JUDGMENT : MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. This petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- "i. Direct the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Buddh Nagar to decide the application 18Ga filed by the defendant/petitioner under order 39 Rule 4 of C.P.C. dated 07.04.2025 in Original Suit No.2105 of 2024 (Santosh Vs. Chirag Aashiana), expeditiously, within a time bound period as may be directed by this Hon'ble Court preferably within a period of one month. ii. Issue any other such order or directions, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case. iii. Set aside the ex-parte order dated 16.12.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Buddh Nagar." 3. Sri Nipun Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he confines his prayer to decide and consider the prayer No. 3 made in the writ petition. The prayer No. 3 in the writ petition is to set aside the ex-parte injunction order dated 16.12.2024 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Buddh Nagar. 4. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff-respondents instituted Original Suit No. 2105 of 2024 (Santosh and another Vs. Chirag Aashiana) on 16.12.2024 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) Gautam Buddh Nagar for the relief of declaration that sale deed dated 09.05.2008 is not binding on the plaintiff- respondents. A further prayer for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the land in dispute was made. The plaintiff-respondents also filed an application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. claiming interim injunction. The trial court i.e. Civil Judge (Senior Division) Gautam Buddh Nagar by order dated 16.12.2024 granted ex-parte injunction directing both the parties to maintain status quo till next date of listing. Hence the present writ petition. 5. When the learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the proposition of law that petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against an ex-parte order of injunction and that he could have also filed an application under Rule 4 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. for setting aside the order of ex-parte injunction. 5. When the learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the proposition of law that petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against an ex-parte order of injunction and that he could have also filed an application under Rule 4 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. for setting aside the order of ex-parte injunction. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no appeal could be filed against an ex-parte order of injunction as under Rule 1(r) of Order XLIII, appeal is provided only against orders passed under Rule 1, 2, 2(A), 4 and 10 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. No appeal can be filed against an order passed under Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. It has also been contended by counsel for the petitioner that in view of the judgment of this Court in case of Gurmej Singh and others Vs. Ranjit Kaur and others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine All 1531 , an appeal cannot be filed against an order of ex-parte injunction before the expiry of six months from the date of the passing of the order of the ex- parte injunction. It has been further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed in the case of Gurmej Singh (supra) has been followed by this Court in subsequent judgments i.e. India Glycols Limited Vs. Radico Khaitan Limited reported in 2 021 SCC OnLine All 516 and in the case of Rinku Maheswari & 4 others Vs. Snehlata Maheshwari and 6 others in Matters Under Article 227 No. 5356 of 2021 decided on 21.10.2021. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs S. Chellappan And Ors. /b> reported in (2000) 7 SCC 695 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a view that where the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3(A) of C.P.C. has been flouted, the aggrieved party, would be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order of ex-parte injunction. He however stated that the judgment reported in (2000) 7 SCC 695 would not be of any help as Rule 3(A) C.P.C. is no longer applicable in the State of U.P. as it stands deleted by the Notification No. 103/IV-h-360 dated 03.02.1981 issued by High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 122 of the C.P.C. 6. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that temporary injunction whether ex-parte or after hearing the parties is granted under Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX C.P.C. Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. provides for an appeal against an order granted under Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX, therefore, appeal against exparte temporary injunction order is maintainable. It has also been submitted by learned Standing Counsel that right of appeal being statutory in nature cannot be interpreted to curtail the right unless, provided by the statute granting right of appeal. 7. The question which arises therefore, for the consideration of this Court in this petition is as to whether against an order granting ex-parte injunction, an appeal can be filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of C.P.C. and further whether appeal can be filed only after the expiry of six months from the date of order granting ex-parte temporary injunction as held in case of Gurmej Singh and others (supra). 8. Before considering the aforementioned questions, it would be relevant to consider the nature of injunction orders passed by the civil courts and the power of the appellate court under Order XLIII Rule 1 of C.P.C. 9. According to Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law (2009), page 474, injunction is the standard remedy of private law for forbidding the commission of some unlawful act e.g. a tort or a breach of contract. Its sanction is imprisonment or fine for contempt of court, or attachment of property. Historically, it is an equitable remedy (since it derives from the former Courts of Chancery), and accordingly it has discretionary character. Now however even in England, it is statutory. In India, undeniably injunction is statutory in nature. 10. Injunctions are of various types. They may be classified as:- (i) temporary or perpetual (ii) prohibitory or mandatory (iii) negative or positive (iv) ad-interim or interim etc. 11. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner, it would appropriate to look into the statutory provisions relating to grant of injunction. 10. Injunctions are of various types. They may be classified as:- (i) temporary or perpetual (ii) prohibitory or mandatory (iii) negative or positive (iv) ad-interim or interim etc. 11. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner, it would appropriate to look into the statutory provisions relating to grant of injunction. Chapter VI of Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with injunctions. The relevant Sections of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are quoted as under:- “36. Preventive relief how granted.—Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. 37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions.—(1) Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specific time, or until the further order of the court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). (2) A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. 12. Sections 94 of the C.P.C. provides for grant of temporary injunction and the same is being reproduced as under:- “ 94. Supplemental proceedings. In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed,— (a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison; (b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property; (c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold; (d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property; (e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient.” 13. Order XXXIX of C.P.C. relates to temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders to be passed in a suit. Order XXXIX of C.P.C. relates to temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders to be passed in a suit. Order XXXIX of C.P.C. was amended by Amending Act of 104 of 1976 w.e.f 01.02.1977 by which Rule 2A, proviso to Rule 3 and Rule 3(A) were added by the legislature by the Amending Act. It would be useful to consider both the amended as well as unamended provisions of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. in order to decide whether an appeal will lie against an ex-parte order of injunction granted by the trial court. Un-amended Order XXXIX of C.P.C.is quoted as under:- "Order XXXIX Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory orders Temporary Injunctions 1. Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or disposition of the property as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 2. (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. (3) In the case of disobedience, or of breach of any of the terms, the Court granting the injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (4) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto. 3. The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. 4. Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order. 5........10..." 14. By Section 86 of Act No. 104 of 1976 proviso was added to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX and a new rule i.e. Rule 3(A) was also added by the said amendment which came in effect from 01.02.1977. 5........10..." 