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2025 DIGILAW 137 (AP)

Manchala Mouleswara Reddy v. Dabbali Samanna

2025-01-23

VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

body2025
JUDGMENT : VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree dated 30-7-2012 in A.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Nandyal, Kurnool District, in setting aside the Judgment and decree dated 19-01-2012 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal. 2. The appellants herein are plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the respondents 1 to 11 are defendants 1 to 11 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal. Respondents 12 to 14 herein are added as legal representatives of deceased 5 th respondent vide order dated 26-6-2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2023. 3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.69 of 2008 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal, with a prayer for declaration of plaintiffs’ title in respect of the plaint schedule properties and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, legal heirs, assignees, representatives etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs with regard to the plaint schedule properties and for costs of the suit. 4. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal, decreed the suit with costs by declaring the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the plaint schedule property as owners of the plaint schedule property and also granted permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, legal heirs, assignees, representatives etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs with regard to the plaint schedule properties. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendants in the above said suit filed the aforesaid appeal before the first appellate Court. The learned III Additional District Judge, Nandyal, allowed the first appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiffs/appellants approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiffs/appellants approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.69 of 2008, is as follows: (a) It is pleaded that the plaintiffs purchased the plaint schedule properties from one K. David and others under a registered sale deed dated 24-7-1987 and since then they are in possession and enjoyment of the said properties and the Government also issued pattadar pass books and title deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs also availed crop loan from Andhra Pragati Grameena Bank, Gadivemula Branch, by executing a registered mortgage deed in favour of the bank on 28-11-2007 and the plaintiffs are paying cist to the Government authorities for the plaint schedule lands. (b) It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs filed a caveat petition on 11-02-2008 before Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Nandyal and having received the said caveat petition, the defendants gave reply on 04-3-2008 stating that the plaintiffs are the tenants of plaint schedule properties and the defendants are aware that they are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. (c) It is further pleaded that in temporary absence of the plaintiffs, the defendants tried to trespass into the plaint schedule properties and due to intervention of the elders, the matter was pacified and as the defendants are proclaiming that they will interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties, the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit. 7. The defendants 1, 2 and 6 filed a written statement, which was adopted by the defendants 3 to 5, denying the contents of plaint averments and they further contended as follows: (a) It is contended that the plaintiffs are not the owners of plaint schedule properties. The plaint schedule properties are the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village, represented by the 2 nd defendant as President, the 6 th defendant as Secretary and the 1 st defendant as Treasurer. The American Baptist Foreign Mission Church is a necessary party to the suit. The plaint schedule properties are the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village, represented by the 2 nd defendant as President, the 6 th defendant as Secretary and the 1 st defendant as Treasurer. The American Baptist Foreign Mission Church is a necessary party to the suit. Even after filing caveat petition by the plaintiffs, the defendants gave reply to them stating that the properties belong to the American Baptist Foreign Mission Church and the said properties are in possession and enjoyment of the Church committee. Knowing fully well about the facts, the plaintiffs filed the suit against wrong persons in their individual capacity, so the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary party and proper parties. (b) It is further contended that the plaintiffs never purchased the plaint schedule properties from K. David and others under the alleged sale deed dated 24-7-1987. The said document was created by the plaintiffs with an intention to grab the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village. The said K. David and his family members have no right, title and enjoyment over the plaint schedule properties to sell the same to the plaintiffs. The plaint schedule properties are situated within the limits of Nandyal Sub-Registration District, at present within the limits of Bandi Atmakur Registration District. The plaintiffs in collusion with K. David with an intention to grab the church property, created false documents and as per the recitals of the alleged registered sale deed dated 24-7-1987, it was registered at Kurnool. The plaint schedule properties belong to American Baptist Foreign Mission Church and they are not transferable. It is further contended that the said property stands in the name of Reverend Stanton Dora in the records of Registration and Revenue authorities. Further, the plaintiffs or K. David or his family members were never in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties as owners. The documents filed by the plaintiffs are only created and fabricated documents. (c) It is further contended that the plaintiffs have no right to mortgage the church properties. Further, the plaintiffs or K. David or his family members were never in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties as owners. The documents filed by the plaintiffs are only created and fabricated documents. (c) It is further contended that the plaintiffs have no right to mortgage the church properties. It is further contended that the plaint schedule agricultural landed properties are the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village and the same were shown in the Record of Holdings at page-4 and in Re-Survey and Re-Settlement Register and in No.3 Village Adangal Extract, it is shown that the properties shown in the name of Reverend Stanton Dora, agent of American Baptist Foreign Mission Society. (d) It is further contended that as per Field Measurement Book, Survey No.246 is an extent of Ac.0-35 cents, Survey No.247 is full extent of Ac.2-10 cents, Survey No.251 is full extent of Ac.2-60 cents, Survey No.252 is full extent of Ac.1-89 cents and Survey No.280 is full extent of Ac.3-00. In Survey Nos.246, 247, 252 and 280 full extent of land belongs to the church and to an extent of Ac.1-10 cents in Survey No.251, which is made sub-division as Survey No.251/1 belongs to the church. But, in the alleged registered sale deed filed by the plaintiffs, the said Survey number is mentioned as Pyki and the said registered sale deed was registered at Kurnool. It is further contended that the properties of church cannot be alienable. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and prayed for dismissal of the same. 8. The defendants 7 to 10 remained ex parte. 9. On the basis of the above pleadings, the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the plaint schedule mentioned properties ? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of their title over the plaint schedule mentioned property ? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for ? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? and (5) To what relief ? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-65 were marked. (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for ? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? and (5) To what relief ? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-65 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Ex.B-1 to B-27 were marked. Exs.X-1 to X-10 were also marked. 11. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendants filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.10 of 2012 before III Additional District Court, Nandyal, wherein the following points came up for consideration. (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration as prayed for ? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed ? and (3) To what relief the appellants/defendants are entitled ? 12. The learned III Additional District Judge, Nandyal, i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the respondents/plaintiffs and in favour of the appellants/defendants and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiffs 1 and 2 in O.S.No.69 of 2008 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 13. The following substantial questions of law are framed on 12-9-2012 at the time of admission of second appeal by the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad: (1) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in not accepting the title set up by the plaintiffs and reversing the judgment of the trial Court ? and (2) Whether the lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record ? 14. Heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs and Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents/defendants. 15. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would contend that the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Judge is contrary to law. 14. Heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs and Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents/defendants. 15. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would contend that the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Judge is contrary to law. He would further contend that the defendants have not claimed any title and possession over the plaint schedule properties, but the learned first appellate Judge came to wrong conclusion that Ex.A-1 registered sale deed, Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books and title deeds issued by the Revenue authorities, Ex.A-5 No.3 adangal and Exs.A-15 to A-52 land revenue receipts issued by the Tahsildar do not confer title in favour of plaintiffs. He would further contend that the second appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge. 16. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents would contend that on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge rightly held that the plaintiffs are not having any right and title in the plaint schedule properties, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief and the said finding given by the learned first appellate Judge is sustainable under law and the second appeal may be dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge. 17. Normally in a second appeal, the second appellate Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the first appellate Court are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. If the findings are based on inadmissible evidence or failure to consider the relevant evidence, then only the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the conclusions drawn by the first appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring the material evidence, then also the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra, the same has been well settled that if the judgment of the first appellate Court is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring the material evidence, then only in a second appellate stage the High Court can interfere with the findings arrived by the first appellate Judge. 18. The title document of the plaintiffs is Ex.A-1 registered sale deed dated 24-7-1987 said to have been executed by one K. Daveedu and others. Admittedly, the defendants severely pleaded in the written statement itself that the plaintiffs’ vendor has no right in the property under Ex.A-1 sale deed. The suit schedule properties to the extents of Ac.0-35 cents, Ac.2-10 cents, Ac.1-10 cents, Ac.1-89 cents and Ac.3-00 in Survey Nos.246 Pyki, 247 Pyki, 251/1 Pyki, 252 Pyki and 280 Pyki, respectively, to a total extent of Ac.8-44 cents situated in Pesaravai village of Kurnool district, which were situated within the common boundaries. In the written statement itself, the defendants 1, 2 and 6 severely pleaded that they are not the owners of plaint schedule properties and the plaint schedule properties are the properties of American Baptist Foreign Mission Church of Pesaravai village, represented by the 2 nd defendant as President, the 6 th defendant as Secretary and the 1 st defendant as Treasurer and the American Baptist Foreign Mission Church is a necessary party to the suit. Admittedly, the title of the plaintiffs’ vendor is strongly disputed by the defendants, therefore, the burden is heavily casts on the appellants/plaintiffs to prove the right and title of their vendors over the plaint schedule properties. 19. It is trite law that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weaknesses, if any, of the case set up by the defendant would not be a ground to grant the relief of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. The onus to prove title to the schedule property in question was on the plaintiff. The onus to prove title to the schedule property in question was on the plaintiff. It was incumbent on the part of the Court to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit property, the Court is also bound to enquire or investigate that question on first before going into any other question that may arise in a suit. 20. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-1 registration extract of sale deed dated 24-7-1987 said to have been executed by K. Daveedu and others in favour of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the title of the vendor is not found in Ex.A-1. One of the plaintiffs’ vendors was examined as P.W.3. He admits in his evidence in chief-examination that the suit schedule properties were their ancestral properties. As stated supra, there is no whisper in Ex.A-1 registered sale deed said to have been executed by P.W.3 and others that property covered under Ex.A-1 is their ancestral property. In cross-examination, P.W.3, the plaintiffs’ vendor, admits that in total, the church is having property of an extent of Ac.8-44 cents in Survey Nos.280, 246, 252, 251 and 247 and the said property belongs to the church and the suit schedule properties and the property belongs to the church are one and the same. Another crucial admission made by him is that he was President and Secretary of the church for a long period and he was continued as President of the church up to the year 2001. Another crucial admission made by him is that as President of the church, he cultivated the suit schedule property. Another admission made by him is that they have no right to sell the church property to the plaintiffs and the suit schedule property stands in the name of Reverend Stanton Dora. The own admissions of the plaintiffs’ vendor clearly goes to show that himself and other executants in Ex.A-1 are not having any right and title in Ex.A-1 property and Ex.A-1 property belongs to the church property, therefore, the title of the plaintiffs’ vendor is not at all proved. Furthermore, the own admissions of the plaintiffs’ vendor go to show that himself and other vendors are not having any right to alienate the suit schedule property under Ex.A-1. 21. Furthermore, the own admissions of the plaintiffs’ vendor go to show that himself and other vendors are not having any right to alienate the suit schedule property under Ex.A-1. 21. As seen from the recitals of Ex.B-9 i.e. Rights of Holdings issued by the Sub Registrar, Nandyal, Reverend Stanton Dora is in possession and enjoyment of the property. The plaintiffs pleaded that they purchased the property under Ex.A-1 from one K. Daveedu and others, who are lawful owners. As noticed supra, the said K. Daveedu, plaintiffs’ vendor, was examined as P.W.3. As per the own admissions of P.W.3, himself and other executants in Ex.A-1 sale deed are not having any right and title in Ex.A-1 property and Ex.A-1 property belongs to the church property. Furthermore, Ex.B-10 re-survey settlement register shows that Reverend Stanton Dora is in possession and enjoyment of the properties. Admittedly, the plaintiffs pleaded their title based on Ex.A-1 registered sale deed said to have been executed by K. Daveedu and others. The plaintiffs did not file any link documents to prove the ownership of their vendors. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ vendor i.e. P.W.3 himself admits that himself and other executants are not having right and title in Ex.A-1 property i.e. plaint schedule property. 22. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A-55 true copy of No.2 adangal, Ex.A-56 true copy of adangal for fasli 1411 and Exs.A-57 to A-59 true copies of adangals. The law is well settled that entries in revenue records cannot form basis for declaration of title. In Exs.A-15 to A-52 land revenue receipts relied on by the plaintiffs, survey numbers are not at all mentioned in Exs.A-15 to A-52. It is well settled that payment of land revenue does not confer any right and title in the suit schedule property. Since the plaintiffs are seeking the relief of declaration of title, they must have established their title de hors mutation entries. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramanna v. Samba Murthy, [ AIR 1961 A.P. 361 ] held that the entries in revenue records though may be relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and those are not evidence of title. 23. The plaintiffs relied on Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Gadivemula Mandal of Kurnool District. 23. The plaintiffs relied on Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Gadivemula Mandal of Kurnool District. Ex.B-1 shows that on hearing both sides, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nandyal, through his proceedings dated 23-8-2008, cancelled Exs.A-2 and A-3 pattadar pass books. 24. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants placed a reliance on Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector, [ AIR 2003 SC 1805 ] In that judgment, the Apex Court held as follows: “19. It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title. 20. This Court in Nair Service Society Limited v. K. C. Alexander and Ors. ( AIR 1968 SC 1165 ) observed, “the possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.”” The aforesaid case law relates to a writ petition. Both parties in the said writ petition are Chief Conservator of Forests, Collector and other respondents. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs are claiming the relief of declaration of title in the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the cited judgment are different to the instant case. 25. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants placed a reliance on High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Ramkrishna Sharma v. State of M.P, [2022 Law Suit (MP) 447]. In the case on hand, the title of the plaintiffs’ vendors is denied by the defendants. Admittedly, one of the plaintiffs’ vendor i.e. P.W.3 categorically admitted in his evidence that himself and other executants in Ex.A-1 registered sale deed are not having any right and title in the schedule property and the suit property belongs to the church property. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the case law are different to the instant case. 26. In the case of Smriti Debbarma (Dead) thr. LRs. v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, [2023(2) ALD 28 (SC)], the Apex Court held as follows: “31. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the case law are different to the instant case. 26. In the case of Smriti Debbarma (Dead) thr. LRs. v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, [2023(2) ALD 28 (SC)], the Apex Court held as follows: “31. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief. This is mandated in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be universal and has exceptions, but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail. Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title. … … … .” Admittedly, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs failed to prove their title over the suit schedule property. Since the defendants are disputing the title of the plaintiffs, it is for the plaintiffs to prove the title of the plaintiffs’ vendor. As stated supra, the evidence of plaintiffs’ vendor clearly goes to show that himself and other executants in Ex.A-1 are not having any right in the schedule property and the suit schedule property belongs to the church property and the suit schedule property is not belong to them. 27. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession in the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiffs are not entitled to the main relief of declaration of title, the question of granting consequential relief of permanent injunction does not arise. 27. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession in the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiffs are not entitled to the main relief of declaration of title, the question of granting consequential relief of permanent injunction does not arise. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge. The learned first appellate Judge on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, rightly set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and allowed the first appeal. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. 28. Resultantly, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.