ORDER : M. NAGAPRASANNA, J. The petitioner/accused is before this Court calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.205 of 2024 arising out of crime No.4 of 2020 registered for offences punishable under Section 7(a)of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short). 2. Facts, in brief, as borne out from the pleadings are as follows:- The 2 nd respondent is the complainant. A complaint comes to be registered on 18-03-2020 by the 2 nd respondent before the 1 st respondent alleging that the petitioner, President of Beellavi Gram Panchayat, Tumkur Taluk had demanded and received a bribe of Rs. 2,000/- from CW-1, GPA holder of CW-5, owner of the property for effecting khatha in the name of CW-5 on the basis of a Will in respect of a house and a site in the said village. It is further alleged that on 13-03-2020, CW-1 called the petitioner on his phone at which point in time, the petitioner had demanded Rs. 10,000/- as bribe to do the work and the said conversation is said to have been recorded by CW-1. The complainant registers the complaint on the said demand before the 1 st respondent/Lokayukta Police which becomes a crime in Crime No.4 of 2020 for offences punishable under Section 7(a) of the Act. A pre-trap mahazar was drawn and trap was laid against the petitioner. No amount was recovered from the hands of the petitioner. The Lokayukta Police, after investigation, filed a charge sheet against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Act. Filing of the charge sheet against the petitioner for offences punishable under Section 7(a) in Special Case No.205 of 2024 is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 3. Heard Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.B. Patil, learned counsel representing the 1 st respondent. 4. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that there is no proof of demand and acceptance of bribe in the case at hand. The work had to be done by the Panchayat Development Officer (‘PDO’). The petitioner being the President of the Bellavi Gram Panchayath had no role to issue khatha. Therefore, nothing was pending before the petitioner. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that there is no proof of demand and acceptance of bribe in the case at hand. The work had to be done by the Panchayat Development Officer (‘PDO’). The petitioner being the President of the Bellavi Gram Panchayath had no role to issue khatha. Therefore, nothing was pending before the petitioner. The learned senior counsel would contend that the tainted currency notes were not recovered from the hands of the petitioner, but from the dickey of a two-wheeler which were planted by the complainant. The hands of the petitioner were subjected to sodium bicarbonate test. The petitioner’s hands remained colourless as the petitioner had not touched the currency notes, as there was neither demand nor acceptance. There is no recovery of bribe money from the hands of the petitioner. The recovery of money from a two-wheeler parked outside would not constitute an offence under Section 7(a) of the Act. He would contend that the case is a classic illustration of misuse of provisions of law and a failed trap. He would seek quashment of the proceedings. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri B.B.Patil representing the 1 st respondent would vehemently contend that the allegation against the petitioner is demand and acceptance of bribe. As Rs. 10,000/- is recovered from the two-wheeler of the petitioner, it is beside the fact that it was parked outside the office. Since the Police after investigation have filed a charge sheet, he would submit that it is a matter of trial for the petitioner to come out clean. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated fact the afore-narrated fact of the petitioner being the President of Bellavi Gram Panchayat is not in dispute. The 2 nd respondent is the complainant. The complaint is with regard to change of katha based upon a Will. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: Based upon the aforementioned complaint a pre-trap mahazar is drawn and trap is laid in the office of the petitioner. During the trap, the amount is not recovered from the hands of the petitioner. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: Based upon the aforementioned complaint a pre-trap mahazar is drawn and trap is laid in the office of the petitioner. During the trap, the amount is not recovered from the hands of the petitioner. It is recovered from a two-wheeler that was parked outside which is said to be that of the petitioner. The relevant portion of the pre-trap mahazar reads as follows: The Police after investigation filed a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17 reads as follows: A perusal at the summary of the charge sheet would indicate that when CW-1, the GPA holder of CW-5 wanted to get the khatha transferred, the petitioner has demanded Rs. 10,000/- bribe. The issue now would be, whether the demand by the petitioner has been prima facie proved; whether acceptance is proved albeit, prima facie; whether there was any recovery from the hands of the petitioner. 8. The afore-narrated facts are borne out from the pleadings, the complaint or the trap mahazar. Therefore, they would not be necessary to be reiterated again. Before embarking upon consideration of the case of the petitioner on its merit, I deem it appropriate to notice the elucidation of law by the Apex Court both pre and post amendment to the Act interpreting the necessary ingredients of Section 7(a) of the Act. The provisions of the Act that are alleged are as follows: “7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. The provisions of the Act that are alleged are as follows: “7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. —Any public servant who,— (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.—For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an offence under this section. Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section,— (i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.] 7-A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence.—Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. … … … 12. Punishment for abetment of offences.—Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant .—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or any property under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office. Explanation 1.—A person shall be presumed to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for. Explanation 2.—The expression “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful sources. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 7 directs that any public servant who accepts or attempts to obtain from any person undue advantage with an intention to perform or cause performance of public duty or to forbear such performance either by himself or by another public servant is said to have committed the offence of bribe. Therefore the soul of Section 7(a) is demand and acceptance for the performance of public duty or forbearance of such performance. Section 7A deals with taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence. The section mandates that whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person undue advantage for performance of a public duty or its forbearance is amenable for punishment. Here again it should be demand and acceptance by himself or through some other person. Section 12 deals with abatement of offence which cannot be applicable to the petitioner. Section 13(2) deals with punishment for criminal misconduct. Criminal misconduct is defined in Section 13(1)(a) that whoever dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office. These are the offences alleged against the petitioner. Since the soul is Section 7 either under the un-amended Act or under the amended Act, the interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section 7A by the Apex Court qua un-amended Act or the amended Act is germane to be noticed. INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT: 9. These are the offences alleged against the petitioner. Since the soul is Section 7 either under the un-amended Act or under the amended Act, the interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section 7A by the Apex Court qua un-amended Act or the amended Act is germane to be noticed. INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT: 9. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH , [ (2014) 13 SCC 55 ] interprets Section 7 of the Act and holds as follows: “ 7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [ (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [ (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1].” (Emphasis supplied) In the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMILNADU , [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] the Apex Court holds as follows: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 58- 59) “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] . 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court, later, in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v. STATE OF TELANGANA , [ (2022) 4 SCC 574 ] has held as follows: “10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the well- settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p.159) “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (emphasis supplied) 12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the said Society to produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary books were produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in February 2020, the demand of Rs 3000 by way of illegal gratification was made by the appellant for passing the assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-examination, accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of accounts of the said Society, exemption from payment of commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for Assessment Year 1996-97. 13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing the said Society that an exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97. But she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing the said Society that an exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 23-3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful. 14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-trap mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 — complainant at the time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 — complainant inside the chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appellant and PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap. 15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus: “In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions. Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. AO offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead of taking the same amount directly by her with her hands she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary. Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then she instructed the lady attender to call ACTO concerned to her along with the society records concerned. Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000 below her signature in the said register though she signed on 27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO signed on the last page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000 below her signature in the said register though she signed on 27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed on the office note of final assessment orders at that time. Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal to the trap party.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own, he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads thus: “I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161 CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met the AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000 I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000 and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she will not issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my Section 164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-2000, I was engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did not demand any money from me. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did not demand any money from me. I did not state in my Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO was in the office and informed me that she should be available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so also in my Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to from which phone number I made phone call on that day. I cannot describe office telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that she did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that the AO offered me a chair and that after discussion with the AO the said person left the room of AO and then I informed the AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not state that said aspects to DSP during the post trap proceedings also.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-chief about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1 about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the appellant has not been conclusively proved. 18. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1 about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the appellant has not been conclusively proved. 18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on 15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15-3-2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that when he met the appellant on the same day, she enquired whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 3000. However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant demanded the said amount for granting any favour to the said society. 19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cross- examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless in performing his duties.” The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreting Section 7 as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court holds that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under Section 7 of the Act. JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT: 10. The Apex Court has further interpreted Section 7(a) post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI , [2023 SCC OnLine SC 280] and holds as follows: “ 8. The Apex Court holds that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under Section 7 of the Act. JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT: 10. The Apex Court has further interpreted Section 7(a) post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI , [2023 SCC OnLine SC 280] and holds as follows: “ 8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect from 26 th July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “ 7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.— Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations.- (a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”- The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” 9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time, reads thus: “ 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.— (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- (a) ……………………………… (b) ……………………………… (c) ……………………………… (d) if he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) ………………………………….” 10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act. 11. The Constitution Bench 4 was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus: “ 74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment . In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” (emphasis added) 12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under: In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/ document-tary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution .” (emphasis added) 13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj 1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy 2 . There is another decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu 5 , which follows the view taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj 1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy 2 In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj 1 , this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus: “9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus: “9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” (emphasis added) 14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. The presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the presumption. 15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar 5 , another bench of three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: “ 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: “ 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.” (emphasis added) 16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26 th July 2018, was different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to “any gratification”. The substituted Section 7 does not use the word “gratification”, but it uses a wider term “undue advantage”. When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of 26 th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. 18. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand.” Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA’S case the Apex Court in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE , [(2023) SCC OnLine SC 424] has held as follows: “ FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND 9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta 3 has reiterated that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the accused and the acceptance thereof. 10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not supported the prosecution. He has not said anything in his examination-in-chief about the demand made by the appellant. The public prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness stated that there was no demand of a bribe made by the appellant. According to him, he filed a complaint as the return of the sale deed was delayed. Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the complaint, in the cross-examination, he was not confronted with the material portions of the complaint in which he had narrated how the alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor ought to have confronted the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint and proved that part of the complaint through the concerned police officer who had reduced the complaint into writing. However, that was not done. 11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26 th July 2018, is ‘gratification’. There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted by the accused. 12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both demand and acceptance are established, offence of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved.” The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA supra was clarifying and interpreting the judgment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA which was rendered by a Constitution Bench and further holds that proof of demand and acceptance of gratification is sine qua non for any allegation under Section 7 of the Act, be it pre-amendment or post- amendment. This is reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN supra. 11. The Apex Court, in its latest judgment, in the case of AMAN BHATIA v. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) , [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013] while considering the purport of Section 7 of the Act has held as follows: “…. …. …. 51. In C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477 , this Court, although interpreting the term “accept” in the context of the 1947 Act, observed that “accept” means to take or receive with a consenting mind. In contrast, “obtain” was understood to imply securing or gaining something as a result of a request or effort. …. 51. In C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477 , this Court, although interpreting the term “accept” in the context of the 1947 Act, observed that “accept” means to take or receive with a consenting mind. In contrast, “obtain” was understood to imply securing or gaining something as a result of a request or effort. In both instances, a demand or request by the receiver is a prerequisite for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 , categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “ 88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. It was further explained by this Court in P.Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC152, as follows: “ 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied) 55. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied) 55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of offer of bribe. 57. By applying the abovementioned principles to the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that, having regard to material inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant and the testimony of the panch witness, the allegation of demand by the appellant herein does not emerge clearly, let alone being proved beyond reasonable doubt. 58. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable witness, the court faces no difficulty in reaching a conclusion, it may convict or acquit solely on the basis of such testimony, provided it is free from any suspicion of interestedness, incompetence, or subordination. Similarly, in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court again faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable witness, the court faces no difficulty in reaching a conclusion, it may convict or acquit solely on the basis of such testimony, provided it is free from any suspicion of interestedness, incompetence, or subordination. Similarly, in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court again faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. The real challenge arises when the witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In such situations, the court must proceed with caution and seek corroboration in material particulars, whether through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court's duty to act on the testimony of a single witness arises when it is satisfied, upon a careful perusal of the testimony, that it is free from all taints and suspicions. [See: VediveluThevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390].” The Apex Court also considers the presumption under Section 20 of the Act and holds on examination of evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. v. Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act 64. Insofar as the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is concerned, such presumption is drawn only qua the offence under Sections 7 and 11 respectively and not qua the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The presumption is contingent upon the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the PC Act. Such proof of acceptance can follow only when the demand is proved. 65. In that case, the prosecution evidence alone cannot be considered for the purpose of coming to the conclusion. The evidence led by the prosecution and, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, are also required to be considered. It is then to be seen as to whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the court is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible was that the public servant accepted the amount. If the answer is in affirmative, then alone it can be held that the prosecution established the case beyond reasonable doubt. 66. It is then to be seen as to whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the court is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible was that the public servant accepted the amount. If the answer is in affirmative, then alone it can be held that the prosecution established the case beyond reasonable doubt. 66. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 20 arises once it is established that the public servant accepted the gratification. However, in determining whether such acceptance occurred, the totality of the evidence led at the trial must be appreciated. The evidence led by the prosecution, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, the entire record is required to be considered. Only if the cumulative effect of all the evidence is such that the sole possible conclusion is that the public servant accepted the gratification can it be said that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt. 67. On examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the ACB. In such circumstances, there is no question of a presumption under Section 20. Consequently, we find ourselves compelled to conclude that it would be entirely illegal to uphold the conviction of the appellant under Sections13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. G. CONCLUSION 68. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached the following conclusion: 68.1 The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption. Keeping this intention of the legislature in mind, we are of the view that the definition of “public servant” as defined under the PC Act should be given a purposive and wide interpretation so as to advance the object underlying the statute. 68.2 It is the nature of duty being discharged by a person which assumes paramount importance when determining whether such a person falls within the ambit of the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act. 68.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of performing an important public duty and receiving remuneration from the Government for the discharge of such duty, are undoubtedly public servants within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i)of the PC Act. 68.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of performing an important public duty and receiving remuneration from the Government for the discharge of such duty, are undoubtedly public servants within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i)of the PC Act. 68.4 In the case at hand, the appellant was eligible for receiving discount on the purchase of stamp papers owing to the license that he was holding. Further, the discount is traceable to and is governed by the 1934 Rules framed by the State Government. Thus, the appellant, without a doubt, could be said to be “remunerated by the government” for the purposes of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. 68.5 Further, the prosecution has failed in establishing the allegation of demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act cannot be sustained and is, thus, liable to be set aside.” On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 is demand and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the interpretation, in the considered view of the Court would be, if there is demand but no acceptance it would not make an offence under Section 7. If there is acceptance but no demand, it would then also make no offence under Section 7. An act alleged under Section 7 should have the ingredients of demand and acceptance and it is for the performance of a public duty or forbearance from performance. Therefore, demand and acceptance should be for the purpose of performance of some duty. For such performance there should be work pending at the hands of the public servant against whom Section 7 is alleged. APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE: 12. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand, as noticed above, are considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, what would become unmistakably emerge is, in the given case there should be both demand and acceptance or there should be circumstances which lead to demonstrate prima facie demand and acceptance. In the case at hand, money is recovered from beneath the seat of the two-wheeler of the petitioner. The petitioner is not caught red-handed demanding bribe or accepting bribe. In the case at hand, money is recovered from beneath the seat of the two-wheeler of the petitioner. The petitioner is not caught red-handed demanding bribe or accepting bribe. There is no recovery of bribe amount from the petitioner. The pre-trap mahazar and trap panchanama all of which do not pin the petitioner down for ingredients of Section 7(a) of the Act. If there had been demand and there had been acceptance and the recovery thereto of the tainted currency was from the hands of the petitioner, it would have been an all together different circumstance. The complainant appears to have planted Rs. 10,000/- in the scooter of the petitioner. The notes and the hands of the petitioner were put to phenolphthalein test. There was no colour change, as the water remain colourless. Therefore, there is nothing that can become an offence under Section 7(a) of the Act against the petitioner. In this regard, it becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL , [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] , wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in clauses (1), (5) and (7) clearly holds that even if the allegations are construed to be true, it would not make out any case against the accused and if the crime is registered on mala fide intention such crimes should not be permitted to be continued. In view of the above, permitting further proceedings as against the accused/petitioner, would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 13. In view of the above, permitting further proceedings as against the accused/petitioner, would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) Proceedings in Special Case No.205 of 2024 arising out of crime No.4 of 2020 and pending before the VII Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge at Tumkur stand quashed.