JUDGMENT : A.D. MARIA CLETE, J. Heard. 2. The writ petitioner in both petitions is the management of a cooperative sugar factory in Salem. These two petitions challenge the Award issued by the Labour Court, Salem, in I.D. No. 199 of 2014 and I.D. No. 209 of 2014, both dated 29.07.2019. Through separate awards, the Labour Court ruled that the oral termination of the workman C. Boopathy on 08.12.2012 and the termination of Sankar on 12.01.2013 were illegal. Consequently, the court set aside both terminations and directed the management to reinstate the workmen with back wages. 3. In both writ petitions, a notice of motion was issued on 23.12.2020. Although the management filed two Miscellaneous Petitions in W.M.P. Nos. 24386 of 2020 and 24389 of 2020, seeking an interim stay on the operation of the Award, no orders were passed. The Respondent C. Boopathy, in W.P. No. 19742 of 2020, filed a Miscellaneous Petition in W.M.P. No. 2485 of 2024, seeking payment of last drawn wages under Section 17B . However, no orders have been passed in that petition either. As a result, all three WMPs remain pending. 4. The circumstances leading to the filing of these writ petitions are as follows. A trade union, namely the Salem Co-operative Sugar Mills National Workers Union, filed W.P. No. 14700 of 2008 before this Court, seeking a direction to the management to refrain from engaging contract labor in place of 84 workmen who had approached the competent authority under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status) Act, 1981 (T.N. Act 46/1981), seeking the conferment of permanent status. 5. After issuing notice to the parties, this Court disposed of the writ petition by an order dated 01.09.2008. Upon noting that a petition was pending before the authority under the Permanent Status Act, the Court directed the authority to complete the inquiry and pass appropriate orders within three months, with the management required to cooperate in the process. After the disposal, the Court issued the following direction to the management: “It is made clear that after the decision is rendered by the authority under Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981, it is open to the 2 nd respondent to act in accordance with the decision arrived at by the said authority.” 6. After the disposal, the Court issued the following direction to the management: “It is made clear that after the decision is rendered by the authority under Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981, it is open to the 2 nd respondent to act in accordance with the decision arrived at by the said authority.” 6. The competent authority, namely the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Salem, by an order dated 10.10.2011, held that the management of the sugar factory falls within the purview of the Permanent Status Act. It was further determined that workmen employed in the factory who complete 480 days of service within a span of 24 calendar months are entitled to permanent status. Accordingly, the authority directed that the individuals listed in the annexure be granted permanency. The annexure contained a list of 108 names. 7. The management filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the order of the authority. After hearing both sides, this Court, by an order dated 31.10.2011, dismissed the writ petition and upheld the authority’s decision granting permanent status to the workmen. In the judgment reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 5561 , the operative portion in paragraphs 36 and 37 states as follows: “36. Further, in the present case, when a direction was issued by this court in W.P.No.14700 of 2008, dated 4.9.2008, this court had directed the parties to act according to the order made by the first respondent and till such time the engagement of these workmen was directed to be continued. 37. In the light of the above factual matrix and the legal precedents set out above, this court do not find any case made out for interfering with the impugned order. Hence the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.” 8. After this Court passed its order, the management took the position that they had published a seniority list of casual laborers (CLR) on 01.10.2012. In that list, the respondent in the first writ petition, C. Boopathy (P.F. No. 2069), was listed at Sl. No. 211, while the respondent in the second writ petition, P. Sankar (P.F. No. 2063), was listed at Sl. No. 230. However, on 15.03.2013, the management issued a notice publishing a revised seniority list. In that list, the respondent in the first writ petition, C. Boopathy (P.F. No. 2069), was listed at Sl. No. 211, while the respondent in the second writ petition, P. Sankar (P.F. No. 2063), was listed at Sl. No. 230. However, on 15.03.2013, the management issued a notice publishing a revised seniority list. In that revised list, against the names of C. Boopathy (P.F. No. 2069) and P. Sankar (P.F. No. 2063), the following remark was made in Tamil: This means that they had not been reporting to work continuously, and as a result, their names were removed from the list. 9. The notice further stated that if any workman had objections, they must submit them within seven days, failing which the list would be finalized. Notably, the list contained 86 names, and for some individuals, the management specified that they were not covered by the court order. This plainly means that the names of the two contesting respondents were indeed covered by the court’s order. Subsequently, on 21.12.2013, the management published a third list, temporarily appointing 71 workers under various categories, with those possessing specific qualifications being assigned designated roles. 