Order : MUKESH RAJPUROHIT (V. J.), J. 1. Instant D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed by appellant-petitioner filed under Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as ‘Act of 1996’) aggrieved and dis-satisfied from order dated 28.03.2025 in misc. application No. 01/2025 (CIS No. 2/2025) passed by learned Commercial Court No.1, Jaipur Metro, Jaipur whereby an application under Section 9 of Act of 1996 was allowed on certain conditions. 2. By this order we are only considering stay application No. 2459/2025, wherein the appellant has made a prayer to stay effect and operation of para Nos. 77 to 80 of impugned order dated 28.03.2025. 3. Before considering the stay application we are reproducing para Nos. 77 to 80 as under:- 77- c'k rsZ fd fo}ku e/;LFkrk vf/kdj.k ds vfUre iapkV ds v/;/khu (subject to final award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal) izkFkhZ dh vksj ls vizkFkhZ dks fnukad 02-06-1984 ls fnukad 31-05-2024 rd dh vof/k esa vf/kd mi;ksx esa fy;s tk jgs {ks= ds cnys ykblsal Qhl ds rkSj ij :i;s 1]52]00]000@& ¼:i;s ,d djksM+ ckou yk[k½ dh jkf'k dh 90 fnol ds vUnj vnk;xh dh tkosxh rFkk fnukad 01-06-2024 ls c<+h gqbZ ykblsal Qhl dh jkf'k :i;s 84-00-000@& ¼:i;s pkSjklh yk[k½ izfro"kZ dh nj ls vnk;xh dh tkosxhA 78- c<+h gqbZ ykblsal Qhl dh jkf'k :i;s 84]00]000@& ¼:i;s pkSjklh yk[k½ izfro"kZ dh nj ls fnukad 01-06-2024 ls fnukad 31-03-2025 rd dh 10 ekg dh :i;s 70]00]000@& ¼:i;s lRrj yk[k½ dh jkf'k Hkh izkFkhZ dh vksj ls vizkFkhZ dks 90 fnol ds vUnj vnk dh tkosxh rFkk fnukad 01-04-2025 ls ns; ykblsal Qhl dh jkf'k :i;s 84]00]000@& ¼:i;s pkSjklh yk[k½ izfro"kZ dh nj ls ykblsal ds izkjafHkd djkj fnukafdr 28-08-1985 esa r; ikbZ xbZ 'krZ ds vuqlkj Nekgh vUrjky ij vnk dh tkrh jgsxhA 79- ;fn fnukad 31-05-2029 rd izLrkfor e/;Lfkrk dk;Zokgh dk fuLrkj.k ugha gksrk gS rks izkFkhZ dh vksj ls dqy :i;s 6]00]000@& ¼:i;s N% yk[k½ izfro"kZ dh c tkosxhA 80- ;g Li"V fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dh vksj ls mijksDr 'krksZa dh ikyuk ugha fd;s tkus ij ,oa 90 fnol ds vanj izkFkhZ dh igy ij e/;LFkrk dk;Zokgh 'kq: ugha gksus dh fLFkfr esa ;g vkns'k Lor% gh fujLr gks tkosxk (Shall A stand automatically vacated) ” 4. A perusal of impugned order dated 28.03.2025 indicate that the relief granted also shows that respondent-non- petitioner was restrained and an order was passed in favor of appellant-petitioner and same is reproduced as under:- 76- vr% izkFkhZ dh vksj ls vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 9 ds rgr izLrqr fd;k x;k gLrxr izkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;k tkdj vizkFkhZ dks vUrfje vkns'k@O;kns'k ds tfj;s ikcan fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dks e/;LFkrk dk;Zokgh 'kq: gksus ,oa dksbZ vokMZ ikfjr gksus rd fookfnr ^t; egy iSysl gksVy* ds mlds dCts ds lEiw.kZ {ks= (whole area) ls csn[ky ugha fd;k sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssstkos] uk gh uksfVl fnukad 24-12-2024 ds vxzlj.k esa fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkos rFkk fnukad 24-12-2024 dh fLFkfr ;Fkkor cukbZ j[kh tkosA (Status qua) 5. Learned Senior Advocate while referring the judgment in case of North Eastern Handloom & Handicraft Vs. Sports Station India Limited 2007 SCC Online Del. 2088 has submitted that aggrieved from repeated communication since April, 2022 and continuous threatening by respondent, an application under Section 9 of Act of 1996 was filed for interim relief. He further submitted that learned Commercial Court while considering the necessity for issuance of urgent relief has granted interim relief to the petitioner but without any jurisdiction and authority has determined license fee and directed to petitioner to make payment within 90 days. He further submitted that an Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter referred as “Tribunal”) is already constituted and relief granted by the Commercial Court is subject-matter of the Tribunal and not within domain of the Commercial Court under Section 9 of the Act of 1996. He further submitted that without considering the scope of inquiry under Section 9 of Act of 1996, the Commercial Court acted in haste and beyond the authority conferred by statute. He further judgment in case of Essar house Private Limited Vs. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited 2022 SCC Online SC 1219 and Vijay Maheshwari Vs. Splendor Buildwell Private Limited and Anr. 2024 SCC Online Delhi 4373 and submitted that determination of lease money beyond the terms of agreement is impermissible. 6. Learned Senior Advocate has further referred the agreement dated 28.08.1985 entered between the parties submitted that this agreement is entered between the parties for business profit sharing of the operation of hotel license to appellant-petitioner. 2024 SCC Online Delhi 4373 and submitted that determination of lease money beyond the terms of agreement is impermissible. 6. Learned Senior Advocate has further referred the agreement dated 28.08.1985 entered between the parties submitted that this agreement is entered between the parties for business profit sharing of the operation of hotel license to appellant-petitioner. He further submitted that a supplementary agreement was also entered on 03.09.1999 but a notice was sent to terminate these agreements, though as per agreement, the property in question is under a license to appellant-petitioner till 2059. He further submitted that the dispute between the parties can be decided by the Tribunal but till the dispute is considered or decided by the Tribunal they have sought an interim relief from the Commercial Court and the Court exceeding the jurisdiction has imposed condition upon the petitioner which is contrary to all settled principle of law. He further referred judgment in case of Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 and submitted that the conditions imposed by the Commercial Court is unreasonable, capricious and passed after ignoring the material on record, therefore, the same can be interfered by this Court. He also referred the judgment in case of Venkataraman krishnamurthy and Anr. Vs. Lodha Crown Buildmart Private Limited (2024) 4 SCC 230 and submitted that the terms of agreement between the parties is an operative law and the Court has no authority to re-write the terms of contract. He further referred the judgment in case of Nokia Technologies OY Vs. Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corporation Limited 2022 SCC Online Delhi 4014 and submitted that the Commercial Court has no authority to rely upon informal offer made during negotiations and no Court can adjudicate the matter, on basis of said informal proposal. 7. Learned Senior Advocate has further referred the dispute between the parties and submitted that respondent- non-petitioner had alleged that the petitioner is occupying 2.74 acre land in excess of land licence to appellant-company. He further submitted that the appellant-company is in possession and carrying on business for last more than 40 years and the agreement is valid till 2059 as the terms were extended by a supplementary agreement. He further submitted that the appellant-company is in possession and carrying on business for last more than 40 years and the agreement is valid till 2059 as the terms were extended by a supplementary agreement. He also submitted that there may be an internal dispute between the family and the petitioner is not involved into the intricacies of dispute and submitted that the appellant is a commercial entity and purely working in hospitality sector. He also submitted that the dispute was raised only 2024 after some communication April, 2022 about the excess land of 2.74 acres. He also submitted that the basis of determination of license fee and the arrears by the Commercial Court is a question required to be determined by this Hon’ble Court and till such consideration in the para Nos. 77 to 80 may be stayed. 8. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondent non-petitioner and he submitted that the total area with building is 18 acres but out of this only 14.44 acres was given on license in year 1984 but in excess of this 2.74 acres was illegally encroached by the appellant and learned Commercial Court has determined interim licence fee for ?2.74 acres of land which is not part of the agreement in question. He further submitted that the appellant-petitioner has approached the Court only for protection of his possession on excessive land of 2.74 acres and the Commercial Court while restraining respondent has imposed certain conditions upon the appellant-petitioner, therefore, he is bound by terms and conditions as imposed by the Commercial Court. He also offered that in case there is any dispute or any issue determined against the respondent then they undertake to return the amount so received under the orders of the Court. He further referred the judgments in case of Wander Limited & Anr. Antox India Private Limited 1990 (Suppl) SCC 727, Gujrat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Coca Cola Co. & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 545 , Sepco Limited Power Construction Corporatioon Vs. Power Mech Projects Limited 2020 SCC Online Del. 1990, Supreme Infrastructure India Limited Vs. Central Public Works Department 2017 SCC Online Del 8228, Mary Vs. Biju. P. Sebastian WP (C) No. 18303 of 2013 (O), Aditya Birla Finance Limited Vs. Mclead Russel India Limited 2022 SCC Online Cal 1691, Zenit Mataplast Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Power Mech Projects Limited 2020 SCC Online Del. 1990, Supreme Infrastructure India Limited Vs. Central Public Works Department 2017 SCC Online Del 8228, Mary Vs. Biju. P. Sebastian WP (C) No. 18303 of 2013 (O), Aditya Birla Finance Limited Vs. Mclead Russel India Limited 2022 SCC Online Cal 1691, Zenit Mataplast Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 388 , Bakshi Ram & Ors. Vs. Brij Lal 1994 Suppl (3) SCC 198, Subash Chander Chachra & Ors, Vs, Ashwani Kumar Chachra and Anr. 2007 (95) DRJ 55 and submitted that under Section 37 of Act of 1996 this Court cannot go into the facts, to be adjudicated by the Tribunal. He also submitted that the facts clearly indicate that the property was on licence on a meager licence fees. He also referred facts in brief in written submission and submitted that all these facts were required to be considered while deciding the stay application. At last, he submitted that in without making any payment of licence fee, the appellant is not entitled to use excess land other than 14.44 acres. 9. Heard learned Senior Advocate appearing for appellant and learned counsel for respondent. Perused the brief notes/submissions submitted by both the parties along with judgments as referred by them. 10. The matter pertains to invocation of provision under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and for ready reference we are referring Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as under:- “9. Perused the brief notes/submissions submitted by both the parties along with judgments as referred by them. 10. The matter pertains to invocation of provision under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and for ready reference we are referring Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as under:- “9. Interim measures, etc., by Court .—1[(1)]A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court— (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. 