JUDGMENT : C M JOSHI, J. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 2. None appears for the respondent. 3. Being aggrieved by the judgment in R.A.No.2/2003 by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kudligi dated 01.09.2008, which reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff is before this Court in appeal. 4. It is the contention of the appellant that he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit schedule property bearing Sy.No.247 on the eastern side and the defendant is the owner of the said survey number on the western side. It is the case of the plaintiff that on the western side of the property purchased by the defendant, there is a north south National Highway and on the northern side of the National Highway there is a Village Hosahalli and on the southern side on the West of the National Highway a village Hulikeri is situated. It is the case of the plaintiff that he and his father and brother were owning Sy.Nos.246 and 245 which is on the southern side of Sy.No.247 and after their partition, the plaintiff was given his share in Sy.No.248. However, he purchased the eastern portion of Sy.No.247 which abuts the property belonging to his brother and father as may be seen from the hand sketch map prepared by the Court Commissioner. 5. It is the case of the plaintiff that in order to approach the property purchased by him, he has to pass through the property of the defendant. Therefore, there is an easement of necessity for him. He also submits that the defendant had purchased his property in Sy.No.247 subsequent to the purchase by the plaintiff and therefore, the defendant has to yield to the requirement of the plaintiff to approach his land through the property purchased by the defendant. Therefore, he contends that he has the right of easement of necessity to pass through the property of the defendant. It is his case that his brother and father are not allowing him to pass through their land though a mud road is shown by the Court Commissioner in his sketch. Therefore, he contends that he has the right of easement of necessity to pass through the property of the defendant. It is his case that his brother and father are not allowing him to pass through their land though a mud road is shown by the Court Commissioner in his sketch. When there was obstruction by the defendant to use the said cart road to approach his property, there was cause of action and as such, he has filed suit seeking a declaration that he has right of way through the property of the defendant as shown in the hand sketch map. 6. The defendant had appeared before the Trial Court and had filed the written statement. The defendant denied the contention of the plaintiff and stated that the defendant is from Hosahalli Village and the plaintiff is from Hulikere. Therefore, it would be nearer for the plaintiff to approach his property in Sy.No.247 through the property of his brother or father i.e., Sy.Nos.245 and 246. It was stated by the defendant that there is no such easement of necessity as claimed by the plaintiff and when the alternate road is there for the plaintiff to approach his property, there cannot be any easement of necessity. The written statement contends that the topography of the land is such that the plaintiff can approach his land through the property of his father or brother and therefore, there is no need to carve a cart road through the property of the defendant. 7. On the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues were framed by the Trial Court. “i) Whether the plaintiff proves that he has acquired right of easement of necessity over the suit cart way shown by letters A and B in plaint sketch in defendants land Sy.No.247 & 248 as contended? ii) If so, whether plaintiff proves the illegal interference by defendant as contended? iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for? iv) What order or decree?” 8. The plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and three witnesses were examined as PW.2 to PW.4. Ex.P.1 to P.5 were marked in evidence. The defendant was examined as DW.1 and four witnesses were examined as DW.2 to DW.5. Ex.D.1 was marked. 9. iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for? iv) What order or decree?” 8. The plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and three witnesses were examined as PW.2 to PW.4. Ex.P.1 to P.5 were marked in evidence. The defendant was examined as DW.1 and four witnesses were examined as DW.2 to DW.5. Ex.D.1 was marked. 9. After hearing the arguments, the Trial Court decreed the suit as prayed by the plaintiff and held that the plaintiff has acquired the right of easement of necessity over the suit cart track as shown in the hand sketch map and the defendants were restrained from obstructing the plaintiff to use the said cart track. Being aggrieved, the defendant approached the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.2/2003. After hearing the arguments, the First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that there being an alternate road for the plaintiff to approach his property, there is no easement of necessity created and therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff is before this Court in second appeal. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, this Court framed the following substantial question of law on 09.09.2009. “i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court erred and in that regard whether the manner of re- appreciation of the evidence would admit of perversity when the Trial Court has recorded finding in favour of the plaintiff based on the very same evidence which was available before it? ii) Whether in that circumstance the Lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court?” 11. Thereafter, despite service of notice, the respondent has not appeared before this Court. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the Trial Court in fact had appreciated the oral testimony of the witnesses in detail. He submits that when the father of the plaintiff and his brother have denied to accede to his request to pass through their land, it cannot be held that the plaintiff had an alternate road. Secondly, he submits that the plaintiff as well as the defendant had purchased Sy.No.247 from the same vendor and therefore, the plaintiff acquires right to approach his property through the property of the defendant. Secondly, he submits that the plaintiff as well as the defendant had purchased Sy.No.247 from the same vendor and therefore, the plaintiff acquires right to approach his property through the property of the defendant. It is pointed out that Sy.No.247, on the eastern side is held by the plaintiff and the portion on the western side abutting the National Highway. 13. Perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that, while answering the issue framed on the acquisition of the right of easement of necessity over the suit cart road shown by letters A and B in the plaint sketch, in the land of the defendants, it comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff as well as the defendant had acquired the property from the same vendor and therefore, it was necessary for the vendor to earmark the cart road to approach the property of the plaintiff. It observes that the previous owner, Benakashetty Thippeswamy, under the registered sale deed dated 02.03.1995, sold the property to the plaintiff. After the sale, the name of the plaintiff was recorded in the revenue records and the remaining land in both the survey numbers have been sold to the defendant about two months prior to the filing of the suit. When there was obstruction, the plaintiff approached the Trial Court seeking that he had no other way except the cart road through the property of the defendants and therefore, there is an easement of necessity. 14. The Trial Court observed that the defendant has distanced himself away from such knowledge and denied the claim of the plaintiff. By relying on the testimony of PW.1, it opined that the plaintiff has no other way than the suit cart road to approach his property purchased from the said Benakashetty Thippeswamy. It further observes that PW.1 had stated that on the Southern side, there is a property belonging to his father and there is a gate which leads to a mud road. However, he denied that the said mud road can be used to go to the property of the plaintiff. The Trial Court also observes the testimony of PW.2 and PW.3 and comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has the right of easement to pass through the property of the defendant shown by letters A and B in the sketch. After coming to such conclusion, the Trial Court decreed the suit. 15. The Trial Court also observes the testimony of PW.2 and PW.3 and comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has the right of easement to pass through the property of the defendant shown by letters A and B in the sketch. After coming to such conclusion, the Trial Court decreed the suit. 15. The First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment observed that the initial onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that there is a cart track situated in the land of the defendant to approach his land and secondly, the plaintiff has to prove that there is no alternative way to reach his land except through the land of the defendant. After observing so, it notices that in the cross-examination of PW.1 it was elicited that there is a mud road on the Southern side of the property belonging to the land of the father of the plaintiff and through it, the plaintiff can approach his property. It holds that the admission of PW.1 goes to show that there is an alternative way to approach his property and therefore, it comes to the conclusion that there is no such easement of necessity for the plaintiff. It also observes that the village of the plaintiff is on its Southern side and it would be roundabout for the plaintiff to approach his property from the Northern side and as such there is no such probability that the plaintiff wants a cart track through the property of the defendant. In this regard, it relies on the report of the Court Commissioner in paragraph No.17 and holds that there is no such easement of necessity. 16. It is in the light of the above divergent findings that the evidence on record needs to be considered by this Court on the anvil of law of easement. The first document in this regard, which needs to be looked into is a sale deed of the plaintiff and the defendant executed by the said Benakashetty Thippeswamy. The sale deed of the plaintiff is produced at Ex.P.1. It shows that 80 cents out of 2 acre 59 cents in Sy.No.247 and 2 acre 20 cents out of 4 acre 86 cents in Sy.No.248 were purchased by the plaintiff on 02.03.1995. In the said sale deed, there is no mention of any easementary right. The sale deed of the plaintiff is produced at Ex.P.1. It shows that 80 cents out of 2 acre 59 cents in Sy.No.247 and 2 acre 20 cents out of 4 acre 86 cents in Sy.No.248 were purchased by the plaintiff on 02.03.1995. In the said sale deed, there is no mention of any easementary right. Obviously, the remaining portion of the property in the said survey numbers were retained by the seller Benakashetty Thippeswamy. 