10. Upon realizing that he had not been considered for appointment despite the court's order, the respondent, C. Boopathy, raised an industrial dispute before the Government Labour Officer, alleging that his services had been terminated with effect from 08.12.2012. Similarly, the respondent, P. Sankar, filed a petition claiming that his services had been terminated with effect from 12.01.2013. As the Conciliation Officer was unable to mediate a resolution, he issued a failure report dated 13.03.2014. Based on this failure report, both workmen filed claim statements before the Labour Court, Salem. Their disputes were registered as I.D. No. 199 of 2014 and I.D. No. 209 of 2014, respectively, and notices were issued to the petitioner management. 11. Before the Labour Court, Salem, the management filed a reply asserting that, in compliance with the High Court’s order, a seniority list had been published. However, since the respondent had ceased reporting for work, his name was omitted from the list. In paragraph 7 of the reply, the management stated as follows: A similar counter statement was filed in the case of the other workman also. 12. The Labour Court, Salem, conducted separate trials for both disputes. However, since the respondent had ceased reporting for work, his name was omitted from the list. In paragraph 7 of the reply, the management stated as follows: A similar counter statement was filed in the case of the other workman also. 12. The Labour Court, Salem, conducted separate trials for both disputes. In I.D. No. 199 of 2014, the workman testified as PW1 and submitted six documents, which were marked as Ex.P1 to Ex.P6. On behalf of the management, Ravindran, the Office Manager, was examined as RW1, and another individual, Rajendran, was examined as RW2. Similarly, in I.D. No. 209 of 2014, the respondent, P. Sankar, examined himself as PW1, while the same witnesses, Ravindran and Rajendran were examined by the management. 13. During cross-examination, RW1, Ravindran, the Office Manager, candidly admitted that he joined duty on 03.03.2016 and was not in service at the time when the two respondents were employed or when the counter statement was filed in the industrial dispute. He also provided a straightforward response regarding the termination of the two respondents. In cross-examination, he stated as follows:- Similar evidence was adduced in I.D.No.209 of 2014. 14. The Labour Court issued two separate awards dated 29.07.2019, allowing the claims of both respondents. In paragraph 8 of the impugned awards, the Labour Court held as follows: “8. Thus from the cross examination of RW1 and RW2, it is found that the Petitioner who has joined with the Respondent in the year of 2000 and worked till 2012 was terminated from service without following natural justice and further the Respondent has not given any reply to Ex.P2 and Ex.P3 which are the letters sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent for his reinstatement along with salary. Under the above facts and circumstances and cumulative analysis of the facts of this case, this court of the view the oral termination of the Petitioner on 08.12.2012 is against natural justice and is hereby set aside. Further, the Respondent is directed to reinstate the Petitioner along with back wages. No costs.” 15. The present writ petitions have been filed by the management challenging these two awards. Although the affidavit raised contentions that the Co-operative Societies Act is a special law and, therefore, an industrial dispute cannot be raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, such arguments can no longer be sustained before this Court at this stage. No costs.” 15. The present writ petitions have been filed by the management challenging these two awards. Although the affidavit raised contentions that the Co-operative Societies Act is a special law and, therefore, an industrial dispute cannot be raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, such arguments can no longer be sustained before this Court at this stage. Another contention put forth was that casual laborers are not entitled to regularization, relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Uma Devi’s case ( 2006 (4) SCC 1 ). However, in the present case, regularization was ordered after an earlier round of litigation, and it was based on a specific state enactment—Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981—which expressly provides that a worker who completes 480 days of service within 24 calendar months is eligible for permanency. The order of the competent authority granting such permanency was upheld by this Court in the very same case by judgment dated 31.10.2011. Even prior to that, this Court had issued a direction on 04.09.2008 for compliance with the competent authority’s order. Given these binding precedents, it is now far too late for the management to raise such contentions, which are untenable and without legal foundation. 16. The learned counsel, in conclusion, relied on the judgment of this Court dated 22.09.2023 in W.P. No. 20267 of 2023 and a batch of related cases concerning the petitioner management and similarly placed workmen who had secured awards in their favour, directing reinstatement, continuity of service, and back wages. While disposing of the batch of writ petitions, the learned judge, in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 24, issued the following directions: “21. …………The Labour Court has elaborately dealt with the issue and had granted the benefit of reinstatement in favour of the workmen, which is based on sound and justifiable reasoning and the said finding does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. Therefore, the workmen herein are entitled to regularisation as ordered by the Labour Court. 