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2025 DIGILAW 1328 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Madan Lal s/o Kishan Lal

2025-06-11

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, SANDEEP SHAH

body2025
Judgment : Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. The instant criminal appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated 19.05.2009 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nimbahera (‘Trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.12/2008 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Madan Lal & Ors.), whereby the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused (Madan lal, Prakash Chandra, Udai lal and Kishan lal) of the charges against them under Sections 302 /34 & 447 IPC, but convicted and sentenced them as hereunder: Offence Sentence In Default of payment of fine further undergo 325/34 of I.P.C. Two years’ R.I. with fine of Rs.1,000/- (each of the accused) One month’s additional S.I. 323/34 of I.P.C. Six months’ R.I. - 1.1. For the purpose of clarity, in the present adjudication, the parties herein shall be referred to as ‘State’ and ‘accused’respectively. 1.2. The State has preferred the above-numbered Criminal Appeal No. 635/2009, against the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused, whereas the accused persons have challenged the said judgment, to the extent of their conviction, by preferring the instant Criminal Appeal No. 359/2009. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 2007 and the present appeals have been pending since the year 2009. 3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State, are that on 14.12.2007 at around 12:00 p.m., one Satyanarayan (complainant), while he was under treatment at CHC, Dungla, submitted a written report (Ex.P.10) before the S.H.O., Police Station, Dungla, stating therein that on the said date at around 8:00 a.m. when the complainant went to his well, the accused, came there, armed with an axe & lathi. It was stated in the written report that the accused Prakash and Madan attacked the complainant with axe, and the accused Udai Lal and Kishan Lal forcibly took off the clothes of the complainant and subjected him to grave beatings, as a result whereof, the complainant sustained injuries on the head (by axe), fracture in hand as well as injuries on both the legs. As per the complainant, the said act of the accused persons was intervened by Sohan Lal, Durga Shanker and Udi Bai, who at the relevant time were present at the place of the incident. 3.1. As per the complainant, the said act of the accused persons was intervened by Sohan Lal, Durga Shanker and Udi Bai, who at the relevant time were present at the place of the incident. 3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was registered under Sections 447 & 323/34 IPC and the investigation began accordingly. While the investigation was going on, Satyanarayan (complainant) died under the treatment. Thus, upon completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons under Sections 447 , 323/34 & 302 IPC before the concerned Court. 3.2. Owing to the nature of the crime, the matter was committed to the Court of Session for the trial. 3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 27 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 27) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 43) got exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; whereafter, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question due to previous animosity. 3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment dated 19.05.2009, as above, whereby though the accused were acquitted under Sections 302 /34 & 447 IPC, but convicted under Sections 325/34 & 323/34 IPC. Hence, the State is in appeal against the acquittal part of the impugned judgment, whereas the accused are in appeal against the conviction part of the impugned judgment. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the evidence on record and the statements of the prosecution witness as well as documents clearly point out towards the guilt of the accused. Harlal (P.W. 6), eyewitness, has clearly stated that on the day of incident while he was working on his field, he heard a few voices, thus, he stopped and witnessed that the accused, Prakash, Madan lal, Udailal and Kishan lal were attacking the deceased. It was further submitted that Sohan lal (P.W. 18), eyewitness, has also stated that when he reached the place of incident he saw that all the accused were beating the deceased. 4.1. It was further submitted that Sohan lal (P.W. 18), eyewitness, has also stated that when he reached the place of incident he saw that all the accused were beating the deceased. 4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Udobai (P.W. 8) the wife of the deceased also saw the deceased being attacked by the accused, and Durgashankar (P.W. 9), the nephew of the deceased heard voices, and thus he ran towards the place of incident and saw that the deceased was being attacked by all the accused herein. 4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted Mahendra Singh (P.W. 17), was the auto driver who took the deceased from the well to the hospital, has stated in his testimony that there was no part of body left where the deceased was not injured. 