JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Heard Ms. S. Kar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M.P. Goswami, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent State of Assam. 2. This criminal petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [previously, Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] is preferred seeking setting aside and quashing of the proceedings of G.R. Case no. 45/2017 and Police Report Case [PRC] no. 153/2024, which arose out of Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017, presently pending before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate [M], Lakhipur, Cachar [‘the Trial Court’, for short]. 3. The facts relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the instant criminal petition can be narrated, briefly, at first. One Jadumoni Sharma, Officer In-Charge [I.O.], HSLC Examination Centre, Joypur Rajabazar, Cachar as the informant lodged the First Information Report [FIR] before the Officer In-Charge, Joypur Police Station on 17.02.2017 on the subject : ‘Regarding proxy candidates in the H.S.L.C. Exam., 2017 in the Joypur Rajabazar Centre, Cachar’. 4. In the FIR, the informant had inter-alia stated that 17 th of February, 2017 was the first day of Higher Secondary Leaving Certificate [HSLC] Examination, 2017. When the examination was being held at Joypur Rajabazar HSLC Examination Centre, the informant as the Supervising Officer with the help of other officials detected as many as ten persons who appeared as proxy candidates for ten nos. of HSLC examinees. After being detected, the proxy candidates were handed over to Police and the FIR was lodged to carry out necessary investigation in that connection. The FIR was received and registered as Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017 under Sections 448/468/420/471/419 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] on 17.02.2017. 5. After registration of the case, investigation was carried out. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], Code of Criminal Procedure [‘the Code’ and/or ‘CrPC’, for short] was submitted by the I.O. vide Charge-Sheet no. 08/2024 on 30.04.2024 finding a prima facie case against twenty nos. of accused persons for committing the offences under Sections 448/468/420/471/419, IPC. The petitioner herein is one of the twenty charge-sheeted accused persons. It is stated that after submission of the Charge- Sheet, the Trial Court took cognizance on 25.06.2024 and issued processes to the charge-sheeted accused persons for their appearance before it. 6. of accused persons for committing the offences under Sections 448/468/420/471/419, IPC. The petitioner herein is one of the twenty charge-sheeted accused persons. It is stated that after submission of the Charge- Sheet, the Trial Court took cognizance on 25.06.2024 and issued processes to the charge-sheeted accused persons for their appearance before it. 6. The first issue raised in this criminal petition to assail the criminal proceedings of G.R. Case no. 45/2017 and Police Report Case [PRC] no. 153/2024, which arose out of Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017, and presently pending before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate [M], is that in view of the provisions contained in Section 468, CrPC, the proceeding could not have proceeded further as the Trial Court is barred from taking cognizance. It is contended that after Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017 was registered on 17.02.2017, the Investigating Authority took more than seven years to submit the Charge- Sheet on 30.04.2024 and in view of the provisions contained in Section 468[2][c], CrPC, the Trial Court could not have taken cognizance on the said Charge-Sheet on 25.06.2024 as a period of three years for taking cognizance had already expired. 7. It is, thus, contended that the entire proceedings has been time barred and is liable to be set aside and quashed. 8. Section 468 of the Code reads as under :- 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation [1] Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section [2], after the expiry of the period of limitation. [2] The period of limitation shall be— [a] six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; [b] one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; [c] three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [3] For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. 9. [3] For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. 9. Regarding interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 468, CrPC, there arose conflict of opinions between a two-Judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Damodar Kale and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2003] 8 SCC 559 , which was followed in another two-Judge Bench decision in Japani Sahoo vs. Chandrasekhar Mohanty, [2007] 7 SCC 394, and a three-Judge Bench decision in Krishna Pillai vs. T.A. Rajendran and another, [1990] Supp SCC 121 . In Bharat Damodar Kale [supra] it was held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of a process by Court. In Krishna Pillai [supra], the Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which stated that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. The three-Judge Bench held that since Magisterial action in the case before it was beyond the period of one year from the date of commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance when he did in view of the bar under Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. As a result, a conflict arose apparently on the question whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC in respect of a criminal complaint, the relevant date is the filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance. 9.1. The following questions arose for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Mrs. Sarah Mathew vs. the Institute of Cardio-Vascular Diseases, [2014] 2 SCC 62 :- 3.1. 9.1. The following questions arose for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Mrs. Sarah Mathew vs. the Institute of Cardio-Vascular Diseases, [2014] 2 SCC 62 :- 3.1. [i] Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468, CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of the prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence? 3.2. [ii] Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai vs. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 ] or Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 ] (which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 ]), lays down the correct law? 9.2. The Constitution Bench answered the aforesaid questions as follows :- 51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468, CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale vs. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 ] which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 ] lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai vs. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. 