JUDGMENT : K. Sujana, J. This appeal is filed by the appellants-plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2008 passed in O.S.No.414 of 2001 on the file of IV- Additional Senior Civil Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District. The suit is filed for preliminary decree for partition of the plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and to put them in exclusive possession of the same. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein after referred to as arrayed in the suit. 2. The plaintiff No.1 and defendantNos.1 to 3 are the sons of late Chandra Reddy. Late Chandra Reddy and his brother Chukka Reddy constituted a joint family and they owned agricultural lands in Nanakramguda village, Sherilingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District. The properties included lands in survey numbers 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, and 148. During their lifetime, they partitioned their properties equally. Chandra Reddy's half-share was assigned with sub-division numbers 19/1, 20/1, 21/1, 23/1, 24/1, 27/1, 28/1, and 148/1. Chukka Reddy's half-share was assigned with sub-division numbers 19/2, 20/2, 21/2, 24/2, 27/2, 28/2, and 148/2. After the death of Chandra Reddy, his children and their mother Nagamma succeeded to his estate. Upon Nagamma's death, the 1stPlaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 became the sole legal heirs, each having a 1/4thshare in the schedule property. Further one Dharmagari Ramaiah @ Ramreddy had daughters and no sons as such, he performed the marriage of his elder daughter – Mallamma with the 1st plaintiff and made himIllatomson-in- law and he managed the properties of Dharmagari Ramaiah. However, defendants 1 to 3 allegedly colluded with each other and disposed of portion of lands in Survey No. 27/1 and 28/1 to third parties without informing the 1stplaintiff. The defendant No.4 published notice in Eenadu cautioning the general public that he intended to purchase the rest of the lands from defendants 1 to 3. As such, the 1stplaintiff issued a notice on 29.06.2000 to defendant No.4 claiming interest in the schedule property, and despite assurances from the Managing Director of defendant No.4 and defendants 1 to 3 that they would not conclude any contract without the consent of 1st plaintiff and his sons plaintiffs 2 to 6, they attempted to create sale deeds excluding the plaintiffs. The 1stplaintiff then got issued legal notice on 19.02.2001 calling upon defendants 1 to 3 to effect partition of the schedule properties but no reply was given by defendantNos.1 to 3 and filed caveat before the Junior Civil Judge, West and South Rangareddy District and Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy with false allegations alleging that the 1stplaintiff was taken in adoption as a son but notIllatomson-in-law by Dharmagari Ramaiah, as such, his co- parcenery right has extinguished. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statements, denying the plaintiffs claim and stated that the suit is not maintainable under law. They contended that the plaintiff had admitted in O.S.No.372 of 1994 that he was the adopted son of late Dharmagari Ramaiah, having been given in adoption to him in the year 1946 as per the customs. Following this adoption, the plaintiff's surname was changed to Dharmagari, and he inherited properties from his adoptive family, including those of his adoptive father's brother-Chandra Reddy who had no issues. The defendants claimed that the 1st plaintiff adoption predated his marriage to Ram Reddy's daughter, Mallamma, and therefore, he ceased to be a member of the defendants' family and is not entitled to co-parcenary rights. They also contended that the 1st plaintiff was never in joint possession of the schedule property with the defendants and that the defendants never managed the properties on behalf of 1 st plaintiff. The defendants denied approaching the 1 st plaintiff with a request to enter into a contract without his consent and pointed out the difference in surnames between the plaintiff and his sons as evidence of the plaintiff's attempt to suppress the adoption. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed five issues. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Pws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.18 are marked. On behalf of the defendants, Dws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.4 are marked and after hearing both parties and perusal of material on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed by the plaintiffs. 5. On behalf of the defendants, Dws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.4 are marked and after hearing both parties and perusal of material on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed by the plaintiffs. 5. Heard Sri M.V.Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri V. Prasad Rao, learned counsel appearing for Sri C.C.S. Sastry, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 5 to 12 and Sri Sanjeev Reddy Gillela, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. 