by him. The testimony falls short of establishing Balwant Singh’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 9. PW-12 Gejo Bai deposes regarding the circumstances around the deceased Sunita and the appellant Balwant Singh. The testimony falls short of establishing Balwant Singh’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 9. PW-12 Gejo Bai deposes regarding the circumstances around the deceased Sunita and the appellant Balwant Singh. She confirms that Sunita, her niece, was harassed and beaten by her in-laws over dowry demands, including a motorcycle and gold ornaments. Gejo Bai narrates the incident when Sunita was taken back to her in-laws’ house in the evening with folded hands, but later did not return alive. She states that when she and family members went to see Sunita at her in- laws’ place, they found her lying dead on a cot with foam coming from her mouth. Sunita’s mother-in-law told them she had a seizure. She also testifies that Sunita had confided in her once about the demands for dowry items, but there is no specific instance of sustained cruelty mentioned. Importantly, PW-12’s evidence does not establish any overt acts of cruelty, physical or mental harassment, or assault by the accused after the marriage other than the initial demand for dowry. The seizure explanation by the mother-in-law and absence of other direct proof weakens the prosecution’s claim for offences under Section 304B IPC (dowry death). Hence, on a careful reading, the ingredients required to attract Section 304B IPC — i.e., death caused by harassment or cruelty over dowry — are not sufficiently made out from PW-12’s testimony alone or in conjunction with other evidence. 10. PW-13 Jaspal Kaur is the biological mother of deceased Sunita and Neeta. She states on oath that both daughters were married to Balwant Singh (surviving appellant) and Jaswant Singh (since deceased), sons of Trilok Singh. She confirms that the marriages were solemnised approximately 14–15 months prior to Sunita’s death. However, PW-13 turned hostile during her deposition. She clearly stated: She does not know the circumstances under which Sunita died. The police never recorded her statement nor interrogated her. She gave dowry according to her means. When confronted with her police statement (Ex. P-26 Part A), she denied having made any such statement to the police. Most importantly, she expressly denied that Sunita ever informed her of any harassment or cruelty by her in-laws, or that there was any demand for dowry. She repeatedly maintained that Sunita was living happily in her matrimonial home, and any minor disputes with husband or in-laws were not related to dowry. Most importantly, she expressly denied that Sunita ever informed her of any harassment or cruelty by her in-laws, or that there was any demand for dowry. She repeatedly maintained that Sunita was living happily in her matrimonial home, and any minor disputes with husband or in-laws were not related to dowry. In cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor, her testimony remained non-incriminating and exculpatory toward the accused. She categorically denied the essentials required to invoke Section 304B IPC. Therefore, her evidence, as the natural and primary witness (mother of the deceased), does not support the prosecution case. Rather, her hostile turn and denial of cruelty or dowry demand seriously dents the prosecution's version. Hence, the ingredients of Section 304B IPC — dowry demand and cruelty soon before death —are not made out from the testimony of PW-13. 11. It is pertinent to note that the term “dowry” has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. For its legal connotation, reference must be made to Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which defines "dowry" to mean any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other, or by the parents or any other person to either party, at or before or any time after the marriage, in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The definition explicitly excludes dower or mahr as applicable under Muslim Personal Law. 12. A cursory yet purposeful examination of the statutory definition reveals that dowry is inextricably linked to the institution of marriage, and its demand or transfer may occur in three distinct phases: prior to, at the time of, or subsequent to the marriage, provided it is in connection with the marriage. 13. In legal parlance, for any demand or transaction to qualify as “dowry,” there must be a discernible nexus with the solemnization of marriage, whereby such transfer of property or valuable security is a condition or consideration for the marriage taking place. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvir Singh & Ors. 13. In legal parlance, for any demand or transaction to qualify as “dowry,” there must be a discernible nexus with the solemnization of marriage, whereby such transfer of property or valuable security is a condition or consideration for the marriage taking place. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 2828, laid down the tripartite test for invoking the presumption of guilt under Section 304-B IPC, namely: (a) That the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment; (b) That such cruelty or harassment was in connection with a demand for dowry; and (c) That such cruelty or harassment occurred "soon before her death. 14. It is only upon the successful establishment of these foundational facts that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can be invoked against the accused. 15. In the present case, however, upon a holistic appreciation of the evidence adduced, it becomes manifest that these essential ingredients remain unsubstantiated. Notably, PW-13 Jaspal Kaur, the mother of the deceased and a natural witness, turned hostile and unequivocally deposed that her daughter Sunita never complained of any dowry- related cruelty. She further asserted that the deceased was living ‘raajikhushi’ at her matrimonial home and categorically denied any dowry demand by the accused persons. Other prosecution witnesses also failed to attribute specific or proximate acts of dowry-related harassment to the accused, particularly to appellant No. 2 Balwant Singh. 16. In the absence of any credible, cogent, and consistent evidence regarding cruelty qua dowry demand inflicted upon the deceased soon before her unnatural death, the mandatory legal requirements to attract Section 304-B IPC remain unfulfilled. The presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore, cannot be pressed into service in the prosecution’s favour. 17. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court are set aside. 18. In view of the above: Appellant No. 2, Balwant Singh, is acquitted of all charges. He is on bail, he need not to surrender back. His bail bonds are discharged hereby. As regards appellant Nos. 1 and 3, who are reported to have died during the pendency of appeal, the appeal against them is deemed to have abated. Disposed of accordingly.