ORDER : 1. By way of filing this instant petition under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has assailed the judgment dated 07.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra (Shri T.H. Samma, RHJS) in Criminal Appeal No. 8/2004, whereby the learned appellate court, while partly allowing the petitioner’s appeal, modified and reduced the substantive sentences awarded to him by the trial court and sentenced him to undergo one month’s simple imprisonment under Section 279 IPC, three months’ simple imprisonment under Section 337 IPC, nine months’ simple imprisonment under Section 338 IPC, and one year’s simple imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC, along with a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one month’s simple imprisonment, with all sentences directed to run concurrently. The petitioner has also challenged the earlier judgment dated 26.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Balotra in Criminal Case No. 123/1997, whereby he was convicted and sentenced to six months’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 279 IPC, six months’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 337 IPC, one year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 338 IPC, and two years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default thereof, to further undergo two months’ simple imprisonment, with all sentences directed to run concurrently. The petitioner seeks setting aside of both the judgments on the grounds urged in the present revision. 2. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged on 05.12.1996 by one Ashok Kumar at Police Station Kalyanpur, alleging that on the same day, while he and his family members were travelling in a Rajasthan Roadways bus (No. RJ-04 P-0098) towards Pali, and the bus was being driven by Rana Ram, a truck (No. RJ-01 G-0457), driven rashly and negligently by one Bhanwru Khan, collided with the bus near Balotra. The truck entered from the driver’s side, causing injuries to several passengers including the driver and the conductor (khalasi). One passenger, Gudi No. Satya Narayan, died on the spot. Upon registration of the FIR, the police investigated the matter and filed a chargesheet against the present petitioner. The case was tried before the Judicial Magistrate, Balotra. During the trial, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses and exhibited several documents. The petitioner’s statement was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and one defence witness (DW-1 Shokin) was also examined. Upon registration of the FIR, the police investigated the matter and filed a chargesheet against the present petitioner. The case was tried before the Judicial Magistrate, Balotra. During the trial, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses and exhibited several documents. The petitioner’s statement was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and one defence witness (DW-1 Shokin) was also examined. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned Judicial Magistrate convicted the petitioner for offences under Sections 279 , 337, 338, and 304-A IPC and sentenced him accordingly vide judgment dated 26.08.2004. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, who, vide judgment dated 07.07.2006, partly allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence on each count. Challenging the legality, propriety, and correctness of both the judgments, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present revision petition. 3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 4. Before proceeding to analyse the merits of the impugned conviction and sentence, this Court deems it appropriate to advert to a significant finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in the appellate judgment dated 07.07.2006. At paragraph 8 (pages 6–7), the learned Judge has categorically observed that: 5. The above finding clearly reflects that the occurrence was a consequence of joint or contributory negligence of both the drivers involved. The learned Sessions Judge has himself noted that if either of the drivers had taken reasonable care, the accident could have been averted. Notably, the Roadways bus driver was found to be equally culpable, yet, for reasons unexplained on record, only the present petitioner was arraigned and prosecuted. This unilateral prosecution raises serious doubts regarding the fairness of the investigative process and casts a shadow on the legitimacy of the petitioner’s conviction. 6. In light of the above, and for the purpose of dispelling any ambiguity while undertaking a further re-appreciation of evidence, this Court has independently scrutinised the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. A cumulative reading of the testimonies reveals glaring inconsistencies and a conspicuous absence of cogent evidence to conclusively establish that the petitioner was the person driving the truck at the relevant time: PW-1 candidly admitted that she could not identify the driver of the truck. PW-2 explicitly stated that he did not witness the occurrence. PW-3 gave no testimony regarding the identity of the truck driver. PW-2 explicitly stated that he did not witness the occurrence. PW-3 gave no testimony regarding the identity of the truck driver. PW-4 merely stated that the bus was being driven by Rana Ram but did not establish who was driving the offending truck. PW-5 is not a witness to the factum probandum and lends no assistance to the prosecution's core case. PW-6 also did not mention anything