ORDER N. TUKARAMJI, J. This Writ Petition is filed with the following relief: “Issue a writ or an order or a direction, more particularly a Writ in the nature of Mandamus declaring that the action of respondents more specifically respondent No.2 in issuing Memo bearing Memo No.1686/2025/CPE/TS/F1 dated 18.10.2025, extending the last date for receipt of the applications for the Retail Liquor A4 shops in the State of Telangana (for license period 2025-27) to 23.10.2025 as arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India and also in violation of the Telangana Excise (Grant of license of selling by Shop and Conditions of License) Rules, 2012 and consequently direct the respondents not to take into account the applications for the A4 liquor shop licenses for the year 2025-27, which are submitted before 18.10.2025 (05:00p.m).” 2. Heard Mr Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. TPS Harsha, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Mohd. Imrankhan, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents. Factual Matrix: 3.1. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are as follows: The Government of Telangana (respondent No. 1), through G.O.Ms. No. 93, Revenue (Ex.II) Department, dated 14.08.2025, provided for the allotment of A4 shops for the licence period from 01.12.2025 to 30.11.2027, and authorized the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana, to supervise and oversee the entire allotment process. Pursuant thereto, the Commissioner issued Gazette Notifications and published the schedule for the selection and allotment process for granting licences for 184 Nos. A4 shops, vide Memo No. 1686/2025/CPE/TS/F1, dated 24.09.2025. 3.2. In consequence thereof, the respective District Prohibition and Excise Officers issued notifications in the District Gazettes on 26.09.2025, inviting applications for allotment of shops under Rules 3, 4, and 5 of the Telangana Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2012 (for short, “the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012”). The selection process was to be conducted through a draw of lots, and the corresponding schedule was duly communicated. The last date for receipt of applications was fixed as 18.10.2025. 3.3. However, by the impugned Memo dated 18.10.2025, the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana (respondent No. 2), extended the last date for receipt of applications up to 23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh called by the OBCJAC/Associations, which was supported by various political and social organizations on 18.10.2025. The last date for receipt of applications was fixed as 18.10.2025. 3.3. However, by the impugned Memo dated 18.10.2025, the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana (respondent No. 2), extended the last date for receipt of applications up to 23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh called by the OBCJAC/Associations, which was supported by various political and social organizations on 18.10.2025. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed challenging the said extension. Petitioners’ Submissions: 4.1. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that the extension of time for submission of applications beyond 18.10.2025, the date prescribed in the original notification, is arbitrary, illegal, and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. It is urged that the Telangana Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2012 (for short, ‘the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012’) do not confer any power upon the authorities to extend the deadline for submission of applications. 4.2. In particular, it is submitted that Rule 12(4) mandates that applications must be submitted within the prescribed period, while Rule 12(5) empowers only the postponement of the selection process and not the extension of the time for submission of applications. Further, Rule 12(6) stipulates that the selection process commences only after the receipt of applications. Therefore, the extension of the last date for receipt of applications, in the absence of express statutory authority, is ultra vires the Rules and constitutes an impermissible alteration of the selection process midstream. It is contended that such deviation violates the principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution, as it confers an undue advantage upon applicants who submitted their applications after the prescribed date. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that it is a settled legal principle that once a selection process has commenced, its terms and conditions cannot be altered midway to benefit a particular group of participants. 4.3. The learned Senior Counsel also argues that the justification offered for the extension, namely the State-wide Bandh, is factually unfounded, as nearly 80% of the applications were filed on 18.10.2025, the very date of the Bandh, thereby demonstrating that there was no substantial disruption. The impugned decision, it is contended, reflects non-application of mind and lacks any rational basis. 4.3. The learned Senior Counsel also argues that the justification offered for the extension, namely the State-wide Bandh, is factually unfounded, as nearly 80% of the applications were filed on 18.10.2025, the very date of the Bandh, thereby demonstrating that there was no substantial disruption. The impugned decision, it is contended, reflects non-application of mind and lacks any rational basis. Moreover, permitting applications during the extended period prejudices the petitioners’ legitimate expectation and adversely affects their prospects of selection, thereby causing serious detriment to those who complied with the original schedule. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned Memo extending the time be set aside and that only applications submitted on or before 18.10.2025 be considered. 4.4. In support of their contentions, the petitioners place reliance upon Buddela Suresh v. State of Andhra Pradesh , 2020 SCC OnLine AP 136, wherein the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court interpreted Rules 7(3), (4), and (6) of the A.P. Excise Rules, provisions pari materia with Rules 12(3), (4), and (5) of the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012 and held that applications must be submitted strictly within the prescribed period and that any submission beyond such time is invalid. The Court further held that once the last date is announced, it cannot be altered by any authority, and any extension of the deadline is arbitrary, ultra vires, and violative of Articles 14 and 47 of the Constitution. While the Rules empower the District Collector to postpone the date of selection, no such authority exists to extend the time for submission of applications. 