Judgment : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. The present second appeal has been preferred against judgment and decree dated 08.10.1993 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bali in Civil Appeal (Decree) No.42/1986 (36/1982) whereby the regular first appeal as preferred by the appellant against judgment and decree dated 12.07.1982 passed by the Civil Judge, Sirohi in Civil Original No.40/1979 stood dismissed. Vide judgment and decree dated 12.07.1982, the learned Trial Court proceeded on to decree the representative suit for eviction as preferred by the plaintiffs. The Court also proceeded on to pass a decree for mesne profit in favour of the plaintiffs for an amount of Rs.204/- for the period from 01.03.1978 to the date of institution of the suit. 2. Vide order dated 02.12.2003, while admitting the present appeal, following substantial questions of law were framed: “(i) Whether the Courts below were right in not first determining the valuation of the temple property and proceeding to decide the whole matter without adverting to determine the question of bar under Section 29 of the Act? (ii) Whether it was incumbent upon the Courts below to try the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to determine other issues as per the Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C.? (iii) Whether the Courts below have rightly held that the suit was properly constituted under Rule 1 of Order 8 CPC?” (Order 1 Rule 8, CPC) 3. Arguing on the first question of law, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that a specific objection regarding the maintainability of the suit in terms of Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act of 1959’) had been raised by the defendants with a submission that the Temple Trust was unregistered. The specific averment of the defendants was that the temple in question was a private property of two persons namely Seth Shri Panaraj and Munnilal. The construction of four disputed rooms was also undertaken by the said two owners of the temple only but the land on which the said rooms were constructed was of the ownership and possession of the defendants. The property of Jain Community/Jain Temple neither constitutes any public trust nor any such trust has been registered. Therefore, the learned Trial Court firstly was under an obligation to decide whether the Trust in question was a ‘Public Trust’ or a ‘Private Trust’. The property of Jain Community/Jain Temple neither constitutes any public trust nor any such trust has been registered. Therefore, the learned Trial Court firstly was under an obligation to decide whether the Trust in question was a ‘Public Trust’ or a ‘Private Trust’. It is only after the said determination been made, it could have been decided whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question. 4. Further, it is only after the said determination that the issue whether the Trust in question was mandatorily required to be registered, could have been decided. 5. Furthermore, whether the Trust (if it is so held) would be governed by circular dated 28.06.1962 could also be determined only after the above issue been decided. The learned Trial Court having not determined the first and foremost question as to whether the Trust in question was a public or a private Trust, all the subsequent proceedings/findings were non-est as the same goes to the root of the matter. In support of his above submission learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Jagannath vs. Satya Narain; 1973 AIR (Raj) 13 6. Learned counsel further submitted that reliance of both the Courts below on circular dated 28.06.1962 was also totally misconceived, as once the objection regarding maintainability of the suit on count of the Trust not being registered was raised by the defendant, the burden to prove that the Trust was not required to be registered in terms of Circular dated 28.06.1962 was on the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Court wrongly placed the burden of the said issue on the defendants and wrongly observed that the defendants did not raise any plea to the effect that the Trust in question was having an annual income of more than Rs.3,000/- or the valuation of the assets of the Trust was more than Rs.30,000/-. Counsel submitted that even otherwise, the plea regarding valuation of the assets of the Trust being more than Rs.30,000/- was very well taken by the appellants-defendants in the first appeal. Hence, the First Appellate Court was under an obligation to decide the said objection but the First Appellate Court without considering the said plea, erroneously affirmed the finding of the learned Trial Court. 7. Hence, the First Appellate Court was under an obligation to decide the said objection but the First Appellate Court without considering the said plea, erroneously affirmed the finding of the learned Trial Court. 7. Responding to the above arguments, learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, while relying upon the judgment of a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in Bhagwanram vs. Thakurji Hanumanji Maharaj Next Friend; 1989 (2) RCJ 451 submitted that the learned Trial Court rightly recorded a finding that in absence of any specific plea raised by the defendant regarding the annual income or the valuation of the assets of the temple in question, it could not have been concluded that the temple/Trust would not be governed by circular dated 28.06.1962. 