14. By Section 86 of Act No. 104 of 1976 proviso was added to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX and a new rule i.e. Rule 3(A) was also added by the said amendment which came in effect from 01.02.1977. The amended Rule 3 and 3(A) of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. is quoted as under:- "Rule 3: Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party— The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant— (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with— (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent. Rule 3-A: Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days— Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. " 15. From reading the provisions of statute quoted above, it is clear that a perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon merits of the suit, the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of right or from commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of a plaintiff. From reading the provisions of statute quoted above, it is clear that a perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon merits of the suit, the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of right or from commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of a plaintiff. Thus, perpetual or permanent injunction is granted at the conclusion of the suit, appeal or other proceeding and are based on judgment, decree or final order and operates against the defendant permanently or perpetually on merits of the case. Permanent perpetual injunction are regulated by Specific Relief Act, 1963. (Sections 36 to 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1963). 16. Temporary injunctions are such as to continue until a specified time, or until the further orders of the court and they may be granted any stage of a suit. They are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure i.e. Section 94 of C.P.C. and Order XXXIX of C.P.C. Admittedly, preliminary, interim or interlocutory injunction operates pendente lite i.e. during pendency of the suit, appeal or proceedings or for a specified period. It does not conclude the right and liabilities of the parties finally, and are regulated by the provisions of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. Section 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, envisages grant of preventive relief by way of temporary injunctions by a Court at its discretion. Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of that Act provides that such temporary injunctions may continue until a specified time or until further orders of the Court and may be granted at any stage of the suit, as regulated by the Code. Section 94(c) of the Code says that in order to prevent ends of justice from being defeated, the Court, if it is so prescribed by rules, may grant a temporary injunction. Rules 1, 2, 3, 3A and 4 of Order XXXIX of the Code enable the initial grant and the subsequent affirmation, setting aside, varying or modifying of the interim order of temporary injunctions. Section 151 of the Code enables the Court to grant temporary injunctions in certain residuary situations, as provisions of Order XXXIX are not exhaustive of the Court's injunctive jurisdiction. Section 94(c) of the Code provides that the Court may grant a temporary injunction only "if it is so prescribed". Section 151 of the Code enables the Court to grant temporary injunctions in certain residuary situations, as provisions of Order XXXIX are not exhaustive of the Court's injunctive jurisdiction. Section 94(c) of the Code provides that the Court may grant a temporary injunction only "if it is so prescribed". The expression "prescribed" in Section 94 would obviously mean, as defined in Section 2(16) of the Code, "prescribed by Rules". The Rules which prescribe grant of temporary injunction are Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX and, therefore, a temporary injunction may be granted under Section 94(c) only if a case satisfying the requirements of Rules 1 and 2, Order XXXIX is made out. Court does not have two sources of power, one under Section 94(c) and another under Order XXXIX of the Code and may resort to one or the other as and when necessary. Under the Code the Court grants temporary injunction only under one set of provisions, namely, Section 94(c) read with Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. It is true that, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Vs. Seth Hiralal MANU/SC/0056/1961: AIR 1962 SC 527 , a Court can grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers also, but there it does not grant it under any power conferred by the Code but under powers inhering in its very constitution which are saved by and under Section151 of the Code. 17. Interim or temporary injunction may consist of two stages:- (i) ad-interim injunction, which is granted without finally deciding or disposing the application for injunction and operates immediately till the disposal of the application or till some other order is passed. (ii) interim injunction is normally granted while deciding and disposing the application for interim injunction to ensure, generally, till disposal of the suit. 18. Section 37 of Specific Relief Act, Section 94 (c) C.P.C. or Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C., which provides for temporary injunction do not use the word interim or ad-interim. Interim or ad-interim are the phrases coined by legal fraternity to indicate the stage at which such orders are passed. Bombay High Court in case of Rajendraprasad R. Singh vs The Municipal Corpn. Of Gr. Bombay ; AIR 2003 BOM 392 stated: “Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XXXIX do not use the words "interim or ad interim". Interim or ad-interim are the phrases coined by legal fraternity to indicate the stage at which such orders are passed. Bombay High Court in case of Rajendraprasad R. Singh vs The Municipal Corpn. Of Gr. Bombay ; AIR 2003 BOM 392 stated: “Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XXXIX do not use the words "interim or ad interim". These are the words coined by the lawyers and the courts merely to indicate the stage at which orders are passed. Interim order usually remains in force for whole of the period of the suit unless varied under Rule 4 or set aside in appeal. Ad interim order operates only till the hearing of the application for injunction.” 19. Usually, ad interim order is passed ex parte though it can also be passed when other side is present. It is possible that in a given case at the time of institution of a suit, the plaintiff does not make an application for an order of interim injunction as he feels no necessity in which case only summons of the suit are issued to the defendant. During the pendency of the suit, a contingency may arise requiring the plaintiff to apply for an injunction. When such an application is made and when the defendant is present and seeks time to file reply, the court may pass ad interim order of injunction pending reply of the defendant. In some cases, even after the reply is filed by the defendants the court may grant ad interim order of injunction if it does not have time to hear the matter and feels that it is necessary to grant injunction pending hearing to protect the plaintiff. Thus, ad interim order of injunction may be ex parte or may be passed even in the presence of the defendants. There is no qualitative difference between an interim and ad interim order except about the period for which they operate and the stage at which they are passed. 20. Primary purpose of granting interim relief is the preservation of property in dispute till legal rights and conflicting claims of the parties before the court are adjudicated. There is no qualitative difference between an interim and ad interim order except about the period for which they operate and the stage at which they are passed. 20. Primary purpose of granting interim relief is the preservation of property in dispute till legal rights and conflicting claims of the parties before the court are adjudicated. In other words, the object of making an order regarding interim relief is to evolve a workable formula to the extent called for by the demands of the situation, keeping in mind the pros and cons of the matter and striking a delicate balance between two conflicting interests, i.e., injury and prejudice, likely to be caused to the plaintiff if the relief is refused; and injury and prejudice likely to be caused to the defendant if the relief is granted. The court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion can grant or refuse to grant interim injunction. 21. Section 104 of Order XLIII of the C.P.C. deals with appeals from orders. Section 104 enacts that an appeal shall lie from those orders which have been enumerated in sub-Section 1 and “save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force”, not from other orders. Under Order XLIII appeal lies against certain orders. Section 104 and Order XLIII, therefore, have to be read together. Section 104 and Order XLIII of C.P.C. are quoted as under:- “S. 104 Orders from which appeal lies. (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:--- 1** * * * 2[(ff) ……. 3[(ffa) ……. (g).……. (h) .……. (i) .……. 2[.……. (2).……. ORDER XLIII – Appeals from Orders Rule 1: Appeals from orders—An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely: — (a)…….(q)… (r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2-A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX; (s) ...(w) ……. Rule 2: Procedure— The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from orders.” 22. The term “order” has been defined as the “formal expression of a decision of Civil Court, which is not a decree”. Rule 2: Procedure— The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from orders.” 22. The term “order” has been defined as the “formal expression of a decision of Civil Court, which is not a decree”. The distinction between a decree and an order lies in the fact that whereas every decree is appealable unless barred by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no appeal lies from an order unless it is expressly provided by the Code or by any law for the time being in force. 23. Before considering the question as to whether an appeal will lie against an ex-parte injunction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) it would be appropriate to consider the right to appeal of a litigant. The expression of 'appeal' has not been defined in the Code. According to dictionary meaning, however, 'appeal' is an application or petition to a higher authority or a court of law for reconsideration of decision of a lower authority or an inferior court of law. (Chamber’s 21 st Century Dictionary, (1997)) 24. In Nagendra Nath Vs. Suresh Chandra ; AIR 1932 PC 165 : 59 IA 283 , speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Sir Dinshaw Mulla stated: “There is no definition of appeal in the Code of Civil Procedure, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term……..” 