10. Answering the reference, the Constitution Bench has observed that if the date on which the complaint is filed is taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the period of limitation, there is no question of it being time barred. 10. Answering the reference, the Constitution Bench has observed that if the date on which the complaint is filed is taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the period of limitation, there is no question of it being time barred. After a thorough examination of the provisions contained in Chapter-XXXVI with the heading, ‘Limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences’ in the Code the Constitution Bench had observed that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. 11. In Bharat Damodar Kale and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2003] 8 SCC 559 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explaining the provisions contained in 468, CrPC, has made it clear that the Magistrate can take cognizance of a complaint if filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of the offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the situation in the following manner :- 50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law. 51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted [and there is no dispute about it] that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings. 53. In the instant case, the complaint was filed within a period of three days from the date of alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, must be held to be filed within the period of limitation even though cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate after a period of one year. Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed by the High Court, the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside by directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. 12. A doubt has been expressed with regard to the expression, ‘institution of prosecution’ submitting that the expression has not been defined in the Code. The expression, ‘institution of prosecution’ is wide enough to include within its ambit filing of a complaint or lodging of a First Information Report [FIR]. 12. A doubt has been expressed with regard to the expression, ‘institution of prosecution’ submitting that the expression has not been defined in the Code. The expression, ‘institution of prosecution’ is wide enough to include within its ambit filing of a complaint or lodging of a First Information Report [FIR]. In other words, ‘institution of prosecution’ under the Code would mean initiation of prosecution upon giving of information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154, CrPC, or upon filing of a written complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 200, CrPC. 13. The factual matrix involved in Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni and others, [2022] 13 SCC 128 , is that the appellant filed a written complaint before the concerned Superintendent of Police on 10.07.2012 claiming that he had entrusted 33.139 KG of silver to the respondent; and on 04.10.2009, on demand being made by him, the respondent refused to return the silver. The FIR was registered and, after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 13.11.2012 for the offences punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code [IPC]. Thereupon, the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate, First Class took cognizance on 04.12.2012. On 12.09.2013, charges were framed. The Orders were put to challenge on the ground that the Order taking cognizance was barred by limitation in view of Section 468, CrPC. It was contended that the date of offence alleged by the complainant was passed on 04.10.2009 and the Order taking cognizance was on 04.12.2012, which was beyond a period of three years as stipulated in 468[2][c], CrPC. 13.1. The Hon’ble Court after following the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew [supra] has observed as follows :- 11. Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of law by the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew case [Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 721], do not admit of any doubt that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The High Court has made a fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e. 4-12- 2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the appellant on 10-7-2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of commission of offence i.e. 4-10-2009. 14. From the above exposition, it is evidently clear that the date of institution of prosecution would be the date of lodging of the First Information Report under Section 154, CrPC. Therefore, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468, CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of lodging of the FIR and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. 15. Reverting back to the facts of the case in hand, it can be noticed that the FIR lodged on 17.02.2017 in connection with Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017 was in respect of an incident which occurred on 17.02.2017 itself. The FIR was registered for offences under Sections 448/468/420/471/419 of the IPC. After investigation, the Charge-Sheet was submitted on 30.04.2024 and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on 25.06.2024. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Order dated 25.06.2024 taking cognizance of the offences is barred by limitation. 16. The second issue raised on behalf of the petitioner is that there was inordinate delay in completing the investigation of Joypur Police Station Case no. 04/2017. It has been pointed out that the investigating authority took more than seven years to complete the investigation and to submit the Charge-Sheet. The issue raised does not have much force. There is no limitation prescribed under the Code for completion of investigation into an offence and for filing of charge-sheet before Courts. Section 173[1] of the Code has provided that every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay. Section 173, CrPC was amended by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31.12.2009 and a new sub-section [1A] was added to it. As per the newly added sub-section [1A], the investigation in relation to rape of a child may be completed within three months from the date on which the information was recorded by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station. Section 173, CrPC was amended by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31.12.2009 and a new sub-section [1A] was added to it. As per the newly added sub-section [1A], the investigation in relation to rape of a child may be completed within three months from the date on which the information was recorded by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station. There is nothing in the Code/BNSS to the effect that an investigation would get termination upon expiry of a specific period. 17. Having regard to such settled position of law, the issues raised in this criminal petition are found to be misconceived and bereft of any merit. Resultantly, the criminal petition being not merited, is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly ordered. No cost.