Judgment : SAMEER JAIN, J. 1. The present petition is filed assailing the order dated 27.01.2025 passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.340/2024 whereby, the learned Revisional Court has upheld the order dated 05.06.2024 passed by Special Judicial Magistrate (N.I. Act Cases) No.3, Kota whereby, the application of the accused petitioner under Section 315 of Cr.P.C. was dismissed. 2. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complainant has filed a complainant against the accused petitioner for offences under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, "N.I. Act, 1881") accordingly, learned ACJM No.2, Kota registered a complaint as 1048/2015 (100/2011) (Annexure-1). It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court closed the evidence of the accused-petitioner and after hearing both the parties dismissed the application (moved under Section 315 of Cr.P.C.) vide order dated 05.06.2024 against which the petitioner filed a revision petition, howsoever, vide order dated 27.01.2025, the same was also dismissed. 3. In this backdrop, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders are perverse in nature and are ought to be quashed and set aside. 4. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and upon perusal of the material available on record, it is noted that the present petition is filed in connection with the case and proceedings thereafter which were instituted in the year 2011; that on 08.01.2011 the complainant was informed that the cheque so given, by the accused-petitioner got bounced due to the funds being insufficient, in furtherance to the same, the complainant served a legal notice dated 27.01.2011 to the accused-petitioner and thereafter proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act were initiated. 5. It is noted that in the instant matter provisions of Section 138 of NI Act are attracted. The primary objective of the NI Act is to create an efficacious and expeditious adjudication; wherein provisions of Section 143 of the Act makes it unambiguous that the concerned Magistrate shall make every endeavor to culminate the proceedings within a period of six months from the date of institution of suit. 6. Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments have opined that there is a dire urgency for expeditious disposal of cheque bounce cases as if not done, the primary objective of the special Act is vitiated. 6. Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments have opined that there is a dire urgency for expeditious disposal of cheque bounce cases as if not done, the primary objective of the special Act is vitiated. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the ratios encapsulated in Indian Bank Association Vs. Union of India: (2014) 5 SCC 590 , In Re: expeditious trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881: (2021) 16 SCC 116 . " 9. Section 143 of the Act has been introduced in the year 2002 as a step-in aid for quick disposal of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to Chapter XXI of the Code which deals with summary trials. In a case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, it is sufficient for the Magistrate to record the substance of the evidence and deliver a judgment, containing a brief statement of reasons for his findings. There is a restriction that the procedure for summary trials under Section 262 is not to be applied for any sentence of imprisonment exceeding three months. However, Sections 262 to 265 of the Code were made applicable “as far as may be” for trial of an offence under Chapter XVII of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code. It is only in a case where the Magistrate is of the opinion that it may be necessary to sentence the accused for a term exceeding one year that the complaint shall be tried as a summons trial. From the responses of various High Courts, it is clear that the conversion by the Trial Courts of complaints under Section 138 from summary trial to summons trial is being done mechanically without reasons being recorded. The result of such conversion of complaints under Section 138 from summary trial to summons trial has been contributing to the delay in disposal of the cases. Further, the second proviso to Section 143 mandates that the Magistrate has to record an order spelling out the reasons for such conversion. The object of Section 143 of the Act is quick disposal of the complaints under Section 138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code, to the extent possible. Further, the second proviso to Section 143 mandates that the Magistrate has to record an order spelling out the reasons for such conversion. The object of Section 143 of the Act is quick disposal of the complaints under Section 138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code, to the extent possible. The discretion conferred on the Magistrate by the second proviso to Section 143 is to be exercised with due care and caution, after recording reasons for converting the trial of the complaint from summary trial to summons trial. Otherwise, the purpose for which Section 143 of the Act has been introduced would be defeated. We accept the suggestions made by the learned Amici Curiae in consultation with the High Courts. The High Courts may issue practice directions to the Magistrates to record reasons before converting trial of complaints under Section 138 from summary trial to summons trial in exercise of power under the second proviso to Section 143 of the Act " (Emphasis supplied) 7. Upon a perusal of the impugned orders, it is noted that it is categorically observed in the order dated 05.06.2024 that ever since the year 2019 the matter is at the stage of final arguments. The relevant extract from the order dated 05.06.2024 is retreated herein below: 8. It is noted that the present is second round of litigation as on an erstwhile in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.3670/2019 vide order 19.07.2021, a cost of Rs.15,000/- was imposed upon the accused-petitioner for re-examination, however, despite giving several opportunities, the petitioner is not cooperating in the trial that is pending ever since the year 2011, under the provisions of Section 138 of N.I. Act. 9. Nevertheless, this Court is of the view that the order 27.01.2025 is a detailed and speaking order whereby, learned trial Court has taken due note of all the material facts and circumstances of the instant matter. The relevant extract from the same is reproduced herein below: 10. In view of the above, it can be noted that the orders dated 05.06.2024 and 27.01.2025 are valid, legal and speaking with due rationale being noted therein. Taking note of the unwarranted and undue delay that the accused-petitioner is causing while adopting indefensible and unpardonable tactics, this Court directs the accused-petitioner to compensate the respondent-complainant with a cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only). Taking note of the unwarranted and undue delay that the accused-petitioner is causing while adopting indefensible and unpardonable tactics, this Court directs the accused-petitioner to compensate the respondent-complainant with a cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only). The said amount be deposited in the bank account of the complainant pronto. 11. Learned Trial Court is directed to proceed further, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the governing statute. 12. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed with the aforementioned directions. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 13. Copy of this order be sent to the Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Kota/undersigning authority of order dated 27.01.2025.