25. M. Ramanarain Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Trading Corporation of India Ltd. ; (1983) 3 SCC 75 , the Supreme Court stated:- “The right to prefer an appeal is a right created by Statute. No party can file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order as a matter of course in the absence of a suitable provisions of some law conferring on the party concerned the right to file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order.” 26. The right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right, it is well settled that an appeal is creature of a statute and there is no right to file an appeal unless it is given clearly and in express term by legislation. In other words, a right of appeal requires legislative authority. The right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right, it is well settled that an appeal is creature of a statute and there is no right to file an appeal unless it is given clearly and in express term by legislation. In other words, a right of appeal requires legislative authority. Neither an inferior court, nor a superior court nor both combined can create such a right. 27. There is a fundamental distinction between right to file a suit and the right to file an appeal. An appeal is a creature of a statute and it is for the legislature to decide whether the right of appeal should be conferred on the aggrieved party or not. Every person has an inherent right to file a suit of a civil nature unless; such right is barred by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication. The position of appeal, however, is quite different. There is no right of appeal and for maintainability of appeal, there must be an authority of law. 28. The distinction between a right to bring a suit and right to file an appeal has been succinctly and appropriately explained by Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar AIR 1974 SC 1126 , in the following words: "There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough if no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeal is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law." 29. The right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. But the position in regard to appeal is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law." 29. The right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. It is a vested right and accrues in favour of the litigant on the date lis commences and although, it may be actually exercised when an adverse judgment is pronounced, such a right is governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal. It is well settled that right of appeal arises when a proceeding is commenced and cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislation except by express provision or by necessary intendment to the contrary. Ram Singha Vs. Shankar Dayal ; (1928) I.L.R. 50 All. 965 (F.B.). 30. The right of appeal being a creature of a statute, exercise of such right can be circumscribed by the condition in the grant. The statute providing for an appeal may also provide conditions for exercise of right of appeal. In some cases, such as for example, Section 406 of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 provided no appeal against assessment of tax would be maintainable unless the amount of tax has been deposited. In other words, the deposit of amount of tax was a condition precedent to entertain an appeal. The condition of pre-deposit was challenged and the Supreme Court in case of The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Others ; AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1234, the Supreme Court has held "It is open to the Legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability or the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern no contravention of Article 14 in it........" 31. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability or the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern no contravention of Article 14 in it........" 31. Again in case of Seth Nand Lal and Another vs. State of Haryana and Others ; AIR 1980 Supreme Court 2097 following the Anant Mill's case (supra) the Supreme Court stated "It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory". 32. Again in case of Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and another vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay ; (1988) 4 SCC 402 the Supreme Court reiterated "the right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial or quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the condition in grant......If the statute gives a right of appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfillment of those conditions that right becomes vested and exercisable by the appellant.” 33. In case of Garikapatti Veeraya vs N. Subbiah Choudhury , 1957 AIR 540 after referring to several leading decisions on the point, the Supreme Court observed that a vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides either expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. (Para 28 of the judgment). 34. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal representatives Kasibai and others vs. Mahadeo and others reported in AIR1965 SC 703 held that it is true that as a general rule, alteration in the law of procedure are retrospective, but a right of appeal to a particular forum is a substantive right and is not lost by alteration in the law unless, provision is made expressly in that behalf, or a necessary implication arises. 35. 35. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court a right of appeal is a vested right and is governed by the statute which confers such right. In case the statute or the law which confers the right places certain conditions for exercise of such right, the said can be exercised only after the fulfillment of those conditions by the appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the right of appeal being substantive right has held to the extent that by a subsequent enactment (such as Court Fees Act), the right of the appellant cannot be impaired or made onerous by providing additional conditions by the subsequent Act. Unless, the subsequent Act providing for such a condition is made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since ex-parte injunction is granted under Rule 3 of Order XXXIX and there is no corresponding amendment in the Order XLIII granting right of appeal against an ex-parte injunction order granted under Rule 3 of Order XXXIX, no appeal can be filed against the ex-parte injunction. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon paragraph No. 22 of the judgment of this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra). 37. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that power to grant temporary injunction whether ex-parte or after hearing the parties emanates from Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX and not from Rule 3 of Order XXXIX. Rule 3 of Order XXXIX provides the procedure to be followed by the courts while exercising the power provided under Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX. Learned Standing Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in case of Zila Parishad Budaun Vs. Brahma Rishi Sharma reported in 1969 SCC On Line All 237 and also judgment of Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra). 38. Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXXIX are repository of the power to grant injunction. An order of injunction is always passed under Rule 1 or Rule 2 Order XXXIX save and except rare orders passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ad interim order operates only till the hearing of the application for injunction. 38. Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXXIX are repository of the power to grant injunction. An order of injunction is always passed under Rule 1 or Rule 2 Order XXXIX save and except rare orders passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ad interim order operates only till the hearing of the application for injunction. The Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) after considering the Rule 1 of Order XXXIX in paragraph No. 13 has held "it cannot be contended that power to pass interim ex-parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the said Rule is the repository of the power to grant orders of temporary injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary, or till further orders or till disposal of the suit.” The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) held an ex-parte order of injunction made under Order XXXIX of C.P.C. will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. There is no other provision under which such an order can be made. 39. Paragraph No. 22 of the judgment in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is quoted as under:- “22. It is also pertinent to note that although amendments were made in Order 39 Rule 3 CPC by adding Proviso granting power to the trial court to grant ex-parte injunction without issuing notice to the opposite parties, however, no amendment was made in Order 43 Rule (1)(r) CPC by providing that the appeal would be maintainable under the aforesaid provision in case any order is passed in exercise of powers under Proviso to Rule 3. It may further be noticed that by means of Section 89 of amending Act 104 of 1976 Rule 2-A was added w.e.f. 1.2.1977 in Order 39 and also in Order 43 Rule (1)(r) CPC. Clearly, the legislature has no intention to provide for appeal under Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC in case any ex-parte injunction is granted before issuing notice to the opposite parties in exercise of powers under Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC. Clearly, the legislature has no intention to provide for appeal under Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC in case any ex-parte injunction is granted before issuing notice to the opposite parties in exercise of powers under Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC. The reason appears to be for not inserting Rule 3, wherein Proviso was added by Amending Act 1976, in Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC can be drawn from the insertion of Rule 3-A in Order 39 CPC by the same amending