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2025 DIGILAW 1366 (TS)

D. Maria Das v. State of Telangana

2025-11-03

APARESH KUMAR SINGH, G.M.MOHIUDDIN

body2025
JUDGMENT: This Writ Appeal assails the order dated 02.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.4956 of 2021, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 2. Heard Sri G. Allabakash, learned counsel for the appellant; Ms. M. Shalini, learned Government Pleader for Services-II for respondent No.1, Sri Srinivasa Srikanth, learned Standing Counsel for Telangana State Power Transmission of Corporation Limited (TSTRANSCO) for respondent Nos.2 to 5 and perused the record. Factual Matrix in brief: 3. The factual background, necessary for the adjudication of this appeal, is as follows: i. The appellant/writ petitioner (hereafter "the petitioner") was engaged as a contract labourer (skilled worker) in the Electricity Department of the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) on 01.05.1993. ii. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 23.09.1996, prohibiting engagement of contract labour in certain categories. Consequently, APSEB issued B.P.Ms.No.36 dated 18.05.1997 and B.P.Ms.No.326 dated 14.03.1998, providing for absorption of contract labour in abolished categories with service benefits from 06.12.1996 and pecuniary benefits from 09.12.1997. iii. The petitioner’s case for absorption under the said 1997 scheme was initially rejected on the ground that he was supplied through an unlicensed contractor. The writ petitioner challenged the rejection of absorption in W.P.No.4209 of 1999, and this Court directed the respondents to consider his case without disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that he was supplied through an unlicensed contractor. Pursuant to the order, the petitioner was interviewed on 28.10.1997, but no further action was taken. iv. The petitioner was eventually absorbed as Artisan Grade-II on 29.07.2017 on an ‘as-is-where-is’ basis under a settlement reached with trade unions under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the 1947 Act’) and was approved by the Government, which was expressly without service or pecuniary benefits for the prior contract period. v. The petitioner superannuated on 01.07.2020, and filed W.P.No.4956 of 2021 seeking the following relief: “…to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus to declaring the impugned action of the respondents in not allowing the petitioner the regular service and notional seniority w.e.f 1.5.1993 and pecuniary benefit w.e.f. 1.5.1993 while extending such benefits to all other contract labour absorbed under the scheme of absorption vide B.P.Ms. No.36, dated 18/05/1997 and B.P.Ms.No.271 and 272 dated 31/12/1997 and B.P.Ms. No.36, dated 18/05/1997 and B.P.Ms.No.271 and 272 dated 31/12/1997 and B.P.Ms. No. 326 dt 14.3.1998 and thereby denying the petitioner the equal treatment and further action of the respondents in giving consolidate pay to the petitioner while fixing higher scale to all other contract labour absorbed under the same scheme is highly illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondents to allow the service benefit w.e.f 1.5.1993 and pecuniary benefit from 1.5.1993 as per B.P. Ms. 326, dt 14/3/98 as allowed to the other similarly Situated persons vide Memo No. CEE/O& MJDR NTTPS /Adm /C.3 /F. 8/D. N0. 2813/11, dt 14/12/2011 as per the orders of this Honorable Court in writ Petition No. 2179/2006, Dt 19/11/2010 and pass…. 4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the underlying writ petition, holding that the writ petitioner was absorbed as outsourced personnel in TSTRANSCO on as-is-where-is basis; that he did not choose to challenge the absorption order dated 29.07.2017 issued by the respondent No.2; and that the petitioner’s failure to seek regularization of his services from the date of his initial appointment in the year 1993 had rendered the relief sought in the present writ petition, barred by delay and laches. Contentions of the appellant: 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant had been continuously working as contract labour from 01.05.1993 in the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB), which was subsequently restructured into APTRANSCO. After the formation of the State of Telangana, APTRANSCO was renamed as TSTRANSCO, under which institution the appellant continued in service till 30.06.2020. 6. It was contended that the respondents themselves admitted in their counter affidavit that the appellant’s services had been regularized in the cadre of Artisan Grade-II with effect from 29.07.2017. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore argued that the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits, including counting of his prior service from 01.05.1993 for purposes of pension and terminal benefits, in the same manner as extended to similarly situated contract labour under B.P. Ms. No. 326. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, following the dismissal of W.P.(PIL) No. 149 of 2017, the respondents issued Memo dated 28.11.2019 regularizing the appellant’s services with effect from 29.07.2017, rendering any challenge to the earlier proceedings unnecessary. No. 326. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, following the dismissal of W.P.(PIL) No. 149 of 2017, the respondents issued Memo dated 28.11.2019 regularizing the appellant’s services with effect from 29.07.2017, rendering any challenge to the earlier proceedings unnecessary. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate this crucial fact, and the denial of consequential benefits despite such regularization is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 8. It was contended that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the ratio of the judgment in W.P. No. 17643 of 2012, dated 16.07.2018, and the circular issued by the respondents vide Memo dated 13.08.2024, extending pensionary benefits to artisans who have retired or are due to retire. Learned counsel urged that denial of the pensionary benefits to the appellant was discriminatory and contrary to both precedent and administrative policy. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned order, contending that the order suffers from no infirmity in law or on facts. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly appreciated the record and applied the settled legal principles, warranting no interference in appeal. The learned Standing Counsel for TSTRANSCO further submitted that the appellant was absorbed only in 2017 on an “as-is-where-is” basis under a settlement accepted without protest, excluding any claim for past service benefits. The appellant never challenged the terms of absorption. The precedents relied upon by the appellant relate to cases under B.P. Ms. No. 37, which are inapplicable to the facts of the case of the appellant. It was also urged that the claim is hopelessly belated and barred by laches, and that the Circular Memo dated 13.08.2024 has no retrospective operation. 10. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged. Analysis and Reasons: 11. It is pertinent to note that the appellant’s absorption was affected pursuant to a Memorandum of Settlement entered into under the 1947 Act, which has statutory force and binds both the employer and the employees under Section 18 of the Act. The settlement terms unequivocally provided that the absorption would be on an ‘as-is-where-is’ basis, thereby excluding recognition of the appellant’s past contract service for any consequential benefits, including seniority, pension, or other terminal dues. The appellant, with full knowledge of these stipulations, accepted the absorption and continued in service without protest for several years. The settlement terms unequivocally provided that the absorption would be on an ‘as-is-where-is’ basis, thereby excluding recognition of the appellant’s past contract service for any consequential benefits, including seniority, pension, or other terminal dues. The appellant, with full knowledge of these stipulations, accepted the absorption and continued in service without protest for several years. Thus, the appellant having availed the benefits of such settlement without demur cannot now seek to reopen or alter its terms after his retirement. 12. A perusal of the record would show that the appellant was absorbed into service pursuant to proceedings issued in 2017 and continued therein until his retirement on 30.06.2020. The record reveals that at no point during his service did the appellant challenge the terms of his absorption or assert any claim for retrospective regularization or consequential benefits. The underlying writ petition is instituted only in 2021 nearly four years after the absorption and a year after retirement without offering any explanation for the inordinate delay and this only goes to show that such prolonged inaction, silence in asserting his rights and unexplained inaction amounts to acquiescence and attracts the principles of delay and laches. 13. Further, the reliance placed by the appellant on the judgments rendered in W.P. No. 2179 of 2006 and W.P. No. 17643 of 2012 is wholly misconceived. Those cases pertained to employees who were absorbed under B.P. Ms. No. 37, dated 18.05.1997, a scheme framed for the regularization of contract labour engaged in prohibited categories pursuant to G.O.Ms.No. 41, Labour Department, dated 23.09.1996. The appellant, however, was not covered by that scheme. His absorption was effected much later under a distinct Memorandum of Settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Act of 1947, which was a self-contained arrangement having statutory force. 14. It is further to be noted that, the terms of that settlement specifically provided for absorption on an “as-is-where-is” basis, thereby expressly excluding the counting of past contract service for seniority, pension, or other consequential benefits. The appellant, having been absorbed under this separate and independent settlement, cannot claim parity with those covered under B.P. Ms. No. 37. In this regard the learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly distinguished the precedents relied upon and held that they have no application to the appellant’s case. 15. The appellant, having been absorbed under this separate and independent settlement, cannot claim parity with those covered under B.P. Ms. No. 37. In this regard the learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly distinguished the precedents relied upon and held that they have no application to the appellant’s case. 15. This Court is of the view that the Circular Memo dated 13.08.2024 merely outlines procedural formalities for payment of gratuity, GIS, and other terminal benefits and does not confer any substantive right to count past contract service. It cannot be construed as modifying or overriding the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement, under which the appellant was absorbed on an “as-is-where-is” basis. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the Circular has no retrospective effect and creates no enforceable right in favour of the appellant. 16. This Court does not dispute that the appellant had rendered long and continuous service with the respondent- Corporation. However, mere length of service, by itself, does not create an enforceable right in the absence of a statutory or contractual foundation. Equity, though a guiding consideration, cannot be invoked to defeat settled legal principles or to rewrite binding terms of employment voluntarily accepted by the appellant under the Memorandum of Settlement. 17. In this regard, the appellant’s plea for notional regularization from the year 1993, dehors the express stipulations of the settlement under which he was absorbed on an “as-is-where-is” basis, is legally untenable. Granting such retrospective regularization would not only lack legal sanction but would also unsettle the established seniority structure and service conditions of other employees who have been absorbed or promoted in accordance with the governing rules. 18. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Appeal is devoid of merits. The order of the learned Single Judge is just, equitable, and legally sound. 19. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.