JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 21.9.2021, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ani, District Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter bereferred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the accused purchased grocery articles worth Rs.80,000/- from the complainant and issued a post-dated cheque of Rs.80,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Bagipul in his favour. The complainant presented the cheque before his banker, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement of “funds insufficient”. The complainant issued a legal notice on 22.01.2014, which was deemed to be served on 27.01.2014. The accused failed to make the payment; hence, the complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he used to purchase articles from the complainant. He denied that he had purchased the articles worth Rs.80,000/- from the complainant. He stated that he had issued two blank cheques to the complainant on 26.2.2013 at his request as a security. He admitted that the cheque was dishonoured. He stated that he had made the payment of the entire amount to the complainant, and he was falsely implicated. 6. Statements of Vaneet Kumar (DW1), accused Mohar Singh (DW2), and Muni Lal (DW3) were recorded in defence. 7. Learned Trial Court held that the legal notice was issued to the accused asking him to make the payment. The complaint was to be filed within 30 days after the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Statements of Vaneet Kumar (DW1), accused Mohar Singh (DW2), and Muni Lal (DW3) were recorded in defence. 7. Learned Trial Court held that the legal notice was issued to the accused asking him to make the payment. The complaint was to be filed within 30 days after the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was deemed to be served on 27.1.2014. The complaint was filed on10.4.2014, which was barred by limitation. No application for condonation of delay was filed; therefore, the complaint was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the complainant filed the present appeal asserting that the complaint was to be filed on or before 9.3.2014. It was drafted on 7.3.2014. Learned counsel erred in not filing the complaint within limitation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. B.N. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr. Dinesh Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. B.N. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the Court had issued a notice and is deemed to have condoned the delay. The complaint was prepared on 7.3.2014 but was filed belatedly by the learned counsel. The complainant should not be faulted for the error of the learned counsel. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of Praveen Otarmal Parmar Vs. M/s Abhiroop Associates and another 2023: BHC-AS:22324 in support of his submission. 11. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the delay cannot be condoned without issuing a notice to the accused and passing a conscious order for the condonation of delay. The complaint was admittedly barred by limitation and was rightly dismissed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. The complaint was admittedly barred by limitation and was rightly dismissed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: “25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The “two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the courts, and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [ Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka , (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19] : (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. 236-37, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p. 643, para 9) ‘9. … We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view, and even if by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.’” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586 ] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807] ). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] ).” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It was submitted that the Court had issued a process which amounts to the implied condonation of delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in Sajjan Kumar Jhunjhuhnwala v. Eastern Roadways Pvt. Ltd., 2006 SCC OnLine Kar 399 : ILR 2006 Kar 3771 : 2007 Cri LJ 482 that delay in filing the complaint under Section 138 of NI Act cannot be condoned without issuing notice to the accused. It was observed at page3773: “6. Section 138 of the Act would deal with insufficiency of funds in a bank account. Section 142 would deal with taking cognisance of the offence. Section 142(b) of the Act would specify the time limit within which a complaint is required to be filed for the offence under section 138. Under Section 142(b), a complaint is required to be filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 142 of the Act. Under Section 142(b), a complaint is required to be filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 142 of the Act. The proviso was added by Act No. 55/02 with effect from 6-2-2003, enabling the complainant to file the complaint after the prescribed period if he satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause in not making the complaint within the time prescribed. On a reading of the proviso, which was inserted by Act No. 55/02, it becomes abundantly clear that a time-barred complaint could also be entertained if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause. Admittedly, in the case on hand, there is a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint. The learned Magistrate, before taking cognisance and recording the sworn statement, has straight away condoned the delay in filing the complaint. Incidentally, that exercise is done without notice to the petitioners. Undoubtedly, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioners when there is a delay in lodging the complaint. The provisions of Section 142(b) of the Act will have to be read in tandem with Section 142(a), which starts with a non-obstante clause that ‘no court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under Sec. 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque’. Clause (b) specifies that such complaint shall be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 142. When there is a delay in filing the complaint, necessarily the complainant will file an application for condonation of delay. When such an application is filed, notice obviously will have to be issued to the other side before the order is passed, either allowing the application or declining the same. 7. The observation made in Wade's Administrative Law (10th Edition) is useful. Willes, J. said: ‘I am of the same opinion. I apprehend that a Tribunal which is by Law invested with power to affect the property of one of Her Majesty's subjects is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before it proceeds and that the rule is of universal application and founded on the plainest principles of justice. I apprehend that a Tribunal which is by Law invested with power to affect the property of one of Her Majesty's subjects is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before it proceeds and that the rule is of universal application and founded on the plainest principles of justice. Now, is the board, in the present case, such a Tribunal? I apprehend it clearly is …’ Byles, J. Said: ‘It seems to me that the board are wrong whether they acted judicially or ministerially. I conceive they acted judicially because they had to determine the offence, and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy. That being so, a long course of decisions, beginning with Dr Bentley's Case and ending with some very recent Cases, establish that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the Justice of the Common Law will supply the omission of the Legislature.’ 