Act, whereby it was provided that the Court is to dispose of application for injunction within 30 days. Clearly, the legislature has no intention to provide for appeal from orders passed under Order 39 Rule 3 Proviso CPC. The Hon'ble Full Bench in Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) and Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) have held that such appeal is maintainable. The judgment in Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) was rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the year 1970 and therefore, the Hon'ble Court had no occasion to consider the powers provided to the trial court under Proviso added to Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC in the year 1976. Insofar as maintainability of appeal against ex-parte injunction order under Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC is concerned, even Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) has held that appeal is maintainable. However, in case any such appeal is preferred the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal as maintainable and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate court in complying with the provision of Order 39 Rule 3-A CPC. It is very pertinent to note that this observation has given after the observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that in a case where mandate of Order 39 Rule 3-A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) is a case from State of Tamil Nadu, where provision of Order 39 Rule 3- A CPC are applicable, which is not so in the State of Uttar Pradesh. A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) is a case from State of Tamil Nadu, where provision of Order 39 Rule 3- A CPC are applicable, which is not so in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are, therefore, heavily in favour of entertaining the appeal after 30 days in view of provision of Rule 3-A, which has been extensively considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which, in fact, is not applicable in the present case.” 40. It is also relevant to consider the paragraph Nos. 9 and 11 of the judgment in case of Gurmej Singh (supra), the same are quoted as under:- “9. Admittedly, the aforesaid judgment is of the year 1970 and amendments were made in the year 1976 Vide Section 86 of Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977, whereby Proviso to Rule 3 was added in Order 39 CPC providing powers to the trial court to grant injunction without giving notice to the opposite parties, Thus, with all respect at my command it is observed that judgment of the Hon'ble Full Court was based on the fact that at that point of time there was no specific provision giving power to the trial court for passing ex-parte order of temporary injunction. 11. Therefore, the Hon'ble Full Bench had no occasion to consider Rule 3 and Rule 3-A added to Order 39 CPC in the year 1976. May be, which could have substantially influenced the judgment of the Hon'ble Full Bench.” 41. Power to grant ex-parte interim injunction does not emanates from Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. but from Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. deals with procedural part which is required to be followed by court dealing with the application of interim injunction and the requirement as to recording of reason for granting ex-parte injunction is mandatory. Legislature being aware of the situation has not amended the Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) by adding Rule 3. 42. Legislature being aware of the situation has not amended the Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) by adding Rule 3. 42. The Full Bench judgment in case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) was considered by this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) but the same has not been followed on the ground that the judgment was passed prior to the amendment made in Order XXXIX and the court while deciding the case could not have considered the effect of proviso added to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX by the amendment. In case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra), the specific question which was referred to the Full Bench was "whether the ex-parte order issuing injunction against the defendants is appealable in the circumstances of the case?" While replying the question, the Full Bench held as under in paragraph Nos. 9 to 14 of the judgment as under:- “9. Two things deserve notice at threshold. Firstly, the language of Rule l(r) is unhedged and broad. Secondly, courts should lean in favour of an interpretation which expands rather than shrinks a remedial right. A remedial provision of law is generally construed liberally. Rule 1 (r) creates a remedial right of appeal for protection of substantial and substantive rights. 10. An ad interim injunction may be granted under Order XXXIX or Section 151 in some cases. No appeal lies against an order under Section 151, be it ex parte or otherwise. An ex parte order of injunction made under Order XXXIX will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. There is no other provision under which such an order can be made. Rule 1 (r) of Order 43 does not say that an appeal shall lie from a final order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXXIX. No adequate reason is shown for interpolating the word 'final' before 'order' in Rule l(r). Courts do not ordinarily make additions in enactments. That is a legislative function. 11. Let us now examine the scheme of Rules 1 to 4 of Order XXXIX. Rules 1 and 2 provide for the making of an interim order of injunction. Rule 3 firstly provides that an interim injunction should ordinarily be granted after notice to the adversary party. Secondly, it provides that notice may be dispensed with where the court is satisfied that it would defeat the purpose of granting an injunction. Rules 1 and 2 provide for the making of an interim order of injunction. Rule 3 firstly provides that an interim injunction should ordinarily be granted after notice to the adversary party. Secondly, it provides that notice may be dispensed with where the court is satisfied that it would defeat the purpose of granting an injunction. Rule 4 provides that an order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside on an application made by the party dissatisfied with such order. 12. Three things follow from these provisions. The law does not require the issue of notice when an ex parte injunction is made, although courts, as a matter of caution, issue a notice. The service of the ex parte order of injunrtion itself is adequate notice. Again, Rule 4 shows that an order of injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of the adversary party. Such application may be given when the order is ex parte or even after it has been made absolute. Until it is discharged or varied or set aside on such an application, either written or oral, the ex parte order operates with full vigour and stands on its own feet, provided it has not expired earlier. Thirdly, the provisions of Order XXXIX do not classify orders of injunction into (1) an ex parte order of injunction and (2) a final order of injunction. Courts have coined this dichotomy for the sake of convenience of speech and expressions. In the eye of law an 'ex parte' order is as much an order under Rule 1 or 2 as a 'final' order. Both orders last for the period each is granted or till each of them is discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4. The temporal life of each may be shorter than the life of the suit. 13. An injunction interferes with substantial and substantive rights of a person. The object of Rule l(r) of Order 43 is to provide a remedy for improper or invalid interference with his rights. If we restrict this rule to only final orders of injunction, the object of the rule will not be fully achieved. 13. An injunction interferes with substantial and substantive rights of a person. The object of Rule l(r) of Order 43 is to provide a remedy for improper or invalid interference with his rights. If we restrict this rule to only final orders of injunction, the object of the rule will not be fully achieved. For instance, where a grievance of the party affected by the ex parte interim injunction is that the court granting it has also acted from bias against him it is meaningless to force him to go to that very Court in the first instance. It shall only prolong the suspension of his valuable rights. In many cases he may get no relief in the end. Similarly, where the order of injunction is founded on an Act challenged as unconstitutional, appeal may yield quicker relief. 14. The language and the object of Rule 1(r) of Order 43 and the scheme of Rules 1 to 4 of Order 39 show that an appeal also lies against the ex parte order of injunction. As soon as an interim injunction is issued and the party affected thereby is apprised of it, he has two remedies: (1) he can either get the ex parte injunction order discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4 of Order 39 and if unsuccessful avail the right of appeal as provided for under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), or (2) straightway file an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) against the injunction order passed under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. C.P.C. It is not unusual to provide for alternative remedies. For instance, when an ex parte decree is passed against a person, he has two remedies: either he may go up in appeal against the ex parte decree or he may seek to get the ex parte decree set aside by the same court." 