JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. This appeal arises out of the final decree in O.S.No.178/2003 on the file of the Subordinate Judge Court (Additional), Palakkad, as confirmed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.112/2019. 2. The defendants are the appellants herein. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents filed O.S.No.178/2003 for partition. By a preliminary decree dated 19.10.2010, the Sub Court, Palakkad, directed the plaint schedule property to be divided into two by metes and bounds. One share each was directed to be allotted to the plaintiff and the first defendant. While effecting partition by metes and bounds, the Sub Court directed the Advocate Commissioner to consider the respective occupation of the property by the parties. Pursuant to the said preliminary decree, the plaintiffs filed Final Decree Interlocutory Application No.482/2011 in O.S.No.178/2003 for passing of final decree. In the meantime, the original plaintiff expired and the supplemental plaintiffs were impleaded. During the course of the final decree proceedings, it was brought to the notice of the Court that the defendants had filed R.S.A No.525/2018 against the preliminary decree and an interim stay of passing of final decree was passed initially. However, the date of the same was not extended. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on 08.07.2019. In the final decree proceedings, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed for dividing the property by metes and bounds and accordingly, a report (Ext.C1) was filed along with which Ext.C1(a) plan was also produced. The Advocate Commissioner in his report and plan had demarcated ‘A’ portion of 30.35 cents in favour of the defendants and ‘B’ portion of 30.35 cents (26.85 cents + 3.50 cents) in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants did not file any objection to the Advocate Commissioner’s report and submitted before the Court that a final decree can be passed based on the report. Accordingly, the Sub Court, Palakkad, passed final decree as per order dated 22.03.2019. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants herein preferred A.S.No.112/2019 before the District Court, Palakkad, which also came to be dismissed on 13.03.2024. Consequent to the dismissal of the appeal by the First Appellate Court, it is stated across the bar that the delivery of the property was effected during January 2025 and the plaintiffs has been put in possession of the same. 3. Consequent to the dismissal of the appeal by the First Appellate Court, it is stated across the bar that the delivery of the property was effected during January 2025 and the plaintiffs has been put in possession of the same. 3. Heard Shri. S.Sanal Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Adv.T.J.Seema and Shri.R.Lakshminarayan, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri. E.Adithyan for respondents. 4. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Advocate Commissioner did not refer to the reservations held by the Sub Court in favour of the defendants as per condition No.3 of the preliminary decree. Although, the defendants, did not raise any objection to the report of the Advocate Commissioner, it was incumbent upon the Advocate Commissioner to have adhered specifically to condition No.3 in the preliminary decree. Both the Courts had erroneously held that in the absence of any objection by the defendants, the report of the Advocate Commissioner could be accepted. There is not warrant for such conclusion and that when gross illegality is committed by the Advocate Commissioner and which results in an inequitable distribution of the plaint schedule property, the defendants are entitled to maintain this appeal. 5. Per contra, R.Lakshminarayan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs would point out that the final decree proceedings started from the year 2011 and the Advocate Commissioner had inspected the property during 2016. As a matter of fact, if the defendants had any objection regarding the distribution of the plaint schedule property by the Advocate Commissioner, they should have raised objection at the time of the inspection of the property or much less later when the report was filed before the Court. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. 6. I considered the the rival submissions raised across the bar. 7. It is true as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the preliminary decree provides protection of shares held by both parties respectively. However, the question is whether there can be any absolute mandate that could be drawn by the reading of condition No.3 of the preliminary decree. While decreeing the suit, the trial court had specifically ordered that “by effecting partition by metes and bounds the respective occupation of the property by the parties should be considered”. However, the question is whether there can be any absolute mandate that could be drawn by the reading of condition No.3 of the preliminary decree. While decreeing the suit, the trial court had specifically ordered that “by effecting partition by metes and bounds the respective occupation of the property by the parties should be considered”. A reading of the aforesaid clause no doubt shows that the entitlement of the parties to hold the possession of the properties held by them is reserved. However, The said direction cannot be construed in any manner being prejudicial to the interests of both parties. In other words, In a given case, where the Advocate Commissioner finds that a strict adherence to the Condition No.3 quoted above would result in an inequitable distribution of the properties, the Advocate Commissioner can proceed to divide the property in a more equitable way. This is precisely what has been done by the Advocate Commissioner. The aforesaid fact would be evident on a bare perusal of Ext.C1(a) plan. 8. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the defendants had an indefeasible right with aid of the aforesaid clause in the preliminary decree, the fact remains that neither during the inspection of the property by the Advocate Commissioner nor Ext.C1(a) plan was filed before the trial court in the course of proceedings for passing of the final decree, an objection regarding the inequitable distribution of the properties was raised on the behalf of the defendants. Therefore, there is a clear acquiesce on the part of the defendants, insofar as rights if any conferred on him by virtue of condition No.3 of the preliminary decree evades insignificance because of the contest. 9. Still further, a reading of the judgment of the First Appellate Court shows that, on 16.10.2018, at the time of the final decree proceedings in the trial court, both parties stated that no oral evidence is required and final decree can be passed in terms of the report and plan of the Advocate Commissioner. If, as a matter of fact, the defendants had any grievance, as regard to the aforesaid findings, the remedy of the defendants was to seek appropriate relief by way of review petition. If, as a matter of fact, the defendants had any grievance, as regard to the aforesaid findings, the remedy of the defendants was to seek appropriate relief by way of review petition. Even before this Court it is not the case of the appellants that the recording of such proceedings is per se incorrect and inasmuch as there was no such concession before the trial court. At any rate, even assuming for argument sake that there was a concession on the counsel appearing for the defendants, still the defendants were entitled to raise the objections to the report of the Advocate Commissioner independently by way of separate application and seeking to remit the report of the application. Having not done, the defendants had clearly acquiesced to the report and plan submitted by the Advocate Commissioner. As a result of the above discussion, the inevitable conclusion is that there is no illegality infirmity or perversity in the orders passed by the trial court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court. Added to the fact that the final decree stands executed and the delivery of the property has been given to the parties. Hence, this Court finds no reason to entertain the appeal and consider the contention on merit. Thus, as no substantial question of law arises for consideration, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.