17. The Ex.P.5 happens to be the registered partition deed among the plaintiff and his father and brothers. In this document also, there is no mention that any easementary right is given to the plaintiff to pass through the property of his father and brothers. Thus, there is no documentary evidence to establish that there is any easmentary right created in favour of the plaintiff. 18. The perusal of the documents produced by the defendant also does not show anything in this regard. The defendant has not produced any such document, except the hand sketch map which was prepared by the Court Commissioner. 19. The perusal of the report of the Court Commissioner shows that plaintiff is a resident of Hulikeri Village and the defendant is a resident of Hosahalli Village. The suit schedule property is situated on the Eastern side of both these villages and in between there is a National Highway running North-South. It is stated that the plaintiff is approaching his property purchased in Sy.Nos.247 and 248 by going towards North on the Highway and then, he is taking a turn towards East to approach his property through the property of defendant. The Court Commissioner also observes that the distance would be around 1000 meters. He also observes that immediately on exiting the Hulikeri village of the plaintiff, he can turn towards Sy.No.245 of the relatives of the plaintiff and through the mud road, he can approach his property and the distance would be 600 meters. The said Sy.No.245 belongs to the father and brothers of the plaintiff who are the parties to the partition as per Ex.P.5. The testimony of the father of the plaintiff, who is examined as PW.3 shows that, he has refused to allow the plaintiff to approach his land through the Southern mud road as shown by the Court Commissioner in Ex.D.1. The testimony of the father of the plaintiff, who is examined as PW.3 shows that, he has refused to allow the plaintiff to approach his land through the Southern mud road as shown by the Court Commissioner in Ex.D.1. He admits that on the Southern side of the land of the plaintiff, his property is situated and he denies that he would allow the plaintiff to approach his property through the land which was allotted to PW.3 in the partition. 20. The testimony of the defendant who is examined as DW.1 shows that he simply denies the claim of the plaintiff in his examination-in-chief. In a cross-examination, except saying that the plaintiff can approach his property through the property of the PW.3 and other relatives, he failed to establish that, there is any alternative road. The testimony of DW.2 shows that he is the brother of the defendant and he says that he used to approach his property through the cart road, which is now claimed by the plaintiff. However, he denies that the plaintiff has no other alternative way than to suit cart road. It is pertinent to note that DW.2 admits that he used to come on the National Highway and then turn East to approach his property. 21. Similarly, the testimony of DW.3 shows that the defendant is approaching his property through NH-13 only and earlier suit cart road was used by the vendor Benakashetty Thippeswamy. However, he denies that the plaintiff is using the said cart road. The testimony of DW.3, DW.4 and DW.5 is also on the same lines and they say that one can approach the property of the plaintiff through the mud road shown through Sy.No.245 on the Southern side, but they failed to establish that the said road is open for anybody to be used, especially the plaintiff. 22. From the perusal of the above evidence on record, it may be seen that an alternative road to approach the property of the plaintiff is to be established by the defendant. Primarily, though the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the suit cart road is the only road to approach his land, the burden to prove the alternative road is on the defendant. Primarily, though the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the suit cart road is the only road to approach his land, the burden to prove the alternative road is on the defendant. If we examine the evidence available on record, it is evident that when the plaintiff and the defendant purchased their respective properties from Benakashetty Thippeswamy, the sale deeds do not mention anything. Obviously, when the properties were sold, it was incumbent upon Benakashetty Thippeswamy to spell out as to how to approach the property of the plaintiff. No such evidence is available on record. The said Benakashetty Thippeswamy has not been examined either by the plaintiff or by the defendant. Therefore, if the said Benakashetty Thippeswamy was using the property which is now sold to the defendant to approach the remaining portion of his land which has been sold to the plaintiff, the said cart road becomes an easement of necessity. Therefore, it is for the defendant to establish that there exists an alternative road for the plaintiff. 