43. With all humility at my command, I am unable to agree with the reasoning given by this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) for the reason firstly that, this Court has taken the view in Gurmej Singh (supra) that judgment of Full Bench was given at that point of time when there was no specific provision giving power to the trial court for passing ex-parte order of temporary injunction. It appears to me that un-amended provision of Order XXXIX Rule 3 was not placed before the Hon'ble court while deciding the Gurmej Singh (supra) or the same skipped attention of this Court. Even prior to the amendment, power to grant ex- parte injunction was there with the trial court. Rule 3 of the un- amended Order XXXIX states "The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party." On a comparative analysis of the provisions as contained in Order XXXIX of C.P.C. before the 1976 amendment and thereafter, there is no substantial difference in exercise of the power by the courts except for that the procedural safeguards were provided by the amendment by adding proviso to Rule 3 and adding Rule 3(A) in Order XXXIX of C.P.C. Proviso to Rule 3 provided for recording of reasons by the Court for its opinion that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay and required the applicant to comply with the conditions as mentioned in sub-Rule (a) and (b) of Rule 3. 44. Power to grant ex-parte injunction was very well there with the Court even prior to the amendment and the same has not been conferred by the Amendment of 1976. This aspect of the matter has been either not placed before the court or was being overlooked by the court while deciding Gurmej Singh (supra). 45. Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. requires the court before granting an injunction, to issue notice to the opposite party except where it appears that object of granting injunction would be defeated if notice is issued. The proviso as added by the Amendment Act, 1976 enjoins the court to record reasons for granting ex-parte injunction and obliges the applicant to comply with the requirements laid down in clauses (a) and (b). The proviso as added by the Amendment Act, 1976 enjoins the court to record reasons for granting ex-parte injunction and obliges the applicant to comply with the requirements laid down in clauses (a) and (b). The underlying object of the proviso is twofold, firstly, recording of reason would operate as check against indiscriminate exercise of power and would inspire confidence in judicial system, and secondly, it would also enable the superior court to know as to what reasons/ grounds weighed with the trial court for granting ex-parte injunction without issuing notice to the opposite party and whether such reasons are relevant, germane and well founded. Thus, it is clear that power to grant interim injunction emanates from Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX C.P.C. Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. prescribes procedure for grant of injunction and is not the repository of power to grant injunction. (AIR 2003 Bombay 392; (2000) 7 SCC 695 ) 46. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that an appeal can be filed against an ex-parte order of temporary injunction only after a period of thirty days as held by the Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) where the provisions of Rule 3 (A) of Order XXXIX are applicable. In State of U.P., the appeal can be filed only after expiry of six months as held by this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) 47. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that Rule 3(A) of Order XXXIX has been omitted in State of U.P. therefore, the judgment of Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) will not be applicable to the State of U.P. In case of Gurmej Singh (supra), this Court has relied upon the administrative circular of the High Court directing the courts below to decide the application for temporary injunction within six months. 48. In case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs S. Chellappan And Ors. /b> reported in (2000) 7 SCC 695 , the Supreme Court while considering the Rule 3(A) of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. has held in paragraph Nos. 19 to 21 as under:- "19. The aforesaid Rule casts a three-pronged protection to the party against whom the ex parte injunction order was passed. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. 19 to 21 as under:- "19. The aforesaid Rule casts a three-pronged protection to the party against whom the ex parte injunction order was passed. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. Second is, the legal obligation that if for any valid reasons the Court could not finally dispose of the application within the aforesaid time the Court has to record the reasons thereof in writing. 20. What would happen if a Court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the Court would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the Court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the Court is empowered to by-pass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the Court to pass final orders on the application within the period of thirty days. Here also it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court can by-pass such a rule in which cases the legislature mandates on the court to have adequate reasons for such bypassing and to record those reasons in writing. If that hump is also bypassed by the Court it is difficult to hold that the party affected by the order should necessarily be the sole sufferer. 21. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1,2,2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3A. In appropriate cases the appellate court, apart from granting or vacating or modifying the order of such injunction, may suggest suitable action against the erring judicial officer, including recommendation to take steps for making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to decide the application or vacate the ex-parte temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of the appeal, be deemed to be the final order passed on the application for temporary injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in the Rule." 49. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra), the Supreme Court while interpreting the provision of Rule 3(A) of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. held that where the mandate of Rule 3(A) is violated, the party will have right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of application for temporary injunction. Since Rule 3(A) has been omitted in State of U.P., the judgment in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) will not be of much help for deciding the question whether appeal will lie under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of C.P.C. against an ex-parte injunction order in State of U.P. Even in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra), the Supreme Court has held that order passed in exercise of powers under Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of C.P.C. would be appelable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of C.P.C. Paragraph No. 13 of the A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) is quoted as under:- "13. It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the said rule is the repository of the power to grant orders of temporary injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary, or till further orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be appealable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex parte order for any relief. " 50. In case of Gurmej Singh (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court has held in paragraph No. 37 of the judgment as under:- “37. Since this petition is being decided on the legal question involved in the present case and more so, when the defendants are represented before this Court and I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, I find that the impugned order dated 27.8.2020 is not sustainable in the eye of law. From the discussions made hereinabove, it can, therefore, safely be held as under:- I. Though in Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC Rule 3 (which necessarily include Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC) has not been mentioned, however, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Full Bench in Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) and in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) the appeal under the aforesaid provision would be maintainable. II. Such appeal, if filed, would be maintainable only after expiry of thirty days, where the provision of added Rule 3-A to Order 39 CPC is in force. However, in the State of U.P., since the Circular dated 16.8.2017 has been issued providing for six months time for disposal of applications of interim injunction failing which the subordinate court must have to record reasons in the order-sheet, therefore, such misc. appeal would be maintainable only after expiry of six months. III. In absence of any specific statutory provision, such appeal, if filed, on expiry of aforesaid time period can be entertained guided by the parameters set out in the judgment of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) or in any other judgment on this issue. IV. appeal would be maintainable only after expiry of six months. III. In absence of any specific statutory provision, such appeal, if filed, on expiry of aforesaid time period can be entertained guided by the parameters set out in the judgment of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) or in any other judgment on this issue. IV. While entertaining such appeal the appellate court is bound to record reasons for entertaining such appeal, and such appeal must indicate the omission on the part of the trial court to decide such temporary injunction application finally, if filed, by the plaintiff or omission on the part of the trial court to decide an application filed by the defendant for vacating the interim order granted by the trial court within the said time period of six months (in the State of U.P.). V. At the cost of repetition it may further be clarified that in case the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff or any other party to the suit interested in temporary injunction is not decided within the time period of six months in the State of U.P., he can file misc. appeal under the provisions of Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC, which can be entertained for the reasons recorded and in case of non- consideration of disposal of the stay vacation application filed by the defendant or any other party to the suit, he can also file misc. appeal under the aforesaid provision, which can also be considered for the reasons recorded as per the parameters set out by the Courts. VI. If any such misc. appeal is filed, the same can be considered only on the evidence already on record before the trial court unless the additional evidence is received by the appellate court under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC as per the law by recording reasons. In other words, in such misc. appeal the appellant cannot rely on the evidence filed by him in the appellate court without the same having not been allowed by the misc. court under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Full Bench in the case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra).” 