Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1330 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Prem Singh s/o Bhanwar Lal

2025-06-12

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, SANDEEP SHAH

body2025
Judgment : Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. In the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 06.02.1997 passed by the learned Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Cases, Jodhpur (‘Trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.99/96 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Premsingh & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents herein were acquitted of the charges against them under Section 302 read with Sections 149 , 147 & 498A IPC. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1990 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1998. 3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf the appellant-State, are that one Balchand (complainant) lodged an FIR on 29.06.1990 before the Police Station, Sardarpura, Jodhpur. Later, the complainant on 07.09.1990 submitted a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.2, Jodhpur wherein it was alleged that he had no faith in the police authorities and thus, he had an apprehension that the case would not be investigated in a fair manner. 3.1. The said learned Court called for a report and on 19.12.1990, the SHO of the Police Station, Sardarpura, Jodhpur submitted the final report in the matter before the said Court. Thereupon, the learned Court initiated proceedings under Sections 200 & 202 Cr.P.C., whereafter, on 03.06.1996, took cognizance against the accused-respondents under Sections 147 , 302 read with Sections 149 & 498A IPC. 3.2. As per the complaint (Ex.P.5), marriage of sister (Jasoda) of the complainant was solemnized with accused-respondent Pukhraj 12-13 years prior to the incident in question and out of the said wedlock, five children (girls) were born. It was further alleged that 3-4 years prior to lodging of the complaint, the accused threatened Jasoda (deceased) that in case of birth of another girl child, she would be ousted from her matrimonial home. Thereafter, Jasoda (deceased) gave birth to another girl child. The Matrimonial relationship worsened, and when the said child was only two years old, Jasoda was subjected, at the hands of the accused, to beatings and abuses. 3.3. Thereafter, Jasoda (deceased) gave birth to another girl child. The Matrimonial relationship worsened, and when the said child was only two years old, Jasoda was subjected, at the hands of the accused, to beatings and abuses. 3.3. It was also alleged that despite intervention of the complainant party, and assurances being given by the accused party to not repeat such the acts of cruelty and such behavior in future, the accused-respondents did not stop, rather they started making dowry demands from Jasoda (deceased), and on her failure to do so, she was subjected to further acts of cruelty and abuses. 3.4. It was further alleged that on 28.06.1990 at around 7:00 p.m., while the complainant was going to his home from Sojati Gate, accused-respondent Prem met him and informed that Jasoda(deceased) got slight burns on her abdomen, whereupon the complainant went to the matrimonial home of Jasoda(deceased), and saw her dead body, which was completely burnt. Thereupon, as per the complaint the accused party apologized for the said act, while saying that the same was done mistakenly. 3.4.1. As alleged, the younger daughter of deceased and the neighbours informed the complainant that the accused- respondents, after pouring kerosene, set Jasoda (deceased) on fire. 3.5. Owing to the nature of the crime involved, the matter was committed to the Court of Session, wherefrom the case was transferred to the learned Trial Court, for the necessary trial. 3.6. During the course of trial, the statements of 6 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 6) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 12) were got exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, documents (Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.9) got exhibited, for examination; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question. 3.7. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, acquitted the accused-respondents herein of the charges against them, as above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 06.02.1997; against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State. 4. Mr. 3.7. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, acquitted the accused-respondents herein of the charges against them, as above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 06.02.1997; against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State. 4. Mr. Ramesh Dewasi, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submitted that the learned Trail Court has erred in not relying on the Statements of Balchand (P.W.3), who has categorically stated, while giving his testimony, that his sister (deceased) got married to accused-respondent Pukh Raj 18 years ago, and just after 5-6 months of the marriage the accused started taunting and beating his sister (deceased). It was further submitted that on demand of the accused-respondents 6-7 thousand rupees were also given to them by the father of P.W.3 and deceased, and Kisan Vikas Patra(Ex.P.3) worth Rs.10,000 was also purchased in the name of the accused-respondent Pukh Raj by the father of P.W.3 and deceased. It was further submitted that P.W.3 had also stated in his testimony that just 2 and half month prior to the death of his sister, accused-respondents subjected her to cruelty, due to which injuries on lips of the deceased were caused. 