ORDER : 1. The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked by way of filing an application under Section 483 BNSS at the instance of accused-petitioner. The requisite details of the matter are tabulated herein below: S. No. Particulars of the Case 1. FIR Number 0568/2024 2. Concerned Police Station Mahamandir 3. District Jodhpur 4. Offences alleged in the FIR 406,420 of IPC 5. Offences added, if any 6. Date of passing of impugned order 19.12.2024 2. The concise facts of the case as alleged in the FIR are that the complainant, Bela Prasad, wife of late Ganga Prasad, resident of Hathiyon Ki Bawdi, Rasala Road, Jodhpur, states that she rented the upper portion of her house to Mukesh Kumar (S/o Chhaganlal Khara, Village Sanchore) from 2011 to 2021. Over time, close and familial relations developed. In 2017, Mukesh borrowed Rs. 30,000 for his father's medical treatment, which he repaid, thereby further strengthening her trust. In 2019, Mukesh, an employee of the State Bank of India (SBI), requested that she take a loan in her name for his personal and family needs (medical and property- related), assuring her that he would repay the EMIs. Accordingly, a loan of Rs. 2,94,000 was sanctioned through her SBI account (originally at Raika Bagh branch), which Mukesh had transferred without her written consent to SBI Pali Industrial Area branch. He paid only a few instalments, and the complainant had to bear the remaining repayment burden. Later, upon obtaining her bank statement, she discovered that another loan of Rs. 3,31,000 was fraudulently sanctioned on 28.04.2023 in her name, without her presence or consent, and Rs. 3,05,000 was unlawfully transferred to Mukesh’s account through forged documents in collusion with SBI officials. When confronted, Mukesh pleaded for forgiveness and promised to repay the money with interest. In October 2024, Mukesh issued a cheque of Rs. 3,91,100 dated 28.10.2024, which was dishonoured. Subsequently, he gave a written undertaking on plain paper on 09.11.2024 to repay Rs. 9,00,000 by 14.11.2024, but failed to do so. On 16.11.2024, while checking her bank account at SBI Piyush Bhawan branch (Account No. 32780131731), she discovered only Rs. 1640 in her account. Upon inquiry, she learned that large sums had been fraudulently withdrawn by Mukesh using forged signatures and fake documents in collusion with bank officials. Despite repeated follow-ups, neither Mukesh nor his family returned the money. On 16.11.2024, while checking her bank account at SBI Piyush Bhawan branch (Account No. 32780131731), she discovered only Rs. 1640 in her account. Upon inquiry, she learned that large sums had been fraudulently withdrawn by Mukesh using forged signatures and fake documents in collusion with bank officials. Despite repeated follow-ups, neither Mukesh nor his family returned the money. Instead, she was threatened that if Mukesh committed suicide, they would initiate legal action against her. It has also come to light that Mukesh is heavily indebted to several individuals. Hence, the complainant prays for registration of an FIR and strict legal action against Mukesh Kumar and the concerned bank officials involved in the conspiracy, forgery, misappropriation, and breach of trust. 3. It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that no case for the alleged offences is made out against him and his incarceration is not warranted. There are no factors at play in the case at hand that may work against grant of bail to the accused-petitioner and he has been made an accused based on conjectures and surmises. 4. Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application and submits that the present case is not fit for enlargement of accused on bail. 5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the entire material available on record. On a prima facie consideration, it appears that the dispute is essentially based on financial transactions arising from a relationship of trust between the parties. The record reveals that the trial is yet to commence and the conclusion of trial may take considerable time. In these circumstances, and having regard to the nature of allegations, it is deemed appropriate to consider the petitioner’s prayer for bail. 6. It is not disputed that the accused-petitioner has remained behind the bars for a period exceeding six months. Despite this prolonged incarceration, the trial has not yet commenced, nor is there any clear indication from the record that it will begin in the near future. Continued detention of the petitioner, solely on the ground that further investigation is ongoing against other alleged co-accused persons (including certain bank officials), cannot be a valid basis to prolong the pre-trial custody of the present accused. Continued detention of the petitioner, solely on the ground that further investigation is ongoing against other alleged co-accused persons (including certain bank officials), cannot be a valid basis to prolong the pre-trial custody of the present accused. A person should not be subjected to punitive detention before conviction unless there exists a clear and compelling reason for doing so. The liberty of an undertrial cannot be sacrificed at the altar of a speculative future investigation, especially when there is no credible apprehension that the petitioner may tamper with evidence or flee from justice. 7. The argument advanced on behalf of the complainant that he still wishes to be heard at greater length, has also been duly taken into consideration. However, this Court is satisfied that both parties have been afforded full and fair opportunity to present their submissions and no useful purpose would be served by keeping the matter pending merely to prolong the hearing. Upon balancing the rights of the accused against the need for fair investigation and societal interest, this Court finds no cogent ground to deny the relief sought by the petitioner. 