51. In other words, in such misc. appeal the appellant cannot rely on the evidence filed by him in the appellate court without the same having not been allowed by the misc. court under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Full Bench in the case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra).” 51. This Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) and Court has noted in Gurmej Singh (supra) that Rule 3(A) of Order XXXIX has been omitted in State of U.P. but relied upon a circular issued by this Court dated 16.08.2017 providing time limit of six month for disposal of application for interim injunction and held that an appeal cannot be filed before six months. Paragraph Nos. 18 to 20 of the judgment in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) are quoted as under:- “18. It is also pertinent to note that the Rule 3-A added to Order 39 CPC by way of amendment in 1976 has no application in the State of U.P. as the same stood omitted vide Notification No. 103/IV-h-360 dt. Feb. 3, 1981, w.e.f. Oct. 3, 1981 in the State of U.P. Therefore, no finality, on failure of trial court to decide temporary injunction application or vacate the same on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in Order 39 Rule 3-A CPC as held in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra), would be attracted in the State of U.P. 19. Further, this Court has issued a Circular Letter dated 16.8.2017 regarding time bound disposal of the interim injunction application, which is quoted as under:- "Through Registered Post/E-mail From, Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, HJS, Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. To, All the District & Sessions Judges, Subordinate to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. C.L. No. 24/Admin. 'G-II' Dated: Allahabad 16.08.17 Sub: Time bound disposal of interim injunction application. Madam/Sir Hon'ble Court has directed that all the subordinate courts must ensure to dispose of applications of interim injunction within six months, failing which they shall have to record reasons in the order sheet. I am, therefore, directed to request you to circulate the instant direction amongst all the Judicial Officers working under your supervision and control and to ensure strict compliance of the same in letter and spirit. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Mohd. I am, therefore, directed to request you to circulate the instant direction amongst all the Judicial Officers working under your supervision and control and to ensure strict compliance of the same in letter and spirit. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan) No. /Admin.'G-II' Dated: Allahabad 2017. Copy forwarded for information and necessary action to: 1. The Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. 2. P.S. to all the Hon'ble Judges at Allahabad and also at Lucknow Bench, Lucknow to place the same before their Lordships for kind perusal. 3. The Director, Judicial Training & Research Institute, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. 4. All the Judicial Officers posted in the Registry in Allahabad High Court and Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. 5. The Member Secretary, U.P. State Legal Services Authority, III floor, Jawahar Bhawan, Annexe Lucknow. 6. Section Officer, Admin. 'H' Section for compliance of guard file." (Emphasis supplied) 20. Thus, in a way, even if Order 39 Rule 3-A CPC is omitted in the State of UP, a direction to ensure disposal of interim injunction application within six months has been given by this Court. This direction appears to be to balance the equity between the parties, as on one hand, party enjoys the ex-parte temporary injunction order would be interested in prolonging the same and on the other hand, if temporary injunction is not granted, the other party would be interested in prolonging the disposal of the same. Hence, in the State of U.P. in absence of applicability of Rule 3-A thirty days time limit can be safely treated to be six months for disposal of temporary injunction application and also for the purpose of deemed inclusion of order passed in exercise of powers under Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC (after six months) in Order 43 Rule (1) (r) CPC.” 52. With all humility at my command, I am unable to agree with the view taken by this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) for the following reason: (I) The judgment in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) was given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Rule 3(A) of Order XXXIX which was not applicable in the State of U.P. as the same had been omitted in the State of U.P. Therefore, the judgment in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) would not be of much help in deciding the question whether an appeal could be filed against an ex-parte injunction order under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of C.P.C. Though, this Court has relied upon a circular letter dated 16.08.2017, which is quoted in paragraph No. 19 of the judgment in case of Gurmej Singh (supra). Administrative instructions/circular/orders may be binding upon the courts subordinate to High Court but in my view will have no effect on the statutory right of appeal conferred upon a party by the statute i.e. C.P.C. Administrative instructions/circular letter issued by the High Court cannot over ride the express provisions of the statute which does not provide any such restriction of time for filing the appeal. 53. The right of appeal conferred by Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) read with Section 104 is a statutory right. The right cannot be restricted when no restriction is found in Section 104 and Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r). The legislature granted an unqualified right of appeal against "any order" passed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1, 2, 2-A, 4 and 10, whether inter partes or ex parte, by a speaking or non-speaking order. The legislature has provided for two reliefs/ alternative reliefs and has provided two forums for reliefs. The statutory provisions for obtaining reliefs, both under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) and Order XXXIX, Rule 4, is legislative will. The intention is clear, precise and direct and this should end all judicial speculations. In Shri Mandir Sitaramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 1868 Mathew, J. speaking for the Court observed that the well-established rule of law is that where legislature has spoken, the Judges cannot afford to be wiser. I am, therefore, of the opinion that against an ex parte order of ad interim injunction relief can be obtained under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 as well as under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r). I am, therefore, of the opinion that against an ex parte order of ad interim injunction relief can be obtained under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 as well as under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r). When the legislature willed that reliefs may be had in two forums, the Court cannot shut the relief on the plea that if appeals are permitted it would open flood-gate of litigation and create difficulties to the appellate Courts. To deny the right on this score is to defy the legislative mandate, which in my opinion, is not permissible. The Supreme Court in case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (Supra) has also held that any order passed in exercise of power under Order XXXIX Rule 1 C.P.C. would be appealable under Order XLIII Rule (1) C.P.C. Choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex-parte order for any relief. (Paragraph no. 13 of the judgment) 54. If a court had an appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of a final order on an application made for temporary injunction before the trial court, it would by parity of reason have a similar jurisdiction in respect of an order of a similar character, which has to take effect not for the period of pendency of the suit but for smaller duration. Any other view, I am inclined to think, would lead to a highly anomalous situation; granting jurisdiction to the appellate Court in one respect and denying it in other, although both may relate to a common subject. In my opinion, the provision for appeal as provided under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) that an appeal shall lie from "an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX" do not permit classification of an order of ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 or Rule 2 or an order of temporary injunction passed after hearing the parties, both into two divisions and taking one of the division out of the purview of appeal. The courts should adopt an interpretation which maintains rather than curtails a remedial right, even if it leads to a multiplicity of proceedings. The courts should adopt an interpretation which maintains rather than curtails a remedial right, even if it leads to a multiplicity of proceedings. The right of appeal being a creation of the statute, its scope must be determined with reference to the provisions of the statute conferring it and cannot be whittled down by interpretation. Right of appeal is a substantive right and not a matter of procedure. 