concerning the identity of the truck driver. PW-7 is not a witness to the principal fact in issue and hence his testimony holds no probative value. PW-8 affirmed that he had no knowledge about who was driving the truck. PW-10, while claiming to have seen the truck, initially did not name the driver, and only in court identified the petitioner, who was singularly standing in the dock. No prior identification was conducted in his presence, and the manner in which the identification was made — for the first time during trial — severely undermines its evidentiary weight. Notably, he also stated that he lost consciousness due to the impact of the collision, thereby rendering his claim of recognising the driver inherently doubtful and legally unreliable. PW-11 did not support the prosecution version at all. PW-12 unequivocally attributed the cause of the accident to the negligence of the bus driver. PW-13 denied knowledge regarding the petitioner’s involvement. PW-14, while claiming that the truck was being driven by Bhanwru Khan and that it hit the bus from behind, failed to demonstrate how he came to know about the identity of the driver, especially in light of his own injury and the impact happening from behind. PW-16, in her examination-in-chief, admitted that she was told after the accident by someone that the petitioner was the driver. Her statement lacks personal knowledge and is therefore inadmissible as hearsay. PW-17 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution. PW-18 and PW-20 are not relevant to the principal issue of identity or culpability. PW-19, being the Investigating Officer, is limited to the formal aspects of investigation and is not a witness to the occurrence itself. 7. The combined effect of the above depositions is that there exists no direct, reliable, and legally admissible evidence affirmatively identifying the petitioner as the person driving the offending vehicle at the time of the incident. The prosecution’s case is replete with contradictions, assumptions, and speculative assertions unsupported by a coherent chain of evidence. 7. The combined effect of the above depositions is that there exists no direct, reliable, and legally admissible evidence affirmatively identifying the petitioner as the person driving the offending vehicle at the time of the incident. The prosecution’s case is replete with contradictions, assumptions, and speculative assertions unsupported by a coherent chain of evidence. In criminal jurisprudence, conviction cannot rest on conjecture or presumption, particularly in the absence of a Test Identification Parade or prior consistent statement establishing the accused’s identity. 8. Moreover, the presence of doubt regarding the exclusive culpability of the petitioner is further compounded by the appellate court’s own finding of joint negligence. When the responsibility for the accident is evenly apportioned between the petitioner and the bus driver, the selective prosecution of only one party — and the exoneration of the other without lawful justification — raises serious questions of due process and prosecutorial fairness. 9. It is trite law that when two possible inferences emerge from the evidence — one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence — the benefit of doubt must invariably go to the accused. The present case, as it stands, not only presents such conflicting inferences, but also suffers from material infirmities and legal deficiencies in proof, particularly with respect to the essential ingredient of identity and exclusive criminal negligence. 10. The law is well settled that in order to fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, it must be shown that the death was the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that the said act was the proximate and efficient cause of death, uninfluenced by any intervening or contributory negligence. This position was lucidly expounded by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap , 4 Bom. L.R. 679 , wherein it was held: “To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, INDIAN PENAL CODE , it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.” 11. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.” 11. In the present case, the very foundation of prosecution is clouded by the trial court's and appellate court's concurrent findings that the bus driver was equally responsible, and the overwhelming lack of direct, credible, and unambiguous evidence identifying the petitioner as the actual driver of the offending truck. Thus, the legal ingredients for invoking criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC — particularly the requirement of exclusive rash and negligent act being the proximate cause — remain unfulfilled. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion and guided by the legal principles enunciated in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial court and the appellate court suffer from legal infirmities, factual inconsistencies, and improper appreciation of evidence. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner under Sections 279 , 337, 338, and 304-A IPC cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 13. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The judgments dated 26.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Balotra, and dated 07.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, are hereby set aside. The petitioner stands acquitted of all charges. His bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. 14. The record be sent back.