Judgment : (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) 1. The matter has been listed for consideration on I.A. No. 2 of 2025, which is the application for urgent hearing of the case. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard finally. 2. Present is the Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 06-08-2018, passed by Learned Special Judge ( Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012) Raipur, in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 48 of 2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner : Conviction Sentence U/s. 363 of IPC R.I. for 03 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 01 month. U/s. 366 of IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 01 month. U/s. 6 of POCSO Act R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 02 months. All the sentences are directed to be run concurrently 3. The brief facts of the case are that on 24-12-2017, a missing report has been lodged by the father of the victim/PW-2, that his minor daughter is missing since 22-12-2017, who had gone to her school but could not return back. Despite her search in various places, her whereabouts could not be traced out. On the report made by the father of the victim, the FIR (exhibit P-5) for the Offence under Section 363 of IPC has been registered against unknown person. 4. During the investigation, the victim was recovered on 11-01-2018 from the possession of the appellant and Recovery Panchanama (exhibit P-1) was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to Community Health Centre, Kharora. Since no lady doctor available at Community Health Centre, Kharora, she was referred to Community Health Centre, Tilda. She was being medically examined at Community Health Centre, Tilda by PW-9/Dr. S. Gandharva, who after her medical examination gave report (exhibit P-24). While examining the victim, the doctor has found no external injuries on her body. However, she was found carrying pregnancy of 28 weeks. She advised for her USG test. She was being medically examined at Community Health Centre, Tilda by PW-9/Dr. S. Gandharva, who after her medical examination gave report (exhibit P-24). While examining the victim, the doctor has found no external injuries on her body. However, she was found carrying pregnancy of 28 weeks. She advised for her USG test. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for its chemical examination. Spot map (exhibit P-6) was prepared by the police and Exhibit P-10 was prepared by the Patwari. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, one enrollment card of the victim with the Chhattisgarh Madhyamik Shiksha Mandal, Raipur and one letter written by the victim has been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-8). The school register from Government Primary School, Parsada has also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-12) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-11C), the original school register was returned back to the school. 5. The appellant was arrested on 11-01-2018 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Community Health Centre, Kharora, where he was medically examined by Dr. Yashpal Khanna (PW-6), who gave his report (exhibit P-16) and found the appellant capable to perform sexual intercourse. The vaginal slides and pubic hair of the victim as well as underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL, Raipur, from where a memo (exhibit P-23) was sent to the police that since the victim was found pregnant, therefore there is no necessity to examine her vaginal swab. However, for confirmation of paternity of the child, DNA test may be conducted. 6. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC and statement of the victim under Section 164 of CRPC have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act before the Learned Trial Court. 7. The Learned Trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 8. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. 7. The Learned Trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 8. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CRPC has also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and have submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 9. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the Learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgement. Hence, this appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omission and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis to convict him in the offence in question. There is no legally admissible evidence with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim to hold that she was minor on the date of incident. The school record has not been produced by the prosecution in accordance with law by examining its author and further, the basis on which the entries have been made in the school record have also not been produced. He would further submit that the high school certificate produced by the victim has also not been proved by confronting with the school record, whereas the entries with respect to her date of birth is made in the said high school certificate is on the basis of the school record and when the school record itself is not proved in accordance with law, no inference can be drawn from the high school certificate that her date of birth was correctly recorded in it, particularly in view of the fact that the victim herself did not stuck on her date of birth in her evidence. He would also submit that the victim was major girl having love affair with the appellant and she herself engaged in making consensual physical relation by which she conceived pregnancy and she has not made any complaint to anyone and engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant by which she conceived pregnancy. He would also submit that the victim was major girl having love affair with the appellant and she herself engaged in making consensual physical relation by which she conceived pregnancy and she has not made any complaint to anyone and engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant by which she conceived pregnancy. She herself eloped with him and both of them had gone to village Sohela and has not made any protest and has not raised any objection. Therefore, she being the consenting party engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant, no offences either of kidnapping or rape are made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and submitted that from the evidence led by the prosecution, the guilt of the appellant has duly been established. From the school record as well as high school certificate, the victim was found to be minor and she was taken by the appellant and kept her away from her lawful guardianship and committed physical relation with her, by which she conceived pregnancy. Making physical relation with a minor girl itself an offence of rape, which has duly been proved by the medical report of the victim that she conceived pregnancy. The victim was recovered from the possession of the appellant and therefore, the alleged offences have duly been proved which the Learned Trial Court has rightly considered and passed the well-reasoned judgment. There is no infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and the same is liable to be upheld. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 13. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether on the date of incident she was minor or not? 14. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register (exhibit P- 11C), which is sought to be proved by PW-4 who is the Headmaster of the school. He has stated in his evidence that he is Headmaster of the school since 2008. The police has seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo/exhibit P- 12 and after retaining the attested true copy of the school register/exhibit P-11C, the original school register has been returned back to the school. He has stated in his evidence that he is Headmaster of the school since 2008. The police has seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo/exhibit P- 12 and after retaining the attested true copy of the school register/exhibit P-11C, the original school register has been returned back to the school. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 22-12-2000. In cross-examination, he admitted that who has made endorsement in the school register/exhibit P-11C, he did not know. He further admitted that no any authentic document with respect to her date of birth has been produced in the school. He further admitted that who had come to the school for her admission, he did not know. From the evidence of this witness it is quite vivid that he is not the author of the school register and also the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register has not been produced by the prosecution. The other piece of evidence which relied upon by the prosecution is the high school certificate/Article ‘A’ and admission card/Article ‘B’. The high school certificate/Article ‘A’ is sought to be proved by the victim/PW-1. Although the same date of birth is mentioned in the school register/Article ‘A’ as has been mentioned in the school register/exhibit P-11C, but the fact remains that the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register have not been produced by the prosecution and the school register itself is not proved by examining its author. 15. The PW-1/victim though has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 22-12-2000, but in cross-examination she stated that since her teacher and her counsel have disclosed the different dates of her birth, therefore she could not tell her actual date of birth and age. She further admitted that her date of birth was not got recorded in Kotwari Panji and she did not know about it. She only stated in her evidence that the police has seized the high school certificate from her. She further admitted that her date of birth was not got recorded in Kotwari Panji and she did not know about it. She only stated in her evidence that the police has seized the high school certificate from her. Although the said high school certificate is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but in absence of its proof and when the school record itself is not found proved, the date of birth mentioned in the high school certificate cannot be said to be the sufficient evidence to determine the age of the victim that she was minor on the date of incident. 16. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police , 2011(2) SCC 385 . In Para 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in Issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 17. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others , 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others , 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. xxxx xxxx xxxx 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the 33 Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper. technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, Inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 33 Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 18. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 18. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police , 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under: "14, Section 94 (2)(iii) of the 33 Act clearly Indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, l.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been. fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (1) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(1) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted In order of preference." 19. Reverting to the facts of the present case, as the victim herself has stated that she could not tell her actual age or date of birth as there are variants in the date of birth disclosed by her teacher and her counsels. 20. PW-2, the father of the victim, though he has stated that the date of birth of the victim is 22-12-2000, but in cross-examination he admitted that with respect to the date of birth of his daughter, he has not produced her birth certificate or Kotwari Register to the police. He further admitted that he has got registered the birth of the victim with the Kotwari Register. He further stated that he has got admitted her in the school at the age of her 2 years or 4 years. He further admitted that he has not given her Class 1 st mark sheet to the police and he voluntarily stated that he has given her Class 5 th to Class 12 th mark sheet to the police. 21. He further admitted that he has not given her Class 1 st mark sheet to the police and he voluntarily stated that he has given her Class 5 th to Class 12 th mark sheet to the police. 21. From all these evidence, though the high school mark sheet is available, but in the opinion of this Court, that itself is not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident on the grounds that her school record has not been found proved and it is quite obvious that in Class 10 th mark sheet, her date of birth is recorded on the basis of her initial schooling record, which has not been proved in the present case. Therefore, in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, it cannot be held that the victim was minor on the date of incident, yet the Learned Trial Court has held her minor. 22. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape upon the victim are concerned, I again examined the evidence of the victim/PW-1. She stated in her evidence that she was well acquainted with the appellant because he used to come to her house along with her maternal uncle. On the date of incident, when she was going to school, on the way, the appellant met her and he was on his motorcycle. He took her on his motorcycle to village Sohela, where he kept her for about 5 days and made physical relation with her. Thereafter, he again took her to another place, where they resided about 15 days together. Thereafter, her parents came there in her search and taken her back. When she declared hostile, she stated that the appellant allured her and committed forceful sexual intercourse with her. She also admitted that by the repeated act of physical relation with the appellant, she conceived pregnancy. In cross-examination, she stated that the police has not recorded her statement and she denied her 161 CRPC statement (exhibit D-1). She also stated that, she has not disclosed to the police that the appellant has taken her and made physical relation with her. She has not given her medical report regarding her pregnancy to the police. In cross-examination, she stated that the police has not recorded her statement and she denied her 161 CRPC statement (exhibit D-1). She also stated that, she has not disclosed to the police that the appellant has taken her and made physical relation with her. She has not given her medical report regarding her pregnancy to the police. From the evidence of this witness, it is not there that she has raised any objection or any protest have been made by her, while she was being taken by the appellant and making physical relation with her. Even no sign of any protest or injury have been found on her body. It is notable here that the victim was medically examined by the doctor on 11-01-2018 and at that time she was found carrying pregnancy of 28 weeks, whereas it is alleged that she eloped with the appellant on 22-12-2017, which clearly reflects that much prior to the date of her elopement, she conceived pregnancy and she was in physical relation with the appellant. Even from her entire evidence, it has not reflected that she made any protest or objected the act of the appellant. From her entire evidence, it is quite vivid that she was the consenting party in eloping with the appellant and engaged in making consensual physical relation. 23. PW-2/the father of the victim, has stated that when the victim could not return from school, he has lodged a missing report and when she recovered from the possession of the appellant, she disclosed about the incident. 24. PW-9/Dr. S. Gandharva, who medically examined the victim, has not found any external injuries on her body and found her carrying 28 weeks pregnancy. 25. From all these evidence, it is quite apparent that there is no evidence on record that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as she was found to be major on the date of incident, no offence of kidnapping/ abducting the victim has been found proved and even otherwise there is no evidence of the victim that she was being allured or kidnapped by the appellant. While she was going with the appellant upto village Sohela and during her stay with him, she has not made any objection and has not raised any alarm, which shows her willingness in eloping with the appellant, which does not amount to offence of kidnapping/abducting or illicit intercourse. 26. While she was going with the appellant upto village Sohela and during her stay with him, she has not made any objection and has not raised any alarm, which shows her willingness in eloping with the appellant, which does not amount to offence of kidnapping/abducting or illicit intercourse. 26. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 27. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant succeeds and the same is allowed . The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the alleged offences. 28. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 11-01-2018. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 29. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.