55. The normal rule is that temporary injunction cannot be granted except after notice of the application for temporary injunction to the opposite party. It is only where the Court finds that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, that it can grant it ex parte. There are no different kinds of temporary injunction; an ex parte injunction is as much a temporary injunction as an injunction granted after hearing the opposite party. An ex parte, injunction is not a provisional injunction and does not require to be followed by another injunction; nor does it require, to be confirmed. As far as the application for temporary injunction is concerned, it is fully disposed of when the Court grants injunction either ex parte or after hearing the opposite party. The only difference between an ex parte injunction and an injunction granted after hearing the opposite party is that in the former case, the opposite party is bound by it and can move the Court to dissolve it under Rule 4 or file an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 of C.P.C. whereas in the latter case, the opposite party can have it dissolved only by approaching the appellate Court. 56. In case of H. Bevis And Co. vs Ram Behari And Ors. reported in AIR 1951 ALL 8 the Division Bench of this Court has held "Rules 1 to 5 of the Order deal with temporary injunctions. Rules 1 and 2 state the grounds on, or the circumstances, in which temporary injunction can be granted and Rule 3 prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the Court for granting it......The normal rule is that temporary injunction cannot be granted except after notice of the application for temporary injunction to the opposite party. It is only where the Court finds that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, that it can grant it ex parte. It is only where the Court finds that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, that it can grant it ex parte. There are no different kinds of temporary injunction; an ex parte injunction is as much a temporary injunction as an injunction granted after hearing the opposite party. The judgment in case of H. Bevis (supra) has been approved by the Full Bench in case of Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra). 57. Now, let us turn to Order XXXIX, Rules 1, 2, 2-A and 4 to find out the nature and character of the process by which an ad interim injunction is issued, Order XXXIX , Rule 1 states that on fulfilment of the "conditions precedent", the Court may by Order grant a "temporary injunction", and what is more important, grant the order "until the disposal of the suit or until further orders". Thus, ad interim order of temporary injunction is clearly visualised by Rule 1. Similarly Rule 2 provides that "the Court may by order grant such injunction......”. Rule 4 of Order XXXIX which deals with discharge, variation or cancellation of "any order for an injunction" recognises the power of the Court to discharge, vary or set aside "any order of injunction". Therefore, the power of discharge, vary or set aside can be invoked if there is in existence an "order for an injunction". If ex-parte orders rendered under Rules 1 & 2, are not orders of injunctions the Court cannot exercise power under Order XXXIX, Rule 4. In my opinion, all orders rendered under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2 whether ex- parte or after hearing the parties, have been designated as "orders" and Rule 4 empowers the trial Court to discharge, vary or set aside any of such orders. It does not stand to scrutiny that if the order is an ex parte order or it is non-speaking order, it would be revisable by the trial Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 of the Code. Rule 4 empowers the trial Court to vary, alter or cancel any order of injunction, which undoubtedly includes orders under Rules 1 & 2 of Order XXXIX. As such, all orders which are dischargeable variable or cancellable, are appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r), because an appeal lies against any order of injunction made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2. As such, all orders which are dischargeable variable or cancellable, are appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r), because an appeal lies against any order of injunction made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2. However, there is a line of decisions in which it has been held that an ex parte or ad interim order of injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2 is not appealable as it is temporary or ex parte or non-speaking. But in the same breath the High Courts recognise the right of petition against such orders under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 of the Code. An ex parte non-speaking temporary or ad interim order of injunction is revisable but it is not appealable, although the characteristics of the impugned order are absolutely the same both in Order XXXIX, Rule 4 as well as in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r), seems to be irreconcilable. If it is an order of injunction, it is appealable as well. Similarly, if it is an order of injunction it is revisable under Order XXXIX, Rule 4. Situated thus, I find it difficult to accept the line of reasoning and respectfully differ from the view. In my opinion, all ex parte ad interim injunction are appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) as well as revisable under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 of the Code. 58. I cannot subscribe the view that no appeal lies against an ex parte order of ad interim injunction but an appeal is competent only "after both the parties are heard and a reasoned order is given by the trial Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 of "the Code". Such a construction overlooks the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r), which provide for appeal against Order under Rules 1, 2 and 2-A apart from an order under Rule 4. If it were so, the legislature would have surely provided for appeal only against an order under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 and would have omitted Rules 1, 2 from Rule 1 (r) of Order XLIII. I cannot hold that the expressions "R. 1, Rule 2" in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) are superfluous or unnecessary and can be omitted or overlooked, in spite of the expressed legislative will. 59. Order XXXIX Rule 4 C.P.C. provides an alternative remedy and not the sole remedy. I cannot hold that the expressions "R. 1, Rule 2" in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) are superfluous or unnecessary and can be omitted or overlooked, in spite of the expressed legislative will. 59. Order XXXIX Rule 4 C.P.C. provides an alternative remedy and not the sole remedy. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgment in case of Astral Traders v. Hazi Mohammad MANU/JK/0013/1982 (FB). I partly agree with the opinion expressed in the case of Astral Traders (supra) that every interim injunction order whether ex-parte or otherwise is appealable. However, I cannot subscribe to the view expressed therein that means should be adopted to restrict the right of appeal. When an right expressly conferred, in my opinion, no means should be adopted to restrict the same. It would amount to imposing conditions which are not warranted by the provisions of law. In my opinion, in a country where the Rule of Law prevails the courts are under law. As such, the view that court should drive the party to the trial court to obtain relief under Order XXXIX Rule 4, in my opinion, cannot be accepted as correct preposition of law. However, these appeals are against the discretionary orders and the appellate court would undoubtedly bear in mind while entertaining and disposing of an appeal under Order XLIII Rule (1)(r) C.P.C. that an alternative relief is available to the appellant to the trial court itself. It is to be cautious in granting ex-parte stay as the same may cause irreparable loss to the other side. While granting such stay, the court ought to bear in mind the nature of order passed and the likely effect of the stay. But if the order is bad, illegal or void, relief must be given to the aggrieved person. 60. The existence of Rule 4 does not mutually exclude operation of Order XLIII under which appeal is permitted against the order passed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. Neither in Order XLIII nor under Rule 4 there is anything which mutually exclude operation of each other when one is resorted to. Against the order of injunction when legisltaure provides two remedies, one under Rule 4. Order XXXIX and the other under Order XLIII and in that event, it is the discretion of the person against whom injunction is granted to opt for the either. Against the order of injunction when legisltaure provides two remedies, one under Rule 4. Order XXXIX and the other under Order XLIII and in that event, it is the discretion of the person against whom injunction is granted to opt for the either. It is also not provided in the provision that once one of the provision is opted, the other is excluded or that both options cannot be opted together. It is always open to such persons to proceed simultaneously when one or the other opts for the both and success and defeat in one or the other may have the impact on the result of other, which is decided later. Such a matter is to be taken into account by the Court dealing with such cases and weigh the impact of the situation in a given case depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and the question raised therein. 61. When the ex parte order of injunction is granted without notice both the remedies under Rule 4 and Order XLIII are open to such aggrieved party, who may even concurrently proceeded with both the remedies. Such a view was taken by Calcutta High Court in Re Santosh Kumar Ghosh v. State . AIR 1983 Col 250 , and ad interim injunction passed prior to issue of notice to the defendant is appealable is a view taken in the case of Saraju Prashad Singh Vs. Gangaprosad Shah and Others ; MANU/WB/0070/1951 : AIR 1951 Cal 446 , as well as in the case of H. Bevis and Co. Vs. Ram Behari and Others (supra) and L.D. Meston School Society Vs. Kashi Nath Misra ; MANU/UP/0389/1950. In the case of Zila Parishad, Budaun and Others Vs. Brahma Rishi Sharma, (supra). In Roomi Prasad Vs. IIInd Additional District Judge, Etah and Others; 1998 (34) ALR 366 and Ram Dhani & others v. Raja Ram and others; 2011 (5) ADJ 780 this Court had held that a party aggrieved by the order of ex parte interim injunction, has two remedies. He may seek vacation or variation of the order under Rule 4 or he may file appeal under Order XLIII. 