6. The contention of the appellants-plaintiffs is that the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit by ignoring established law regarding "Illarikam," a recognized custom in Telangana area where a son-in-law lives with his wife's family. The 1 st plaintiff married Dharmagari Ramaiah's daughter and became an "Illarikam" son-in-law, but the court failed to acknowledge that this custom doesn't deprive him of his rights to his natural family's property, despite receiving property from his father-in- law. Furthermore, the defendants' claim that the 1 st plaintiff was adopted as Dharmagari Ramaiah's son lacks merit since Dharmagari Ramaiah performed the marriage of his daughter with the 1 st plaintiff, and plaintiffs 2 to 6 are children from this marriage. The court also contradicted its own findings by relying on Exs.B1 to B.4 with no evidentiary value, despite previous suits showing the first plaintiff was an "Illarikam" son-in-law, not an adopted son. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents- defendants would submit that the surname of 1st plaintiff clearly shows that he is an adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah as such, he is Dharmagari Venkat Reddy, whereas, the surname of defendants starts with the word ‘S’ but not ‘D’. It is an admitted fact that Dharmagari Ramaiah had no sons and he adopted 1st plaintiff and later performed the marriage of his elder daughter with him. Hence, as an adopted son he is not entitled for any share in the natural family. In support of their contention, they relied on the judgments in Marripudi Narasimha Rao and others Vs Maripudi Chenchaiah and others, 2018(5) ALD 541 Narasayya and others Vs Ramadrayya and others, AIR 1956 AP 209 In L.Debi Prasad (died) by L.Rs V Smt Tribeni Devi and others, [AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1286], it was observed as under : “8. In support of their contention, they relied on the judgments in Marripudi Narasimha Rao and others Vs Maripudi Chenchaiah and others, 2018(5) ALD 541 Narasayya and others Vs Ramadrayya and others, AIR 1956 AP 209 In L.Debi Prasad (died) by L.Rs V Smt Tribeni Devi and others, [AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1286], it was observed as under : “8. That is also the view expressed in Mayne's Hindu Law wherein it is observed that the giving and receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption; they are the operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the boy from one family to another; but the Hindu Law does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned; for a valid adoption all that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose 9. There is no doubt that the burden of proving satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father and received by Gopal Das as his adoptive son is on Shyam Behari Lal. But as observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Rajendrao Nath Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee [14 Moor's Indian Appeals p. 67] ; that although the person who pleads that he had been adopted is bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact yet from the long period during which he had been received as an adopted son, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact was to be favourably entertained, and that the case was analogous to that in which the legitimacy of a person in possession had been acquiesced in for a considerable time, and afterwards impeached by a party, who had a right to question the legitimacy, where the defendant, in order to defend his status, is allowed to invoke against the claimant every presumption which arises from long recognition of his legitimacy by members of his family; that in the case of a Hindu, long recognition as an adopted son, raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the validity of his adoption, arising from the possibility of the loss of his rights in his own family by being adopted in another family. In Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi [36 IA 103] the Judicial Committee observed that in the absence of direct evidence much value has to be attached to the fact that the alleged adopted son had without controversy succeeded to his adoptive father's estate and enjoyed till his death and that documents during his life and after his death were framed upon the basis of the adoption. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Balinki Padhano v. Gopalkrishna Padhano [ AIR 1964 Ori 117 ] ; held that in the case of an ancient adoption evidence showing that the boy was treated for a long time as the adopted son at a time when there was no controversy is sufficient to prove the adoption although evidence of actual giving and taking is not forthcoming. We are in agreement with the views expressed in the decisions referred to above. 10. In the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Passage of time gradually wipes out such evidence. Human affairs often have to be judged on the basis of probabilities. Rendering of justice will become impossible if a particular mode of proof is insisted upon under all circumstances. In judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, we have to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place years before the same is questioned, the most important evidence is likely to be that the alleged adoptive father held out the person claiming to have been adopted as his son; the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. A fact is said to have been proved where after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. A fact is said to have been proved where after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Hence if after taking an overall view of the evidence adduced in the case, we are satisfied that the adoption pleaded is true, we must necessarily proceed on the basis, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is a valid adoption as well.” 8. Basing on the above submissions, now the points to be determined are : 1. Whether the 1st appellant-1st plaintiff is an adopted son or Illatom son-in-law of Dharmagari Ramaiah ? 