8. The above quotations show clearly how the courts are justified in their interventions. They held that every judicial act is subject to the procedure required by natural justice, and they then denominated the great majority of administrative acts as ‘Judicial’ for this purpose. Instead of saying, as was, in fact, the truth, that natural justice must be observed in both judicial and administrative acts, the courts stretched the meaning of ‘Judicial’ in an unnatural way. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard, i.e. ‘hear the other side’. This rule is being enforced for a long. No court will overlook it, and overlooking is one of the common errors to which human nature is prone. 9. Lord Denning has said: ‘If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the Case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given an opportunity to correct or contradict them.’ Another classic example is the statement of Willes, J. in a case which, in essentials, was the same as Cooper. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given an opportunity to correct or contradict them.’ Another classic example is the statement of Willes, J. in a case which, in essentials, was the same as Cooper. v. Wands Worth Board of Works: ‘In condemning a man to have his house pulled down, a judicial act is as much implied as in fining him five, and as the local board is the only Tribunal that can make such an order, its act must be a judicial act, and the party to be affected should have a notice given to him …….. In the present case, there is nothing in the Act of Parliament to limit the natural inference as to the nature of the Act.’ 10. Taking into consideration the fact that the delay of 3 days was condoned without notice to the petitioners, I am of the view that the proceedings commencing from taking cognisance and issuing process to the petitioners requires to be set aside as it is opposed to principles of natural justice.” 16. A similar view was taken in Manish Maseih v. Babulal 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11941 : (2017) 2 MP LJ 618 : 2017 ACD 785 wherein it was observed at page 621: “7. Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act would deal with bad cheques. Section 142, Negotiable Instruments Act, would deal with taking cognisance of the offence. Section 142(1)(b), Negotiable Instruments Act, would specify the time limit within which a complaint is required to be filed for the offence under section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. Under section 142(1)(b), Negotiable Instruments Act, a complaint is required to be filed within one month from the date of which the cause of action has arisen as per clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. The proviso under sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of section 142 was added by Act No. 55/2 with effect from 6-2-2013, enabling the complainant to file the complaint after the prescribed period of limitation if he satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause in not making the complaint within time prescribed. On a bare reading of the said proviso, it becomes abundantly clear that a time-barred complaint could also be entertained if the complainant satisfies the trial Court that he had a cause. On a bare reading of the said proviso, it becomes abundantly clear that a time-barred complaint could also be entertained if the complainant satisfies the trial Court that he had a cause. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the learned JMFC has registered the complaint without deciding the condonation application. Under the circumstances, a valuable right has accrued to the petitioner to defend his case on the ground of delay. The provisions of section 142(1)(b), Negotiable Instruments Act will have to be read in tandem with section 142(1)(a), Negotiable Instruments Act which starts with a non-obstante clause that no Court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or as the case may be the holder in due course of the cheque. Section 142(1)(b) specifies that such a complaint shall be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (a) of the proviso to section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. For the aforestated reasons, when there is a delay in filing the complaint, it is mandatory for the complainant to file an application for condonation of delay. When such an application is filed, a notice will have to be issued to the accused before the order is passed, either allowing the condonation application or declining the same. 8. In the light of the above discussion, the learned JMFC ought to have decided the condonation application after hearing the petitioner and the respondent. However, the learned JMFC has registered the complaint without deciding the condonation application. His said act is certainly contrary to the principles of natural justice and provisions to sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of section 142, Negotiable Instruments Act. The aforesaid view of mine is fortified by a decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Jhunjhunwala v. Eastern Roadways Pvt. Ltd., 2007 Cr. LJ. 482 . In that case, the complaint under section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, was filed with a condonation application seeking condonation of delay of only three days. The learned JMFC allowed the condonation application without hearing the accused. It is held that it was mandatory for the learned JMFC to provide an opportunity for the accused to argue on the merits of the condonation application. The learned JMFC allowed the condonation application without hearing the accused. It is held that it was mandatory for the learned JMFC to provide an opportunity for the accused to argue on the merits of the condonation application. Thereupon, the Karnataka High Court quashed the proceedings against the accused and directed the trial Court to decide the condonation application, affording an opportunity to the accused to oppose the same.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. Therefore, there can be no implied condonation of the delay. 18. It was not disputed in the memorandum of appeal that the complaint was barred by limitation, and it was required to be filed on or before 9.3.2014. It was submitted that the complaint was prepared on 7.3.2014 but was not filed before the Court by the learned counsel, and the complainant should not be penalised for the fault of the counsel. This submission will not help the complainant. It was permissible for the complainant to present the complaint himself before the Court as per Section 200 of Cr.P.C., and he did not require the assistance of the counsel for presenting the complaint. Hence, the appellant cannot shift the entire blame on the counsel. He could have filed an application for condonation of delay, giving reasons, but he failed to do so, and it is not permissible for the Court to condone the delay when no such prayer was made before the learned Trial Court. 19. In Praveen Qtarmal Parmar (supra), the Bombay High Court held that the delay was impliedly condoned. It also held that the Court had not given an opportunity to pray for the condonation of delay. There cannot be any implied condonation, as noticed above. It is difficult to see how the Court can grant an opportunity for condonation of delay if no such prayer is made.It is bound to dismiss the complaint if a person is barred by limitation and no sufficient reason has been shown for not filing the complaint within limitation; therefore, it is difficult to follow the cited judgment. 20. No other point was urged. 21. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while deciding the complaint and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 22. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 23. Registry is directed to send down the records.