4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted one Kailash Chandra (P.W. 7), has stated that he saw the deceased lying on a bed in Dugla hospital, and at that time his dressing was going on. It was submitted that from the Dungla hospital the deceased was referred to the General Hospital, Chittorgarh were Dr. Chotu Lal Meena (P.W. 15) was posted as radiologist who conducted the X- ray examination of the deceased. P.W.15 has stated that there were multiple fractures on the body of the deceased along with fracture right side of jaw, right leg, left forearm. Ex.P 16, the X- ray report also reveals the multiple fractures on the body of the deceased. 4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that it is evident from the statement of Dr. Jai Kumar (P.W. 16), who prepared the Injury report (Ex.P. 24), that there were multiple injuries present on the body of deceased. It was concluded by the said Doctor that when he received X-ray report on 18.12.2007 he found that the injury no. 5 to 8, were grievous in nature. It was also concluded by the said doctor that as per the X-ray report there was a fracture on the head and jaw of the deceased which along with the other multiple injuries were dangerous to the life of the deceased. It was also submitted that due to the critical condition of the deceased he was admitted to the Trauma Centre, MB hospital, Udaipur on 15.12.2007, where Dr. Tarun Kumar Gupta (P.W. 27), neuro-surgeon, was posted. It was also submitted that due to the critical condition of the deceased he was admitted to the Trauma Centre, MB hospital, Udaipur on 15.12.2007, where Dr. Tarun Kumar Gupta (P.W. 27), neuro-surgeon, was posted. It was highlighted that the testimony of P.W. 27 was that the deceased was in critical condition when he was admitted to the hospital, and subsequently, he passed way on 21.12.2007 due to the injuries he suffered. 4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Dr. Anupam Johri (P.W. 19) conducted the postmortem of the deceased, and gave the description of the injuries wherein he has stated that the deceased was hit on the head due to which he suffered coma and died. P.W. 19 has stated that such kind of injury in ordinary course of nature is sufficient to cause death. 5. Per Contra, Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, Amicus Curiae, learned counsel for the accused while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the State, submitted that the impugned judgment to the extent of conviction of the accused is contrary to the settled principles of law, and very crucial aspects of the factual matrix present on the record have not been considered properly. 5.1. Learned counsel submitted that Udai Singh (P.W.26), SHO Dugla at the relevant time, stated in his witness testimony that deceased himself gave Titamba Bayan which were taken into consideration while preparing the charge-sheet, however it was not present in the record. It was submitted that the said statements were in favor of the accused. 5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the presence of the tractor at the place of the incident is false and fabricated, because had the tractor been present at the place of incident then in that case there would have been tyre marks, which would have been mentioned in the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P. 1). Furthermore, it was submitted that the tractor in question was recovered only on 29.12.2007, i.e., after 15 days, and the presence of blood on the tractor despite such a long duration is not possible. 5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the whole story of the incident has been created due to previous animosity and political pressure. Furthermore, it was submitted that the tractor in question was recovered only on 29.12.2007, i.e., after 15 days, and the presence of blood on the tractor despite such a long duration is not possible. 5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the whole story of the incident has been created due to previous animosity and political pressure. It was further submitted that Mohanlal (P.W. 02), Babulal (P.W. 20), Rajesh Bharadwaaj (P.W.22), Mahendra Singh (P.W.17) in their statements have stated that in response to the incident under consideration, the witnesses sat on a strike due to which political pressure was created and thus, the accused were implicated in the case. 5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that registration of the FIR in the instant case was delayed without any explanation as to sufficient cause for the delay, thus, it shows the FIR was registered in pursuance of a larger plan. It was submitted that Kailash Chandra (P.W.7) in his stated that on 14.12.2007 at around 9 a.m. he wrote the written complaint on behalf of the deceased, however the FIR was not registered until 12 p.m., and therefore it was submitted that the possibility of fabrication and concoction cannot be ruled out. 5.5. Learned counsel also submitted that P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.18 all claim to be eyewitnesses to the alleged incident, however, none of the witnesses tried to save the deceased from the alleged attack by the accused. It was submitted that at the time of attack the deceased was undressed the accused, however, no such clothes were recovered. 