22. Now the next issue which requires determination is with regard to the direction of the Labour Court ordering reinstatement of the workmen with continuity of service and backwages. 23. The order of the Labour Court granting reinstatement to the workmen herein from the date of their termination is just and proper and no interference is warranted with the same. 22. Now the next issue which requires determination is with regard to the direction of the Labour Court ordering reinstatement of the workmen with continuity of service and backwages. 23. The order of the Labour Court granting reinstatement to the workmen herein from the date of their termination is just and proper and no interference is warranted with the same. However, at the same time, it should not be lost sight of that the petitioner industry is a seasonal industry, which is operable during the period when sugarcane is cultivated and available. The whole functioning of the petitioner industry is based on cultivation and monsoon. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the petitioner industry is a seasonal industry and its crushing operations would only be available subject to the availability of raw materials, viz., sugarcane. 24. Keeping in mind the nature of the industry of the petitioner and it is dependent upon variable factors, which are beyond the control of the petitioner industry, this Court is of the considered view that while the workmen herein are entitled for reinstatement and regularisation of their services with continuity of service from the date of their termination, however, to meet the ends of justice to either side keeping in mind that it causes no injury to either side and at the same time it works benefit to both the parties, importing the concept of ‘No Work – No Pay’, this Court holds that the workmen would not be entitled to backwages as ordered by the Labour Court.” The learned counsel urged this Court to adopt the reasoning set forth in the order passed by the Single Bench concerning the same management. 17. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent workmen referred to his counter affidavit and defended the award, asserting that it was justified. He urged this Court not to interfere with either the findings or the relief granted by the Labour Court in the impugned awards, emphasizing that the power under Article 226 is limited. In support of his argument, he cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited & Anr., reported in 2014 (6) SCC 434 , and relied on the following passage: “10. In support of his argument, he cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited & Anr., reported in 2014 (6) SCC 434 , and relied on the following passage: “10. ……… The High Court has not applied its mind in setting aside the judgment and award of the labour court in exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence as it is patently clear that the labour court has not committed any error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without sufficient evidence. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award and judgment of the labour court be restored.” 18. Under normal circumstances, this Court would have directed compliance with the two impugned awards, granting the workmen reinstatement with back wages. However, another learned judge of this Court had previously interfered with the grant of back wages, reasoning that a sugar mill is a seasonal industry and that workmen may not have continuous employment throughout the year, except during the crushing seasons. This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the present case. When the petitioner management earlier challenged the order of the competent authority under Tamil Nadu Act 46/81 before this Court, one of the contentions raised was that, by virtue of Section 1(3) of the Tamil Nadu Act 46/81, the petitioner mill was excluded from the provisions of the Permanent Status Act. 19. Section 1(3) of the Tamil Nadu Act 46/81 reads as follows:- “It applies to every industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than fifty workmen were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months. If any question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the Government thereon shall be final: Provided that the Government may, by notification, apply the provisions of this Act to any industrial establishment employing such number of workmen less than fifty as may be specified in the notification.” 20. Notwithstanding this exemption, this Court, in the judgment reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 5561 , pertaining to the same management, held that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 46/81 are applicable to a sugar mill. Notwithstanding this exemption, this Court, in the judgment reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 5561 , pertaining to the same management, held that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 46/81 are applicable to a sugar mill. It was further ruled that any worker who completes 480 days of employment within a span of 24 calendar months is entitled to be made permanent. In paragraphs 29, 31, and 32, the Court held as follows: “29……… in the present case, since there is no authoritative order by the Government in respect of the petitioner mill under Section 25-A or Section 25-K of the I.D. Act or under Section 1(3) of the Conferment of Permanent Status Act, the court cannot presume that the Government had gone into the issue and decided the issue in respect of the petitioner mill. The letter dated 20.7.1998 issued by the Industries Department cannot be said to be a statutory order in terms of the two enactments. In the absence of the authoritative order from a competent authority, the court cannot presume that the entire operation of the petitioner mill is of a seasonal character. 