2[(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub- section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious.]” 11. Instant misc. appeal is preferred under Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 wherein till disposal of misc. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub- section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious.]” 11. Instant misc. appeal is preferred under Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 wherein till disposal of misc. appeal a stay is sought by the appellant-petitioner and we are referring Section 37 as under:- 37. Appealable orders. —(1) 2[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:— 3[(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8; (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.] (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal— (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub- section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or takeaway any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 12. A perusal of Section 37 (1)(b) shows that aggrieved from granting or refuse to grant any measure under Section 9 , an appeal can lie whereas Section 13 of the COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT , 2015 prescribes that such appeal would lie to the commercial division of the High Court. No specific pari materia provision for interim relief as that of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC is available either under the Act of 1996 or under the Commercial Court Acts. If we consider appellate powers of this Court in light of a very recent judgment in case of Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Vs. No specific pari materia provision for interim relief as that of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC is available either under the Act of 1996 or under the Commercial Court Acts. If we consider appellate powers of this Court in light of a very recent judgment in case of Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Vs. Sanman Rice Mills 2024 SCC Online SC 2632 then considering an appeal against dismissal of a petition under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the appellate power under Section 37 is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the Civil Courts because the scope of interference of the Courts with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the ambit of law and even that power cannot be exercised in a casual and cavalier manner. 13. Both the parties have referred several judgments and we have gone through these judgments along with principle of law under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, but for sake of brevity we are not referring them individually by reproducing ad verbatim. 14. In case of Essar house Private Limited Vs. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has expanded the scope of Section 9 of Act of 2016 and laid down three essentials are required to be established such as prima facie case, balance of convenience and reasonable expedition in order to seek an interim protection under Section 9 of the Act of 1996. A Court is not bound by provision of CPC but at the same time cannot ignore basic principle of CPC. 15. In case of Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Appellate Authority can interfere when the Court has acted unreasonably, capriciously and has ignored the relevant facts and material on record. This judgment can be considered while considering the misc. appeal and not at the consideration of stay. Similarly, in case of Venkataraman krishnamurthy and Anr. Vs. Lodha Crown Buildmart Private Limited (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that a Court cannot re-write the terms of contract between the parties which is the basic law. Herein, this case the property under licence is 14.44 acres with building but the compensation was accessed as interim measure for excess land of 2.74 acres. 16. Similarly, judgment in case of Vijay Maheshwari Vs. Herein, this case the property under licence is 14.44 acres with building but the compensation was accessed as interim measure for excess land of 2.74 acres. 16. Similarly, judgment in case of Vijay Maheshwari Vs. Splendor Buildwell Private Limited and Anr. (supra), Nokia Technologies OY Vs. Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corporation Limited (supra) and North Eastern Handloom & Handicraft Vs. Sports Station India Limited (supra) were referred to buttress the arguments by learned Senior Advocate and all these judgments have relevancy at the time of final adjudication and not at this stage. 17. Similarly learned counsel for respondent has referred judgment in case of Wander Limited & Anr. Antox India Private Limited (supra), Gujrat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Coca Cola Co. & Ors, Zenit Mataplast Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Bakshi Ram & Ors. Vs. Brij Lal 1994 Suppl (3) SCC 198 (supra) wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down different provisions and same can be considered at the time of consideration of final appeal. Similarly, in case of Sepco Limited Power Construction Corporatioon Vs. Power Mech Projects Limited (supra), Mary Vs. Biju. P. Sebastian WP (C) No. 18303 of 2013 (O) , Aditya Birla Finance Limited Vs. Mclead Russel India Limited , Subash Chander Chachra & Ors, Vs, Ashwani Kumar Chachra and Anr. (supra) can be considered at the time of final adjudication of the appeal. 