JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. In the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 03.02.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shrikaranpur (‘Trial Court’) in Sessions Case No. 16/2007 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Jadawali and Ors.) whereby the accused-respondents herein were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 302 & 304B IPC , though, they were convicted and sentenced under Section 498A IPC . 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 2007 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2009. 3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf the appellant-State, are that on 04.04.2007, a written report was presented before Police Station, Shrikaranpur alleging therein that one Vimla @ Pammi (daughter of the complainant) was married to accused-respondent Gopal, 11 months prior to the presentation of the report. It was alleged that just after 3 months of the marriage his daughter was being harassed for demand of dowry by the accused-respondent Gopal (Husband), accused-respondent Jadawali (Mother in law) and accused-respondent Khushwanti (Sister in law). The report stated that, due to the said harassment the complainant made his daughter stay at his home, whereupon 2 months prior to the presentation of the report, one relative by the name of Gevarram, who had mutual relations with the complainant and the accused-respondents assured that the accused-respondents would not fight or beat the daughter of complainant, and would also not make any demand of dowry or money, and thereupon Gevarram took the daughter of complainant along with him. It was further alleged in the report that thereafter, the complainant with his daughter went to his home, from where the accused-respondent Gopal, after 2 days took her with him. It was further alleged in the said report that on 03.04.2007 at around 8:30 p.m. the complainant got to know that all accused-respondents had set the daughter of the complainant on fire, and she had been admitted in the Shriganganagar Hospital. It was further alleged that when complainant inquired, his daughter told him that accused-respondents poured kerosene on her and set her on fire, and the father in law of the complainant’s daughter was not in home at the relevant time. 3.1. It was further alleged that when complainant inquired, his daughter told him that accused-respondents poured kerosene on her and set her on fire, and the father in law of the complainant’s daughter was not in home at the relevant time. 3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was registered under Section 498A and 304B IPC and upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused-respondents under Sections 304B and 498A IPC before the concerned Court, and after hearing arguments on the stage of framing of charge, the said charges were read over to the accused-respondents, who denied the same and claimed trial, thereafter upon an application being preferred by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court passed order dated 01.09.2008 for addition of the charge under section 302 IPC , in alternative of charge under section 304B IPC and the said charges were also read over to the accused-respondents, which were denied and trial was claimed, the trial commenced accordingly. 3.2. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions for the necessary trial. 3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 18 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 18) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 30) were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, document (Ex.D.1 to 6) were exhibited; where-after, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question. 3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts with respect to the charges under section 302 and 304B, acquitted the accused-respondents herein of the charges framed under section 302 and 304B against them, however convicted and sentenced them with respect to the charge under section 498A, vide the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2012; against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State to the extent of the acquittal as stated above of the accused-respondents. 4. Mr. Ramesh Dewasi, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in law as well as facts in acquitting the accused respondents, whereas prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubts. 4.1. 4. Mr. Ramesh Dewasi, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in law as well as facts in acquitting the accused respondents, whereas prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubts. 4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that as per the record the deceased was tortured for dowry and the learned Trial Court has convicted the accused-respondents for the offence punishable under section 498A on the basis of the evidences on record, however has acquitted the accused-respondents under the charges of section 302 and 304B on the same set of evidences, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Om Prakash (father of the deceased and P.W.5), Mayadevi (mother of the deceased and P.W.6) and sister of the deceased (P.W.13) and Gevarram (relative of the deceased and P.W.7) have explicitly and in the same lines stated in their testimonies that the deceased was being harassed for dowry. 4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that P.W.6 in her testimony stated that just after 3 months of the marriage the deceased told P.W.6 that accused-respondents demanded a gold ring, television and money from her, and used to beat her. Furthermore, it was submitted that the P.W.5 and P.W.13 have corroborated with the testimony of P.W.6. It was submitted the said P.W.6 along with P.W.5 and P.W.13 have equivocally stated in their testimonies that due to such demands of dowry by accused- respondents the situation aggravated to the level that the deceased was beaten up with wires by accused-respondents, and was thrown out of the house for non-fulfillment of the said demands, whereupon the deceased went to the house of her aunt. 4.4. Learned Public prosecutor submitted that the said witnesses have further stated that the father in law of the deceased, brother of the father in law, her husband Gopal (accused-respondent) and Gevarram (P.W.7) went to the house of complainant and promised not to demand any dowry and beat the deceased. It was submitted that the said witnesses stated, that it was upon this assurance the deceased was sent to matrimonial house along with accused-respondents, however, the harassment with respect to demand of dowry did not stop. It was submitted that the said witnesses stated, that it was upon this assurance the deceased was sent to matrimonial house along with accused-respondents, however, the harassment with respect to demand of dowry did not stop. It was further submitted that P.W.7 had stated in the testimony that a compromise was arrived to the effect that the deceased would not be subjected to any further demands of dowry and beatings in connection therewith. However, despite the aforementioned assurances and compromise the complainants daughter was murdered by the accused-respondents. 5. Per Contra, Mr. Vikram Choudhary, learned Counsel for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that learned Trial Court after taking into consideration the statements made by the prosecution witnesses and the evidences on record concluded that the accused-respondents cannot be held liable under section 302 and 304B IPC . 5.1. Learned counsel submitted that the statement of the deceased under section 164 IPC (Ex.P 13) which was taken before the death of the deceased, wherein it had been alleged that the deceased was set on fire by the accused-respondents was not believable as it lacked corroboration, and a doctors’ certificate of mental fitness was not taken before recording the said statement despite the deceased being critically burnt. Furthermore, it was submitted that the testimony of P.W.5 (father of the deceased) stating that the deceased told him that the accused-respondents set her on fire cannot be believed as the father was an interested witness. Thus, it was contended that statements of the deceased recorded under 164 Cr.P.C. and the testimony of P.W.5 do not come in aid to establish a case under section 302 and 304B IPC . 