30……… 31.On the contrary, the first respondent on being directed to consider the issue on merits by the order of this court in W.P.No.14700 of 2008, dated 04.09.2008 referred elsewhere, the authority clearly held that the workmen are not only working during the crushing season for maintenance and operation work, but also during off season for the plant maintenance and repair of machineries throughout the year. Therefore, the exception relied on by the petitioner under Section 1(3) cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner management. Even the judgment relied on in Badhili Dina Cooli Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam's case (cited supra) has no application to the case on hand. 32.But, in this context, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Vanivilas Sugar Factory's case (cited supra) will have direct application. The Supreme Court has set aside the Government order declaring the sugar mill is of seasonal character under Section 25-K, which terminology is also borrowed under Section 1(3). In fact, the reason for appointing these workmen on non permanency basis is even explained in paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, which reads as follows: “6. In fact, the reason for appointing these workmen on non permanency basis is even explained in paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, which reads as follows: “6. .Only as a stop gap arrangement to meet the needs of administration, the Management, bearing in mind the financial constrains which the industry would face on account of permanent recruitments, deemed it fit and proper that appointment could be made on a contract basis as provided under the bylaws of the sugar mills.” Hence the contention that in view of Section 1(3) workers are not entitled for the benefit cannot be accepted. The said contention is rejected” 21. It was only after this directive that the management of the mill began implementing the order and granted permanent status to several workmen. However, those who were left out were compelled to approach the Labour Courts individually, leading to disputes such as the ones in the present writ petitions. The documents submitted before the Labour Court in these cases, particularly Ex.R4, Ex.R5, and Ex.R6, clearly indicate that these workmen were not only engaged in the cane yard but were also employed as semi-skilled and unskilled workers in regular employment, depending on their qualifications. It is also important to note that majority of the workmen had acquired skills through ITI and diploma certifications, and that a sugar mill, in addition to seasonal workers, employs regular workers as well. Thus, when the learned judge made certain observations in the earlier case, these critical facts were not brought to his attention. 22. Apart from the fact that these workers do not fall under the category of seasonal workers in the traditional sense, this Court has no discretion to interfere with the two mandamus orders previously issued. The first was in W.P. No. 14700 of 2008, dated 04.09.2008, where Justice Jyothimani directed the petitioner management to comply with the decision of the competent authority under Tamil Nadu Act 46/81. Pursuant to this, the competent authority, by an order dated 10.10.2011, directed that 108 workers be granted permanent status with immediate effect. That means that these workers became entitled to all relief from the date of the competent authority’s order, i.e., 10.10.2011. That order was subsequently upheld by this Court through an order dated 31.10.2011, reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 5561 . 23. That means that these workers became entitled to all relief from the date of the competent authority’s order, i.e., 10.10.2011. That order was subsequently upheld by this Court through an order dated 31.10.2011, reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 5561 . 23. Unfortunately, the counsel representing the management failed to inform this Court that the order dated 22.09.2023 in W.P. No. 20267 of 2023 and the batch cases had been the subject of an appeal and had been addressed by a Division Bench. This omission is particularly concerning, given that the very same management was the appellant in all those appeals and should have properly instructed their counsel. 24 . On discovery by this court, it is seen that the Division Bench, upon hearing the management’s appeal in a batch of writ appeals, including W.A. No. 2645 of 2024 and related cases, dismissed all the appeals by a common order dated 14.11.2024, thereby affirming the order of the learned Single Judge. Unfortunately, the workmen did not challenge the portion of the order that denied them back wages. As a result, the Division Bench, while upholding the Single Judge’s order, made the following observation in paragraph 11 of its common order dated 14.11.2024: “11. The learned single Judge has refused back wages. That would only mean that the workmen will not be entitled to the back wages till the date of award. Once award is passed, they are entitled to reinstatement and therefore, the employer would be liable to pay wages from the date of the award and the wages shall be paid to the employees within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 25. Although this was a case where it would have been appropriate to disagree with the learned Single Judge's decision to deny back wages— especially since, under normal circumstances, these two workmen would have been entitled to them—this court nonetheless bound by duty to follow the order of the Division Bench, which affirmed the Single Judge’s ruling.