JUDGMENT : PRANJAL DAS, J. 1. Heard Mr. M. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. S. H. Bora, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Mr. M. Islam, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2/informant. 2. The petitioner filed the instant proceeding under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. seeking quashing of the entire proceeding of GR No. 3041 of (PRC No. 418/2021) arising out of North Lakhimpur PS Case No. 1420/2019 under section 366(A)/511/34 IPC pending before the learned Additional CJM, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur 3. The background of the criminal proceeding is that on 28.11.2019, the informant, Akramul Islam lodged an ejahar before the North Lakhimpur PS with the allegation that the accused person induced his 11 year old sister and attempted to sell her to some person of Arunachal Pradesh; that on 27.11.2019, the accused person tried to get her into a vehicle with such objective but she managed to flee away from that vehicle and took shelter in the house of one Md. Abdul Mojid; then subsequently, the same person informed the villagers and the minor girl was recovered. 4. As already mentioned, the aforesaid police case was registered on the basis of that ejahar and upon completion of investigation, the IO submitted charge-sheet dated 30.09.2020 against three accused persons, namely, Mazid Ali, Hanif Ali (the petitioner) and Md. Samar Ali. However, Hanif Ali and Samar Ali were shown as absconders in the charge-sheet. 5. The matter was followed by a subsequent development wherein the respondent-2/informant entered into an agreement with Md. Hanif Ali/petitioner whereby, the first party/informant stated that he would withdraw the case on the basis of the compromise and that both parties shall live peacefully and that will not do any such activities in future. The agreement was made and signed on 24.02.2020. 6. M. Islam, learned counsel for the said second party /informant/respondent No.2 appearing before this court as mentioned earlier supports the said agreement and admits that he has no objection in quashing of the proceeding pertaining to the said agreement. 7. In this regard, the respondent No.2 also filed an affidavit narrating his contentions and reiterating his no objection to the petitioner's prayer in the context of this agreement. 8. 7. In this regard, the respondent No.2 also filed an affidavit narrating his contentions and reiterating his no objection to the petitioner's prayer in the context of this agreement. 8. Accordingly, the petitioner is seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding and in support of the said agreement the learned petitioner counsel has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nariender Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another , reported (2014) 6 SCC 466 . 9. I have perused the said leading case on the point of quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of agreement between the parties. The conclusions drawn by the Hon’ble Apex Court are summarized in Para 29 comprising (7) sub clauses. The same may be reproduced herein below: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 10. It is the well settled proposition of law that the inherent powers of this court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now 528 BNSS) is not bound by the constraints of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is no longer res integra that offences which are not listed in the two tables of Section 320 Cr.P.C can also be quashed in exercise of inherent powers, subject to the guidelines laid down in this regard by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Even the listing of offences in the two tables of Section 320 has an underlying philosophy, in as much as, these offences are considered to be those where the complainant/victim side and the accused side are given some flexibility to arrive at a the settlement whereupon these cases can be compounded, resulting in acquittal of the accused. Even within these offences, the second table lists those penal offences, where despite granting the power of settlement, the permission of the court has to be taken. The common thread running through the offences, listed in Section 320 is perhaps that any settlement between the parties may not have any significant adverse impact on society. 11. In the scheme of criminal law in our system, broadly offences can also be seen as criminal falling into two categories - the first category of offences which are considered to be more in the nature of private wrongs and in the second category are offences whose implication goes beyond the immediate victim and has a bearing on society as well. In these crimes, therefore, the State takes up the responsibility of conducting the prosecution on behalf of the victim. 12. In these crimes, therefore, the State takes up the responsibility of conducting the prosecution on behalf of the victim. 12. In terms of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the catena of decisions, including the leading case of Narinder Singh (supra), the court exercising inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings in non compoundable offences, therefore, has a basic duty to look at the nature of the offence and its social impact. 13. Needless to say that, in any criminal prosecution, if the informants/victim side and the accused side arrive at an agreement, it will certainly diminish or even extinguish the possibility of conviction, if the trial proceeds and evidence is adduced on the lines of the agreement. Interestingly, some of such agreements could even be contrary to public policy within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act. 14. Nonetheless, even in the context of such a situation, despite an agreement between the parties, the court seeking to exercise inherent powers cannot overlook the nature of the alleged offence and its societal impact. 15. For example, in a prosecution for murder also, hypothetically speaking, the informant side and the accused side can arrive at a settlement, despite the same being opposed to public policy. And even in such a prosecution for homicide, the possibility of conviction will certainly diminish due to such agreement. However, it does not mean that in exercise of inherent power, even such a prosecution for homicide/murder should be quashed. That would be making a mockery of inherent powers and the bona fide right of the society, if not the victim, for proper prosecution of serious crimes. Therefore, perhaps the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its wisdom, has qualified the scope of inherent powers for quashing of non compoundable offences by stipulating that the nature of the offence and its impact on society has to be seen. 16. Now, coming back to the facts of this case, the nature of the allegations in the ejahar dated 28.11.2019 pertaining to a girl stated to be aged only 11 years. The nature of the allegations is also serious in nature as it is alleged that accused persons attempted to traffic/sell her to Arunachal Pradesh. Though this is not explicitly stated, but underlying intention might have been to force her into exploitation, including sexual exploitation. 17. The nature of the allegations is also serious in nature as it is alleged that accused persons attempted to traffic/sell her to Arunachal Pradesh. Though this is not explicitly stated, but underlying intention might have been to force her into exploitation, including sexual exploitation. 17. In exercise of jurisdiction inherent power, that the court is largely proscribed from evaluating the veracity or correctness of the allegations and that the court has to take allegations on their face value and if the allegations, prima facie, on their face value, do not make out any offence, the court would be justified in quashing the same, at that nascent stage itself, as per guideline number (1) of para 102 of the foundational case of State Of Haryana And Ors. vs Bhajan Lal and Ors reported in 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335. 18. Coming back again to the facts of the instant case, upon perusing the ejahar, the court is unable to come to the opinion that they do not make out, prima facie, any offence under 366A IPC or an attempt under Section 366A. It also has to be noted that the investigation of the case resulted in a charge- sheet against three accused persons as mentioned earlier, including the present petitioner, who along with another accused were shown as absconders in the charge-sheet. The investigating officer in his narration in the charge-sheet has stated about finding implicating materials against the accused persons and materials making out the penal provisions under which the case was registered. 19. It may be reiterated to say that the allegations and the charge-sheet pertaining to the alleged offences involved a case regarding a minor female and the allegation of attempt to force the person into trafficking. It gives serious colour to the alleged offences. 20. Since the charge sheet has been filed pursuant to the investigation, not allowing the prosecution to proceed to a logical conclusion, irrespective of the outcome, would not be in keeping with the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court regarding quashing of non compoundable cases, especially those of serious nature and having societal impact. 21. If such alleged offences are allowed to be quashed, simply on the basis of an agreement between the two sides, the same could also shake the confidence of society on the criminal justice system and its efficacy. 22. 21. If such alleged offences are allowed to be quashed, simply on the basis of an agreement between the two sides, the same could also shake the confidence of society on the criminal justice system and its efficacy. 22. In the entire facts and circumstances and in the backdrop of the above discussion and keeping in mind the principles of law laid down in this regard by the highest court of the land - I come to the considered opinion that it would not be prudent to quash the instant criminal proceedings, despite the mutual agreement between the accused and the informant side. 23. Consequently, I do not find sufficient merit in the matter to exercise inherent powers and accordingly, the criminal petition stands dismissed and disposed of.