4.5. The petitioners further rely on Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka , (1995) 1 SCC 574 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the State permits trade or business in liquor, it must treat all qualified persons equally and that no discriminatory treatment is permissible among eligible applicants. 4.6. Reliance is also placed upon Tata Cellular v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 651 , wherein the Apex Court held that judicial review of administrative action is confined to examining the legality of the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision itself. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny must ensure that the authority acts within the bounds of law, adheres to the principles of natural justice, and avoids arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. 4.7. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny must ensure that the authority acts within the bounds of law, adheres to the principles of natural justice, and avoids arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. 4.7. The learned Senior Counsel further cites Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand , (2013) 9 SCC 363 , wherein it was held that an action that is illegal at its inception cannot be validated by subsequent events, and that no person can derive any legal right from his own wrongful conduct. 4.8. The petitioners also place reliance upon W.B. State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. , (2001) 2 SCC 451 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in public contracts, fairness and transparency are paramount considerations, and that a non-compliant bid, even if it is the lowest, cannot be accepted. The Court emphasized that strict adherence to procedural norms is essential to maintain public confidence and to prevent favoritism. 4.9. On the strength of the above authorities, the petitioners contend that the impugned extension of the last date for submission of applications is arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory, and accordingly pray that the impugned Memo extending the time be quashed, and that only applications submitted on or before 18.10.2025 be taken into consideration. Respondents’ Submissions: 5.1. Learned Additional Advocate General (“AAG”) for the respondents submits that the challenge to the Commissioner’s Memo is misconceived, inasmuch as the actual extension of time was effected through District Gazette Notifications issued by the respective District Prohibition and Excise Officers. Hence, the relief sought against the Commissioner’s Memo is itself inconsequential. 5.2. The learned AAG further contends that the submission of applications constitutes an integral part of the overall selection process, and that Rule 12(5) of the the Telangana Excise Rules, 2012 empowers the District Collector to postpone the selection process to a future date. Accordingly, the extension of the last date for submission of applications falls within the scope of this power and cannot be termed ultra vires the Rules. 5.3. It is further submitted that the extension was necessitated by the State-wide Bandh and that the decision was taken in the public interest to ensure that no eligible applicant was deprived of an opportunity to participate in the process. The action, it is argued, squarely falls within the administrative powers of the Commissioner under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968 , read with G.O.Ms. No. 93. The action, it is argued, squarely falls within the administrative powers of the Commissioner under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968 , read with G.O.Ms. No. 93. 5.4. Reliance is placed upon A.P. Public Service Commission v. Sarath Chandra , (1990) 2 SCC 669 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the ‘selection process’ encompasses all preliminary steps, including the invitation and scrutiny of applications. Therefore, the Commissioner’s exercise of administrative discretion to extend the deadline in order to facilitate wider participation cannot be characterized as arbitrary or illegal. 5.5. The learned AAG further submits that the submission of an application does not create any vested right in favour of the applicant. The petitioners cannot claim prejudice at this stage, as the liquor trade does not constitute a fundamental right but merely a privilege regulated by statute. The extension of the submission date was uniformly applied across the State, without any discrimination, and was undertaken solely to ensure fairness and transparency. The temporary disruption caused by the Bandh affected banking operations and consequently impeded payment of prescribed fees. Hence, the uniform extension of time was justified and non-discriminatory. 5.6. It is further contended that the petitioners’ claim of prejudice is illusory. Based on the available data, the ratio of applications per shop increased only marginally, from 1:34.22 to 1:36.31, due to the additional 5,739 applications received during the extended period. This negligible change does not materially affect the petitioners’ chances of selection. Moreover, several petitioners themselves submitted applications during the extended period, which, demonstrates a lack of bona fides. Consequently, the present writ petition is alleged to be a motivated attempt to derail the allotment process. 5.7. The learned AAG relies upon National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises , (2020) 16 SCC 489 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review in tender or allotment matters is confined to cases involving mala fides, arbitrariness, or violation of public interest, and cannot be invoked to safeguard private commercial interests. 5.8. Further reliance is placed upon State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi , (2005) 9 SCC 733 , wherein it was held that interim or administrative directions cannot override statutory provisions or government orders except under compelling circumstances. 5.9. 5.8. Further reliance is placed upon State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi , (2005) 9 SCC 733 , wherein it was held that interim or administrative directions cannot override statutory provisions or government orders except under compelling circumstances. 5.9. The learned AAG also cites Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa , (2007) 14 SCC 517 , to submit that Courts should refrain from interfering with transparent administrative processes, particularly in economic or policy matters, unless arbitrariness, mala fides, or perversity is clearly established. 