5.6. Learned Counsel submitted that in light of the discrepancies and contradictions within the testimonies of the witnesses the case against accused is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that Mohan lal (P.W.2) has only stated the name of the accused Madanlal, Prakash and Udailal, however subsequently, the name of Kishanlal was also added. It was further submitted that P.W.8, P.W.9 are related witnesses and therefore, their testimonies cannot be believed. 5.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that at the first instance the injury report (Ex.P.24) was prepared by Dr. Jai Kumar, wherein only 4 injuries have been mentioned, out of which injury no. 1, 3 and 4 are stated to be of simple nature, and the injury no. 2, for which an X-ray report was requested, was injury related to right forearm. Learned Counsel further submitted that at the first instance the injury report (Ex.P.24) was prepared by Dr. Jai Kumar, wherein only 4 injuries have been mentioned, out of which injury no. 1, 3 and 4 are stated to be of simple nature, and the injury no. 2, for which an X-ray report was requested, was injury related to right forearm. It was contended that subsequently the number of injuries increased to 8 by the medical jurist, Chittorgarh, and finally postmortem report reflected 24 injuries. In such circumstances Ex.P. 24 cannot be relied upon as done by the learned Trail Court in order to pass the impugned judgment to the extent of their conviction. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 7. This Court observes that the instant case pertains to incident dated 14.12.2007, wherein one Satyanarayan was severely beaten up, and consequently a written report was submitted, alleging that the accused attacked and injured him gravely. Upon the said report, an FIR was registered against the accused and, that during the treatment Satyanarayan passed away. Accordingly, the trial commenced and impugned order was passed, whereby the accused were acquitted under Sections 302 /34 & 447 IPC, but convicted under Sections 325/34 & 323/34 IPC. Hence, the present appeals. 8. This Court observes that there are two principal points for determination in the present appeals:- 1. Whether the acquittal of the accused under Sections 302 /34 and 447 IPC by the learned Trial Court is legally sustainable, or requires interference in appeal? 2. Whether the conviction under Sections 323/34 and 325/34 IPC deserves to be set aside? 9. This Court shall now proceed to decide the first point of determination, and this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 , decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 9.1. In light of the above authoritative principles, this Court has re-appreciated the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. Upon doing so, this Court observes the following significant aspects which cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case: 9.1.1. When the deceased was taken to the Dungla Hospital on 14.12.2007, he was examined by Dr. Jai Kumar (P.W.18), who recorded only four injuries on the body of the deceased. These were: (i) a crushed wound on the head measuring 2x2 cm, (ii) swelling on the right forearm and left elbow measuring 5x5 cm, (iii) scratches on the left leg, and (iv) scratches on the right leg. Out of these, the first, third, and fourth injuries were opined to be simple in nature. With respect to the second injury on the forearm, the doctor reserved his opinion. He noted that all injuries appeared to have been caused by a blunt weapon. 9.1.2. Subsequently, on the next day, i.e., 15.12.2007, the same doctor gave an account of eight injuries; however, none of these included a fracture of the skull, which, according to the Post- Mortem Report, was the primary cause of death. 9.1.3. Furthermore, Dr. Chotulal Meena (P.W.16), who prepared the X-ray report, did not record any fracture on the skull either. 9.1.2. Subsequently, on the next day, i.e., 15.12.2007, the same doctor gave an account of eight injuries; however, none of these included a fracture of the skull, which, according to the Post- Mortem Report, was the primary cause of death. 9.1.3. Furthermore, Dr. Chotulal Meena (P.W.16), who prepared the X-ray report, did not record any fracture on the skull either. Yet, in the Post-Mortem Report prepared later on 21.12.2007, a total of 24 injuries were recorded, including a skull fracture. The record is silent as to why and how the number of injuries increased over time, and more critically, how a fatal skull fracture was not detected earlier. 9.1.4. Such a glaring discrepancy, both in the number of injuries and in the nature of the critical head injury, significantly weakens the prosecution’s version. In absence of any plausible explanation for these contradictions, the Court is not inclined to hold that the injury causing death can be attributed to the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10. This Court further observes that insofar as the allegation of criminal trespass is concerned, this Court has carefully examined the ocular and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and this Court finds that Mohan Lal (P.W.2) deposed that the accused persons were assaulting the deceased on the boundary of his field. Harlal (P.W.6) also stated that the incident occurred on a boundary near the field. Udibai (P.W.8), on the other hand, stated that the deceased was attacked in the field itself, while Durgashankar (P.W.9) also stated that the incident took place on the field. Sohanlal Menariya (P.W.18), however, did not specifically mention the location of the incident in his examination-in-chief, and in cross-examination, he stated that the incident occurred on the boundary of the field. Patwari Devi Nandan (P.W.21) testified that the said boundary, where the alleged incident took place, is a private path and not a public way, though he was unable to specify to whom the path belonged. 