5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that Rajesh Bheel (P.W.18), a police personnel stated in his testimony that it was a case of suicide and not murder. Moreover, it was contended that it was the accused-respondents themselves who took the deceased to the hospital. 5.3. Learned counsel also submitted that there was no eyewitness to the incident in question, rather the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8) or the postmortem report (EX.P.11) did not suggest any marks or signs of struggle, meaning thereby that it was a case of suicide. 5.4. 5.3. Learned counsel also submitted that there was no eyewitness to the incident in question, rather the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8) or the postmortem report (EX.P.11) did not suggest any marks or signs of struggle, meaning thereby that it was a case of suicide. 5.4. Learned counsel also submitted that even if story as alleged by prosecution is believed, it did not reveal that there was a demand of dowry soon before the death of Vimla (deceased) as after the compromise was arrived to the extent that there will be no demand of dowry of any kind in future, as stated by P.W.5, P.W.6 and P.W.7, there is no evidence on record that reflects that any such demand was made soon before her death. Thus, it was contended that one of the essential condition of section 304B that soon before the death of the woman, she being subjected to cruelty or harassment, in connection with dowry demand, was not fulfilled. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 7. This Court observes that the evidences on record revealed that Vimla @ Pammi was married to the accused-respondent Gopal approximately 11 months prior to the incident and that there existed disputes and allegations of harassment for dowry in the matrimonial home. The learned Trial Court, after appreciation of evidence, found sufficient ground to convict the accused- respondents under Section 498A IPC , acknowledging the fact of cruelty. However, with respect to the charges under Sections 302 and 304B IPC , the Trial Court passed the judgment of acquittal by extending the benefit of doubt. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State assailing the judgment dated 03.02.2009 passed by the learned Trial Court to the extent of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 302 and 304B IPC . 8. This Court observes that in the absence of any direct or ocular evidence regarding the incident in question, the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the locus classicus on circumstantial evidence is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , wherein the five golden principles for the cases based on circumstantial evidence were laid down. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced as hereunder: “...the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 9. This Court further observes that the factual matrix of the present case needs to be scrutinized in light of the aforementioned principles of circumstantial evidence. 9.1. This Court also observes that the prosecution has primarily relied on the oral testimonies of related witnesses (P.W.5, P.W.6, and P.W.13), who deposed about demands of dowry and harassment in connection therewith and earlier incidents of cruelty. However, no witness had rendered testimony so as to prove the veracity of the prosecutions case. 9.2. 9.1. This Court also observes that the prosecution has primarily relied on the oral testimonies of related witnesses (P.W.5, P.W.6, and P.W.13), who deposed about demands of dowry and harassment in connection therewith and earlier incidents of cruelty. However, no witness had rendered testimony so as to prove the veracity of the prosecutions case. 9.2. This Court finds that the testimony of P.W.18 (Police Personnel) that the deceased committed suicide, and the admitted fact that the accused-respondents themselves took the deceased to the hospital, coupled with the absence of any signs of struggle as per the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8) and postmortem report (Ex.P.11), introduces a plausible alternative hypothesis, i.e., that the deceased may have committed suicide. Moreover, the absence of any mental fitness certificate in support of the deceased’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.13), despite the deceased being critically burnt, coupled with the fact that the same is not corroborated by any independent witness renders it doubtful. 9.3. In view of the above and upon careful application of the five guiding principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) , the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances which could irresistibly point towards the guilt of the accused-respondents in the commission of offence under Section 302 IPC . The presence of multiple alternative hypotheses, including suicide, and the absence of corroborative medical evidence, independent testimony, and the lack of any direct evidence, rule out the applicability of Section 302 IPC in the present case. 10. This Court observes that for establishing the offence under Section 304B IPC , one of the essential ingredients is that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives soon before her death in connection with any demand for dowry. The legislative intent behind the use of the expression “soon before” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satbir Singh vs. State of Haryana , Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010 decided on 28.05.2021 to mean that there must be a proximate and live link between the cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand and the death in question. 10.1. 1735-1736 of 2010 decided on 28.05.2021 to mean that there must be a proximate and live link between the cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand and the death in question. 10.1. This Court also observes that in the factual matrix of the present case, while the prosecution witnesses P.W.5, P.W.6, and P.W.13 have deposed about incidents of dowry-related harassment, it is also on record that a compromise had been effected approximately two months prior to the incident, pursuant to which the deceased was sent back to her matrimonial home with assurances of good conduct. No specific or cogent evidence has been brought on record to show that any demand of dowry or act of cruelty occurred subsequent to that compromise and proximate to the death of the deceased. No witness has stated with clarity that any fresh demand for dowry or act of cruelty occurred “soon before” the death. In fact, as per P.W.5, after the settlement was reached and the deceased returned to her matrimonial home, no specific instance of cruelty or dowry demand was brought to his knowledge. This absence of proximate causation significantly weakens the foundation of the charge under Section 304B IPC . 10.2. This Court observes that in the absence of any reliable evidence indicating that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demands in the period immediately preceding her death, the requirement of "soon before" a sine qua non for conviction under Section 304B IPC , remains unfulfilled. 11. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka , Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 decided on 12.02.2024 and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 302 and 304B IPC , which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 13. 13. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 14. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting its interference. 15. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 16. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 17. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.