5.10. Reliance is further placed upon State of Kerala v. B. Six Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 186 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no vested right exists in respect of liquor licensing, and that the applicable rules are those in force on the date of the decision, not on the date of application. 5.11. Reference is also made to Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 3 SCC 635 , wherein it was held that judicial review of executive policy in matters relating to liquor trade is limited in scope, and that Courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the executive unless the policy is found to be mala fide, arbitrary, or unconstitutional. 5.12. In view of the foregoing, it is contended that the extension of the last date for submission of applications was a uniform, fair, and non-discriminatory administrative measure taken in public interest, without altering any eligibility conditions or selection criteria. Accordingly, no arbitrariness, illegality, or mala fide intent can be attributed to the Government or its officers. The learned AAG, therefore, prays that the writ petition be dismissed. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and have perused the record. Analysis: 7. The Government of Telangana, through the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, issued a notification inviting applications for the grant of A4 liquor shop licences for the licence period 2025–2026, fixing 18.10.2025 as the last date for submission of applications. Subsequently, by the impugned Memo, the Commissioner extended the last date for submission of applications up to 23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh called by the OBCJAC/Associations and supported by various political and social organizations. Consequential Gazette Notifications were thereafter issued by the respective District Prohibition and Excise Officers to implement this extension. These factual aspects are undisputed. 8. Subsequently, by the impugned Memo, the Commissioner extended the last date for submission of applications up to 23.10.2025, citing the State-wide Bandh called by the OBCJAC/Associations and supported by various political and social organizations. Consequential Gazette Notifications were thereafter issued by the respective District Prohibition and Excise Officers to implement this extension. These factual aspects are undisputed. 8. The core contention of the petitioners is that the extension of the deadline for submission of applications lacks statutory sanction and adversely affects their chances of selection, thereby causing prejudice and violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The principal issue that therefore arises for consideration is the nature and extent of the right, if any, that accrues to the petitioners upon submission of their applications on the originally prescribed date. 9. Under the prevailing system in Telangana, a non- refundable application fee of Rs.3,00,000/- is prescribed per application for an A4 liquor shop licence. Payment of this fee cannot be equated with an earnest money deposit accompanying a tender, as it merely signifies an expression of intent to participate in a regulated privilege and does not confer any vested or contractual right. In legal parlance, submission of an application in such a process constitutes an offer in response to an invitation to offer. 10. The petitioners argue that the receipt of applications and the conduct of the selection process are two distinct and independent stages. Rule 12(6) of the Telangana Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2012 (“Telangana Excise Rules, 2012”) specifies that the selection process begins only after the receipt of applications. Thus, according to the petitioners, submission of applications is an anterior and separate stage, distinct from the selection itself. 11. The State authorities, conversely, contend that the submission of applications is an integral part of the overall selection process and that Rule 12(5) empowers the District Collector to postpone the selection process. They further assert that, by virtue of Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968 (“the Act”) read with G.O.Ms. No. 93, Revenue (Ex.II) Department, dated 14.08.2025, the Commissioner possesses supervisory authority to oversee and regulate the entire allotment process. Hence, the Commissioner’s decision to extend the deadline for receipt of applications, being ancillary to his supervisory functions, falls within the scope of his lawful authority. No. 93, Revenue (Ex.II) Department, dated 14.08.2025, the Commissioner possesses supervisory authority to oversee and regulate the entire allotment process. Hence, the Commissioner’s decision to extend the deadline for receipt of applications, being ancillary to his supervisory functions, falls within the scope of his lawful authority. In this view, the receipt of applications, being inseparable from the selection process, falls within the ambit of administrative discretion. 12. Even if the petitioners’ distinction is accepted, the extension of the application deadline, without altering any eligibility conditions or substantive criteria, cannot be regarded as a modification of the selection process or as a change in its terms after commencement. Conversely, the respondents’ assertion that submission of applications forms part of the selection process is not entirely tenable, since both the notification and the Rules make it clear that the selection process begins only after the applications are received. Therefore, the statutory framework supports the petitioners’ stance. Consequently, the extension of the last date must be viewed as an administrative measure ancillary to implementation. 13. In A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarath Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that preliminary administrative steps, such as the receipt and processing of applications, form part of the overall selection mechanism, and that limited administrative flexibility at such stages is permissible, provided fairness and integrity are maintained. 14. In this context, extending the timeline for submission of applications due to unforeseen circumstances such as a State- wide Bandh constitutes a permissible ancillary administrative measure. Even if viewed as a pre-selection procedural stage, such action still falls within the broader ambit of the selection mechanism. 15. The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the administrative act of extending the deadline from 18.10.2025 to 23.10.2025, in the context of the State-wide Bandh, is arbitrary, ultra vires, or violative of statutory or constitutional provisions. 