10.1.This Court finds that from the above conflicting depositions, it is clear that there is no consistent or conclusive evidence to establish that the place of occurrence was within the exclusive possession of the deceased. The prosecution witnesses themselves differ, where some stating the incident occurred in the field, others stated on the boundary, and yet others on a private path, the ownership or possession of which remains undetermined. 10.2. The prosecution witnesses themselves differ, where some stating the incident occurred in the field, others stated on the boundary, and yet others on a private path, the ownership or possession of which remains undetermined. 10.2. This Court further observes that in the absence of clear proof that the accused persons entered into the land in the exclusive possession of the deceased, with the requisite intent to intimidate, insult, or annoy, the essential ingredients of criminal trespass as defined under Section 441 IPC are not satisfied. It is also relevant that the alleged path appears to have been used by public, and there is no evidence to prove that the accused had no right to be present there. 10.3.Accordingly, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Section 447 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal of the accused persons on this count, as recorded by the learned Trial Court, warrants no interference. 11. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused under Section 302 /34 and 447 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused on the said charges, suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 11.1.This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 11.2.Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court to the extent of acquittal of the accused. 12. This Court shall now proceed to decide the second point of determination, which arises from the appeal preferred by the accused persons challenging their conviction under Sections 323/34 and 325/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860, as recorded by the learned Trial Court. 12.1. Upon perusal of the evidence, this Court notes that multiple prosecution witnesses, including Mohan Lal (P.W.2), Harlal (P.W.6), Udibai (P.W.8), and Durgashankar (P.W.9), have consistently deposed regarding the injuries sustained by the complainant party. These depositions are corroborated by medical evidence. Even if the medical report prepared at the first instance is considered by this Court—namely, the examination conducted immediately after the incident—the same clearly records injuries on the person of the complainant party, including swelling and contusions. These injuries have been medically certified as being caused by a blunt weapon and have been categorized as simple and grievous in nature. The injury on the forearm, in particular, was later confirmed to be a fracture, thereby fulfilling the ingredients of grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC, attracting the penal provisions of Section 325 IPC. 12.2. The prosecution has successfully established the presence of the accused in the incident and the nature of injuries caused to the complainant party. While the accused denied their involvement, no substantive defence evidence was led to rebut the prosecution’s version in this regard. Further, the nature of the injuries and the manner in which they were inflicted suggests common intention, making the application of Section 34 IPC appropriate. While the accused denied their involvement, no substantive defence evidence was led to rebut the prosecution’s version in this regard. Further, the nature of the injuries and the manner in which they were inflicted suggests common intention, making the application of Section 34 IPC appropriate. 12.3.Therefore, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the findings of the Trial Court convicting the accused persons under Sections 323/34 and 325/34 IPC. The conviction recorded is based on cogent oral and medical evidence and does not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction. 13. Consequently, the present appeals, numbered Criminal Appeal No. 635/2009 preferred by State against the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused is dismissed and Criminal Appeal No. 359/2009 preferred by the accused in order to challenge the said judgment, to the extent of their conviction, is also dismissed 14. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., each of the accused are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 15. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 13. This Court is thankful to Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, who has rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the accused, in the present adjudication.