2. Whether the 1 st appellant-1 st plaintiff is in joint possession of the schedule properties along with defendant Nos.1 to 3 ? 3. Whether the 1 st appellant-1 st plaintiff is entitled for a share in the suit schedule properties ? 4. Whether the judgment of the trial Court needs any interference ? POINT NOs.1 TO 4 : 9. The contentions raised by the appellants herein is that 1 st plaintiff is the illatom son-in-law of Dharmagari Ramaiah and he is not adopted son of Ramaiah, whereas the contention of respondents-defendants is that 1 st plaintiff is an adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah. As such, his surname was also changed from ‘S’ to ‘D’. To prove adoption of 1st plaintiff the evidence adduced by the defendants 1 to 3 is that the surname of 1 st plaintiff is mentioned as Dharmagiri. The 1 st plaintiff admitted that though the surname of his father and defendant Nos.1 to 3 is ‘Suraram’, but in the voters list and revenue records, his surname was mentioned as Dharmagari. It is also the case of defendants that the 1 st plaintiff admitted in O.S.No.372 of 1994 that his surname as Dharmagari and in the written statement filed in the said suit, the 1 st plaintiff who is the defendant in the said suit admitted that he is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah. He stated that he went in Illatom adoption. He stated that he went in Illatom adoption. Therefore, the admission of 1st plaintiff in O.S.No.372 of 1994 itself is sufficient that he is adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah and in the wedding card of daughter of 1 st plaintiff also, his name was mentioned as Dharmagari Venkat Reddy. Exs.B.1 to B.4 clearly shows that the 1st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah, whereas, the plaintiffs’ contention is that though the surname of 1 st plaintiff was mentioned as Dharmagari, he married the daughter of Dharmagari Ramaiah and he is only Illatom son-in-law of Dharmagari Ramaiah but not his adopted son. Their further contention is that merely changing of a surname is not at all a ground to prove that 1st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah and in Ex.B.3 it is clearly mentioned that he went in Illatom adoption. If the contention of defendants is taken into consideration that 1 st plaintiff is the adopted son, he cannot marry the daughter of Dharmagari Ramaiah, as he is the adopted son, the 1st plaintiff will become brother and it is a prohibited relationship. Therefore, the said contention of defendants is wrong in the eye of law. The 1 st plaintiff filed the suit for partition stating that he is also entitled for share along with defendants 1 to 3 as he is the son of Chandra Reddy and filed document to show that property was inherited from the ancestors of Chandra Reddy, and Chandra Reddy and his brother partitioned the same. Thereafter, the share of Chandra Reddy is in joint possession of Chandra Reddy, 1 st plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 and he filed documents to prove the same. When it is the contention of defendants 1 to 3 that 1st plaintiff is the adopted son, the burden lies on them to prove adoption. There is no registered adoption deed on record to show that 1 st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah. The defendants relied on Exs.B.1 to B.4 stating that the 1 st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah, as such his name was changed as Dharmagari in the voters list and also in the marriage wedding card of 1 st plaintiff’s daughter. However, those documents are not sufficient to prove adoption. The defendants relied on Exs.B.1 to B.4 stating that the 1 st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah, as such his name was changed as Dharmagari in the voters list and also in the marriage wedding card of 1 st plaintiff’s daughter. However, those documents are not sufficient to prove adoption. Furthermore, the 1 st plaintiff married the daughter of Dharmagari Ramaiah which is an admitted fact and his contention is that he is an Illatom son-in- law. Even the document filed by the defendants under Ex.B.3 clearly shows that he is mentioned as Illatom son-in-law of Dharmagari Ramaiah. Therefore, merely changing surname as Dharmagari is not a ground to declare that 1 st plaintiff is the adopted son of Dharmagari Ramaiah. The 1 st plaintiff married the daughter of Dharmagari Ramaiah and as there is no male member in his family, he looked after the properties and also the responsibilities of Dharmagari Ramaiah as an Illatom son- in-law. As such, the finding of trial Court with regard to adoption has to be set aside. 