JUDGMENT : SANDEEP JAIN, J. 1. The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred by the insurer of the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434, against the impugned judgment and award dated 30.07.2025 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Meerut (North), in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 218 of 2018 ( Mukesh Agrawal and another vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others ), whereby, for the untimely death of Jatin Agrawal in a motor accident that occurred on 12.01.2018, a compensation of Rs.16,65,876/- along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum has been awarded to the claimants (mother and father), which has been ordered to be indemnified by the insurer of the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company submitted that the factum of accident was doubtful since the FIR discloses that it was caused by unknown vehicle. He submitted that as per the claimants case, the accident occurred on 12.01.2018 at the Toll Plaza near Brij Ghat, District Hapur at about 8 PM, but the offending bus was challaned for breach of the terms and conditions of the All India Tourist Permit granted to it by Rajesh Singh (ARTO Amroha) at Gajraula at 7:48 PM, which is at a distance of about 30 kms. from the place of accident, as such, the factum of accident at about 08.00 PM or 7:45 PM as per eyewitness PW-2 was highly doubtful. He further submitted that the owner of the offending bus has denied the accident and also made a complaint to the higher police officials, but still the tribunal has held otherwise. The offending driver has also examined himself as DW-1 and denied the accident. It was further submitted that at the time of alleged accident the offending bus was being plied as a stage carriage whereas, under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, it was to be plied as contract carriage and for this reason, it was challaned by the ARTO Amroha, but the tribunal has ignored this evidence and has fastened the liability to pay compensation on the appellant-insurance company, which is erroneous. 3. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submitted that Jatin Agrawal(deceased) was employed in MEP Infrastructure Developers Ltd. who was granted contract to collect the toll at Allabakshpur Toll Tax Plaza, on NH-24 near Brij Ghat, District Hapur and at that time he was working as operator at the toll plaza, where the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434, which was proved by PW-2 Devmuni Thakur and the retired Investigating Officer of the criminal case Mahipal Singh PW-4. He further submitted that after investigation, a charge sheet has been submitted against the offending driver Mohd. Ajeem (DW-1), as such, there was sufficient evidence to prove that the accident was indeed caused by the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434. With these submissions, it was prayed that the appeal is meritless and is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company and claimants-respondents, perused the impugned judgment and documents annexed with the appeal. 5. The Apex Court in the case of ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajani Sahoo and Others , (2025) 2 SCC 599 , has held as under:- "8. As regards the reliability of charge-sheet and other documents collected by the police during the investigation in motor accident cases, this Court in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819 : 2018 INSC 311, held in para 27, thus : (SCC p. 672) “27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 and 3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2. Our understanding of the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13, noted that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing of charge- sheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by the tribunal .” 9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral and documentary evidence including the FIR, final report and such other documents prepared by the police in connection with the accident in question. The Tribunal had also taken note of the fact that based on the final report, the driver of the offending truck was tried and found guilty for rash and negligent driving. The High Court took note of such aspects and found no illegality in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal and consequently dismissed the appeal. 10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC 510 : 2023 INSC 621 , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 514, para 12) “12. … A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. … A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13 which has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101.” 11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the position that the question regarding negligence which is essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident claim should be considered based on the evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into such documents for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible or inadmissible. 12. It is also a fact that the appellant had attributed that the respondent claimants connived with police and fraudulently prepared the charge- sheet. The contention is that the vehicle insured with the appellant was not involved in the accident and the accident had occurred solely due to the rash and negligence on the part of the deceased. But the evidence on record would reveal that pursuant to the filing of the final report, cognizance was taken for rash and negligent driving which resulted in the death of Udayanath Sahoo." (Emphasis supplied) 6. The Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet and another vs. Abdul Kayam Neb and another , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 497, has held as under:- "4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the bus driver. (Emphasis supplied) 7. The Apex Court in the case of Kuncham Lavanya & Ors. vs Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine 749 , held as under:- 17. The very fact that the case was registered against an unknown vehicle initially would indicate that the offending vehicle was not identified. However, since an FIR is not expected to be encyclopaedic and is only for the purpose of putting into motion criminal law such that thorough and full-fledged investigation by the police ensues, it is the duty of the investigating agency to find out the identity of the culprit which in the present case would be the offending car and driver and take action in accordance with law. Thus, the mere fact that initially the FIR records the vehicle as unknown would not be fatal for the prosecution/claimants to later come up with the specific identity of the vehicle/driver, with the obvious caveat that the connection of the accident with the said vehicle has to be based on cogent and reliable evidence. 