18. Having considered the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case, it is admitted that the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and the parties are likely to approach the Tribunal in coming days. The Commercial Court relazing the dispute has protected the appellant-petitioner from vacating the premises allegedly encroached by them. The agreement pertains to 14.44 acres when a dispute is considered by the Tribunal and if it may confine itself to 14.44 acres and not consider case of excessive land of 2.74 acres, as beyond the scope of agreement, then the dispute may remain unresolved. There is a serious dispute between the parties and learned Presiding Officer of the Commercial Court struck a balance between the parties so that till the matter is adjudicated, the respondent non-applicant may not suffer because of continuous encroachment and enjoyment of excessive property by the appellant-petitioner. 19. In case of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. VS. State of M.P. and Ors. 19. In case of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. VS. State of M.P. and Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 further relied and refer many times including in the case of M/s Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. M/s Federal Motors Private Limited (2005) 1 SCC 705 , it was held that the law imposes an obligation on the party who received a benefit under the order of a Court to make restitution to other party for what he has lost as the benefit and gained by one party by virtue of order of the Court. The principle of restitution of benefit is considered as a principle to strike a balance between the parties. It is a rule of equity, justice and sound logic that one party should not unduly benefit under the garb of the order of the Court. 20. The principle was further considered by a 3 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of The State of Maharashtra and Anr. Vs. M/s Super Max International Pvt. Limited & Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 772 . Again, referred and relied in case of Martin and Harris Private Limited Vs. Rajendra Mehta AIR 2022 SC 3287 and Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF Vs. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai (2024) 8 SCC 668. 21. A relevant para from judgment in case of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. VS. State of M.P. (supra) is reproduced as under: 25. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word 'restitution' in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution or decree or order or the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (See :Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, U.P., and Ors., . In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses; (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p.1315). v. Board of Revenue, U.P., and Ors., . In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses; (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p.1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that 'restitution' is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done. "Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. ..... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortuous misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed." 27. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the 'act of the court' embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise corned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the set of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is the real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced, we are, therefore, or the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. 22. A perusal of principle of law clearly indicate that if any parting is reaping fruits in garb of a protection order obtained from any Court then it is also duty bound to pay the price to the opposite party against whom he has procured an injunction order. 22. A perusal of principle of law clearly indicate that if any parting is reaping fruits in garb of a protection order obtained from any Court then it is also duty bound to pay the price to the opposite party against whom he has procured an injunction order. The imposition of conditions normally depends upon the facts of the case and also relief claimed by the parties. 23. Herein, this case admittedly 14.44 acre land along with constructed area of 3353 square yard was given on license on 28.08.1985 but dispute has arose about illegal encroachment of 2.74 acres by the licensee. A simple option before the licensee is either to vacate the premises in excess of mentioned in agreement or pay interim compensation as directed by the Commercial Court till consideration of matter by the Arbitral Tribunal. 24. The submissions of learned Senior Advocate also suggests that appellant is a commercial entity and the property is being used for commercial purpose, therefore, looking to nature, location and description of property, we are of the considered view that this is not a fit case wherein this Court should intervene to stay certain terms and conditions, not suited to the appellant-petitioner. 25. If appellant-petitioner is not desirous to seek stay, then he is at liberty to withdraw application under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996. The dispute between the parties is required to be adjudicated by the Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, we are not expressing any opinion over the dispute but looking to the nature of the dispute, we are of the considered view that stay on certain terms of the order will cause prejudice to the opposite party. Therefore, by paying a sum of money appellant-petitioner is enjoying excess property of 2.74 acres, allegedly not part of the agreement between the parties. 26. In view of discussions made hereinabove, no case is made out for stay, therefore, stay application is liable to be dismissed. 27. Accordingly, the stay application is hereby dismissed. 28. List this civil misc. appeal in the 2 nd month of July for final disposal.