8. Submitting on the second substantial question of law, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that decision of the said issue would be directly dependent on the decision of question No.1. If the Court reaches to a conclusion that the Trust in question was a private Trust, the suit in question would definitely be not maintainable before a Civil Court. On the other hand, if the Court reaches to a conclusion that the Trust in question is a public Trust, then also the suit would not be maintainable before a Civil Court for the reason of the Trust being unregistered in view of Section 29 of the Act of 1959. Therefore, the learned Courts below were under an obligation to first decide the issue of jurisdiction and then to proceed with the suit proceedings. 9. Learned counsel further submitted that as was proved on record, the property in question was a private property and hence, plaintiff-Community could not have been treated to be a public trust so as to maintain the suit in question before a Civil Court. 10. Responding to the above argument, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property of a temple is, by virtue of law, a public Trust and is not required to be declared so. So far as the registration of the Trust is concerned, the same was not required in view of circular dated 28.06.1962. 11. 10. Responding to the above argument, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property of a temple is, by virtue of law, a public Trust and is not required to be declared so. So far as the registration of the Trust is concerned, the same was not required in view of circular dated 28.06.1962. 11. Arguing on the third substantial question of law, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit in question could not have been maintained in the frame of a representative suit as there was no common interest of the respondents-plaintiffs in the controversy involved in the suit. Learned counsel submitted that the property in question was evidently a private property and hence, no common interest of any other person could have been concluded so as to entitle them to maintain a suit in the representative capacity and hence, the permission as granted by the learned Trial Court in terms of Order 1 Rule 8, CPC ought not to have been granted. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. Coming on to the first Substantial Question of law, “(i) Whether the Courts below were right in not first determining the valuation of the temple property and proceeding to decide the whole matter without adverting to determine the question of bar under Section 29 of the Act? That is to say, whether the learned Courts below were required to determine the valuation of the assets of the property (temple) before proceeding on to decide the issue whether the suit was barred in terms of Section 29 of the Act of 1959? 14. A bare perusal of the written statement as filed by the defendants reflects that the whole case of the defendant was that the property in question (temple) was privately owned and managed property. The case as put up by the defendant was that the property was managed by two individual persons namely Seth Shri Panraj and Munnilal. It is only in the last para that a cursory averment to the effect that the trust was not registered in terms of the Act of 1959 has been made. No pleading whatsoever pertaining to Circular dated 28.06.1962 had been made in the written statement. It is only in the first appeal that for the first time the averment pertaining to Circular dated 28.06.1962 was made. No pleading whatsoever pertaining to Circular dated 28.06.1962 had been made in the written statement. It is only in the first appeal that for the first time the averment pertaining to Circular dated 28.06.1962 was made. Even an application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC was filed on behalf of the defendant before the first Appellate Court for amendment to the effect that valuation of the property of the temple exceeded to Rs.30,000/- and hence, it would not be excluded from the compulsion of registration in terms of Act of 1959. Interestingly, the said application was not pressed by counsel for the defendants on 29.05.1989 before the First Appellate Court and the said application was hence dismissed as ‘Not Pressed’. Along with the said application, application under Order 41 Rule 2, CPC was also not pressed and dismissed as such. 15. In view of the above facts, this Court is of the clear opinion that when no pleading whatsoever was even made by the defendant regarding the valuation of the property (temple) in question and no evidence whatsoever was led qua the same, the learned courts below rightly did not enter into the determination of the valuation of the property (temple) so as to decide whether the trust in question was a public or a private trust and whether it was also compulsorily required to be registered in terms of the Act of 1959. 