16. It is well settled that the power to supervise inherently includes the authority to take incidental or ancillary measures necessary to achieve the object of the statute and to ensure a fair, transparent, and effective process. In Sailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla , (2016) 3 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court held that where a literal interpretation of a rule would defeat its object, a purposive interpretation consistent with legislative intent must be adopted. 17. In Sailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla , (2016) 3 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court held that where a literal interpretation of a rule would defeat its object, a purposive interpretation consistent with legislative intent must be adopted. 17. Notably, the petitioners admit that the extension was applied uniformly across all districts of the State and that there is no allegation of extension of date confers undue advantage upon any class of applicants. 18. It is equally well settled that trade or business in liquor does not constitute a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka , (1995) 1 SCC 574 , and State of Kerala v. B. Six Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 186 , the Supreme Court held that dealing in liquor is a State-regulated privilege, subject to absolute control and regulation, and that no person can claim any vested right or legitimate expectation in relation thereto. 19. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has limited application in matters concerning State-regulated privileges. The petitioners’ claim that their “chance” of selection or “probability” of selection constitutes a legally protected interest is untenable. Mere participation in such a process does not confer an enforceable right, particularly in domains governed by statutory discretion. The only enforceable entitlement is to a process that is fair, transparent, and non-arbitrary. Unless mala fides, arbitrariness, or discrimination is established, a mere assertion of prejudice is insufficient. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any mala fides, discrimination, or colourable exercise of power. 20. It is trite law that judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the decision-making process, not the decision’s merits. As held in Tata Cellular v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 651 , courts do not act as appellate authorities but ensure that administrative decisions are lawful, rational, and free from arbitrariness or mala fides. The principle was reaffirmed in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa , (2007) 14 SCC 517 , emphasizing that the courts should refrain from interfering in administrative or economic policy matters unless illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety is evident. 21. In Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 3 SCC 635 , the Supreme Court held that courts must not substitute their judgment for that of the executive unless mala fides or patent illegality is demonstrated. 21. In Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 3 SCC 635 , the Supreme Court held that courts must not substitute their judgment for that of the executive unless mala fides or patent illegality is demonstrated. Judicial review is limited to ensuring that administrative power is exercised bona fide, for legitimate purposes, and in accordance with law. Matters relating to excise administration, in particular, involve regulatory and economic considerations within the executive domain. 22. In light of these principles, the justification offered by the Commissioner, namely, the disruption of normal administrative and banking operations due to the State-wide Bandh, cannot be considered perfunctory. The uniform extension of the deadline across all districts ensured that no prospective applicant was deprived of participation due to circumstances beyond their control. The measure maintained transparency, consistency, and fairness, without altering any eligibility conditions, licensing criteria, or the prescribed draw-of-lots mechanism. Accordingly, such a uniform and justified extension cannot be regarded as an arbitrary or impermissible alteration of the selection criteria. 23. It is therefore evident that the Commissioner’s action was neither arbitrary nor irrational, nor tainted by mala fides. The record shows that the extension was prompted by administrative necessity, applied uniformly, and did not modify any substantive conditions of eligibility or selection. The marginal increase in applications per shop, from 1:34.22 to 1:36.31, does not constitute material prejudice. The Commissioner’s decision is traceable to his supervisory powers under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968 , read with G.O.Ms. No. 93, and therefore cannot be said to be ultra vires. 24. The decision in Buddela Suresh v. State of Andhra Pradesh , 2020 SCC OnLine AP 136, though superficially similar, is distinguishable both on facts and in law. In that case, the A.P. High Court held that an arbitrary extension of the application deadline was ultra vires the A.P. Excise Rules, 2012, as the authorities lacked express power to do so. The statutory and factual contexts, however, are materially different in Telangana. Here, the extension of the deadline is an administrative step traceable to the Commissioner’s supervisory powers under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act and G.O.Ms. No. 93. and the disputed extension was fair, without any discrimination. Hence, the ratio in Buddela Suresh is inapplicable. Conclusion: 25. The statutory and factual contexts, however, are materially different in Telangana. Here, the extension of the deadline is an administrative step traceable to the Commissioner’s supervisory powers under Section 3 of the Telangana Excise Act and G.O.Ms. No. 93. and the disputed extension was fair, without any discrimination. Hence, the ratio in Buddela Suresh is inapplicable. Conclusion: 25. Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court concludes that the impugned Memo issued by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana, and the consequential Gazette Notifications extending the last date for receipt of applications to 23.10.2025, constitute a valid exercise of administrative discretion made in the larger public interest. The extension was uniform, reasonable, and aimed at preserving fairness in the selection process. Accordingly, the impugned action cannot be held ultra vires the statutory scheme or violative of Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.