8. The FIR regarding the alleged accident was registered on 12.01.2018 at 23:13 hours at P.S. Garhmukhteshwar, District Hapur being Case Crime No.14 of 2018 under Sections, 279, 337, 338, 304-A IPC against the unknown driver of a unknown vehicle. The FIR discloses that on 12.01.2018, the first informant Sandesh Marpeet and his colleague Jatin Agrawal were doing their duty at the Allabakshpur Toll Tax Plaza on NH- 24, then an unknown vehicle came from the side of Delhi at about 08.00 PM, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, which hit Jatin Agrawal who was doing duty at the toll plaza. The accident was seen by Devmuni Thakur (PW-2) and other persons. In the accident Jatin Agrawal suffered grievous injuries who died on the way to the hospital. 9. The accident was seen by Devmuni Thakur (PW-2) and other persons. In the accident Jatin Agrawal suffered grievous injuries who died on the way to the hospital. 9. The claimants have examined father of the deceased Mukesh Agrawal as PW-1, eye witness Devmuni Thakur as PW-2, Jaisheel Kunder as PW- 3 and retired Investigating Officer (I.O.) Mahipal Singh as PW-4. Whereas, the driver of the offending bus Mohd. Azeem has examined himself as DW-1, the insurance company has examined Atul Kumar as DW-2 and Manoj Kumar Vats as DW-3. 10. PW-1 Mukesh Agrawal has very fairly accepted that he has not seen the accident. PW-2 Devmuni Thakur has deposed that he was working as a computer operator in MEP Infrastructure Developers Ltd. at Brijghat (Hapur) Toll Tax Plaza, on NH-24 on 12.01.2018 at booth No.4 with other operator Jatin Agrawal, then at about 07.45 PM, a private bus No.UP-23-T-0434, came from the side of Delhi, stopped at booth, then was rashly driven forward in high speed which hit the deceased Jatin Agrawal, due to which he suffered grievous injury. The bus driver fled after causing the accident. After the accident had occurred, injured Jatin Agrawal was taken to the hospital but he died on the way. He further deposed that the FIR was registered by the deceased's friend and colleague Sandesh Marpeet against unknown vehicle, because he and other employees had taken the injured to the hospital. He subsequently deposed that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending bus. He further deposed that the driver of the offending bus had asked him whether he was feeling sleepy at the toll plaza, before the accident had happened. 11. In cross examination, PW-2 further deposed that there was no barrier at the toll plaza to stop the vehicle because the construction work was going on at the toll plaza and he had stopped the bus at the toll plaza. He further deposed that at the time of the accident, the CCTV cameras were not installed at the toll plaza. He further deposed that the deceased had come out of the booth for taking meals then the unfortunate accident occurred at about 07.45 PM. He further deposed that at the time of the accident, the CCTV cameras were not installed at the toll plaza. He further deposed that the deceased had come out of the booth for taking meals then the unfortunate accident occurred at about 07.45 PM. He further deposed that there was no speed breaker at the toll plaza and the deceased was crushed between the bus and the wall of the toll plaza and after the accident, the offending bus had fled from the spot at the speed of 50 kmph and the security persons deputed at the toll plaza had not put up barrier to stop the offending vehicle. He has denied the suggestion that accident was caused by some other vehicle and he was not an eyewitness of the accident. 12. The claimants have also examined the retired Investigating Officer of the criminal case S.I. Mahipal Singh as PW-4 who has deposed that Case Crime No.14 of 2018 under Section 279, 337, 338, 304-A I.P.C. was registered at Police Station Garh, District Hapur, in which after investigation he had submitted charge sheet against the driver of the offending bus Mohd. Azeem (DW-1) who had surrendered in the Court. He further deposed that during investigation, he had recorded statement of Devmuni Thakur PW-2, who was an eye witness of the accident, who deposed that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434. He further deposed that he had seized the offending bus during investigation, which was got released by its registered owner from the Court and subsequently, the offending driver was enlarged on bail by the competent criminal court. In cross-examination, he deposed that he has retired on 30.06.2019. 13. The offending driver Mohd. Azeem has examined himself as DW-1 who has deposed that on 12.01.2018 while he was driving the offending bus from Delhi to Moradabad, then at about 07.48 PM at Gajraula, the offending bus was challaned by RTO Amroha, regarding which an online complaint was made by the owner of the offending bus Smt. Saiyada Begum to the Inspector General of Police. He denied the factum of accident, but admitted that on 12.01.2018 when he was driving the bus from Delhi to Moradabad then the bus had passed the Moradabad toll plaza and he had reached Moradabad at about 09.00 PM. He denied the factum of accident, but admitted that on 12.01.2018 when he was driving the bus from Delhi to Moradabad then the bus had passed the Moradabad toll plaza and he had reached Moradabad at about 09.00 PM. He further deposed that he had started his journey from Delhi at about 05.00 PM and had reached Hapur at about 7.30 PM. He also admitted he was enlarged on bail in the criminal case and the bus was also released from the court and his criminal case was pending. 