10. Further with regard to rights of Illatom son-in-law, in his natural family, the plaintiffs filed documents to show that the properties are ancestral properties of Chandra Reddy. Exs.A.1 to A.11 shows that originally the schedule properties along with other properties are joint properties of Chandra Reddy and Chukka Reddy and their names are also reflected in Kasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 and also for later years. The trial Court observed that though the properties were in the name of brother of Chandra Reddy, no evidence is adduced by the plaintiffs to show that the properties are ancestral properties whereas, Dw.1 himself admitted in cross-examination that schedule properties are ancestral properties of Chandra Reddy and Chukka Reddy, which is sufficient to prove that properties are their ancestral properties. Further in G. Narayanappa and Another Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh , [(1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 197] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.4, 5 and 6, held as under : “4. An illatom son-in-law is in a sense, a creature of custom. It is well settled by a series of decisions that a custom of illatom adoption prevails among the Reddi and Kamma castes in territories which earlier formed part of the then Madras Presidency. An illatom son-in-law is in a sense, a creature of custom. It is well settled by a series of decisions that a custom of illatom adoption prevails among the Reddi and Kamma castes in territories which earlier formed part of the then Madras Presidency. It is stated in Mayne's Hindu Law and Usages, (13th edn., para 242 in Chapter VII), as follows: “A custom known as that of illatom adoption prevails among the Reddi and Kamma castes in the Madras Presidency. It consists in the affiliation of a son-in-law, in consideration of assistance in the management of the family property. No religious significance appears to attach to the act. Neither the execution of any document nor the performance of any ceremony is necessary. The incidents of an illatom adoption have now become crystallized into fixed rules of law by a long course of decisions. To constitute a person an illatom, a specific agreement is necessary …. After the death of the adopter he is entitled to the full rights of a son even as against natural sons subsequently born or a son subsequently adopted in the usual manner.” 5. It has also been stated by Mayne that an illatom son-in- law has no right to claim partition with his father-in-law unless there is an express agreement or custom to that effect. An illatom son-in-law is not an adopted son in any sense. In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law , (8th edn., paragraph 176), it is stated that an illatom son-in-law loses no rights of inheritance in his natural family and the property he takes in the adoptive family is taken by his own relations to the exclusion of those of his adoptive father. The position, as set out in Mulla's Hindu Law , (16th edn.) is no different. Regarding the position of an illatom son-in-law it has been inter alia observed by Mulla at para 515 (page 534) as follows: “He does not lose his right of inheritance in his natural family. Neither he nor his descendants become coparceners in the family of adoption though on the death of the adopter he is entitled to the same rights and the same share as against any subsequently born natural son or a son subsequently adopted in accordance with the ordinary law. Neither he nor his descendants become coparceners in the family of adoption though on the death of the adopter he is entitled to the same rights and the same share as against any subsequently born natural son or a son subsequently adopted in accordance with the ordinary law. He cannot claim a partition with the father-in-law and the incidents of a joint family, such for instance as right to take by survivorship, do not apply. In respect of the property or share that he may get he takes it as if it were his separate and self-acquired property.” 6. To cite just a few decisions, the custom of having an illatom son-in-law in the Kamma castes and the Reddis in Madras Presidency has been recognised in Nalluri Kristnamma v. Kamepalli Venkatasubbayya [LR (1918-19) 46 IA 168 : AIR 1919 PC 162 : 21 Bom LR 906] . The same custom has also been recognised by the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi [LR (1882) 4 Mad 272]. In Narasayya v. Rammachandrayya [ AIR 1956 AP 209 : 55 Andh WR 1] it has been held that the institution of illatom adoption, that is, affiliating a son-in-law and giving him a share, is purely a creature of custom and judicial recognition has been given to it.” 11. In view of the above judgment, the Illatom son-in-law cannot be equated with adopted son and he is entitled to rights in the natural family and he does not lose his right of inheritance in his natural family. An Illatom son-in-law has no right to claim partition with his father-in-law, unless there is an express agreement or custom to that effect. Further in Marripudi Narasimha Rao’s case in paragraph Nos.28 and 30 it was observed as under : “28. In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh, the Honble Supreme Court of India held as follows: 6. Now on whom does the burden rest and what is the scope of the evidence that is admissible? Further in Marripudi Narasimha Rao’s case in paragraph Nos.28 and 30 it was observed as under : “28. In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh, the