62. He may seek vacation or variation of the order under Rule 4 or he may file appeal under Order XLIII. 62. In case of Gurmej Singh (Supra) this Court has held in paragraph No. 24 of the judgment that though in Order XLIII Rule (1) (r) CPC Rule 3 (which necessarily include Proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX CPC) has not been mentioned, however, in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Full Bench in Zila Parishad, Budaun (supra) and in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) the appeal under the aforesaid provision would be maintainable. In absence of specific statutory provision, such appeal, if filed on expiry of aforesaid time period (six months) can be entertained guided by the parameters set out in the judgment of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) or in any other judgment on the issue. I am unable to subscribe such view for the reason that if an appeal is not provided under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) by the legislature, the same cannot be provided by the courts while interpreting the provision. The appeal is a creation of the statute and unless the same is provided by the statute itself such right cannot be given by the courts. The right of appeal requires legislative authority. Neither an inferior court nor a superior court nor both combined can create such right. In case of M. Narayan Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court has taken the same view. It appears that the said judgment was not brought to the notice of the learned court while deciding the case of Gurmej Singh (supra). The plain language of Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. must be interpreted and given effect to. A restriction not envisaged cannot be read into Rule 1(r) of Order XLIII. The court cannot rewrite the legislation. 63. Right of appeal is a statutory right vested in a litigant with the commencement of lis and subject to condition/ restriction as imposed by legislature while granting the right for exercise of such right. This leads to another question whether courts while interpreting the provision can burden the litigant with other conditions which were not imposed by legislature while conferring the right. 64. The right of appeal being an statutory right is only controlled by the provision providing for an appeal made in the statute if the provision is clear that requires no interpretation. This leads to another question whether courts while interpreting the provision can burden the litigant with other conditions which were not imposed by legislature while conferring the right. 64. The right of appeal being an statutory right is only controlled by the provision providing for an appeal made in the statute if the provision is clear that requires no interpretation. If the right of appeal is not circumscribed by any condition by the legislature, the same cannot be read in while interpreting the provision as the same will be against the legislative mandate. From the perusal of Section 104 read with Order XLIII there is no condition prescribed regarding nature of the injunction order i.e. whether ex- parte or passed after providing opportunity of hearing to the party. The aforesaid provision also do not contemplate any restriction of time for filing such an appeal and therefore, the same cannot be read in while interpreting the statutory provision providing for an appeal. 65. In my opinion, the Court cannot refuse to entertain an appeal only on the ground that the orders are temporary or interim or provisional. Similarly, by their very nature ad interim injunctions passed under Rule 1 or 2 of Order XXXIX are normally rendered ex parte. Parliament being fully aware of the situation permitted appeals against such orders. No interpretation is permissible against the legislative will of the provision. 66. Similarly, no time period can be provided for filing the appeal by the courts while interpreting the provision as there was no impediment for the legislature to have provided such a condition. In case, the provision is clear without any ambiguity of interpreting the same such a condition cannot be imposed by the courts. 67. Subscribing to the view as taken by this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) that an appeal against an ex-parte injunction order can be filed only after expiry of six months period from the date of order of ex-parte injunction i.e. in case that application for temporary injunction is not decided within a period of six months by the trial court will lead to another situation. Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides the limitation for filing an appeal under Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal can be filed to a High Court from any decree order within ninety days and to any other court within thirty days. Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides the limitation for filing an appeal under Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal can be filed to a High Court from any decree order within ninety days and to any other court within thirty days. Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963 is quoted as under: “116. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- (a) to a High Court from any decree or order; Ninety days (b) to any other court from any decree or order; Thirty days” Once the period of limitation has been provided by the Limitation Act for filing an appeal, an appeal cannot be filed after the expiry of aforesaid period unless the court before whom such an appeal is filed condones the delay in filing the appeal. The period of limitation as provided by the Limitation Act cannot be altered, changed, suspended or extended by the courts except in very extraordinary situation such as COVID where the Supreme Court has extended the period of limitation taking into account the extraordinary situation prevailing in the country but not otherwise. With all humility at my command I cannot be subscribe to the view taken in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) that an appeal can be filed after the expiry of six months period for another reason i.e. Sub-rule (2) of Order XLIII C.P.C. provides that the provision of Order XLI will apply to appeals filed under Order XLIII, already quoted by me in the preceding paragraphs. The result is that Rule 3A of Order XLI will come into the play once the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation provided by the Limitation Act (Article 116). Appellant has to file an application under Rule 3A for condoning the delay. The application for condonation of delay has to be decided first after issuing notice to the other side before passing any other order in appeal. Rule 3A of Order XLI is quoted as under: “3A. Application for condonation of delay. (1) When a appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. Application for condonation of delay. (1) When a appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2) If the Court sees no reason to reject the application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice hereof shall be issued to the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-rule (1) the Court shall not made an order fact the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the Court does not, after hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal.” Thus, in my view, the courts by judicial order cannot be curtail the right of a party of filing an appeal within the limitation period as provided by the Limitation Act. 68. In view of the discussions made above, I am unable to persuade myself to follow the judgment of this Court in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) as the same is not a binding precedent. Judgment in case of India Glycols Limited (supra) and Rinku Maheshwari (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has only followed the judgment in case of Gurmej Singh (supra) and has not decided the question whether an appeal will lie under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) against an ex-parte injunction granted by the trial court. 69. I am of the considered opinion that an appeal will lie under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) against an order of ex-parte temporary injunction passed by trial court in exercise of powers under Rule 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX C.P.C. Party aggrieved can also approach the same court under Rule 4 of Order XXXIX, if he so desires. Both the remedies are concurrent and can be availed by the party aggrieved. Both the remedies are concurrent and can be availed by the party aggrieved. It is open to the party aggrieved by an ex-parte order of injunction to proceed even simultaneously and when one opts for both the remedies, the success or defeat in one or the other may have the impact on the result of other, which is decided later. Such a matter is to be taken into account by the court dealing with such cases and weigh the impact of the situation in a given case depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and questions raised therein. 70. I do not find any substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that an appeal will not lie under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. against an ex-parte order of temporary injunction passed by the trial court or that the appeal, if any, can be filed against order of ex- parte temporary injunction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. not before the expiry of six months from the date of order of ex-parte temporary injunction. An appeal can be filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. against an order of ex-parte temporary injunction by the party aggrieved with the order of ex-parte temporary injunction within the limitation period as provided by the Limitation Act, 1963. Since in this petition an order of ex-parte temporary injunction has been challenged by the petitioner, I am of the view that no relief can be granted to the petitioner in view of availability of alternative remedy of appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) C.P.C. as well as to file an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 C.P.C. 71. The writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy as available to him under law.