14. In the cross-examination Mohd. Azeem DW-1 has admitted that his bus had passed the spot of accident at about 07.00 PM, which was subsequently challaned by the RTO at Gajraula Chauraha at about 08.00 PM, which was at a distance of about 30 KM from Brij Ghat and he was challaned because according to the police, he was boarding passengers for hire and reward. 15. It is apparent that the driver of the offending bus DW-1 has admitted that the offending bus had passed from the alleged toll plaza at about 07.00 PM, whereas it is the claimants case that the accident occurred at about 07.45 PM and DW-1 has also accepted that after the offending bus had crossed the toll plaza, it was subsequently challaned at Gajraula at about 08.00 PM. 16. The computerized challan slip filed by the appellant with the appeal shows that the bus was challaned at 07.49 PM at Gajraula, Amroha. DW- 2 Atul Kumar in cross-examination has submitted that the distance between Gajraula and Brijghat is between 12-15 kms. Since the distance between the place of accident and place of challan of the offending bus was only about 15 kms, there was bound to be close proximity between the time of accident and challan, which was proved from the evidence of PW-2, DW-1 and DW-2, as such, merely on that basis, the factum of accident does not become doubtful and the contention of the learned counsel of the appellant to the contrary, is rejected. 17. It is itself proved from the testimony of Mohd. Azeem DW-1 that he was challaned subsequent to the accident. From the testimony of Devmuni Thakur PW-2, it is proved that after causing the accident Mohd. Azeem DW-1 had fled by driving his bus in a high speed. 17. It is itself proved from the testimony of Mohd. Azeem DW-1 that he was challaned subsequent to the accident. From the testimony of Devmuni Thakur PW-2, it is proved that after causing the accident Mohd. Azeem DW-1 had fled by driving his bus in a high speed. It is true that in the FIR, the number of offending vehicle is not mentioned but after investigation in the criminal case, a charge sheet was submitted against the offending driver Mohd. Azeem DW-1 and from the evidence of PW-2 it is proved that the accident was caused due to the sole negligence of the offending driver of the bus as such, the tribunal has not erred in concluding that indeed the accident was caused by the offending bus No.UP-23T-0434, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner at the time of the accident. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the offending bus was challaned by the RTO Amroha for violating the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, since the bus was boarding passengers in the way for hire and reward as a stage carriage, as such, the insurance company was not liable to indemnify the compensation payable to the claimants. 19. The appellant has filed photocopy of the challan with the appeal which shows that it is pending and the insured has not compounded the offence. It further mentions the alleged offences committed as under:- "(1) Fail to produce Driving Licence (No DL) or Driving Licence without effective DL-S.130,159,3,5,r/w S.180,181 of Motor Vehicles Act. (2) Breach of permit conditions-Vehicle not plying for specific purpose(contract carriage)- STA letter No.1979/STA/99 dated 08 October 1999. (3) Seat Belt- Not wearing the seat belts while the vehicle is in motion- Rule 138(3) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules r/w S.177 of Motor Vehicles Act. (4) Vehicle violating standards prescribed for control of noise (using multi tone horn/pressure horn)- S.190(2) of Motor Vehicles Act. (5) No or non functional fitment of reflectors- R.104 of Central Motor Vehicle Rules r/w S.177 of Motor Vehicles Act. Challan Amount : Rs.12,400/- (Pending) Witness Name : Enforcement staffs. Remarks : Vehicle coming from Delhi to Hasanpur with 31 local and footkar passengers of Rs.70/- to 100/- each of Gajraula Hasanpur.........violation of UP Permit conditions. Read under Section 213(5)(e) of Motor Vehicles Act,1988." 20. Challan Amount : Rs.12,400/- (Pending) Witness Name : Enforcement staffs. Remarks : Vehicle coming from Delhi to Hasanpur with 31 local and footkar passengers of Rs.70/- to 100/- each of Gajraula Hasanpur.........violation of UP Permit conditions. Read under Section 213(5)(e) of Motor Vehicles Act,1988." 20. The appellant-insurance company examined Atul Kumar as DW-2 to prove that the offending bus was challaned on 12.01.2018 by ARTO, Rajesh Singh for the breach of conditions of permit because the offending driver was boarding passengers for hire and reward for a fare of Rs.70 to 100/- between Gajraula and J.P. Nagar but in the cross-examination, this witness has admitted that the offending bus was not challaned in his presence and he was not aware about the disposal of the challan. Manoj Kumar Vats DW-3 has proved that the offending bus was insured with the insurance company which was to be operated under a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 21. It is apparent that the offending bus has been challaned for five offences, but only on this ground it is not proved that the bus was being driven in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy because the insured has a legal right to contest the challan and it is only after a competent court records a finding or if there was an admission of guilt on the part of the insured, only then it can be presumed that the alleged offences were committed. In absence of the above evidence on record, the tribunal has rightly concluded that the offending bus No.UP- 23T-0434 was being driven in accordance with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as such, the appellant insurance policy is liable to indemnify the compensation payable to the claimants. 