8. Further, the argument of the complainant that in the future the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 might also be invoked and therefore the matter would no longer remain triable by a Magistrate, is not only premature and speculative, but also patently misconceived. At present, the charge-sheet has been filed under Sections 420 and 406 IPC, which are triable by a Magistrate. The judicial process cannot operate on hypothetical extensions of investigation or distant legal possibilities. This Court cannot predicate the liberty of a person on the basis of imaginative contingencies which may or may not arise. To detain an accused based on such speculative reasoning would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice and an erosion of the presumption of innocence, which is the cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence. 9. In support of the petitioner’s contention that the matter is triable by a Magistrate and hence a liberal approach on the question of bail ought to be adopted, reference may be made to the judgment passed by this Court in Dharmendra v. State of Rajasthan , S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 11484/2023 decided on 07.10.2023 . 9. In support of the petitioner’s contention that the matter is triable by a Magistrate and hence a liberal approach on the question of bail ought to be adopted, reference may be made to the judgment passed by this Court in Dharmendra v. State of Rajasthan , S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 11484/2023 decided on 07.10.2023 . In the said case, bail was granted in respect of offences under Sections 420 , 406, and 120-B IPC—offences similar to the present matter—on the ground that they are triable by a Magistrate, and that the core principle of bail jurisprudence is to balance the liberty of the accused with the necessity of securing their presence during trial. The Court lucidly enunciated that denying bail in cases triable by Magistrates, particularly when there is no allegation of absconding or tampering with evidence, amounts to premature elongation of sentence and a judicial appropriation of the sentencing discretion vested in the Magistracy, thereby undermining the legislative architecture of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. It is further imperative to elaborate that in the present case, the offences alleged— Sections 420 and 406 IPC—are non-bailable but bailable by discretion, and are triable by a Magistrate of First Class. The maximum punishment prescribed under Section 420 IPC is imprisonment of up to seven years, and under Section 406 IPC, three years. These fall well within the sentencing jurisdiction of the Magistracy under Section 29 Cr.P.C. The assertion of the complainant that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act may be added at a future stage is purely speculative and does not alter the present prosecutorial framework, which is solely based on IPC offences. Judicial adjudication must proceed on the basis of existing legal material and not hypothetical legislative outcomes. As held in Dharmendra (supra), the speculative invocation of additional statutes cannot be made a ground to deny bail when the current charge-sheet pertains only to offences triable by a Magistrate. It is judicially impermissible to detain an accused for offences that might, but have not yet, been invoked. Courts must refrain from allowing their processes to be driven by imaginative apprehensions, lest such practices compromise the accused’s right to liberty and the presumption of innocence that animates our criminal justice system. 11. It is judicially impermissible to detain an accused for offences that might, but have not yet, been invoked. Courts must refrain from allowing their processes to be driven by imaginative apprehensions, lest such practices compromise the accused’s right to liberty and the presumption of innocence that animates our criminal justice system. 11. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage prior to conviction, grant of bail is the norm and refusal must remain an exception, to be exercised only in circumstances where denial is imperative to ensure the proper administration of justice. The fundamental rationale behind pre-trial detention is to secure the accused’s presence during the trial. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner has attempted to evade the process of law or that he poses a flight risk. Absent any such material, his continued incarceration would serve no tangible purpose. 12. There is high probability that the trial may take long time to conclude. In light of these facts and circumstances, it is deemed suitable to grant the benefit of bail to the petitioner in the present matter. 13. It is nigh well settled law that at a pre-conviction stage; bail is a rule and denial from the same should be an exception. The purpose behind keeping an accused behind the bars during trial would be to secure his presence on the day of conviction so that he may receive the sentence as would be awarded to him. Otherwise, it is the rule of Crimnal Jurisprudence that he shall be presumed innocent until the guilt is proved. 14. Accordingly, the instant bail application under Section 483 BNSS . is allowed and it is ordered that the accused- petitioner as named in the cause title shall be enlarged on bail provided he/she furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court concerned on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so.