Honble Supreme Court of India held as follows: 6. Now on whom does the burden rest and what is the scope of the evidence that is admissible? The earliest decision on the question regarding proof of custom in variance of the general law is found in Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanatha Perumal Sethuraya to the effect: it is of the essence of special usages modifying the ordinary law of succession that they should be ancient and invariable; and it is further essential that they should Be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such evidence that the Courts can be assured of their existence, and that they possess the conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends. This passage was quoted by this Court with approval in its decision in Pushpavathi Vijayaram v. P. Visweswar ( AIR 1964 SC 118 ) and this Court went on further to observe : In dealing with a family custom, the same principle will have to be applied, though, of course, in the case of a family custom, instances in support of the custom may not be as many or as frequent as in the case of customs pertaining to a territory or to the community or to the character of any estate. In dealing with family customs, the consensus of opinion amongst the members of the family, the traditional belief entertained by them and acted upon by them their statements, and their conduct would all be relevant and it is only where the relevant evidence of such a character appears to the Court to be sufficient that a specific family custom pleaded in a particular case would be held to be proved, vide Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibil Sana. 30. In S. Sugunamma V. B. Padmamma and Others, a Bench of this Court held as follows: 19. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in G. Narayanappa v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1) (1992) 1 SCC 197 , an illatom son-in-law is a creature of custom. 30. In S. Sugunamma V. B. Padmamma and Others, a Bench of this Court held as follows: 19. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in G. Narayanappa v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1) (1992) 1 SCC 197 , an illatom son-in-law is a creature of custom. The Supreme Court quoted in the said decision, a passage from Mayne's Hindu Law , which records the fact that the custom of taking a person in illatom adoption prevailed among Reddy and Kamma castes in the Madras Presidency. But the rules that govern the rights of an illatom son-in-law, as culled out from various judicial decisions both by Mayne and by N.R. Raghavachariar are as follows: (i) to constitute a person as illatom, a specific agreement is necessary, (ii) after the death of the adopter, such a son-in-law is entitled to the full rights of a son even as against natural sons subsequently born or a son subsequently adopted in the usual manner, (iii) an illatom son-in-law has no right to claim partition with his father-in-law unless there is an express agreement or custom to that effect, (iv) an illatom son-in-law cannot be taken to be an adopted son, (v) an illatom son-in-law will not lose the rights of inheritance in his natural family and similarly the property that he takes in the adoptive family is taken by his own relations to the exclusion of those of his adoptive father, (vi) neither he nor his descendants become coparceners in the family of adoption though on the death of the adopter he is entitled to the same rights and same share as against any subsequently born natural son or an adopted son, (vii) the rights of an illatom son-in-law are not identical to those conferred by law on a son or an adopted son, and (viii) an illatom son-in-law does not succeed to the properties of his father-in-law by survivorship, but only on account of custom or an agreement giving him a share in the property of his father-in-law.” 12. In view of the judgment in Narayanappa’s case the illatom son-in-law continues to be entitled to share in the property of his natural father and he will not lose his rights in the natural family and he cannot file a partition suit against father-in-law unless there is an agreement to that effect. In view of the judgment in Narayanappa’s case the illatom son-in-law continues to be entitled to share in the property of his natural father and he will not lose his rights in the natural family and he cannot file a partition suit against father-in-law unless there is an agreement to that effect. Therefore, though the plaintiff is an illatom son-in-law of Dharmagari Ramaiah, he is entitled for share in the suit schedule properties along with defendant Nos.1 to 3. As such, the 1 st plaintiff and his sons are entitled for 1/4 th share in the suit schedule properties and defendants 1 to 3 are entitled for 1/4 th share each in the suit schedule properties. However, as on the date of filing of the suit the mother of defendant Nos.1 to 3 died, and subsequently, defendant Nos.1 and 2 died, as such, the legal heirs of defendant Nos.1 and 2 are entitled for shares in 1/4 th share of defendant Nos.1 and 2. Accordingly, all the points are answered. 13. IN THE RESULT, the Appeal Suit is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2008 passed in O.S.No.414 of 2001 on the file of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions, pending, if any, shall stand closed.