16. As held in Bhagwanram (supra), even when a trust is a public trust, the suit cannot be held to be barred by Section 29 of the Act of 1959 if it is not proved from the evidence on record that the total valuation of all its assets was more than Rs.30,000/- on 01.07.1962. Herein too, even if it is assumed that the trust in question was a public trust, there is not an iota of evidence on record to conclude that the total valuation of the trust in question was more than Rs.30,000/- on 01.07.1962. What to talk of evidence, there is not even a pleading to that effect. The defendant having failed to aver a plea pertaining to the valuation of the assets of the temple and having failed to lead any evidence to that effect, as held in the case of Bhagwanram (supra), the courts below were not required to compute the valuation of the assets of the temple in question. The defendant having failed to aver a plea pertaining to the valuation of the assets of the temple and having failed to lead any evidence to that effect, as held in the case of Bhagwanram (supra), the courts below were not required to compute the valuation of the assets of the temple in question. Further, the applicability of Circular dated 28.06.1992 was also not required to be gone into by the courts below in absence of any plea to the said effect. In the specific opinion of this Court, the burden was upon the defendant to prove that the suit was not maintainable in terms of Section 29 of the Act of 1959. The defendant having miserably failed to lead any evidence on the said issue, issue No.6 was rightly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. 17. Once this Court has reached to the conclusion that bar of Section 29 of the Act of 1959 could not have come in way of the plaintiffs, even if it is assumed that it was a public trust, the ground raised by counsel for the appellant that the courts below ought to have first decided the question whether the trust in question was a private trust or a public trust, becomes redundant. 18. At the cost of repetition, this Court holds that even if the trust in question is assumed to be a public trust, there being no pleading or evidence to the effect that the valuation of the assets of the temple/trust in question was more than Rs.30,000/-, the courts were not required to go into the said issue and in absence of the fact of the assets being more than Rs.30,000/-, it could not have been concluded that the trust in question was compulsorily required to be registered and that in absence of such registration, the suit on behalf of the trust was not maintainable. 19. This Court is of the above opinion also for the reason that the defendant although moved an application for incorporating the above ground before the First Appellate Court but the said application was not pressed and was dismissed as such. Meaning thereby, the ground even if any, stood not pressed and hence the Court was not required to deal with an issue which firstly, was not even raised at the initial stage and secondly, even when raised at the first appellate stage, stood not pressed. Meaning thereby, the ground even if any, stood not pressed and hence the Court was not required to deal with an issue which firstly, was not even raised at the initial stage and secondly, even when raised at the first appellate stage, stood not pressed. 20. So far as the judgment in the case of Jagannath (supra) as relied upon by the counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same would be of no help to the appellant as therein too, the Court specifically held as under:- “Whether this Laxmi Narainjis temple is a public trust or not may have to be decided by the authorities under the Act but whether it is a public trust of the prescribed valuation by way of income or valuation of assets or not, is question which could be decided by the civil court when such controversy is raised.” That is to say, the issue whether a trust is a public trust of the prescribed valuation by way of income or valuation of assets, is a question which could be decided by the Civil Court when such controversy is raised. As observed above, the issue/controversy to the said effect was not even raised by the defendant before the courts below and hence, the ratio of Jagannath (supra) would not apply to the present matter. 21. Question No.1 is hence answered in the terms that the Courts below were right in not determining the valuation of the temple in question. 22. So far as the ground raised by counsel for the appellant regarding the determination of the nature of the trust is concerned, in the specific opinion of this Court, it was not even the case of the defendants before the trial court that the trust is a public trust. Rather the pleadings as made were clear and specific to the effect that the property was a private property managed by two private individuals and the Jain Community had no say in it. 23. In view of the said specific pleading of the defendants, the Courts were not required to determine the nature of the trust in question. Further, as held by this Court in preceding paras, even otherwise, the nature of the trust would not effect the maintainability of the suit in question in the present matter, the same being governed by Circular dated 28.06.1962. 24. Further, as held by this Court in preceding paras, even otherwise, the nature of the trust would not effect the maintainability of the suit in question in the present matter, the same being governed by Circular dated 28.06.1962. 24. Coming on to the second Substantial Question of law, “Whether it was incumbent upon the Courts below to try the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to determine other issues as per the Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C.?” 25. Issue No.6 was framed as under:- ^^6& vk;k fooknxzLr eafnj dk jktLFkku ifCyd VªLV vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr jftLVªhd`r ugha gksus ds dkj.k nkok pyus ;ksX; ugha gSA izŒ^^ 26. A bare perusal of the above issue reflects that an issue pertaining to jurisdiction was very well framed by the learned trial Court and was even decided on merit. Learned trial Court while relying upon Circular dated 28.06.1962 specifically held that Section 29 of the Act of 1959 would be applicable only on a trust whose annual income was more than Rs.3,000/-. The Court specifically observed that no pleading/evidence regarding the annual income of the trust in question was pleaded/led by the defendants. With the above specific finding, the Court decided issue No.6 against the defendants. 