22. A further question arises whether the alleged breach of permit conditions in this case, wherein the offending bus was allegedly plied as a stage carriage whereas as per the permit it was to be plied as contract carriage, amounts to such fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy so as to enable the insurer of the offending vehicle to avoid it’s statutory liability to the third party in terms of S.149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988. 23. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Chandamma & Ors. 23. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Chandamma & Ors. 1999 SCC OnLine Kar 454 , held as under. 2. Admittedly, the offending vehicles involved in all these cases were the “contract carriages” covered by valid permits issued by the prescribed authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short). They were involved in the accidents occurred on various dates resulting in injuries to/deaths of several passengers travelling therein, which had given rise to the respective claims to compensation by the victims of accidents or the dependents of the deceased victims, before the respective Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. It is not in dispute that each of these vehicles was covered by the valid and current “Act Only” insurance policies of the respective appellants/petitioners-insurers. These insurers were respondents in the claim petitions before the Tribunals. The petitions were contested by them on the common ground that the respective vehicles which were plying as “contract carriages” had been used as “stage carriages” when the respective accidents occurred, and in violation of the condition of the insurance policies. In other words, their defence was that the offending vehicles, at the material time, having been used by the insured owners thereof as stage carriages in breach of condition of their insurance policies as also of their respective permits issued by the prescribed authority under the Act for their use only as “contract carriages” they were not liable in law to indemnify the insured owners and pay compensation to the claimants. The Tribunals have negatived their contention and have passed the respective impugned awards holding them also liable to pay the compensation to the respective claimants. Hence, the respective appeals by the insurers of the said vehicles. 3. In the light of the relevant provisions of the Act and on consideration of the relevant condition in the policies of insurance which were produced in evidence and marked as exhibits, we find that, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, the appellants/petitioners-insurers, by pleading the said defence, cannot escape their liability to indemnify the insured and satisfy the impugned awards. *** *** 6. Admittedly, the ground spelt out under sub-clauses (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (a)(i) and the ground under Clause (b) of Section 149(2) are not applicable to the defence of insurers in these cases. *** *** 6. Admittedly, the ground spelt out under sub-clauses (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (a)(i) and the ground under Clause (b) of Section 149(2) are not applicable to the defence of insurers in these cases. On the other hand, an attempt had been made for the insurers to bring their cases within the purview of the defence ground envisaged in sub-clause (a) of sub-section 2(a)(i). This ground is also not available to them for the reason that, admittedly, each of the offending vehicles was covered by a valid permit to carry passengers for hire or reward as they were “public service vehicles”. Merely because these vehicles were stated to have been stopped and picked up passengers on the permitted route, presumably in breach of their permit condition, that by itself does not constitute a statutory defence available in sub-section 2(a)(i)(a) of Section 149. In fact, Section 149(2) of the New Act i.e., Act of 1988, corresponds to Section 96(2) of the Old Act i.e., Act of 1939. The same defence grounds as are contained in Section 149(2) of the New Act were existing as the defence grounds under sub-section (2)(b) and (c) of Section 96 of the Old Act. Similar question had arisen for consideration of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of K.V. Thimmegowda v. Kamalamma, I.L.R. 1991 KAR 4127 and the same had been answered holding: “An Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation in respect of the injury to or death of a third party, caused by a motor accident by a motor vehicle, which is a stage carriage while plying or being used lawfully otherwise than as a stage carriage, at a public place, even if such public place does not lie on the route in respect of which it is permitted to operate as a stage carriage.” Therefore, in law the appellants/petitioners-insurers are not exempt from their liability to pay compensation under their respective ‘Act Policies’ by mere reason of ‘contract carriages’ in question being plied as ‘stage carriages’ in breach of their permit condition since such a defence plea is not permissible under sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. If the said vehicles were found to have been plying in breach of their permits condition, it is open for the concerned authorities under the Act to take appropriate action as is permissible under other provisions thereof viz., Sections 86, 177 and 192 as the case may be. Therefore, we find the contention of the learned Counsel for appellants/Writ Petitioners without force and weight and the appeals are, therefore, bound to fail. 24. Therefore, from the case of Chandamma (supra), it can be deduced that the insurance company cannot escape its liability to compensate on the ground that the offending vehicle was used in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, i.e., as a stage carriage when it was insured only as a contract carriage. 25. No other issue has been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal has got no merit and is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. 27. The appeal is hereby dismissed at the admission stage. 28. The impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal dated 30.07.2025 is affirmed. 29. Office is directed to remit back the statutory deposit made by appellant to the Tribunal concerned, forthwith.