23. Though, the Court Commissioner has stated in his report that the plaintiff can approach his property through a mud road, which has a gate towards the National Highway, the father of the plaintiff who is examined as PW.3 has vehemently denied that he can allow the plaintiff to approach the property. Evidently, there has been a partition as per the registered partition deed at Ex.P.5. When this document also do not mention anything about the right of way of the plaintiff, which at that particular point of time the plaintiff did not have, it cannot be said that the defendant has proved that there is an alternative way. Whatever the defendant purchased from Benakashetty Thippeswamy was subject to the right of way to the property of the plaintiff. Therefore, it appears that the First Appellate Court by relying on Ex.D.1 the report of the Court Commissioner, jumped to the conclusion that there exists an alternative way. But this alternative way, to approach the land of the plaintiff has not been proved as required under law. Obviously, the testimony of PW.3 comes in the way of the defendant establishing it. It may be true that the mud road which is shown by the Court Commissioner in his report on the Southern side may be the shortest one i.e., 600 meters. Obviously, the testimony of PW.3 comes in the way of the defendant establishing it. It may be true that the mud road which is shown by the Court Commissioner in his report on the Southern side may be the shortest one i.e., 600 meters. However, the existence of such road for the plaintiff to use is not established. 24. On the other hand, when the defendant purchased the property subsequent to the plaintiff purchasing his property from Benakashetty Thippeswamy, there existed a right for the plaintiff to approach his property through the property which was owned by Benakashetty Thippeswamy. The said Benakashetty Thippeswamy did not mention anything about the right of way when he sold the property to the defendant. This shows that there existed a right for the plaintiff to approach his property through the property of Benakashetty Thippeswamy and therefore, the defendant purchased the property along with his obligation to allow the plaintiff to approach his property. 25. It is necessary to note that the easement of necessity comes to an end, when an alternative way is shown to be in existence. In the case on hand, there is no such alternative road shown to be in existence which would enure to the benefit of the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff has an easement of necessity to pass through the land of the defendant, which he purchased from Benakashetty Thippeswamy. Consequently, the judgment of the Trial Court deserves to be upheld. 26. It is to be noted that when the judgment of the Trial Court is being reversed by the First Appellate Court, it has to traverse the evidence as is done by the Trial Court from close quarters and then, it should point out where the Trial Court went wrong and how such view is perverse. It is settled principle of law that the First Appellate Court simply cannot replace the reasoning of the Trial Court by its views since such second view is possible. It should point out as to why the view of the Trial Court is not correct. The Appellate Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs. , (2001) 3 SCC 179 has laid down as below: “ 15. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. It should point out as to why the view of the Trial Court is not correct. The Appellate Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs. , (2001) 3 SCC 179 has laid down as below: “ 15. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary [ AIR 1967 SC 1124 ] ). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai [ (1983) 1 SCC 35 : AIR 1983 SC 114 ] ) The rule is — and it is nothing more than a rule of practice — that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh [1950 SCC 714 : AIR 1951 SC 120 ] ) Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” 27. The First Appellate Court erred in holding that there exists a mud road on the Southern side. The First Appellate Court did not notice that the said mud road on the Southern side has been denied by PW.3. It is not only that existence of alternative cart road is to be proved, but it is necessary to prove that such road is permissible for the plaintiff to be used to approach his property. This aspect having not been considered by the First Appellate Court, the judgment of the Trial Court prevails. 28. Therefore, the First Appellate Court should not have replaced the reasoning of the Trial Court by its own reasoning. Under these circumstances, the judgment of the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. In the result, the substantial question of law No.1 is answered in the affirmative and point No.2 answered in the negative . 28. Therefore, the First Appellate Court should not have replaced the reasoning of the Trial Court by its own reasoning. Under these circumstances, the judgment of the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. In the result, the substantial question of law No.1 is answered in the affirmative and point No.2 answered in the negative . Hence, the following: ORDER i) The appeal is allowed ii) The judgment of the First Appellate Court is set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court in OS No.161/1997 is restored.