4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that Balchand (P.W.3), Bhanwari (P.W.1), Jaya (P.W.2) and Ramchand (P.W.4) have given consistent testimonies, wherein they have stated that the deceased was being subjected to cruelty at the hands of the accused-respondents. It was further submitted that P.W.2 and P.W.3 had stated in their testimony that daughter of the deceased told them the accused-respondents had set the deceased on fire. 4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Kana Ram (P.W.5), who was neighbor of the accused-respondents at the relevant time, had clearly stated in his testimony that on 28.06.1990, at around 11/12 a.m. he heard screams cries from the house of Bhanwar lal, it was then he went to the terrace and saw that hands of the deceased were caught by accused- respondents Fefa Devi and Pukh Raj, the legs were caught by accused-respondents Prem and Bhawarlal, and accused- respondent Indu brought a bottle of certain liquid, poured it on the deceased and set her on fire. It was submitted that when the accused saw him they dragged the deceased inside a room and closed the door, and half an hour later he saw the accused- respondents were putting off fire. It was also submitted that P.W.5 also heard cries of the deceased as to why they burnt her later at around 3 p.m. 4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the testimony given by Sunita (D.W.1) that at around 1:30 p.m. deceased got up, poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire, cannot be believed as the said witness is the daughter of the accused-respondent Pukh Raj, and consequently is an interested witness. 5. Per Contra, Mr. Aashutosh Bhardwaj-Amicus Curiae, learned counsel for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that Sunita (D.W.1), daughter of the deceased herself in her testimony had stated that her mother (deceased) was not in fit state of mind as a result of which her mother used to remain ill frequently. It was further submitted that D.W.1 had also stated that on the date of incident, i.e. on 28.06.1990 at around 1/1:30 p.m. her mother suddenly got up, went to back alley of the house where she poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. It was submitted that it is on that moment she rushed to her father to inform him about the incident. 5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that there is contradiction in the motive alleged by the prosecution for committing the offense under consideration. It was submitted that as per the F.I.R.(Ex.P.12) the motive alleged by the complainant(P.W.3) was that it was when the deceased had no son after the birth of five daughters, her in laws (accused-respondents) demanded money from the parental home of the deceased so that they can get the daughters of the deceased married in future, and because their greed was not fulfilled the death of Jasoda (deceased) was caused. On the contrary, in the statement P.W.3 had testified that just after 5-6 months of marriage the accused-respondents started harassing and beating the deceased, and demanded money from the parental home of the deceased. On a parallel note, sister of the deceased Bhanwari (P.W.1) had alleged that the in laws of the deceased (accused-respondent) asked the deceased to get a share from the retirement fund of her father. On a parallel note, sister of the deceased Bhanwari (P.W.1) had alleged that the in laws of the deceased (accused-respondent) asked the deceased to get a share from the retirement fund of her father. It was submitted that these contrary sets of motives alleged by prosecution, seriously dent its case and creates a shadow of doubt in the prosecution story. 5.2. Learned Counsel also submitted that as per the F.I.R., when P.W.3 reached at the spot he saw that the deceased was completely burnt, and thereafter he confronted the accused- respondents that they should have given the information of the incident to their father. It was submitted that upon confrontation the accused-respondents got scared, and apologized for their mistake. It was further submitted that as per the F.I.R., later at around 7:30 p.m. when sister of deceased (P.W.1) and wife of P.W.3 reached the spot, the accused-respondents fell on their knees and confessed that because the deceased did not give birth to any male child, and they did not have money for marriage of the 5 daughters of the deceased, they were infuriated with this situation and thus, the accused-respondents set the deceased a blaze. It was further submitted that P.W.3 did not say anything about this extra-judicial confession in his witness statements, rather it was submitted that he stated that he had a physical tussle with the accused-respondents. Furthermore, it was submitted that sister of the deceased (P.W.1) and P.W.2 also did not say any anything about the said confession, rather the testimony of P.W.1 revealed that the accused-respondents were belligerent when they reached at the spot. 5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that as per F.I.R. the 8 year old daughter of the deceased and neighbors told P.W.3(complainant) that the accused-respondents poured kerosene or some other liquid on the deceased and set the deceased on fire. On the other hand, it was submitted that, in the witness statements P.W.3 stated that the daughter of the deceased narrated the story of accused-respondents setting the deceased on fire to his wife and the sister of the deceased, upon being asked in seclusion by them. On the other hand, it was submitted that, in the witness statements P.W.3 stated that the daughter of the deceased narrated the story of accused-respondents setting the deceased on fire to his wife and the sister of the deceased, upon being asked in seclusion by them. It was brought to the notice of the Court that the said daughter who narrated the incident was not examined as a witness from the prosecution’s side, rather she was examined as a witness from side of defense as D.W.1, and in her testimony she stated that the deceased was mentally ill, and the deceased set herself on fire. 5.3.1. Learned counsel also submitted that Ex.D.2 of the record revealed that on 15.09.1978 the deceased was being treated in Mental Hospital, Jodhpur, and the said document had the signatures of P.W.3. 5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that when the F.I.R was registered it was alleged therein that neighbors told P.W.3 (complainant) about the accused-respondents committing the crime, however no specific individual among the neighbors was named who narrated the story to P.W3. It was submitted that subsequently on 07.09.1990 in the complaint before magistrate the name of one Kana Ram (P.W.5) appeared as an eyewitness to the incident, and the said witness in his testimony stated that he heard screams and cries, whereupon he went to the terrace of his house and saw the accused-respondents committing the crime. It was contended that in the cross-examination the said witness stated that the mouth of the deceased was covered, and thus, it cannot be believed that the said witness heard any voices. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the said witness did not speak about the incident to anyone and did not even try to stop the accused-respondents. It was also contended that the said witness had a previous animosity with the accused-respondents to the extent that they had legal cases registered against each other, and consequently, the testimony of the said witness cannot be believed. 5.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 cannot be believed as they all are related to the deceased, and thus are interested witnesses. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 7. 5.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 cannot be believed as they all are related to the deceased, and thus are interested witnesses. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 7. This Court observes that the incident in question (death of Jasoda) has been alleged to have occurred due to acts of cruelty and abuses, owing to birth of girl child and failure of the deceased to fulfill the demand of dowry; The learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused-respondents, acquitted them, as above, vide the impugned judgment dated 06.02.1997, against which the present challenge has been laid by the appellant-State. 8. This Court observes that in the instant matter, the case is primarily based on the subsequent statements of family members and one neighbour, recorded much after the incident. There is no direct medical or forensic evidence linking the accused-respondents to the act of setting the deceased on fire. 9. This Court further observes that the principal prosecution witnesses—P.W.1 (sister), P.W.2 (sister-in-law), P.W.3 (brother), and P.W.4 (uncle)—are all closely related to the deceased, and this Court is conscious of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rahul vs State of Harayana [Criminal Appeal No. 262 of 2021(decided on 3.03.2021)], wherein it was held as under: “...Further, a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. It is fairly well settled proposition that even the evidence of interested person can also be considered provided such evidence is corroborated by other evidence on record.” 10. While taking into consideration the aforementioned settled proposition of law, this Court finds that in light of the factual matrix of the case, the said witness are nor natural witness to the incident and neither are the testimonies of the said witnesses sufficiently corroborated, rather there are material contradictions in their version regarding the alleged motive, i.e., from not giving birth of a male child, monetary pressure for five daughters’ marriage, and share in retirement funds of father of deceased. These inconsistent narratives weaken the prosecution's story and reflect embellishment over time. 11. Furthermore, this Court finds that the allegation of extra- judicial confession by the accused-respondents does not find consistent reference across prosecution testimonies. These inconsistent narratives weaken the prosecution's story and reflect embellishment over time. 11. Furthermore, this Court finds that the allegation of extra- judicial confession by the accused-respondents does not find consistent reference across prosecution testimonies. Even P.W.3, who filed the complaint, did not depose about any such confession in his examination. The version that the accused “confessed” in front of multiple relatives appears to be an improvement and does not inspire the confidence of this Court. 12. This Court is of the considered view that in circumstances such as the present, judicial scrutiny must be guided by the quality rather than the quantity of the testimonies adduced. Where significant contradictions are apparent in the statements of the alleged witnesses, particularly concerning material aspects required to establish the culpability of the accused-respondents, the benefit of such doubt must necessarily enure to the advantage of the accused-respondents. 13. This Court also finds that the testimony of P.W.5, the only independent witness, is unreliable. He claimed to have witnessed the entire act from a terrace where he went after hearing screams and cries of the deceased, yet the said witness admitted in cross- examination that the deceased’s mouth was tied, moreover he neither raised an alarm nor intervened. The admitted history of enmity and legal cases filed between him and the accused- respondents further casts a serious doubt on the credibility of his account. 14. Furthermore, this Court takes note that the minor daughter of the deceased, who was allegedly an natural eyewitness, was not examined by the prosecution. Instead, she entered the witness box as D.W.1 for the defence and deposed that her mother had mental health issues and set herself on fire. Her testimony was not shaken in cross-examination, and documentary evidence (Ex.D.2) corroborates past psychiatric treatment of the deceased, which even bore the signature of P.W.3. 15. In totality of facts and evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 498A or 302/149 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of cruelty is vague and non-specific, and no proximate cause is established for invoking the rigours of Section 498A IPC. Likewise, the charge under Section 302 IPC rests on speculative and inconsistent testimony, unsupported by direct evidence. 16. The evidence of cruelty is vague and non-specific, and no proximate cause is established for invoking the rigours of Section 498A IPC. Likewise, the charge under Section 302 IPC rests on speculative and inconsistent testimony, unsupported by direct evidence. 16. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 , decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 17. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 19. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 20. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed 21. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., each of the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 22. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 22. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 23. This Court is thankful to Mr. Aashutosh Bhardwaj, who has rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the accused-respondents, in the present adjudication.