27. In the specific opinion of this Court, the finding as recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court being totally in consonance with law as well as the evidence available on record, does not deserve any interference. Question No.2 is hence answered in the terms that the courts below did frame an issue pertaining to jurisdiction and even decided the same on merit. 28. Coming on to Substantial Question of Law No.3, “Whether the Courts below have rightly held that the suit was properly constituted under Rule 1 of Order 8 CPC?” 29. Issue No.5 was framed as under:- ^^5& vk;k oknhx.k vkns'k 1 fu;e 8 ds vUrxZr okn ykus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSaA izŒ^^ 30. 28. Coming on to Substantial Question of Law No.3, “Whether the Courts below have rightly held that the suit was properly constituted under Rule 1 of Order 8 CPC?” 29. Issue No.5 was framed as under:- ^^5& vk;k oknhx.k vkns'k 1 fu;e 8 ds vUrxZr okn ykus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSaA izŒ^^ 30. Replying to the application for permission to be granted to the plaintiffs to file and continue the suit in representative capacity in terms of Order 1 Rule 8, CPC, the defendant pleaded in his written statement as under: ^^2- okn i= in la[;k 2 nks esa fyf[kr dFku vlR; gksus ls vLohdkj dj izR;qrj esa fuosnu gS fd mDr Jh ik’oZukFk Hkxoku ds x`g eafnj dk LoxhZ; lsB Jh iujktth lqjk.kk ,oa Jh eqUuhyky th iq= [ksepUnth us yxHkx lkS o"kZ iwoZ vius futh [kjps ls cuokdj mlesa Hkxoku Jh ik'oZukFk dh izfrek fojkteku dh Fkh mDr eafnj muds futh LokfeRo dk gksus ls os nksuksa mldh ns[k js[k j[krs FksA mUgksaus vius futh [kjps ls izfroknh ds LoxZLFk firk Hkwrkth dks osru ij iqtkjh fu;qDr dj eafnj esa Hkxoku dh iwtk ,oa vU; dk;Z lqpk: :i ls fd;s tkus dh O;oLFkk Hkh dh FkhA LoxZLFk iujktth lqjk.kk ds nsgkolku ds i'pkr~ Jh eqUuhykyth ,oa muds iq= Jh fgereyth dk;Z lapkyu LFkk;h :i ls viuh futh laifr ds :i esa eafnj dh ns[kHkky djrs jgrs FksA vkSj efanj ds iqtkjh dks osru Hkh vius ikl ls [kjp fy[k dj nsrs FksA izfroknh vius firk Hkwrkth ds e`R;q ds i'pkr mDr efanj esa yxHkx ipiu o"kZ ls iqtkjh ds in ij dke djrk jgk gS vkSj mldks osru Hkh LoxZLFk Jh eqUuhykyth ls nks o"kZ iwoZ rd feyrk jgk gSA yxHkx ikap o"kZ iwoZ Jh fgereyth ds xqtj tkus ij LoxZLFk Jh eqUuhykyth vdsys mDr eafnj dh ns[kHkky ,oa O;oLFkk viuh futh lEifr ds :i esa vUr rd djrs jgs tc rd nks o"kZ iwoZ eafnj esa ls Hkxoku dh izfrek dk mRFkkiu fd;s tkus ls eafnj 'kqU; ugha gks x;kA 1 3- okn i= in la-13 rsjg dk dFku vLohdkj gSA oknhx.k dk ;g okn izLrqr djus ds fy, flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk ds vkns”k 1 ,d fu;e 8 vkB ds micU/kksa ds vUrxZr U;k;ky; dh vuqefr izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gS D;ksa fd oknhx.k ftu yksxksa ds izfrfuf/k dh {kerk ls ;g okn izLrqr djus dh vuqefr pkgrs gSa os la[;k esa vuxf.kr u gksdj fuf’pr la[;k esa gh gSaA^^ 31. A bare perusal of the above pleadings reflects that the only averment of the defendant was that the number of people representing the Jain Community is defined and hence they were not required to be represented by the plaintiffs but could have sued in their own name. Hence, the permission to file the suit in a representative capacity could not have been granted by the Court. 32. Sub-Clause (1) of Order 1 Rule 8, CPC reads as under: “8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest. (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,- (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested; (b) the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested.” 33. A bare perusal of the above provision clarifies that a suit can be instituted with the permission of the Court by one or more of the numerous persons having the same interest in one suit. The provision nowhere defines the number of numerous persons. The learned courts below while deciding Issue No.5 observed that there were 27 Mahajan families in the village and all of the members of the said families could not be impleaded in the suit and hence, the suit was filed in representative capacity on basis of the authority letter/proposal dated 17.10.1978 authorising the plaintiffs to file the suit. The same being totally in consonance with Order 1 Rule 8, CPC, the Court proceeded on to decide Issue No.5 against the defendants. This Court does not find any infirmity or illegality in the said finding, the same being in total consonance with Order 1 Rule 8, CPC. 34. Question No.3 is hence answered in the terms that the courts below rightly granted the permission to the plaintiffs to sue in representative capacity in terms of Order 1 Rule 8, CPC. 35. In view of the above observations and conclusions, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgments and decree passed by the learned Trial court as well as the first appellate Court. 36. 35. In view of the above observations and conclusions, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgments and decree passed by the learned Trial court as well as the first appellate Court. 36. The present second appeal is hence, dismissed.